In this article I discuss the conditions under which sovereign debts are not morally binding for a state. Following an old legal doctrine, I call non-binding debts ‘odious'. I proceed as follows. First, I argue that alternative accounts on the morality of debts are unsatisfactory. The problem these accounts have are that they do not clearly identify the philosophical issues that underlie the notion of odious debts, or that they fail to specify what exactly the immorality of odious debts consists (...) in. Second, I defend the view that a debt is odious when two conditions are satisfied: borrowed funds were used by public officials for purposes for which they were not authorised lenders knew, or should have known, about possible unauthorised uses of those funds. If these two conditions are both satisfied, debts should not be considered debts of the state, but rather personal debts of rulers. Third, I discuss the feasibility of my approach by exploring how it would work in the current world. Finally, I d.. (shrink)

Because of the way that the international lending system works, poor nations have been forced to repay sovereign debts without having a moral obligation to do so. Suppose a corrupt public official borrows money from an international agency, or from private investors, and later on embezzles this money, or uses it to oppress the population. Suppose, further, that the lender is aware of the potential of this situation and still lends. Typically, the international community considers that successor governments have the (...) obligation to repay the funds and the interests associated to them. In fact, this is what they usually end up doing. Public officials are all aware that if they do not honour sovereign debts, they will face all kinds of negative consequences, including exclusion from future markets, loss of reputation and legal sanctions. Owing to this mechanism, entire generations have been burdened with debts fraudulently incurred in their name by governments in the past. These kinds of debts have been known in the legal literature as ‘odious’.In this article, I discuss the conditions defining the bindingness of a debt. I suggest that they can be made explicit by looking at the rules under which the lending system works at the domestic level, and by then extending these rules to the international domain. I argue that, because of their plausibility, these are the rules that should govern international lending from now on. I also discuss the feasibility of extending these rules globally, and consider potential objections to my proposal. (shrink)

En este artículo comparo y evalúo críticamente las concepciones sobre la justicia global de Sreenivasan y Pogge. Mientras Sreenivasan sostiene que todas las teorías sobre la justicia global actualmente existentes concuerdan en que los países ricos deberían transferir al menos una porción de sus riquezas a los pobres, Pogge reclama que todas las teorías sobre la justicia global concuerdan en que los países ricos deberían dejar de dañar a los pobres en primer lugar. En este artículo, trataré de mostrar (i) (...) que la propuesta de Sreenivasan, como es presentada en sus artículos, es lo suficientemente amplia como para ser aceptable para algunas teorías de justicia internacional distributiva, pero no para todas ellas; (ii) que la propuesta de Pogge es más amplia que la de Sreenivasan, en el sentido de que aspira a obtener sustento en todas las diversas concepciones de justicia internacional distributiva,pero depende de la afirmación de que los países desarrollados dañan actualmentea la pobreza global –una afirmación que intentaré defender–; y (iii) que la visión de Pogge y Sreenivasan son compatibles. De hecho, si Sreenivasan asumiera la afirmación central del argumento de Pogge en su propia propuesta, el alcance delas teorías desde las que él podría ganar sustento sería mucho más amplio. (shrink)

In this article, I make the idea that poverty outcomes are not necessarily morally relevant for assessing policies as clear as possible by discussing a specific case within the global justice debate: sovereign debts. The claim I would like to defend is that generating poverty among the population of a poor state as a result of a loan is independent from the fact that such debt is morally binding. People might become poorer as a result of a loan, and the (...) loan might still be binding; and people might not be negatively affected as a result of a loan, and the loan might be non-binding. It is of course often the case that there is something wrong with lending that generates massive poverty. However, in my view, the fact that lending and poverty exist parallel to each other is not what makes a loan binding or non-binding. Thus, it is misguided to measure poverty as a way of testing the bindingness of a debt. I will proceed as follows. First, I will explain in some detail Pogge’s view about lending and justice, as he is the main defender of the outcome-view that I am trying to refute. Second, I will show two possible worries about Pogge’s view. I will call the first one the “agnosticism objection” and the second one the “normative limitation objection”. Third, I will briefly describe my own account of the conditions under which lending would count as non-binding. This account does not necessarily rely on outcomes. (shrink)

En este artículo sostengo que muchos países deudores tienen el derecho moral de incurrir en cesación de pagos de sus deudas soberanas. Muestro que deben hacerse excepciones a la afirmación general de que los gobiernos tienen la obligación de devolver préstamos contraídos por gobiernos que le antecedieron.

: There is a puzzling fact about recent discussions on global justice. The debate, as of today, is fairly sophisticated and advanced, and all kinds of views have been defended. However, this debate has often ignored some of the most flagrant injustices of the real world, or is useless to asses them. Consider the following example: currently, the international financial system is set up in such a way that it forces countries to repay their sovereign debts, even if these debts (...) are not morally binding for them. Thus, entire generations end up burdened with debts that were fraudulently incurred in their name. Despite the fact that this problem is massive, global justice scholars have either neglected it, or have not addressed it adequately. In this paper, I attempt to solve the puzzle. That is, I try to explain why there is such a gap in the global justice literature. Also, I propose a new approach to global justice which, in my view, fills this gap. Resumen: Hay un hecho enigmático acerca de las recientes discusiones sobre justicia global. El debate, al día de hoy, es bastante sofisticado y avanzado, y se han defendido todo tipo de teorías. Sin embargo, este debate típicamente ha ignorado algunas de las más flagrantes injusticias del mundo real, o es inútil para evaluarlas. Considérese el siguiente ejemplo: actualmente, el sistema financiero internacional está organizado de manera tal que fuerza a los países a pagar sus deudas soberanas, aun cuando estas no son vinculantes. De esta manera, generaciones enteras terminan siendo cargadas con deudas que fueron incurridas de manera fraudulenta en su nombre. A pesar de que este problema es masivo, los especialistas en justicia global lo han ignorado, o no lo han tratado adecuadamente. En este trabajo, intento explicar este enigma. Esto es, intento explicar por qué existe semejante ausencia en los debates recientes sobre justicia global. Además, propongo un nuevo enfoque a la justicia global que, desde mi punto de vista, subsana parcialmente esta deficiencia. (shrink)

En este trabajo me propongo analizar algunos de los argumentos de John Rawls en contra de un principio de diferencia internacional, tal como fueron presentados en Un derecho de gentes. Sostengo que estos argumentos son inconsistentes con el principio de diferencia doméstico. Si los aceptamos, entonces tendremos que afrontar el dilema de o bien tener que aceptar dicho principio distributivo en ambos ámbitos (el doméstico y el internacional) o bien tener que rechazarlo por completo. También sostengo que las posibles objeciones (...) de Rawls a esta crítica se basan en la dudosa premisa empírica de que los países son exclusivamente responsables de su propio fracaso. In this paper I will analyze John Rawls's claims against an international difference principle as presented in The Law of Peoples. I argue that these claims are inconsistent with the difference principle itself. If we accept them, then we will face the dilemma of either having to endorse this principle both in the domestic and the international domains or having to reject it completely. I also defend the view that Rawls's possible reply to this objection relies on the dubious empirical premise that countries are blameworthy for their own failure. (shrink)

In this paper I shall try to clarify Husserl’s conception of time-consciousness. In particular, I try to explain what exactly the asymmetry between protention and retention consists in. I argue (i) that Rodemeyer’s understanding of the protention-retention relationship, as developed, seems misleading, mainly for two reasons: first, it does not take into account that the ‘now’ has duration; second, she conceives the relation between protention and retention as symmetric, (ii) that the asymmetry between protention and retention could be better understood (...) if we could not only take into account the influence that retention and affect have on protention, but also if we could take into consideration the conceptual difference between surprise and disappointment. This difference, I suggest, reveals new ways to understand the protention-retention asymmetry. (shrink)

The article compares two different interpretations of Kant's categorical imperative −the practical and the logical one− and defends the practical one, arguing that it is superior because it rejects cases of free riding without necessarily rejecting cases of coordination or timing. The logical interpretation, on the other hand, leads to the undesirable outcome that it does not reject immoral cases of free riding, and to the desired outcome that it does not reject maxims of coordination/timing. Given that neither of them (...) rejects maxims of coordination/timing (they are similar in that sense) and only the practical interpretation rejects free riding, the logical interpretation should be rejected. El artículo compara dos interpretaciones diferentes del imperativo categórico kantiano −la práctica y la lógica− y defiende la superioridad de la práctica debido a que rechaza los casos de free riding, sin rechazar necesariamente los casos de coordinación/tiempo. La interpretación lógica, en cambio, lleva al resultado indeseable de no rechazar casos inmorales de free riding, y al resultado deseable de rechazar las máximas de coordinación/tiempo. Dado que ninguna de las dos rechaza las máximas de coordinación/tiempo (y en este sentido son similares) y solamente la interpretación práctica rechaza los casos de free riding, debe rechazarse la interpretación lógica. (shrink)