Commentary on Bergstrom and Rosvall, ‘The transmission sense of information’, Biology and Philosophy. In response to worries that uses of the concept of information in biology are metaphorical or insubstantial, Bergstrom and Rosvall have identified a sense in which DNA transmits information down the generations. Their ‘transmission view of information’ is founded on a claim about DNA’s teleofunction. Bergstrom and Rosvall see their transmission view of information as a rival to semantic accounts. This commentary argues that it is complementary. The (...) idea that DNA is transmitting information down the generations only makes sense if it is carrying a message, that is to say if it has semantic content. (shrink)

This paper develops a notion of manipulative gaslighting, which is designed to capture something not captured by epistemic gaslighting, namely the intent to undermine women by denying their testimony about harms done to them by men. Manipulative gaslighting, I propose, consists in getting someone to doubt her testimony by challenging its credibility using two tactics: “sidestepping” and “displacing”. I explain how manipulative gaslighting is distinct from reasonable disagreement, with which it is sometimes confused. I also argue for three further claims: (...) that manipulative gaslighting is a method of enacting misogyny, that it is often a collective phenomenon, and, as collective, qualifies as a mode of psychological oppression. (shrink)

The volume also extends the debate about emergence by considering the independence of chemical properties from physical properties, and investigating what would ...

Critics have argued that Rawls's account of self-respect is equivocal. I show, first, that Rawls in fact relies upon an unambiguous notion of self-respect, though he sometimes is unclear as to whether this notion has merely instrumental or also intrinsic value. I show second that Rawls’s main objective in arguing that justice as fairness supports citizens’ self-respect is not, as many have thought, to show that his principles support citizens’ self-respect generally, but to show that his principles counter the effects (...) of the market on lower class citizens’ sense of worth. This discussion establishes that Rawls, in the end, sees self-respect primarily as an intrinsic good. (shrink)

Many distributive egalitarians do not endorse strict equality of goods. Rather, they treat an equal division as having a special status such that departures from equality must be justified. They claim, then, that an equal division is “presumptively” just. Though the idea that equality is presumptively just and that departures from it may be just has intuitive appeal, making a case for this idea proves difficult. I argue, first, that extant “presumption arguments” are unsound. Second, I distill two general philosophical (...) morals: luck egalitarians have not adequately defended the presumption of equality and they face serious obstacles in doing so; Rawls has defended it, but only indirectly via the contract apparatus. This approach narrows the presumption’s appeal. Third, I consider and reject two alternative ways of understanding the presumption of equality that might avoid the problems revealed by my examination of extant views. The first appeals to the idea of value pluralism. The second treats the presumption as a view about the burden of proof. I conclude, ultimately, that it is misleading to think of distributive egalitarianism as typically having the form of a presumption argument. (shrink)

This study presents an organizational model to explain when and how trust permeates an organization, when it is constrained and to what extent it informs the perceptions of transparency among stakeholders. Through the use of qualitative research, resulting in five corporate case studies, and a separate quantitative analysis, it was possible to demonstrate ways in which trust can be diffused amongorganizational layers. These findings add to the literature by analyzing trust in organizational settings via reciprocal dyadic relationships in a social-structural (...) context. These findings suggest that functional elements and informal network position contributed to the dyad's ability to establish positive trust climates and specific communication and cooperative behaviors were critical in diffusing trust to the group level; the degree of organizational transparency positively correlated to the degree of dyadic and group-level trust. (shrink)

We argue for the conclusion that intrinsic desires, at least, and every other propositional attitude having the world-to-mind direction of fit exclusively, are never found within consciousness. All desire-like states found in consciousness are experiences or exercises of imaginative capacities pertaining either to the desire or the content of the desire, but never the desire itself.

McCarthy, Homan, and Rozier’s presentation of theological anthropology and its contribution to secular bioethics suffers from three primary limitations. (McCarthy et al. 2020) First, the article re...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Future Directions for Oversight of Stem Cell Research in the United States: An UpdateMary A. Majumder (bio) and Cynthia B. Cohen (bio)On 9 March 2009, President Barack Obama (2009a) signed an executive order revoking the statement issued by President George W. Bush during a televised speech in August 2001, in which the latter had sharply restricted the scope of federally funded human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research to (...) cell lines derived (without federal funding) prior to 9:00 P.M. EDT on 9 August 2001. Action by President Obama to remove the cut-off date had been expected. It came as a surprise, however, that he gave authority to determine the scope of eligible research to the Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), referencing only general concerns of responsibility, scientific worth, and legality.1 This contrasted not only with the approach of former President Bush, but also with that of former President Clinton, who had expressed personal opposition to the creation of embryos for research and had a distinction between hESCs derived from embryos created for research and those derived from spare embryos enshrined in NIH policy.President Obama’s remarks upon signing the executive order give some insight into the thinking behind his approach. Implicit in them are the views that earlystage human embryos outside the womb do not have full moral status and that the destruction of human embryos in the effort to care for and ease the suffering of human beings who do have full moral status does not devalue human life. The President also stressed that the decision to pursue hESC research reflected not only his opinion, but also a broad social consensus. He concluded with strong ethical commitments on two fronts:We will develop strict guidelines, which we will rigorously enforce, because we cannot ever tolerate misuse or abuse. And we will ensure that our government never opens the door to the use of cloning for human reproduction. It is dangerous, profoundly wrong, and has no place in our society, or any society.(Obama 2009b)The specific guarantee that President Obama gave against government support for the development of cloning techniques for human reproductive purposes made his silence on the use of cloning for research seem significant. Comments he had made in the course of the campaign (Obama 2008) suggested that he would affirm [End Page 195] the Clinton-era policy of limiting federal funding to hESCs derived from spare embryos. Did this silence mean that President Obama was opening the door to federal funding of research cloning when and if scientists might manage that feat?2009 NIH GuidelinesThe answer to this question and several others came on 17 April, when Raynard Kington, the acting director of NIH, released Draft NIH Guidelines for Human Stem Cell Research (NIH 2009), developed by an NIH Stem Cell Task Force, along with a request for public comment within 30 days of their publication in the Federal Register.2 The 2009 Draft Guidelines exclude from federal funding the derivation of hESCs, a restriction mandated by the reenactment of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment as part of the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (Public Law 111-8, Division F, Title V, § 509). The 2009 Draft Guidelines also exclude the use of hESCs derived from embryos created for research purposes, and so represent a refusal to open the funding door as broadly as the NIH interpretation of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment might allow, at least for the time being.It appears that the drafters used as their starting point the 2000 NIH Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem Cells (NIH 2000) dating from the Clinton Administration, rather than more recent guidelines from the National Academy of Sciences (National Research Council 2005; 2007; 2008) and other private bodies. Both the format and content of the 2000 and 2009 NIH efforts are similar, making the departures in the latter stand out in high relief. We highlight departures related to informed consent to embryo donation, creation of human-nonhuman chimeras, and the role of an NIH task force, updating our original comment (Cohen and Majumder 2009).Informed Consent to Embryo DonationThe 2009 NIH Draft Guidelines require that certain statements... (shrink)

This article examines the work of professional service firms (PSFs) in their relationships with public corporations; work that is designed to ensure that investors and potential investors have information that will enable them to participate in the capital markets. Using an institutional theory lens, we view these efforts by PSFs as institutional maintenance work and specifically analyze their work related to policing (i.e., rating), enabling (i.e., tutoring), and embedding and routinizing (i.e., collaborating) that helps to support the capital market as (...) a core institution in society. We illustrate how there is a “dark” side to each of these forms of institutional work that exists because of ongoing conflicts of interest within and between their work practices. This dark side has the unintended consequence of producing often biased information or information unavailable to many. When a crisis brings this bias to light, some repair is introduced but often not enough to alleviate the distortion. Our contribution is, therefore, to shed light on the dark side of institutional maintenance work and to explore why repair is increasingly necessary, but often only partially effective. (shrink)

Continuing professional education in ethics for psychologists is becoming more common, as psychology licensing boards in 14 states now require continuing education in ethics as a condition of licensure renewal. This article suggests ways to improve the quality of ethics continuing education by diversifying the content and teaching methods.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:IntroductionCynthia B. CohenThe explosion of genetic information in recent years raises a fundamental question for us as individuals and as members of various communities: Have we an obligation to know as much as possible about our genes—or should we bypass genetic information, leaving it hidden? A terrible ambivalence grips us when it comes to our genes. We want to respond to the Socratic call to know ourselves by learning (...) what lies on the minute threads of the chromosomes spun into the nuclei of our cells. At the same time, we fear obtaining that information, for it seems functionally equivalent to the oracle at Delphi, revealing a distinct and dangerous knowledge we would rather not have.What is it about genetic knowledge that creates such ambivalence in us? Genetic knowledge is empowering. It offers us the freedom to shape the contours of our lives and those of our families. At the same time, genetic knowledge is disempowering. It bears a peculiar mark of inevitability, telling us that we have no control over our present or future in important respects. Better to hide from such overbearing information than to suffer the assaults on our freedom it seems to create.We can see this ambivalence about genetic knowledge appearing again and again as the field of genetics has grown. Initially, genetics emerged as a tool for understanding how traits and diseases are passed from generation to generation. We used genetic testing mostly to enhance our personal decision making about reproductive matters. It was at this time that our hesitancy about pursuing such testing first arose, for we feared being put into a position of asking such painful questions as, “Knowing what we do about our genes, should we have children?” As the scope of genetic information expanded, we learned to test for genes that could signal the development of such terrible conditions as Huntington’s disease. The possibility of gaining access to such disturbing information exacerbated our fear of genetic knowledge—to some, the certainty of knowing seemed worse than the uncertainty of not knowing. As genetic research has disclosed genes associated with conditions that might, but not necessarily will occur, the uncertainty of knowing, to some, seems worse than that of not knowing. Further, questions focused on individuals, although still pertinent, are being supplanted by broader questions about families and [End Page vii] social groups. When added to the personal agony that genetic information can engender, the specter of egregious discrimination seems to some to outweigh the value of knowing. As the net is cast further and further from the initial genetic inquiries, the call to halt or control certain kinds of genetic testing is growing increasingly loud.Ambivalence about whether to obtain genetic information hovers over the pages of this issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal. The authors address both the promise and the threat of the information to be derived from genetic tests. Each examines a different facet of the problem of knowing that vexes the terrain of genetic technology and proposes blueprints for resolving it.Cynthia B. Cohen opens by examining whether genetic testing should be used to unearth information about conditions children might develop later in life. She challenges the current trend within the professional genetics community to keep such information hidden, claiming that the putative psychosocial burdens of receiving that information are outweighed by the psychosocial benefits. Moreover, Cohen maintains that having such information can enhance, rather than impair, the adult autonomy of children. She offers a framework for assessing whether to test in individual cases and maintains that it is the responsibility of parents to make the final decision for their children.A similar response to our ambivalence about obtaining genetic knowledge is given by Robert Wachbroit. In discussing the dilemma caused by pleiotropic genetic tests—those in which a single gene mutation is involved in several apparently unrelated diseases—he favors fully disclosing their dual nature to patients before testing. Wachbroit’s emphasis on openness extends beyond informed consent recommendations, for he maintains that patients have an obligation to know as much about their genetic proclivities as possible. He goes on to confute the common wisdom that genetic information is... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Senatus Consultum de Cn. Pisone PatreD. S. PotterTranslated by Cynthia DamonEditorial Conventions( ) expansion of abbreviation[ ] restoration of letters written but now missing{ } deletion of letters written by mistake[ ] correction of letters considered wrongly inscribed necessary supplements > in translation, material supplied for clarity1 A(nte) d(iem) IIII eid(us) Dec(embres) in Palatio in porticu, quae est ad Apollinis. Scribendo2 adfuerunt M(arcus) Valerius M(arci) f(ilius) Lem(onia (...) tribu) Messallinus, G(aius) Ateius L(uci) f(ilius) Ani(ensi tribu) Capito, Sex(tus) Pomp(eius)3 Sex(ti) f(ilius) Arn(ensi tribu), M(arcus) Pompeius M(arci) f(ilius) Teret(ina tribu) Priscus, G(aius) Arrenus G(ai) f(ilius) Gal(eria tribu) Gallus, L(ucius) Nonius L(uci) f(ilius)4 Pom(ptina tribu) Asprenas q(uaestor), M(arcus) Vinicius P(ubli) f(ilius) Pob(lilia tribu) q(uaestor). vacat Quod Ti(berius) Caesar divi Aug(usti) f(ilius) Aug(ustus)5 pontifex maxumus, tribunicia potestate XXII, co(n)s(ul) III, designatus IIII ad sena– tum rettulit qualis causa Cn. Pisonis patris visa esset et an merito sibi mor– tem conscisse videretur et qualis causa M. Pisonis visa esset, cui relationi ad– iecisset, uti precum suarum pro adulescente memor is ordo esset, qualis cau– sa Plancinae visa esset, pro qua persona, quid petisset et quas propter causas,10 exposuisset antea, et quid de Visellio Karo et de Sempronio Basso, comitibus Cn. Pisonis patris, iudicaret senatus, d(e) i(is) r(ebus) i(ta) c(ensuerunt). vacat senatum populumq(ue) Romanum ante omnia dis immortalibus gratias agere, [End Page 14]1 December 10, on the Palatine in the portico adjacent to the Temple of Apollo. Present at the writing were M. Valerius M.f. Messallinus from the voting tribe Lemonia, C. Ateius L. f. Capito from the voting tribe Aniensis, Sex. Pompeius Sex. f. from the voting tribe Arnensis, M. Pompeius M. f. Priscus from the voting tribe Teretina, C. Arrenus C. f. Gallus from the voting tribe Galeria; L. Nonius L. f. Asprenas from the voting tribe Pomptina, quaestor, M. Vinicius P. f. from the voting tribe Poblilia, quaestor.WHEREAS Ti. Caesar Augustus, son of the deified Augustus, 5 pontifex maxumus,> in the twenty–second year of his tribunician power, having been consul three times, consul–designate for the fourth time, referred to the Senate for decision:how the case of the elder Cn. Piso had seemed and whether he seemed to have taken his life with due cause, andhow the case of M. Piso had seemed (to which item he had added that the senators be mindful of his entreaties on behalf of the young man); how the case of Plancina had seemed (for which person 10 he had previously explained what he sought and for what reasons), andwhat the Senate's judgment was concerning Visellius Karus and Sempronius Bassus, members of the elder Cn. Piso's staff,Concerning These Matters they Decreed as Follows:THAT the Senate and Roman people, before all else, expressed gratitude to the immortal gods because they did [End Page 15]quod nefaris consilis Cn. Pisonis patris tranquillitatem praesentis status r(ei) p(ublicae), quo melior optari non pote [e]t quo beneficio principis nostri frui contigit,15 turbar[i] passi non sunt, deinde Ti. Caesari Augusto principi suo quod earum rerum omnium, quae ad explorandam veritatem necessariae fuerunt, co– piam senatui fecerit, cuius aequitatem et patientiam hoc quoq(ue) nomine admirari senatum, quod, cum manufestissuma sint Cn. Pisonis patris scelera et ipse de se supplicium sumpsisset, nihilominus causam eius cognosci volue–20 rit filiosque eius arcessitos hortatus sit, ut patris sui causam defenderent, ita ut eum quoq(ue), qui ordinis senatori nondum esset, ob eam rem introduci in senatum vellet et copiam utriq(ue) dicendi pro patre et pro matre ipsorum et pro M. Pisone faceret. Itaque cum per aliquot dies acta causa sit ab accusatoribus Cn. Pisonis patris et ab ipso Cn. Pisone patre, recitatae epistulae, recitata exemplaria codicillorum, quos25 Germanicus Caesar Cn. Pisoni patri scripsisset, producti testes cuiusq(ue) ordinis sint, [End Page 16]not allow the tranquility of the present state of the republic... (shrink)

My article discusses the character of Marla, the narrator’s lover, in the film Fight Club. Her only option, within the terms of the film’s logic, I argue, is to define her worth derivatively, by association with the narrator. Fight Club, then, despite its somewhat self-effacing attitude about the rejuvenation of masculinity that it portrays, reinforces a familiar patriarchal story: men’s sense of worth lies in their joint world-making activities. Women’s sense of worth lies in their attachment to individual men who (...) undertake these activities. My main argument builds upon three preliminary discussions. The first is a brief outline of the contours of the concept of self-respect. The second is an analysis of the links between gender, personhood and the grounds of self-respect. The third is an account of my approach to interpreting Fight Club given its many layers of irony. Drawing on these preliminary discussions, I examine two interpretations of the film’s social commentary— what I call the “gender-neutral” and the “gender-specific” interpretations. I show that on both of these readings the film implies that Marla, as a woman, must regain her self-respect through an intimate relationship with the narrator. (shrink)

When the Bible salesman is invited to stay for dinner, Hulga Hopewell immediately recognizes the young man sitting across the table from her as something true to type, a pitiable exemplar of those her mother would classify as "good country people," which happens to be the title of Flannery O'Connor's 1955 short story where this scene takes place (see 1978). 1 Hulga's assessment of Manley Pointer is a preliminary judgment and as such is not particularly perceptive. It signifies what John (...) Dewey calls "recognition," which is "a beginning of an act of perception" cut short, or "perception arrested before it has a chance to develop freely" (2005, 54). Unlike mere recognition, perception requires the work of .. (shrink)

Humor is part of the "complex all" of human experience, and meanings may be discerned and action evaluated in relation to the risible. Not every evocation of laughter is funny. Life's little jokes on us may teach us to take ourselves less seriously or humble our expectations, as Mary Magada-Ward and Jessica Wahman argue in their respective papers on Charles Peirce and George Santayana. Yet this evaluation of humor in view of its benefits assumes too much, for humor must first (...) be conceived as an object of reflection, in the Deweyan sense, in order to be given more serious consideration. (shrink)

I argue that a number of non-utopian accounts of ethical progress—specifically, those offered by Wiggins, Moody-Adams, and Rorty—face a trade-off between objectivity and the radical revision of values. I suggest that each of these views is unsatisfactory because they face the Goldilocks problem—none of the views is able to get the trade-off between objectivity and radical revision of values “just right.” Moody-Adams and Wiggins offer accounts which are too conservative with regard to ethical progress in not allowing radical revision of (...) values, while Rorty’s account is too liberal in not maintaining enough objectivity. Despite thisdifficulty, however, I conclude on an optimistic note about the potential of non-utopian accounts of progress. I sketch out a Dewey-inspired view of progress which I believe can overcome the Goldilocks problem. (shrink)

Bianchi and colleagues have written an important article that proposes a harm reduction approach to eating disorders that mediates the ethical tension in the l...

Traditional approaches to human subjects protections in the United States focus on the ethical principles from the Belmont Report: respect for persons, beneficence, and justice. Since research regu...

It is our privilege to be invited to write a commentary on the "Interface of Ethics and Psychiatry: A Philosophical Case Consultation on Psychiatric Ethics on the Ground." The article presents an innovative collaboration between a philosopher and a psychiatrist reasoning together through the ethical aspects of three clinical cases. The case consultation also offers a unique opportunity to reflect on the teaching of psychiatric ethics in clinical settings. This commentary explores those areas of the article from the perspective of (...) a teacher and trainee whose mentoring relationship is grounded in their shared interest in philosophy and psychiatric ethics.A quick search on PubMed and Google Scholar confirms my own... (shrink)

White, Shelton, and Rivais (2018) have written a thoughtful interpretation of the history of clinical ethics consultation as a movement toward professionalization. In these authors’ narrative, the...

The eight essays contained in this book explore the portrayal of women, and various philosophical responses to that portrayal in contemporary post-civil rights society. They bring feminist voices to the conversation about gender and attests to the importance of feminist critique in what is sometimes claimed to be a post-feminist era.

In this chapter, I argue that one can articulate a historically attuned and analytically rich model for understanding jazz in its various inflections. That is, on the one hand, such a model permits us to affirm jazz as a historically conditioned, dynamic hybridity. On the other hand, to acknowledge jazz’s open and multiple character in no way negates our ability to identify discernible features of various styles and aesthetic traditions. Additionally, my model affirms the sociopolitical, legal (Jim Crow and copyright (...) laws), and economic structures that shaped jazz. Consequently, my articulation of bebop as an inflection of Afromodernism highlights the sociopolitical, and highly racialized context in which this music was created. Without a recognition of the sociopolitical import of bebop, one’s understanding of the music is impoverished, as one fails to grasp the strategic uses to which the music and discourses about the music were put. (shrink)

In this essay, I analyze Romare Bearden’s art, methodology, and thinking about art, as well as his attempt to harmonize his personal aesthetic goals with his sociopolitical concerns. I then turn to Hans-Georg Gadamer’s reflections on art and our experience (Erfahrung) of art. I show how Bearden’s approach to art and the artworks themselves resonate with Gadamer’s critique of aesthetic consciousness and his contention that artworks address us, make claims upon us, and even reveal truth. Lastly, I discuss Gadamer’s emphasis (...) on the spectator’s active yet non-mastering role in the event of art’s address—an event that implicates the spectator and has the potential to transform him or her. This leads to a discussion of Gadamer’s notion of the type of self-(and world) understanding that occurs through aesthetic experience. I close by returning to Bearden in order to discuss how his art unearths a crucial feature of our being-in-the-world. I call this feature “world-unmasking” and show how it expands and enriches Gadamer’s account. (shrink)

A REFERENCE by the poet Martial to an abridged version of the history of Livy has given rise to the view that this epitome provided the main source for the transmission of Livy for those later writers of history whose requirements demanded an outline history of Rome. Such a view was first set out by Mommsen in 1861; he concluded that a large number of authors drew much of their material not from Livy directly but from a lost Epitome which (...) departed at some points from the original in its composition. Other scholars followed his general thesis; indeed they have built upon it to such an extent that the list they compile of writers of Roman history who drew upon the ‘lost Epitome’ is a formidable one. These authors range from the period of Tiberius to the end of antiquity. They include such divergent writers as Valerius Maximus, Florus, Eutropius, the Auctor de viris illustribus, and Orosius, as well as the two known abbreviations made of Livy: the Periochae of the Oxyrhynchus Papyrus and the ‘fourth-century’ Periochae. (shrink)

Levinas's work persistently challenges the claim that the sovereignty of the ego is the foundation for ethics, a claim he attributes to the Greek philosophical tradition. This claim emerges in dominant accounts of responsibility, in which the agent's intentions define his or her culpability. However, in Oedipus Tyrannos Sophocles also attempts to undermine this strict pairing of responsibility and deliberate choice. Oedipus undergoes a fundamentally Levinasian narrative arc by moving from self-assured sovereignty, based on his ability to comprehend the world, (...) to an awakening to responsibility. In this essay I examine the points of intersection and divergence between the tragic narrative of Oedipus and the traumatic subject in Levinas's work. (shrink)