Discrepancies between the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) and the adult and pediatric diagnostic guidelines for brain death (BD) (the “Guidelines”) have motivated proposals to revise the UDDA. A revision proposed by Lewis, Bonnie and Pope (the RUDDA), has received particular attention, the three novelties of which would be: (1) to specify the Guidelines as the legally recognized “medical standard,” (2) to exclude hypothalamic function from the category of “brain function,” and (3) to authorize physicians to conduct an apnea (...) test without consent and even over a proxy’s objection. One hundred seven experts in medicine, bioethics, philosophy, and law, spanning a wide variety of perspectives, have come together in agreement that while the UDDA needs revision, the RUDDA is not the way to do it. Specifically, (1) the Guidelines have a non-negligible risk of false-positive error, (2) hypothalamic function is more relevant to the organism as a whole than any brainstem reflex, and (3) the apnea test carries a risk of precipitating BD in a non-BD patient, provides no benefit to the patient, does not reliably accomplish its intended purpose, and is not even absolutely necessary for diagnosing BD according to the internal logic of the Guidelines; it should at the very least require informed consent, as do many procedures that are much more beneficial and less risky. Finally, objections to a neurologic criterion of death are not based only on religious belief or ignorance. People have a right to not have a concept of death that experts vigorously debate imposed upon them against their judgment and conscience; any revision of the UDDA should therefore contain an opt-out clause for those who accept only a circulatory-respiratory criterion. (shrink)

(1998). The scope of selection: Sober and neander on what natural selection explains. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 76, No. 2, pp. 250-264.

D. H. Mellor; VI*—Conscious Belief, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 78, Issue 1, 1 June 1978, Pages 87–102, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian.

Recent years have been blessed with an abundance of logical systems, arising from a multitude of applications. A logic can be characterised in many different ways. Traditionally, a logic is presented via the following three components: 1. an intuitive non-formal motivation, perhaps tie it in to some application area 2. a semantical interpretation 3. a proof theoretical formulation. There are several types of proof theoretical methodologies, Hilbert style, Gentzen style, goal directed style, labelled deductive system style, and so on. The (...) tableau methodology, invented in the 1950s by Beth and Hintikka and later per fected by Smullyan and Fitting, is today one of the most popular, since it appears to bring together the proof-theoretical and the semantical approaches to the pre of a logical system and is also very intuitive. In many universities it is sentation the style first taught to students. Recently interest in tableaux has become more widespread and a community crystallised around the subject. An annual tableaux conference is being held and proceedings are published. The present volume is a Handbook a/Tableaux pre senting to the community a wide coverage of tableaux systems for a variety of logics. It is written by active members of the community and brings the reader up to frontline research. It will be of interest to any formal logician from any area. (shrink)

Stratified properties such as ‘happy unhappiness’, ‘ungrounded ground’, ‘fortunate misfortune’, and evidently ‘true falsity’ may generate dialetheias (true contradictions). The aim of the article is to show that if this is the case, then we will have a special, conjunctive, kind of dialetheia: a true state description of the form ‘Fa and not Fa’ (for some property F and object a), wherein the two conjuncts, separately taken, are to be held untrue. The particular focus of the article is on happy (...) unhappiness: people suffering from (or enjoying) happy unhappiness (if there is some situation or state of mind of this kind) cannot be truly said ‘happy’ or ‘unhappy’, but we can say they are both. In the first section three cases of conjunctive stratification are presented; in the second section the logic of stratified contradictions is explored. The last section focuses on eudemonistic ascriptions: stated that a is happy to be unhappy (or unhappy to be happy), should we say a is happy? unhappy? both? neither? (shrink)

It is almost universally believed that in quantum theory the two following statements hold: all transformations are achieved by a unitary interaction followed by a von-Neumann measurement; all mixed states are marginals of pure entangled states. I name this doctrine the dogma of purification ontology. The source of the dogma is the original von Neumann axiomatisation of the theory, which largely relies on the Schrődinger equation as a postulate, which holds in a nonrelativistic context, and whose operator version holds only (...) in free quantum field theory, but no longer in the interacting theory. In the present paper I prove that both ontologies of unitarity and state-purity are unfalsifiable, even in principle, and therefore axiomatically spurious. I propose instead a minimal four-postulate axiomatisation: associate a Hilbert space \ to each system \; compose two systems by the tensor product rule \; associate a transformation from system \ to \ to a quantum operation, i.e. to a completely positive trace-non-increasing map between the trace-class operators of \ and \; evaluate all joint probabilities through that of a special type of quantum operation: the state preparation. I then conclude that quantum paradoxes—such as the Schroedinger-cat’s, and, most relevantly, the information paradox—are originated only by the dogma of purification ontology, and they are no longer paradoxes of the theory in the minimal formulation. For the same reason, most interpretations of the theory interpret the same dogma, not the strict theory stripped of the spurious postulates. (shrink)

We investigate computability theoretic and descriptive set theoretic contents of various kinds of analytic choice principles by performing a detailed analysis of the Medvedev lattice of $\Sigma ^1_1$ -closed sets. Among others, we solve an open problem on the Weihrauch degree of the parallelization of the $\Sigma ^1_1$ -choice principle on the integers. Harrington’s unpublished result on a jump hierarchy along a pseudo-well-ordering plays a key role in solving this problem.

This chapter argues that journalism’s ethical frameworks, particularly at moments when it is making its grandest claims to value, collide with those prevalent within universities and particularly with ethical review structures. Working through these tensions requires some accommodation from all sides, and also provides opportunities for learning. The chapter discusses how universities might recognize the ethics systems particular to practices, like journalism, which set out to serve the public good and which produce knowledge in ways distinctive to that practice. Underneath (...) this problem is the more fundamental question of how to establish the boundaries between research and other activities that take place in the university. The chapter proposes, following Spicker’s argument in relation to policy studies, that distinctive ethical criteria must be recognized in different areas of university activity where claims to be producing research are being made. Yet it must also be noted that exceptionalism risks leaving university-based journalists with a weak ethical system. It concludes that journalists within the university have both the opportunity and obligation to extend their practice by using university processes to engage with a wide range of ethical frameworks. (shrink)

"Deductivism" is the thesis that all logic is deductive. Stove lays out the arguments for the existence of non-deductive logic.

We define a class of formal systems inspired by Prawitz’s theory of grounds. The latter is a semantics that aims at accounting for epistemic grounding, namely, at explaining why and how deductively valid inferences have the power to epistemically compel to accept the conclusion. Validity is defined in terms of typed objects, called grounds, that reify evidence for given judgments. An inference is valid when a function exists from grounds for the premises to grounds for the conclusion. Grounds are described (...) by formal terms, either directly when the terms are in canonical form, or indirectly when they are in non-canonical form. Non-canonical terms must reduce to canonical form, and two terms may be said to be equal when they converge towards equivalent grounds. In our systems these properties can be proved through rules distinguished according to whether they concern types or logic. Type rules involve type introduction and elimination, equality for application of operational symbols, and re-writing equations for non-canonical terms. The logic amounts to a sort of intuitionistic system in a Gentzen format. To conclude, we show that each system of our class enjoys a normalization property. (shrink)

With reference to Schelling’s Philosophy of Mythology (PoM) in my paper I will address three points, namely: To what extent Schelling’s PoM provides us with arguments in favour of 1. Realism, 2. Emergentism and 3. Documentality (Ferraris 2009). Accordingly, in the first section, Reality, I will present Schelling’s PoM as realism, arguing that in mythology Schelling finds the traces of the developing of consciousness, regarded as a real fact. But, as this latter can only be real if having a history, (...) i.e. if emerging from a previous natural status, which is devoid of any consciousness, PoM should be regarded as strongly related with a sort of emergentism. This will thus be the object of the second section, where I will investigate the genetic interpretation of Schelling’s Weltalter proposed by Wolfram Hogrebe (Hogrebe 1989) and suggest that precisely this analysis of the Weltalter explains also why Schelling’s project couldn’t but fail. In fact, against its intention, the Weltalter, as it was trying to explain the rise of semantics together with it the true genesis of the our acknowledgment of the world, still remains affected by an idealistic stance and hence couldn’t succeed in becoming positive philosophy. Eventually, in the third section of this paper, Documentality, I argue, that a solution of the problems left open by Schelling’s Weltalter and positively addressed in the PoM is offered by the interpretation of this latter as a contribution to Documentality. Even if created before and apparently independently from the act writing, in fact mythology relies on the possibility of recording tales, hence it is made of and eventually ends up in a written corpus. This means that the consciousness mythology gives us an account of, is the one that for the first time is able to present itself in narrated tales. It is not the mere possibility of acknowledging something, but in fact the possibility of binding our will to a freely formulated law trough our memory, i.e. the birth of conscience upon consciousness, which is the real sense of religion. In this sense Ferraris’ concept of documentality provides us an important theoretical framework to understand the hidden presuppositions of Schelling’s PoM and to relate this latter to its realistic and emergentistic character. (shrink)

Die Ratnavalitika des Ajitamitra. Edited and explained by Yukihiro Okada. Indica et Tibetica Verlag, Bonn 1990. xxxv, 198 pp. No price given.

In this paper we investigate AGM belief contraction operators by using the tools of algebraic logic. We generalize the notion of contraction to arbitrary finitary propositional logics, and we show how to switch from a syntactic-based approach to a semantic one. This allows to build a solid bridge between the validity of AGM postulates in a propositional logic and specific algebraic properties of its intended algebraic counterpart. Such a connection deserves particular attention when we deal with maxichoice contractions, as studied (...) in the final part of the paper. (shrink)

This article is a continuation of Part I, which looked at the relationship between Confucianism and Daoism by first introducing general approaches, before moving on to (1) perspectives on names and actualities; (2) cultivation, learning, the natural; and (3) conceptions of the person. Continuing with the theme‐based comparison of Confucianism and Daoism by looking specifically at the Lunyu 論語 (Analects of Confucius), Daodejing 道德經 (Classic of the Way and Virtuosity) or Laozi 老子 (Book of Master Lao), and the Zhuangzi 莊子 (...) (Book of Master Zhuang), this article looks at (1) politics, nonaction (wuwei 無為), and virtuosity (de 德); (2) morality, virtues, and human nature (xing 性); and finally (3) Dao 道, or “the way.” It references Part I, and while it can be read independently, it is best taken as a continuation of Part I. The conclusion included herein summarizes both Part II and Part I. (shrink)

The article is devoted to dynamic processes in the field of artificial intelligence, namely in the tasks of neurodynamics. The problems of stability of transient processes in neural networks, which dynamics can be described by systems of weakly nonlinear difference equations, are considered. Conditions are formulated in terms of the direct Lyapunov method.

The paper, analyses the role of measurable concepts in deductive explanation. It is shown that such concepts are, although imprecise in a defined sense, exact in that neutral candidates to them do not arise. An analysis is given of the way in which imprecision is related to generalisation, and it is shown how imprecise concepts are incorporated in testable deductive explanations.

This short paper addresses a well‐known difficulty in the Pure Theory of Law: the definition of a legal wrong. Kelsen was unable to offer a suitable one, critics say. I agree. But the critics misdiagnosed the problem, and prescribed for it a fruitless solution. The reason for Kelsen’s failure, the critics say, was that he thought the law consists only of sanction‐stipulating norms addressed to officials, and does not comprise duty‐imposing norms addressed to citizens. But the critics are wrong, exegetically (...) as well as substantively. Kelsen did not—and indeed could not—deny that there are such duty‐imposing norms; and it is not the case, in any event, that the admission that there are such norms would enable us to explain the notion of a legal wrong. Kelsen failed to provide an adequate characterization of the notion of a legal wrong, yes, but for a different reason. (shrink)

Existe uma tensão entre Teoria e História: “[...] a poesia é mais filosófica e de caráter mais elevado que a história, porque a poesia permanece no universal e a história estuda apenas o particular” (Aristóteles, 2007, 43). Esta afirmação de Aristóteles talvez tenha sido a primeira indicação da referida tensão entre as duas formas de conhecimento: a histórica e a teórica. Na citação acima, a filosofia é a referência de um pensamento hierarquicamente superior, sendo que sua legitimação enquanto tal passa (...) pela universalidade de suas verdades. É importante salientar que a poesia nesta reflexão aristotélica é uma forma de conhecimento, embora difira da história no que concerne à matéria do conhecido: na primeira, o fato poderia ter acontecido; na segunda, aconteceu. Porque aconteceu, o fato é singular, e que poderia ter acontecido cai no âmbito do universal. Neste sentido, a chave para a compreensão da tensão entre história e teoria é a universalidade ou singularidade do conhecimento adquirido: “[...] é evidente que não compete ao poeta narrar exatamente o que aconteceu; mas sim o que poderia ter acontecido, o possível, segundo a verossimilhança ou a necessidade. O historiador e o poeta não se distinguem um do outro, pelo fato de o primeiro escrever em prosa e o segundo em verso [...]. Diferem entre si porque um escreveu o que aconteceu e o outro o que poderia ter acontecido” (Aristóteles, 2007, 43). Ao situar a história em nível menos elevado que a poesia, Aristóteles parece ter suscitado em pensadores contemporâneos a ideia da distinção entre conhecimento histórico e conhecimento teórico. O presente estudo versa sobre a natureza do conhecimento histórico e seus impasses metodológicos no uso dos referenciais teóricos necessários às suas indagações fundamentais. (shrink)

I present an annotated development of the basic ideas of the Geneva School approach to the foundations of physics and the structures which emerge as mathematical representations of the physically dual notions of state and property.