In this paper, I examine the relation between phenomenology and anthropology by placing Foucault?s first published piece, Introduction to Binswanger?s?Dream and Existence? in dialectical tension with The Order of Things. I argue that the early work, which so far hasn?t received much critical attention, is of particular interest because while OT is notoriously critical of anthropological confusions in general, and of?Man? as an empirico-transcendental double in particular, IB views?existential anthropology? as a unique opportunity to establish a new and fruitful (...) relation between transcendental forms and empirical contents. This is because IB focuses on a specific object,?Menschsein?, which is neither the transcendental subject nor an empirical being. Thus for the young Foucault existential anthropology occupies a fertile methodological middle ground between transcendental approaches and empirical forms of analysis. I first interpret anthropology in the light of phenomenology and defend the view that Menschsein is neither a transcendental structure nor a concrete particular, but as the instantiation of the first in the second. I argue that for anthropology to yield the full theoretical benefits Foucault claims for it, the particular cases of Menschsein examined in existential analysis have to be regarded as exemplary. I then read phenomenology back in the light of anthropology and examine how, for Foucault, the analysis of Menschsein in dreams benefits fundamental ontology by affording us a clearer view of some of the main existentiale than the focus on everyday waking experience in Being and Time. Finally, I turn to the limits and difficulties of this early position and my reading of it, and to their consequences for Foucault?s later view. (shrink)

Most people do their utmost to avoid any and every type of suffering; yet, as this experience-based article shows, Newman, early in life, came to realize from his own illnesses that physical suffering can bring the sufferer to an awareness of the presence of God and so be an important part of personal spiritual development.

Empirical studies largely support the continuity hypothesis of dreaming. Despite of previous research efforts, the exact formulation of the continuity hypothesis remains vague. The present paper focuses on two aspects: the differential incorporation rate of different waking-life activities and the magnitude of which interindividual differences in waking-life activities are reflected in corresponding differences in dream content. Using a correlational design, a positive, non-zero correlation coefficient will support the continuity hypothesis. Although many researchers stress the importance of emotional involvement on (...) the incorporation rate of waking-life experiences into dreams, Hartmann formulated the hypothesis that highly focused cognitive processes such as reading, writing, etc. are rarely found in dreams due to the cholinergic activation of the brain during dreaming. The present findings based on dream diaries and the exact measurement of waking activities replicated two recent questionnaire studies. These findings indicate that it will be necessary to specify the continuity hypothesis more fully and include factors which modulate the incorporation rate of waking-life experiences into dreams. Whether the cholinergic state of the brain during REM sleep or other alterations of brain physiology are the underlying factors of the rare occurrence of highly focused cognitive processes in dreaming remains an open question. Although continuity between waking life and dreaming has been demonstrated, i.e., interindividual differences in the amount of time spent with specific waking-life activities are reflected in dream content, methodological issues have limited the capacity for detecting substantial relationships in all areas. Nevertheless, it might be concluded that the continuity hypothesis in its present general form is not valid and should be elaborated and tested in a more specific way. (shrink)

The similarities and differences in dream content at the cross-cultural, gender, and individual levels provide one starting point for carrying out studies that attempt to discover correspondences between dream content and various types of waking cognition. Hobson and Kahn’s . Dream content: Individual and generic aspects. Consciousness and Cognition, 16, 850–858.) conclusion that dream content may be more generic than most researchers realize, and that individual differences are less salient than usually thought, provides the occasion for (...) a review of findings based on the Hall and Van de Castle . The content analysis of dreams. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.) coding system for the study of dream content. Then new findings based on a computationally intensive randomization strategy are presented to show the minimum sample sizes needed to detect gender and individual differences in dream content. Generally speaking, sample sizes of 100–125 dream reports are needed because most dream elements appear in less than 50% of dream reports and the magnitude of the differences usually is not large. (shrink)

The book also sheds new light on many important allegories by showing how modern translations often conceal the wit and humor of the Chinese original.

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Robert Romanyshyn's latest book shows how the development of linear perspective vision has altered our relationship with the world and led to our increasing alienation.

( http://philpapers.org/profile/112741 )"Let generation know to procure the love, the concept, knowledge and ideas with thoughts they are acquiring on versatile English Language, instead of making themselves to be felt dealing with only burden." -/- I too realize, -/- "Literature is not merely going through a book, It is the moment of definition of per feeling that : I am acquiring through an imagery.".

This is a book about the American Dream: how to understand this central principle of American public philosophy, the ways in which it is threatened by a number of winner-take-all economic trends, and how to make it a reality for workers and their families in the 21st century. Integrating political philosophy and the history of political thought with recent work in economics, political science, and sociology, this book calls for renewed political and policy commitment to “just work.” -/- Such (...) a commitment is essential to combat the negative moral externalities of an economy where the fruits of growth are increasingly claimed by a relatively small portion of the population: slower growth, rising inequality, declining absolute mobility, dying communities, the erosion of social solidarity, lack of faith in political leaders and institutions, exploding debt, ethnic and nationalist backlash, widespread hopelessness, and the rapid rise in what economists Angus Deaton and Anne Case call deaths of despair. -/- Covid-19 threatens to pour gasoline on these winner-take-all fires, further concentrating economic and political power in the hands of those best suited to withstand (and even profit from) the pandemic-driven economic crisis. In this book, the author provides a model for understanding the American Dream and making it a reality in a post-Covid-19 economy. -/- A tour de force, this book is essential reading for scholars and researchers of political philosophy, political economy, political theory, and economics, as well as for the layperson trying to make sense of the post-pandemic world. (shrink)

Debates about commercial sex occupy a prominent place on the agenda of both global and Russian-language feminist communities. Sex wars have a major impact on the organization and political imagination of the feminist movement. On the other hand, some sex workers and their representatives consider some feminists (neo-abolitionists) to be one of the biggest enemies in the struggle for their rights. Trying to understand this contradiction, the article raises issue on how neo-abolitionist discourse is designed and what political impact it (...) produces. The author proceeds under the assumption that the neo-abolitionist discourse about commercial sex is a way to cope with the two fundamental anxieties of the feminist movement: the anxiety of foundation and the anxiety of translation. This hypothesis is tested through an analysis of Russian and English-language feminist texts on commercial sex, as well as through analysis of existing research literature. The author comes to the conclusion that the construction of sex work as a homogeneous situation of patriarchal violence against women allows it to be used as a metaphor. One of its effects is the legitimation of universalist and essentialist constructions of radical feminism/neo-abolitionism. At the same time, this discourse excludes the voices of women engaged in sex work and reduces the diversity and heterogeneity of their experience. As a result, neo-abolitionism becomes problematic if we consider feminism an inclusive and emancipatory project. In conclusion, the author calls for the formation of a more inclusive and polyphonic version of feminism towards people engaged in commercial sex. (shrink)

Karoline von Günderrode’s reputation as a mystical writer makes her a likely candidate as a proponent of a negative philosophy. However, the historical emphasis on Günderrode’s mystical and lyrical writings reflects gender stereotypes about women’s writing and ignores Günderrode’s strengths as an epic and historical writer. It is therefore important to approach claims about Günderrode’s supposed mysticism carefully. This paper is a preliminary attempt to investigate Günderrode’s claims about knowledge, including knowledge of the absolute, asking: What does Günderrode think knowledge (...) is? What does she think the purpose of knowledge is—i.e., what does she think knowledge gets us, or does for us? And how do her claims differ from those philosophers, such as Novalis, whose thinking on knowledge (including of the absolute) seems to resemble hers? I argue that Günderrode maintains that human beings can experience, or “know,” a reality behind the discrete objects and events that comprise the world of appearances, and that she integrates this idea into a coherent worldview in a unique way. Specifically, I argue that Günderrode reconceptualizes the nature of death and selfhood in specific ways that allow her to make sense of the possibility of experiencing the true nature of the world behind the divisions that are characteristic of human knowledge and existence. (shrink)

"Philosophy as... a rigorous science... the dream is over," Edward Husserl once declared. Heidegger, Derrida, and Rorty have propounded versions of "the end of philosophy." Cumming argues that what would count as philosophy's coming to an end can only be determined with some attention to disruptions which have previously punctuated the history of philosophy. He arrives at categories for interpreting what is at issue in such disruptions by analyzing Heidegger's and Husserl's break with each other, Heidegger's break with Sartre, (...) and Merleau-Ponty's break with Sartre. In this analysis Cumming deals with how a philosophy can be vulgarized, with problems of periodization, with how the history of philosophy can be disinguished as a philosophical discipline from intellectual history. Cumming also elaborates an analogy between a philosophical method and style. (shrink)

American philosopher Cora Diamond's view of the materials admissible in moral philosophy is bound to strike many analytic philosophers as too broad: they wouldn't dream of thinking of them (namely of literature) as 'part of their job'. This, of course, assumes a conception of the nature of the such job, one in regard to which Diamond expresses doubts of several kinds. In this paper I search for different reasons for those doubts and then try to make the connection clear (...) between Diamond's proposal of a change in 'the way we want to do moral philosophy' and her reading of Wittgenstein on ethical non-sense. Finally, I suggest that although Diamond has a strong case when she defends that the dismissal of literary materials in moral philosophy marks an untenable neutrality ideal, not every aspect of her view of the role of literature in moral philosophy is equally compelling. She recruits literature for two different purposes: countering the prevailing 'blindness to blindness' and countering the lack of awe and the obliviousness to the 'difficulty of reality' in moral thinking. Since these are different purposes, philosophers might be rejecting any of various things when they do not dream of counting literature as part of their job. A concepção dos materiais admissíveis em filosofia moral da filósofa americana Cora Diamond certamente parecerá a muitos filósofos analíticos demasiado lata: muitos são aqueles que nem sonhariam contar materiais literários como 'parte do seu trabalho'. Ora isto presume urna concepção da natureza de tal trabalho, e é quanto a essa concepção que Diamond exprime dúvidas de vários tipos. Neste artigo procuro identificar as diferentes razões para tais dúvidas. Procuro também explicitar a relação da proposta de Diamond de uma alteracão na 'forma como queremos fazer filosofia moral' com a sua leitura de Wittgenstein acerca de nonsense ético. Finalmente, sugiro que se é certo que Diamond tem um caso sólido quando defende que a rejeição de materiais literários na filosofia moral é marca de um indefensável ideal de neutralidade, nem todos os aspectos da sua forma de ver o papel da literatura na filosofia moral são igualmente convincentes. Uma vez que ela recruta a literatura para propósitos distintos - para contrariar a 'cegueira à cegueira' mas também para contrariar a falta de assombro no pensamento moral, que torna este estanque à 'dificuldade da realidade' -, os filósofos que nem sonhariam contar a literatura como parte do seu trabalho podem estar a rejeitar coisas completamente diferentes quando rejeitam o papel da literatura na filosofia moral. (shrink)

The guiding thread of this book is the distinction Colin McGinn draws between perception and imagination.

When we dream, it is often assumed, we are isolated from the external environment. It is also commonly believed that dreams can be, at times, accurate, convincing replicas of waking experience. Here I analyse some of the implications of this view for an enactive theory of conscious experience. If dreams are, as described by the received view, “inactive”, or “cranially envatted” whilst replicating the experience of being awake, this would be problematic for certain extended conscious mind theories. Focusing specifically (...) on Alva Noë’s enactive view, according to which the vehicles of perceptual experience extend beyond the brain, I argue that dreams are a quandary. Noë’s view is that dreaming is consistent with enactivism because even if dreams are inactive and shut off from the external environment, they are not “full-blown” perceptual consciousness, and also, there is some reason to reject the inactive claim. However, this view rests on an unjustified and reductive account of dreams which is not supported... (shrink)