Dopamine is critically important in the neural manifestation of motivated behavior, and alterations in the human dopaminergic system have been implicated in the etiology of motivation-related psychiatric disorders, most prominently addiction. Patients with chronic addiction exhibit reduced dopamine D2 receptor (DRD2) availability in the striatum, and the DRD2 TaqIA (rs1800497) and C957T (rs6277) genetic polymorphisms have previously been linked to individual differences in striatal dopamine metabolism and clinical risk for alcohol and nicotine dependence. Here, we investigated the hypothesis that the (...) variants of these polymorphisms would show increased reward-related memory formation, which has previously been shown to jointly engage the mesolimbic dopaminergic system and the hippocampus, as a potential intermediate phenotype for addiction memory. To this end, we performed functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in 62 young, healthy individuals genotyped for DRD2 TaqIA and C957T variants. Participants performed an incentive delay task, followed by a recognition memory task 24 h later. We observed effects of both genotypes on the overall recognition performance with carriers of low-expressing variants, namely TaqIA A1 carriers and C957T C homozygotes, showing better performance than the other genotype groups. In addition to the better memory performance, C957T C homozygotes also exhibited a response bias for cues predicting monetary reward. At the neural level, the C957T polymorphism was associated with a genotype-related modulation of right hippocampal and striatal fMRI responses predictive of subsequent recognition confidence for reward-predicting items. Our results indicate that genetic variations associated with DRD2 expression affect explicit memory, specifically for rewarded stimuli. We suggest that the relatively better memory for rewarded stimuli in carriers of low-expressing DRD2 variants may reflect an intermediate phenotype of addiction memory. (shrink)

Jaśkowski’s discussive logic D2 was formulated with the help of the modal logic S5 as follows (see [7, 8]): \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${A \in {D_{2}}}$$\end{document} iff \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\ulcorner\diamond{{A}^{\bullet}}\urcorner \in {\rm S}5}$$\end{document}, where (–)• is a translation of discussive formulae from Ford into the modal language. We say that a modal logic L defines D2 iff \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\rm D}_{2} = (...) \{A \in {\rm For^{\rm d}} : \ulcorner\diamond{{A}^{\bullet}}\urcorner \in {\it L}\}}$$\end{document}. In [14] and [10] were respectively presented the weakest normal and the weakest regular logic which (†): have the same theses beginning with ‘\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\diamond}$$\end{document}’ as S5. Of course, all logics fulfilling the above condition, define D2. In [10] it was prowed that in the cases of logics closed under congruence the following holds: defining D2 is equivalent to having the property (†). In this paper we show that this equivalence holds also for all modal logics which are closed under replacement of tautological equivalents (rte-logics).We give a general method which, for any class of modal logics determined by a set of joint axioms and rules, generates in the given class the weakest logic having the property (†). Thus, for the class of all modal logics we obtain the weakest modal logic which owns this property. On the other hand, applying the method to various classes of modal logics: rte-logics, congruential, monotonic, regular and normal, we obtain the weakest in a given class logic defining D2. (shrink)

En este trabajo examino la “elección imposible” que Sócrates le plantea a Teeteto y que parece consistir en elegir entre: aceptar (a) que el juicio falso es imposible, o (b) que es posible conocer y no conocer el mismo objeto (Teeteto 196c7-d2). De acuerdo con la interpretación tradicional de esta elección, Sócrates afirma que es necesario aceptar una de las dos opciones: (b). En consecuencia, Sócrates desarrollaría el Aviario como un modelo de explicación del error en el que es posible (...) conocer y no conocer lo mismo. Aquí argumento en contra de esta lectura. Según mi interpretación, lo que dice Sócrates es que se deben rechazar los dos términos de la “elección imposible”, (a) y (b), y, por ende, el Aviario presenta un modelo en el que el juicio falso es posible sin tener que aceptar que es posible conocer y no conocer lo mismo. (shrink)

¿Porqué la policía del D2 decide fotografiar, dejar sentado, inscripto, aquello que se esforzaba por ocultar?, ¿es posible representar el horror?, ¿qué hacer con las imágenes?, ¿porqué y para qué mostrar las fotografías de los centros clandestinos de detención?, ¿qué sentidos son posibles de construir?, ¿qué efectos subjetivos imprime el encuentro con la imagen de sí mismo?. Estos son algunos de los interrogantes que emergieron entre los trabajadores del Archivo Provincial de la Memoria (APM) ante el fondo fotográfico "Registro de (...) Extremistas", compuesto por imágenes tomadas a hombres y mujeres secuestrados y/o detenidos en el Centro Clandestino de Detención D2. El presente texto intenta compartir algunos análisis en torno a la relación de la fotografía con las memorias, la topografía de las memorias y los efectos de sentido que la imagen torna plausible al ser observada, interpretada, significada. La imagen como fisura, hendija, aquello que se escapa a la pretendida totalidad y que, en el acto de ser miradas, dichas, interpretadas por otro, imprimen la posibilidad del acto de veredicción. (shrink)

In [1] J.-Y. Bèziau formulated a logic called Z. Bèziau’s idea was generalized independently in [6] and [7]. A family of logics to which Z belongs is denoted in [7] by K. In particular; it has been shown in [6] and [7] that there is a correspondence between normal modal logics and logics from the class K. Similar; but only partial results has been obtained also for regular logics. In a logic N has been investigated in the language with negation; (...) implication; conjunction and disjunction by axioms of positive intuitionistic logic; the right-to-left part of the second de Morgan law; and the rules of modus ponens and contraposition. From the semantical point of view the negation used by Došen is the modal operator of impossibility. It is known this operator is a characteristic of the modal interpretation of intuitionistic negation. In the present paper we consider an extension of N denoted by N+. We will prove that every extension of N+ that is closed under the same rules as N+; corresponds to a regular logic being an extension of the regular deontic logic D21. The proved correspondence allows to obtain from soundnesscompleteness result for any given regular logic containing D2, similar adequacy theorem for the respective extension of the logic N+. (shrink)

For quite a long time now I have argued against the view, widely held, and forcefully expounded by John Burnet, that at Phaedo 102b2-d2 Plato is formulating the notion of essential attribute and contrasting essence with accident. I have claimed that the essence-accident contrast is absent from that passage. This is a view that others have also held. But I have since 1950 found in that passage a formidable theory of relations. Recently, Professor David Gallop has taken me to task (...) for my heterodoxy. His reaction is overwhelming:I confess that I do not see how such a theory, [A] even if the text were to embody it, [B] could be held to provide an adequate account of relational statements in general. Gallop's paper is very tantalizing. Although he establishes neither A nor B, he does offer a series of very extraordinary arguments, whose examination reveals the depth of Plato's thinking on relations. (shrink)

Reviews of the papers mentioned in the title.

In the late forties, Stanisław Jaśkowski published two papers onthe discursive sentential calculus, D2. He provided a definition of it by an interpretation in the language of S5 of Lewis. The knownaxiomatization of D2 with discursive connectives as primitives was introduced by da Costa, Dubikajtis and Kotas in 1977. It turns out, however,that one of the axioms they used is not a thesis of the real Jaśkowski’s calculus. In fact, they built a new system, D∗2 for short, that differs from (...) D2 inmany respects. The aim of this paper is to introduce a direct Kripke-type semantics for the system, axiomatize it in a new way and prove soundness andcompleteness theorems. Additionally, we present labelled tableaux for D∗2.1. (shrink)

Prostaglandin (PG) D2 and PGE2 are positional isomers; however, they sometimes exhibit opposite physiological functions, such as in cancer development. Because DP receptors are considered to be a duplicated copy of EP2 receptors, PGD2 and PGE2 cross‐react with both receptors. These prostanoids may act as biased agonists for each receptor. In reviewing this field, a hypothesis was proposed to explain the opposed effects of these prostanoids from the viewpoints of the evolution of, mutations in, and biased activities of their receptors. (...) Previous findings showing more mutations/variations in DP receptors than EP2 receptors among individuals worldwide indicate that DP receptors are still in a rapid evolutionary stage. The opposing effects of these prostanoids on cancer development may be attributed to the biased activity of PGE2 for DP receptors, which may incidentally develop during the process of the old ligand, PGE2 gaining selectivity to newly diverged DP receptors. (shrink)

D2.1 (PL models and assignments) i. A PL model is a pair M = 〈DM, ·M〉 such that (a) DM is a non-empty set, and (b) ·M maps each A ∈ Con to AM ∈ DM, and each B ∈ Prdn to BM  (DM)n. ii. GM = {g| g: Var  DM} is the set of M-assignments. For any g ∈ GM, u ∈ Var, d ∈ DM, g[u/d] := (g\{u, g(u)})  {u, d} is the u-to-d alternative to (...) g. (shrink)

This study investigated the link between meditation, self-reported mindfulness and cognitive flexibility as well as other attentional functions. It compared a group of meditators experienced in mindfulness meditation with a meditation-naïve control group on measures of Stroop interference and the “d2-concentration and endurance test”. Overall the results suggest that attentional performance and cognitive flexibility are positively related to meditation practice and levels of mindfulness. Meditators performed significantly better than non-meditators on all measures of attention. Furthermore, self-reported mindfulness was higher in (...) meditators than non-meditators and correlations with all attention measures were of moderate to high strength. This pattern of results suggests that mindfulness is intimately linked to improvements of attentional functions and cognitive flexibility. The relevance of these findings for mental balance and well-being are discussed. (shrink)

THE ART OF CAUSAL CONJECTURE Glenn Shafer Table of Contents Chapter 1. Introduction........................................................................................ ...........1 1.1. Probability Trees..........................................................................................3 1.2. Many Observers, Many Stances, Many Natures..........................................8 1.3. Causal Relations as Relations in Nature’s Tree...........................................9 1.4. Evidence............................................................................................ ...........13 1.5. Measuring the Average Effect of a Cause....................................................17 1.6. Causal Diagrams..........................................................................................20 1.7. Humean Events............................................................................................23 1.8. Three Levels of Causal Language................................................................27 1.9. An Outline of the Book................................................................................27 Chapter 2. Event Trees............................................................................................... .....31 2.1. Situations and Events...................................................................................32 2.2. The Ordering of Situations and Moivrean Events.......................................35 2.3. Cuts................................................................................................ ..............39 2.4. Humean Events............................................................................................43 2.5. (...) Moivrean Variables......................................................................................49 2.6. Humean Variables........................................................................................53 2.7. Event Trees for Stochastic Processes...........................................................54 2.8. Timing in Event Trees.................................................................................56 2.9. Intersecting Event Trees...............................................................................60 2.10. Notes on the Literature...............................................................................61 Chapter 3. Probability Trees...........................................................................................63 3.1. Some Types of Probability Trees.................................................................64 ii 3.2. Axioms for the Probabilities of Moivrean Events.......................................68 3.3. Zero Probabilities....................................................................................... ..70 3.4. A Sample-Space Analysis of the Event-Tree Axioms.................................72 3.5. Probabilities and Expected Values for Variables.........................................74 3.6. Martingales......................................................................................... .........79 3.7. The Expectation of a Variable in a Cut........................................................83 3.8. Conditional Expected Value and Conditional Expectation.........................87 Chapter 4. The Meaning of Probability...........................................................................91 4.1. The Interpretation of Expected Value..........................................................92 4.2. The Interpretation of Expectation................................................................95 4.3. The Long Run..............................................................................................98 4.4. Changes in Belief.........................................................................................101 4.5. The Empirical Validation of Probability......................................................106 4.6. The Diversity of Uses of Probability...........................................................108 4.7. Notes on the Literature.................................................................................110 Chapter 5. Independent Events.......................................................................................113 5.1. Independence........................................................................................ .......114 5.2. Weak Independence.....................................................................................118 5.3. The Principle of the Common Cause...........................................................121 5.4. Conditional Independence............................................................................128 5.5. Notes on the Literature.................................................................................133 Chapter 6. Events Tracking Events.................................................................................135 6.1. Tracking............................................................................................ ...........137 6.2. Tracking and Conditional Independence.....................................................142 6.3. Stochastic Subsequence...............................................................................143 6.4. Singular Diagrams for Stochastic Subsequence...........................................147 6.5. Conjunctive and Interactive Forks...............................................................149 Chapter 7. Events as Signs of Events..............................................................................153 iii 7.1. Sign................................................................................................ ..............154 7.2. Weak Sign................................................................................................ ....159 7.3. The Ethics of Causal Talk............................................................................160 7.4. Screening Off...............................................................................................16 2 Chapter 8. Independent Variables...................................................................................167 8.1. Unconditional Independence........................................................................170 8.2. Conditional Independence............................................................................175 8.3. Independence for Partitions.........................................................................177 8.4. Independence for Families of Variables......................................................182 8.5. Individual Properties of the Independence Relations...................................186 Chapter 9. Variables Tracking Variables........................................................................189 9.1. Tracking and Conditional Independence: A Summary...............................190 9.2. Strong Tracking............................................................................................ 192 9.3. Strong Tracking and Conditional Independence..........................................198 9.4. Stochastic Subsequence...............................................................................201 9.5. Functional Dependence................................................................................203 9.6. Tracking in Mean.........................................................................................204 9.7. Linear Tracking............................................................................................ 207 9.8. Tracking by Partitions..................................................................................210 9.9. Tracking by Families of Variables...............................................................212 Chapter 10. Variables as Signs of Variables...................................................................215 10.1. Sign................................................................................................ ............219 10.2. Linear Sign................................................................................................ .222 10.3. Scored Sign................................................................................................ 225 10.4. Families of Variables.................................................................................227 Chapter 11. AnTheory of Event Trees.............................................................229 11.1. Event Trees as Sets of Sets........................................................................230 11.2. Event Trees as Partially Ordered Sets........................................................232 iv 11.3. Regular Event Trees...................................................................................240 11.4. The Resolution of Moivrean Variables......................................................244 11.5. Humean Events and Variables...................................................................246 Chapter 12. Martingale Trees..........................................................................................247 12.1. Examples of Decision Trees......................................................................249 12.2. The Meaning of Probability in a Decision Tree.........................................253 12.3. Martingales......................................................................................... .......257 12.4. The Structure of Martingale Trees.............................................................261 12.5. Probability and Causality...........................................................................265 12.6. Lower and Upper Probability.....................................................................269 12.7. The Law of Large Numbers.......................................................................272 12.8. Notes on the Literature...............................................................................274 Chapter 13. Refining............................................................................................ ...........275 13.1. Examples of Refinement............................................................................277 13.2. A Constructive Definition of Finite Refinement.......................................281 13.3. Axioms for Refinement..............................................................................282 13.4. Lifting Moivrean Events and Variables.....................................................288 13.5. Refining Martingale Trees.........................................................................288 13.6. Grounding........................................................................................... .......294 Chapter 14. Principles of Causal Conjecture..................................................................299 14.1. The Diversity of Causal Explanation.........................................................302 14.2. The Mean Effect of the Happening of a Moivrean Event..........................305 14.3. The Effect of a Humean Variable..............................................................311 14.4. Attribution and Generality.........................................................................316 14.5. The Statistical Measurement of the Effect of a Cause...............................319 14.6. Measurement by Experiment.....................................................................320 14.7. Using Our Knowledge of How Things Work............................................322 v 14.8. Sampling Error...........................................................................................329 14.9. The Sampling Frame..................................................................................329 14.10. Notes on the Literature.............................................................................330 Chapter 15. Causal Models.............................................................................................3 31 15.1. The Causal Interpretation of Statistical Prediction....................................333 15.2. Generalizing to a Family of Exogenous Variables....................................337 15.3 Some Joint Causal Diagrams......................................................................339 15.4. Causal Path Diagrams................................................................................342 15.5. Causal Relevance Diagrams.......................................................................346 15.6. The Meaning of Latent Variables..............................................................352 15.7. Notes on the Literature...............................................................................357 Chapter 16. Representing Probability Trees...................................................................359 16.1. Three Graphical Representations...............................................................361 16.2. Skeletal Simplifications.............................................................................368 16.3. Martingale Trees in Type Theory...............................................................371 Appendix A. Huygens’s Probability Trees.....................................................................379 Huygens’s Manuscript in Translation..................................................................380 Appendix B. Some Elements of Graph Theory..............................................................385 B1. Undirected Graphs........................................................................................385 B2. Directed Graphs............................................................................................38 6 Appendix C. Some Elements of Order Theory...............................................................393 C1. Partial and Quasi Orderings.........................................................................393 C2. Singular and Joint Diagrams for Binary Relations.......................................394 C3. Lattices............................................................................................ .............395 C4. The Lattice of Partitions of a Set..................................................................396 Appendix D. The Sample-Space Framework for Probability.........................................399 D1. Probability Measures....................................................................................399 D2. Variables........................................................................................... ...........400 vi D3. Families of Variables...................................................................................401 D4. Expected Value............................................................................................402 D5. The Law of Large Numbers.........................................................................405 D6. Conditional Probability................................................................................406 D7. Conditional Expected Value........................................................................407 Appendix E. Prediction in Probability Spaces................................................................409 E1. Conditional Distribution...............................................................................411 E2. Regression on a Single Variable...................................................................412 E3. Regression on a Partition or a Family of Variables......................................415 E4. Linear Regression on a Single Variable.......................................................418 E5. Linear Regression on a Family of Variables................................................422 Appendix F. Sample-Space Concepts of Independence.................................................425 F1. Overview............................................................................................ ...........426 F2. Independence Proper.....................................................................................432 F3. Unpredictability in Mean..............................................................................434 F4. Simple Uncorrelatedness..............................................................................437 F5. Mixed Uncorrelatedness...............................................................................438 F6. Partial Uncorrelatedness...............................................................................440 F7. Independence for Partitions..........................................................................442 F8. Independence for Families of Variables.......................................................445 F9. The Basic Role of Uncorrelatedness.............................................................448 F10. Dawid’s Axioms.........................................................................................449 Appendix G. Prediction Diagrams..................................................................................453 G1. Path Diagrams............................................................................................ ..454 G2. Generalized Path Diagrams..........................................................................462 G3. Relevance Diagrams.....................................................................................466 G4. Bubbled Relevance Diagrams......................................................................475 Appendix H. Abstract Stochastic Processes...................................................................479 vii H1. Probability Conditionals and Probability Distributions...............................477 H2. Abstract Stochastic Processes......................................................................479 H3. Embedding Variables and Processes in a Sample Space.............................480 References.......................................................................................... ..............................491. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a new reading of Phaedo 99b6-d2. My main thesis is that in 99c6-9, Socrates does not refer to the teleological αἰτία but to the αἰτία that will be provided by a stronger ‘Atlas’ (99c4-5). This means that the passage offers no evidence that Socrates abandons teleology or modifies his views about it. He acknowledges, instead, that he could not find or learn any αἰτία stronger than the teleological one. This, I suggest, allows an interpretation of (...) the Phaedo in which Socrates offers a consistent account of the αἰτία of generation and destruction. (shrink)

In this paper, we outline an approach to giving extensional truth-theoretic semantics for what have traditionally been seen as opaque sentential contexts. We outline an approach to providing a compositional truth-theoretic semantics for opaque contexts which does not require quantifying over intensional entities of any kind, and meets standard objections to such accounts. The account we present aims to meet the following desiderata on a semantic theory T for opaque contexts: (D1) T can be formulated in a first-order extensional language; (...) (D2) T does not require quantification over intensional entities­i.e., meanings, propositions, properties, relations, or the like­in its treatment of opaque contexts; (D3) T captures the entailment relations that hold in virtue of form between sentences in the language for which it is a theory; (D4) T has a finite number of axioms. If the approach outlined here is correct, it resolves a longstanding complex of problems in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. (shrink)

We outline the rather complicated history of attempts at axiomatizing Jaśkowski’s discussive logic $$\mathbf {D_2}$$ D2 and show that some clarity can be had by paying close attention to the language we work with. We then examine the problem of axiomatizing $$\mathbf {D_2}$$ D2 in languages involving discussive conjunctions. Specifically, we show that recent attempts by Ciuciura are mistaken. Finally, we present an axiomatization of $$\mathbf {D_2}$$ D2 in the language Jaśkowski suggested in his second paper on discussive logic, by (...) following a remark of da Costa and Dubikajtis. We also deal with an interesting variant of $$\mathbf {D_2}$$ D2, introduced by Ciuciura, in which negation is also taken to be discussive. (shrink)

With the continual development of artificial intelligence and smart computing in recent years, quantitative approaches have become increasingly popular as an efficient modeling tool as they do not necessitate complicated mathematical models. Many nations have taken steps, such as transitioning to online schooling, to decrease the harm caused by coronaviruses. Inspired by the demand for technology in early education, the present research uses a radial basis function neural network modeling technique to predict preschool instructors’ technology usage in classes based on (...) recognized determinant characteristics of technology acceptance. In this regard, this study utilized the RBFNN approach to predict preschool teachers’ technology acceptance behavior, based on the theory of planned behavior, which states that behavioral achievement, in our case the actual technology use in class, depends on motivation, intention and ability, and behavioral control. Thus, this research design is based on an adapted version of the technology acceptance model with eight dimensions: D1. Perceived usefulness, D2. Perceived ease of use, D3. Perceived enjoyment, D4. Intention to use, D5. Actual use, D6. Compatibility, D7. Attitude, and D8. Self-efficacy. According to the TAM, actual usage is significantly predicted by the other seven dimensions used in this research. Instead of using the classical multiple linear regression statistical processing of data, we opted for a NN based on the RBF approach to predict the actual usage behavior. This study included 182 preschool teachers who were randomly chosen from a project-based national preschool teacher training program and who responded to our online questionnaire. After designing the RBF function with the actual usage as an output variable and the other seven dimensions as input variables, in the model summary, we obtained in the training sample a sum of squares error of 37.5 and a percent of incorrect predictions of 43.3%. In the testing sample, we obtained a sum of squares error of 14.88 and a percent of incorrect predictions of 37%. Thus, we can conclude that 63% of the classified data are correctly assigned to the models’ dependent variable, i.e., actual technology use, which is a significant rate of correct predictions in the testing sample. This high significant percentage of correct classification represents an important result, mainly because this is the first study to apply RBFNN’s prediction on psychological data, opening up a new interdisciplinary field of research. (shrink)

This paper takes up the question of whether the consequences of a person’s volitional actions can contribute to their blameworthiness. On the one hand it is intuitively plausible to hold that if D1 volitionally shoots V with the intention of killing V then D1 is blameworthy for V’s death. On the other hand, if the only difference between D1 and D2 is resultant luck, many find it counter-intuitive to hold that D1 is more blameworthy than D2. There are three broad (...) (non-skeptical) strategies for resolving this tension: accept resultant moral luck, deny that one can be morally responsible for outcomes, or accept that outcomes can be within the scope of things one is morally responsible for while denying that they can affect the degree of blameworthiness. This paper aims to defend resultant moral luck against both the scoping and the internalist strategies by drawing on an “inclusive conception” of blameworthiness, according to which how much blame one deserves is a function of two independent variables: the wrongfulness of the offense and the offender’s degree of moral responsibility. The view defended here holds that consequences affect degree of blameworthiness by affecting the wrongfulness of that for which one is being blamed. (shrink)

Against prevailing interpretations, this article contends that Plato's Sophist and Statesman accord the sophist a kind of ‘knowing-how’ (epistêmê). In Soph. 233c10‒d2, the Visitor and Theaetetus agree that the sophist has not truth but a δοξαστικὴ ἐπιστήμη. This phrase cannot mean ‘a seeming knowledge’, for –ικός adjectives formed from verbs express the ability to perform the action denoted by the verb—here, δοξάζω. Although not a first-order, subject-area knowledge, sophistry is a second-order knowledge of how to form and use judgements (doxai). (...) Other acknowledgements of the sophist's epistêmê and the ascription to him of τέχνη, ‘craft/expertise’, confirm that the Visitor's conclusion is not to be dismissed as irony. To critics who argue from the Gorgias and from other works that Plato must consider the Visitor's conclusion an error, the author replies: 1) other dialogues do not control the Visitor dialogues; 2) the Visitor does not validly demonstrate that the sophist lacks all knowledge; 3) by admitting sensibles into Being, the Visitor and Theaetetus allow the objects of epistêmê to include things in the embodied world, even likenesses. Non-philosophers’ epistêmê in the Visitor dialogues is not implicated in the difficulties that critics have raised about epistemology in the so-called Two Worlds dialogues. On this new ontology, even the sophist, if guided by philosophical rulers, can benefit citizens by employing his elenctic expertise as Socrates did, aiding their growth toward virtue. (shrink)

In 1995 N. C. A. da Costa and F. Doria proposed the modaltype elegant axiomatization of Jaśkowski’s discussive logic D2. Yet his ownproblem which was formulated in 1975 in a following way: Is it possible toformulate natural and simple axiomatization for D2, employing classical disjunction and conjunction along with discussive implication and conjunctionas the only primitive connectives? — still seems left open. The matter of factis there are some axiomatizations of D2 proposed, e.g., by T. Furmanowski, J. Kotas and N. (...) C. A. da Costa , G. Achtelik, L. Dubikajtus,E. Dudek and J. Konior , satisfying da Costa’s conditions, but they arerather looking very complicated and unnatural. An attempt is made to solveda Costa’s problem. The new axiomatization of D2 is proposed essentiallybased on da Costa’s-Doria axiomatization from 1995. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"Magic Buffalo" and Berkeley's Theory ofVision: Learning in Society David M. Levy Introduction Berkeley's Theory of Vision contains the remarkable claim that the perception ofdistance is learned by experience. This thesis is rooted in Berkeley's doctrine that the physical basic of optical perception is angular. An impression of angle? impacts upon the optic nerve. The interpretative problem confronting an individual is that of reconstructing two pieces ofinformation, distance d (...) and magnitude m, from one datum T. Let the ratio ofm/d form arctan T. How do we come to distinguish between the pair m1,d1 and the pair m2,d2 when m^d 1 = m2/d2? How do we distinguish big objects at a distance from small objects up close? The evidence Berkeley provides for this thesis is of a funny sort. He gives examples that we do, in fact, distinguish large distant objects from small near objects. Since the arctan of the pair m1, d 1 is by hypothesisthe sameas thatofthepairm2, d2thenrecognizingdistance must be alearned abihty. We cannotextractd and m from? alone. The proper interpretation ofBerkeley's philosophy ofscience is a matter of considerable debate.1 Nonetheless, as a working theorist of visual perception he is afairly simple-minded falsificationist. Here is what he says: find a person born blind who comes by surgery to see. If that person can distinguish at a glance big distant objects from small near objects, 111 amend my theory.2 The literature on Berkeley's Theory ofVision can be fairly said to bifurcate between those who "see" the argument and those who don't. Berkeley's most important eighteenth century disciple, Adam Smith, extended Berkeley's teaching to encompass the remarkable claim that we learn to perceive our economic interest (Levy 1992a, 1992b). The negative reaction to Berkeley's theory starts in 1842 with Samuel Bailey who pronounced himself mystified by the very claim that we learn to perceive distance. The debate between Bailey and John Stuart Mill, a debate which has twentieth century counterparts, has all the characteristics ofpeople talking past each other. Volume XLX Number 1 223 DAVID M. LEVY The missing social dimension The problem, as I see it, with Berkeley's proposed critical test—stipulating his own doctrine—is that a blind person would grow up in a sighted community. Perhaps, if he grew up in a blind community, and most of the community became sighted at the same time he did, all the community might be able to perceive distance. The problem with Berkeley's test is that ifhe himself is correct about the importance ofheuristics in making the visual distinctions, the fate of one individual is somewhat beside the point. One individual surely cannot create the necessary heuristics. This learning requires some evolutionary social process. Thus, while Berkeley's thesis requires some claim about some verybasicsocial epistemology(Fuller 1988), his proposed test, asking about a blind person growing up in a community silently presumed to be sighted, does not take into account the social dimension oflearning. Having said this, it is easy to think ofa better test for Berkeley's theoryofvision. Let us find an entire community where life takes place without the visual perception of great distance. Take any individual from this community and ask Berkeleian questions. Now, we know the answer becausejust such a dialogue was reported thirtyyears ago. One society which fulfils the test criterion is that ofthe BaMbuti people who lived their life in a very dense African forest. The American anthropologist Colin Turnbull took his friend from the BaMbuti, Kenge, to the top of a hill. Here is TurnbuH's famous report: Then he saw the buffalo, still grazing lazily several miles away, far downbelow. He turned to me and said, "Whatinsects are those?" At first I hardly understood; then I realized that in the forest the range of vision is so limited that there is no great need to make an automatic allowance for distance when judging size. Out here in the plains, however, Kenge was looking for the first time Over apparently unending miles of unfamiliar grasslands, with not a tree worth the name to give him any basis for comparison. The same thing happened later on... (shrink)

We were interested in exploring the associations and effects of experimental language (i.e., native – L1, or foreign – L2), dilemma type (i.e., personal – D1 or impersonal – D2), the digital device participants used (i.e., PC/laptop or smartphone), along with gender and age in sacrificial COVID-19 and non-COVID moral dilemmas. We performed two studies involving 522 participants aged 18 to 69 in April 2020. In Study 1, we found no significant associations between the dilemma type and the digital device. (...) However, most participants chose to sacrifice an older COVID-19 patient in a critical medical condition to prioritize rescuing similar, younger patients (i.e., 45-year-old males). Results also suggested that male and younger participants were more likely to choose the utilitarian option when the sacrificial dilemma was presented in French. In study 2 (i.e., non-COVID-19), participants made significantly more utilitarian choices in the personal dilemmas presented in French. Results are discussed concerning the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic context and its emotional impact on moral judgment. (shrink)

A non-Fregean framework aims to provide a formal tool for reasoning about semantic denotations of sentences and their interactions. Extending a logic to its non-Fregean version involves introducing a new connective$$\equiv $$≡that allows to separate denotations of sentences from their logical values. Intuitively,$$\equiv $$≡combines two sentences$$\varphi $$φand$$\psi $$ψinto a true one whenever$$\varphi $$φand$$\psi $$ψhave the same semantic correlates, describe the same situations, or have the same content or meaning. The paper aims to compare non-Fregean paraconsistent Grzegorczyk’s logics (Logic of Descriptions$$\textsf{LD}$$LD, (...) Logic of Descriptions with Suszko’s Axioms$$\textsf{LDS}$$LDS, Logic of Equimeaning$$\textsf{LDE}$$LDE) with non-Fregean versions of certain well-known paraconsistent logics (Jaśkowski’s Discussive Logic$$\textsf{D}_2$$D2, Logic of Paradox$$\textsf{LP}$$LP, Logics of Formal Inconsistency$$\textsf{LFI}{1}$$LFI1and$$\textsf{LFI}{2}$$LFI2). We prove that Grzegorczyk’s logics are either weaker than or incomparable to non-Fregean extensions of$$\textsf{LP}$$LP,$$\textsf{LFI}{1}$$LFI1,$$\textsf{LFI}{2}$$LFI2. Furthermore, we show that non-Fregean extensions of$$\textsf{LP}$$LP,$$\textsf{LFI}{1}$$LFI1,$$\textsf{LFI}{2}$$LFI2, and$$\textsf{D}_2$$D2are more expressive than their original counterparts. Our results highlight that the non-Fregean connective$$\equiv $$≡can serve as a tool for expressing various properties of the ontology underlying the logics under consideration. (shrink)

This paper is a detailed critical study of Adolf Grünbaum's work on the Duhemian thesis. I show that (a) Grünbaum's geometrical counterexample to the (D1) subthesis is unsuccessful, even with minimal claims made for what the counterexample is supposed to show, and (b) the (D2) subthesis is not a reasonable one (and cannot correctly be attributed to Duhem). The paper concludes with an argument about the relation between the Duhemian thesis, concerning component hypotheses of a scientific theory, and the view (...) that it is impossible to falsify entire theories conclusively. (shrink)

Este trabajo analiza documentos del D2 de la policía de Santiago del Estero y de la oficina de inteligencia de una Base Aeronaval en Chubut con el objetivo de identificar sus clasificaciones para la identificación de actores y preguntarse, a partir de allí, respecto del rol de los organismos de información e inteligencia durante los períodos democráticos. Este aspecto, que sigue siendo una de las deudas de la democracia argentina, fue materia de legislación en 2001 con la sanción de la (...) Ley de Inteligencia Nacional 25.520. Sin embargo, el hallazgo de archivos militares y policiales que ocupan a este artículo dan cuenta de la continuidad de la práctica de investigación de antecedentes, reunión de información y producción de inteligencia por razones políticas sobre ciudadanos e instituciones. Esto abre interrogantes en torno a la idea de que el sentido de los documentos responde exclusivamente a las funciones formales del organismo productor. Antes bien, deben ser considerados como artefactos sociales que encarnan y reproducen repertorios culturales políticos de largo aliento, que forman parte de la llamada “baja política” pero que inciden en los procesos, conflictos y decisiones que se despliegan en la dimensión institucional de la política. (shrink)

ObjectivePrevious research has shown reduced interoceptive accuracy in depression. Attention deficit represents a key symptom of depression. Moreover, IAcc is positively correlated with attention. There is no study that investigates the effect of depression on IAcc and attention. The aim of this study is to examine the mediating effect of IAcc on depression and attention.MethodsThirty-six depressed patients from the Psychosomatic Clinic in Windach were matched with 36 healthy controls according to age and sex and were assessed at Ulm University. All (...) participants completed the Beck Depression Inventory-II, the heartbeat perception task to examine IAcc, and the d2 test assessing selective attention.ResultsDepressed patients showed attention deficits—both for general visual attention and IAcc—compared to healthy controls. The mediation analyses revealed that the relationship between depression and attention is not mediated via IAcc. Furthermore, depression predicts IAcc and attention, but these effects are direct and largely unaffected by the respective other variable.DiscussionThe results of the present study highlight both interoceptive as well as attention deficits in depressed patients. No clear mediation between these variables could be shown in this study. More elaborative research is needed to clarify whether different approaches to improve IAcc are effective for these deficits in depressed patients and could therefore be of importance as an additional aspect of therapy in depression. (shrink)

nombreux textes inédits André Robinet. 2. LE SECOND MEMBRE DE LA DISJONCTION ARCHITECTONIQUE (D2): LES AUTOMATES SYSTÉMIQUES ( 1686-1716) Le discours leibnizien dans (v>4) emprunte la voie d'une communication qui ...

This study aimed to investigate whether the ordinal judgments of high math-anxious and low math-anxious individuals differ. Two groups of 20 participants with extreme scores on the Shortened Mathematics Anxiety Rating Scale had to decide whether a triplet of numbers was presented in ascending order. Triplets could contain one-digit or two-digit numbers and be formed by consecutive numbers, numbers with a constant distance of two or three or numbers with variable distances between them. All these triplets were also presented unordered: (...) sequence order in these trials could be broken at the second or third number. A reverse distance effect of equal size was found in both anxiety groups. However, HMA participants made more judgment errors than their LMA peers when they judged one-digit counting ordered triplets. This effect was related to worse performance of HMA individuals on a symmetry span test and might be related to group differences on working memory. Importantly, HMAs were less accurate than LMA participants at rejecting unordered D2 sequences. This result is interpreted in terms of worse cognitive flexibility in HMA individuals. (shrink)

In this paper we present an overview, with historical and critical remarks, of two articles by S. Jaśkowski ([20, 21] 1948 and [22, 23] 1949), which contain the oldest known formulation of a paraconsistent logic. Jaśkowski has built the logic – he termed discussive (D2) – by defining two new connectives and by introducing a modal translation map from D2 systems into Lewis’ modal logic S5. Discussive systems, for their formal details and their original philosophical justification, have attracted discrete attention (...) among experts. Indeed, in what follows, after having introduced Jaśkowski methodology of building D2 and his main philosophical motivations for providing such a system, we will explore some of the main contributions to the development of D2. (shrink)

In 1948, Stanis aw Ja kowski defined a logical system D2 of a discursive 1 sentential calculus. The aim of this paper is to introduce the reader to the basic ideas of the discursive logic and to show, in a historical perspective, its development originating from the two germ papers [19] and [20]. We intend to present some problems connected with it and outline the solutions they have received up to the present day.

Nozick argues, in “Anarchy, State, and Utopia”, correctly I think, that we can go from an equal distribution of wealth to an unequal one through just means. Nozick then asks: If people voluntarily move from a just distribution of wealth, D1, to a different distribution, D2, “isn’t D2 also just?” While Nozick thinks the new distribution of wealth, D2, is just, I think that it is at least possible to go from a just state of affairs to an un-just state (...) of affairs by just means. I then argue that any unequal distribution of wealth cannot maximize the good derived from wealth. Therefore, on the basis of plausible utilitarian ideas, any distribution of wealth that isn’t at least roughly equal is un-just, even if it was arrived at by just means from an equal and just distribution of wealth. (shrink)

Among the instances of apparent illiberality in Plato's Republic, one stands out as especially curious. Long before making a forced return to the cave, and irrespective of the kinds of compulsion operative in such a homecoming, the philosopher-king has been compelled to apprehend the Good (Rep. VII.519c5-d2, 540a3-7). Why should compulsion be necessary or appropriate in this situation? Schooled intensively through the decades for an eventual grasping of the Good, beginning already with precognitive training in music and art calculated to (...) equip the guardian with a natural affinity towards the good and beautiful (Rep. III.401d3-402a4), the fully mature guardian might be expected to leap towards the Good when it is first opportune. For the Good is, according to Plato, the greatest thing to be learned (megiston mathêma; Rep. VI.504e4-5, 505a2). Reflection on these questions permits us to develop a richer appreciation of the forms of necessitation and compulsion Plato envisages for his guardians, which turn out to be primarily merely hypothetical instances of nomic necessitation. It follows that many of Plato's appeals to compulsion are neither coercive nor objectionably authoritarian. (shrink)

The nineteen-nineties saw the so-called “deliberative turn in democracy”, which was taken up by a large number of democracy theorists. This paper sets out: 1) to analyse why this turn took place; 2) to classify the different proposals of deliberative democracy into two models (D1 and D2), in view of their epistemological effectiveness (model D1 assumes the pattern of Rawls’ political liberalism, and model D2, Habermas’ Theory of Discourse); 3) to display the superiority of D2 over D1; 4) to point (...) out certain shortcomings in Habermas’ deliberative-discursive politics and to propose a model of democracy which will enable these to be improved on, to be known as “communicative democracy”. (shrink)

Se realizó el análisis curricular de los planes de estudios D y modificados D1 y D2 y el análisis cuantitativo de las mallas curriculares o plan del proceso docente a partir de la organización de las asignaturas por ciclos, distribución de los componentes académico y laboral, frondosidad y quantum de flexibilidad del currículo. El objetivo de la investigación es evaluar el diseño curricular del plan de estudios de la carrera de Bioanálisis Clínico. Se concluye que hay deficiencias en el nuevo (...) plan al no definirse los aspectos que deben integrarse en el macro, meso y micro currículo de una carrera universitaria, no están diseñadas las estrategias curriculares, los programas de las disciplinas ni el plan de la bibliografía básica, lo cual atenta contra la planificación y organización del proceso docente educativo, una asimilación consciente y por ende una correcta formación de conocimientos y habilidades que permitan solucionar exitosamente los problemas profesionales. The curriculum analysis of the syllabus D, D1 and D2 were performedas well as the quantitative analysis of the curricular nets or plan of the teaching process from the organization of the subjects by cycles, distribution of academic and labour components, luxuriance and quantum of flexibility within the curriculum. The objective of the research is to evaluate the curriculum design of the syllabus for the Bioanalysis Clinical Degree. It is concluded that there are lacks in the new plan as the aspects that should be integrated in the macro, meso and micro curriculum of a college degree are not well defined, the curricular strategies are not designed neither the disciplines programs nor the plan of the basic bibliography, which infringes on the planning and organization of the educational teaching process. A conscious assimilation and therefore a correct formation of knowledge and skills that allow to solve successfully the professional problems. (shrink)

This study investigated the neuropsychological profile of college students who engage in binge drinking using comprehensive neuropsychological tests evaluating verbal/non-verbal memory, executive functions, and attention. Groups were determined based on scores on the Korean version of the Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test and Alcohol Use Questionnaire. There were 79 and 81 participants in the BD and non-BD groups, respectively. We administered the Korean version of the California Verbal Learning Test and Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure Test to evaluate verbal and non-verbal memory, (...) respectively, and measured executive functions using the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, Trail-Making Test, Controlled Oral Word Association Test and Stroop Color-Word Test. We administered the d2 test to evaluate attention. Neuropsychological performance was analyzed by multivariate analysis of variance. The BD group showed significantly poorer performance in the long-term free recall condition of the K-CVLT and delayed recall condition of the RCFT and completed significantly fewer categories on the WCST than the non-BD group. In addition, there were significant negative associations among the AUDIT-K total score, AUQ binge score, and long-term free recall score of the K-CVLT. There were significant negative associations between the total AUDIT-K score and delayed recall RCFT score, and between the total AUDIT-K total score and numbers of completed categories on the WCST. These results indicate that college students who participate in BD have difficulties with verbal/non-verbal memory and executive functions, and further suggest that excessive alcohol use could have detrimental effects on the hippocampal-prefrontal circuit even with a relatively short period of alcohol use. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Plato on Parts and Wholes: The Metaphysics of StructureNicholas SmithVerity Harte. Plato on Parts and Wholes: The Metaphysics of Structure. Oxford: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. x + 311. Cloth, $45.00.In this book, Verity Harte seeks to provide an account of Plato's view of mereology. According to Harte, Plato presents two distinct models about the relation of part to whole, but actually only ever accepts (...) one of these two models. Plato presents one model in the Parmenides, Theaetetus, and one passage in the Sophist. In this model, which Harte compares to a conception of part and whole recently advanced by David Lewis, the whole is simply identical to its collective parts and Plato attends to this model only to call attention to its problems. Harte explicates Plato's presentation of this model in the last section of Chapter 1 and in Chapter 2 of her book. The second model—the only one Plato actually accepts, according to Harte—Plato initially outlines in the Parmenides, but then explicates in finer detail in the Sophist, Philebus, and Timaeus. In this conception, wholes are now understood as "structures, the identity of whose parts is determined only in the context of the whole they compose" (3). Harte presents her evidence for Plato's endorsement of this model in Chapters 3 and 4, and then draws conclusions in Chapter 5.The book has several significant virtues, including especially clarity of exposition, and care and thoroughness in the review of the relevant texts from Plato's later dialogues. But this same care and attention to detail does not at all extend to any of Plato's discussions of part and whole in earlier works, and Harte's peremptory refusal to consider the relevant passages in these other works is puzzling, at best.Indeed, Harte bothers to identify only two such passages from earlier works, and then only to explain why they and other passages like them do not merit further attention: the Republic's famous division of the soul into three parts in Book IV and the consideration of virtue as a whole and the several virtues as parts of that whole in the Protagoras. Harte acknowledges that Plato explicitly supplies, in the Protagoras discussion, two different sorts of relations of part and whole, in distinguishing the way in which parts of gold form a larger whole, and the way the parts of the face are related to the whole face (349d4-8), but seems oblivious to the clear implication that—at least when he wrote the Protagoras, and contrary to Harte's primary thesis—Plato recognized more than one way in which wholes could be composed of parts. But Harte dismisses the significance of both discussions by noting, first, that the "principle of opposition" given in the Republic by which Plato divides the soul provides "at most, a sufficient, and not necessary, condition on something having parts" and concludes that it thus "cannot be used to establish general claims about parts" (2). Harte never mentions that this same view of the partitioned soul seems to reappear in the Phaedrus and Timaeus—a dialogue in which the allegedly preferred conception of mereology is presented—and also passes over the Republic's representation of the tripartition of the kallipolis, and Plato's conception of the citizen as a part of a state. As for the Protagoras's discussion of the relationships between the virtues, Harte says only that "there is here no discussion of the nature of parts or of the relation between parts and whole" (2). She concludes that "in both works the focus of discussion is the examples themselves (the soul, the virtues) and not wholes of parts as such" (2). Harte fails to notice, however, that the arrangement of virtues into parts and wholes may also be found in the Laches (190a1-199e7), [End Page 333] Meno (78d7-e2), and especially the Euthyphro (12c2-d2), in which the relation of piety to justice as part to whole is likened to the relationships between reverence and fear and odd numbers and numbers, which are plainly not examples of part-whole relationships between virtues.Harte is well... (shrink)

Fanconi anaemia (FA) is a cancer‐prone genetic disorder that is characterised by cytogenetic instability and redox abnormalities. Although rare subtypes of FA (B, D1 and D2) have been implicated in DNA repair through links with BRCA1 and BRCA2, such a role has yet to be demonstrated for gene products of the common subtypes. Instead, these products have been strongly implicated in xenobiotic metabolism and redox homeostasis through interactions of FANCC with cytochrome P‐450 reductase and with glutathione S‐transferase, and of FANCG (...) with cytochrome P‐450 2E1, as well as redox‐dependent signalling through an interaction between FANCA and Akt kinase. We hypothesise that FA proteins act directly (via FANCC and FANCG) and indirectly (via FANCA, BRCA2 and FANCD2) with the machinery of cellular defence to modulate oxidative stress. The latter interactions may co‐ordinate the link between the response to DNA damage and oxidative stress parameters (3, 6–12). BioEssays 25:589–595, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)