The relativistic revolution led to varieties of neo-Kantianism in which constitutive principles define the object of scientific knowledge in a domain-dependent and historically mutable manner. These principles are a priori insofar as they are necessary premises for the formulation of empirical laws in a given domain, but they lack the self-evidence of Kant’s a priori and they cannot be identified without prior knowledge of the theory they purport to frame. In contrast, the rationalist endeavors of a few (...) masters of theoretical physics have led to comprehensibility conditions that are easily admitted in a given domain and yet suffice to generate the theory of this domain. The purpose of this essay is to compare these two kinds of relativized a priori, to discuss the nature of the comprehensibility conditions, and to demonstrate their effectiveness in a modular conception of physical theories. (shrink)

Much discussion was inspired by the publication of Harvey Brown's book \textit{Physical Relativity} and the so-called dynamical approach to Special Relativity there advocated. At the center of the debate there is the question about the nature of the relation between spacetime and laws or, more specifically, between spacetime symmetries and the symmetries of laws. Originally, the relation was mainly assumed to be explanatory and the dispute expressed in terms of the arrow of explanation – whether it goes from spacetime (symmetries) (...) to (symmetries of) laws or vice-versa. Not everybody agreed with a setting that involves leaving ontology out. In a recent turn, the relation has been claimed to be analytical or definitional. In this paper I intend to examine critically this claim and propose a way to generally understand the relation between spacetime symmetries and symmetries of laws as deriving from constitutive principles. (shrink)

Balancing implies a comparison among goods, values, principles and rights that cannot be ranked on a single scale of measurement, ie there is no unequivocal measuring unit applicable to all of them. In such situations, it is common to state that one has to compare incommensurable things. Indeed, this issue has been mentioned by several authors as a strong reason in favour of abandoning balancing (and proportionality) as a rational form of judicial argumentation and decision-making. My article aims at (...) arguing that this objection is based on fallacious assumptions concerning the relations among three concepts: incommensurability, incomparability and balancing. Initially, what is at stake is the analysis of the connection between comparing values (or principles) and commensurability. The results of this initial analysis were then used to provide greater analytical strength to the specific debate on balancing and comparing rights in order to show that incommensurability does not imply incomparability and that rational decisions are possible even when incommensurable values are at stake. Since balancing (and proportionality) implies comparisons, and since constitutional principles are doubtlessly incommensurable (for there is no common metric to measure them), arguing for the comparability of incommensurable principles is an unavoidable step if one aims at demonstrating that balancing may be a rational procedure after all. (shrink)

Constitutivism locates the ground of practical normativity in features constitutive of rational agency and rests on the concept of a constitutive norm – a norm that is internal to a thing such that...

In the science of administrative and constitutional law, administration science and many other sciences, including political science, it is widely accepted that the basic, inherent feature of a municipality, deciding the essence of the territorial self-government unit as an entity of public administration, is the self-reliance it is entitled to. The self-reliance of territorial self-government units is even defined as a constitutional norm.In principle, self-reliance is perceived as a fundamental attribute of a decentralised public authority and constitutes one of the (...) fundamental systemic principles of the Republic of Poland. It was formulated expressis verbis in art. 165 par. 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, which states that the self-reliance of territorial self-government units is subject to judicial protection, meaning that TSGUs can defend themselves against illegal attempts, not grounded in the law to interfere in their self-reliance. This protection seems to encompass both the private-law and public-law spheres of territorial self-government activity.The essence and guarantees of territorial self-government units’ self-reliance also arise from other constitutional principles, including the aforementioned decentralisation principle, subsidiarity principle, separation of powers, supremacy of the nation and democratic state under rule of law.The goal of this article is to interpret the principle of municipal self-reliance in the context of constitutional principles of law, in the light of the Polish Constitution. The studies were conducted based on analysis of normative acts, doctrinal views and case law. (shrink)

Recently, Christine Bratu and Mortiz Dittmeyer have argued that Christine Korsgaard’s constitutive project fails to establish the normativity of practical principles because it fails to show why a principle’s being constitutive of a practice shows that one ought to conform to that principle. They argue that in many cases a principle’s being constitutive of a practice has no bearing on whether one ought to conform to it. In this paper I argue that Bratu and Dittmeyer’s argument (...) fails in three important respects. First, they fail to recognize the ways in which Korsgaard’s neo-Kantian view departs from more orthodox Kantian views. Second, they fail to recognize the respect in which Korsgaard’s view is a version of moral rationalism. Third, they overlook an important scope ambiguity in an important premise of their argument. A sensible way of resolving this ambiguity gives the constitutivist a reasonable response. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a new framework supporting the claim that some elements in science play a constitutive function, with the aim of overcoming some limitations of Friedman's (2001) account. More precisely, I focus on what I consider to be the gradualism implicit in Friedman's interpretation of the constitutive a priori, that is, the fact that it seems to allow for degrees of 'constitutivity'. I tease out such gradualism by showing that the constitutive character Friedman aims (...) to track can be captured by three features - namely, quasi-axiomaticity (QA), generative potential (GP), and empirical shielding (ES) - which are exhibited to a maximal degree by the examples Friedman deploys, particularly in his analysis of Newtonian mechanics. I argue that not all varieties of 'constitutivity' can be captured by the kind of gradualism implicit in Friedman's view, although developing the gradualism itself might provide useful insights. To show this, I analyse the function of the Hardy-Weinberg principle (HWP) in population genetics in terms of its QA, GP, and ES. Whereas the HWP does not count as constitutive in classical philosophical interpretations (Sober 1984), nor does it within Friedman's framework, it does nonetheless perform a minimally constitutive function. By means of historical details and considerations on the prospects of replacing the HWP, I show that the HWP is minimally constitutive by being a counterfactual instantiation of a paradigmatically constitutive stability principle, where the latter might itself be regarded as an enabling condition for a variety of modelling practices across the sciences. (shrink)

Andreas Follesdal,Victor Muñiz Fraticelli | : A Principle of Subsidiarity regulates the allocation and/or use of authority within a political order where authority is dispersed between a centre and various sub-units. Section 1 sketches the role of such principle of subsidiarity in the EU, and some of its significance in Canada. Section 2 presents some conceptions of subsidiarity that indicate the range of alternatives. Section 3 considers some areas where such conceptions might add value to constitutional and political deliberations in (...) Canada. Section 4 concludes with some reminders of crucial contested issues not fully resolved by appeals to subsidiarity alone, exemplified by the protection of human rights. | : Un principe de subsidiarité réglemente la répartition et/ou l’usage de l’autorité au sein d’un ordre politique où l’autorité est dispersée entre un centre et des sous-unités variées. La section 1 de cet article montre le rôle d’un tel principe de subsidiarité dans l’Union européenne, et certaines de ses implications au Canada. La section 2 présente des conceptions de la subsidiarité qui indiquent un éventail d’alternatives. La section 3 considère certains domaines où de telles conceptions pourraient ajouter de la valeur aux délibérations constitutionnelles et politiques au Canada. La section 4 conclut en rappelant certains problèmes cruciaux contestés, non entièrement résolus par les seuls appels à la subsidiarité, exemplifiés par la protection des droits humains. (shrink)

One of the still unsolved problems in liberal anarchism is a definition of social constituency in positive terms. Partially, this had been solved by the advancements of liberal discourse ethics. These approaches, built on praxeology as a universal framework for social formation, are detached from the need of any previous or external authority or rule for the discursive partners. However, the relationship between action, personal identity, and liberty within the process of a community becoming solely generated from the praxeological a (...) priori remains largely disputed. In order to develop a testable constitutional model, this study revises how the “ontological turn” was introduced into liberal theories and redefines the concept of liberty. Liberty is usually understood as a moral goal or measurement for just actions, as the generative principle of all social existence - individual and interpersonal. For this purpose, the function of performative contradiction within the mechanism of interpersonal “encounter”, as part of the co-generative process of the individual becoming and social formation was explored through the production of a game-based narrative historiography grounded on 19th century life writings. This narrative historiography was developed in the context of Swiss history, with a “design-based” research approach, and resulted in a prototype for networked storytelling through which the transformative learning process could be visible and the negotiation of competing individual visions of the future could be re-enacted. (shrink)

The issue of methodological solipsism in the philosophy of mind and psychology has received enormous attention and discussion in the decade since the appearance Jerry Fodor's "Methodological Solipsism" [Fodor 1980]. But most of this discussion has focused on the consideration of the now infamous "Twin Earth" type examples and the problems they present for Fodor's notion of "narrow content". I think there is deeper and more general moral to be found in this issue, particularly in light of Fodor's more recent (...) defense of his view in Psychosemantics [Fodor 1987]. Underlying this discussion are questions about the nature and plausibility of the claim that scientific explanation should observe a constraint of methodological individualism . My goal in what follows is to bring out this more general problem in Fodor's "internalist" account of the mental. (shrink)

This essay considers the role of the ‘all affected interests’ principle in democratic theory, focusing on debates concerning its form, substance and relationship to the resolution of the democratic boundary problem. It begins by defending an ‘all actually affected’ formulation of the principle against Goodin’s ‘incoherence argument’ critique of this formulation, before addressing issues concerning how to specify the choice set appropriate to the principle. Turning to the substance of the principle, the argument rejects Nozick’s dismissal of its intuitive appeal (...) and considers the two arguments advanced in favour of the principle as a criterion of democratic inclusion: the interlinked interests argument and the tracking power argument. It is shown that neither of these arguments can substantiate a view of the principle as a criterion of democratic inclusion, although both ground a constitutional understanding of the principle as specifying the scope of a duty of justification. It is then proposed that the principle can play an important role in a two-stage resolution of the democratic boundary problem in which it addresses the question of who is entitled to inclusion in the ‘pre-political’ demos that determines whether to constitute a polity. The second stage of this resolution requires an answer to the question of who should constitute the ‘political demos’, that is, the demos of a constituted polity and it is argued that a version of the ‘‘all subjected persons’’ principle can appropriately play this role.Keywords: all affected interests; all subjected persons; democracy; boundary problem; demos problem. (shrink)

Most analysts agree that democratic theorists have not offered a persuasive answer to the question of how the boundaries of a demos, a democratic people, should legitimately be defined. Some contend that boundaries should be maintained in ways that preserve sufficient sense of common identity to sustain support for redistributive policies. Many others endorse the “principle of all affected interests,” but it has been widely criticized as unrealistically destructive of too many existing community boundaries. This essay argues for an alternative (...) “principle of constituted identities.” It holds that, subject to certain important qualifications, modern constitutional democracies, at least, are morally obligated to extend the option of full membership to all those whose identities have been substantially constituted through such regimes’ coercive policies. Keywords : civic boundaries; principle of affected interests; constitutional democracy; stories of peoplehood; cultural identity (Published online: 25 August, 2008) Citation: Ethics & Global Politics 2008. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v1i3.1860. (shrink)

A revised version of Nathaniel Chipman's Sketches of the Principles of Government (1793), this early treatise on the underlying principles of American government addresses civil laws and obligations, the social state, rights of property, sovereignty and political power. An important early contribution to American constitutional law, it is also interesting for its Federalist perspective on the evolutions of political institutions from Washington to Jackson.Nathaniel Chipman [1752-1843] was a leading Vermont Federalist who was instrumental in that state's admission to (...) the Union. He became Vermont's chief Justice and went on to represent Vermont in the U.S. Senate. He was also one of America's first significant legal writers.One of his books, the Reports and Dissertations (1793) is included in Warren's list of "the four general works on the Common Law... [of] permanent value in American Legal Literature.": Warren, A History of the American Bar 335-336. See Cohen, Bibliography of Early American Law 5752, Sabin, A Dictionary of Books Relating to America 12824, Dictionary of American Biography II:73-74. (shrink)

In legal orders around the world, commitments to democracy, liberalism and constitutionalism are increasingly eroding. Although political and constitutional theorists often lament this trend, they invariably adopt frameworks that are indifferent to these commitments. My aims in this article are both critical and constructive. As a critical matter, I will expose the indifference of the leading political and constitutional theories to the emergence, maintenance and refinement of liberal democratic constitutional orders. As a constructive matter, I will draw on Immanuel Kant’s (...) constitutional theory to explain why realizing such a form of governance is a public duty and why receding from it is a public wrong. (shrink)

In the first part of the paper the authors analyze how the distinction between mandatory rules, principles in the strict sense and policies can be understood in structural terms and in terms of reason for action. In the second part, they attempt to clarify which kind of legal provisions embrace constitutional statements recognizing liberty rights are.

So far, the methodological debate about neuroeconomics rarely refers to original methodological positions in the neurosciences. I confront one of the most influential ones, the constitutive explanations or mechanism approach, with methodological claims that directly relate the economic model of choice with neuronal embodiments, represented by Glimcher’s influential work. Constitutive explanations are composite and non-reductionist, therefore allow for recognizing complex causal interactions between basal neuronal phenomena and cognitive structures, also involving external symbolic media. I demonstrate the power of (...) this methodology in discussing the example of money, which Glimcher posits as one of the most important research tasks in further developing neuroeconomics. Whereas Glimcher justifies neuroscientific reductionism by presenting an evolutionary rationale for deploying formal economic models on particular modules enabling choice, the case of money reveals the need for mechanistic explanations that include a substantial role for cultural evolution, though recognizing causal interactions with basal neuronal mechanisms. (shrink)

This manuscript delves into the philosophical debate surrounding the Special Composition Question (SCQ), focusing on the causal relationships between objects and their constituent parts. By distinguishing between Weak and Strong Causal Composition, the article explores how causal mechanisms underpin the composition of objects. Theories from notable philosophers, including van Inwagen and Leibniz, are evaluated. This study seeks to bridge the gap between common sense perspectives and principled ontological theories by introducing the concepts of Weak and Strong Causal Composition. The analysis (...) reveals how a causal approach can offer insightful resolutions to longstanding debates in mereology and ontology, emphasizing the role of causality in understanding the essence of material composition. The proposed causal perspective encourages further philosophical inquiry into the foundational principles governing the composition of objects. (shrink)

The ‘causal-constitution’ fallacy, the ‘cognitive bloat’ worry, and the persisting theoretical confusion about the fundamental difference between the hypotheses of embedded (HEMC) and extended (HEC) cognition are three interrelated worries, whose common point—and the problem they accentuate—is the lack of a principled criterion of constitution. Attempting to address the ‘causal-constitution’ fallacy, mathematically oriented philosophers of mind have previously suggested that the presence of non-linear relations between the inner and the outer contributions is sufficient for cognitive extension. The abstract idea of (...) non-linearity, however, can be easily misunderstood and has, in the past, led to incorrect and counterintuitive conclusions about what may count as part of one’s overall cognitive system. In order to prevent any further mistakes I revisit dynamical systems theory to study the nature of the continuous mutual interactions that give rise to the aforementioned non-linear relations. Moreover, focusing on these interactions will allow us to provide two distinct arguments in support of the ontological postulation of extended cognitive systems, as well as an objective criterion of constitution. Accordingly, I put forward a version of HEC that treats continuous mutual interactions (and the resultant non-linear relations) not just as sufficient but also as necessary for cognitive extension. Such a qualified version of HEC may exclude certain alleged cases of cognitive extension where the agent does not mutually interact with his artifacts (e.g., shopping lists and directory services), but it is immune both to the ‘causal-constitution’ fallacy and the ‘cognitive bloat’ worry, and it can be sharply distinguished from HEMC. (shrink)

Constitutive arguments for the principles of practical reason attempt to justify normative requirements by claiming that we already accept them in so far as we are believers or agents. In two constitutive arguments for the requirement that we must will universally, Korsgaard attempts first to arrive at the requirement that we will universally from observations about the causality of the will, and secondly to establish that willing universally is constitutive of having a self. Some rational requirements (...) may be established by some version of this second argument, but the strategy does not seem promising when it comes to establishing the requirement that we will universally. I draw on the discussion of Korsgaard to highlight a challenge facing constitutive arguments in general. (shrink)

의학은 물질인 인체의 이상증상을 다루는 학문이기 때문에 당연히 과학에 근거하여 성립된 학문이라고 생각한다. 그러나 사상의학은 인체의 생리(生理)가 인간본래성인 성정(性情)에 근원하여 작용하며, 갖가지 육체적 병들도 잘못된 성정의 작용에 의한 기(氣) 흐름의 異常에 의하여 비롯됨을 강조한다. 즉 의학은 육체의 병을 치료하는 학문이지만, 병이 생기는 것은 잘못된 기 흐름 때문이며, 기 흐름을 주관하는 것은 성정이기에 병을 치료하기 위해서는 형이상적 존재인 성정이 어떤 존재이며, 어떻게 작용하는지를 알아야 한다는 것이다. 본 논문은 형이상적 존재인 성정과 그 작용성 및 사상의학의 생리작용이 역학의 형이상적 존재원리에 근원을 두고 있음을 (...) 탐구한 것이다. 즉 역학의 음양오행론에 근거하여 ‘성정의 존재구조와 작용성’ 그리고 ‘타고나는 성정의 차이에 의한 장부의 크고 작음과 사상체질’ ‘인체에서의 기 흐름’ 등에 관하여 고찰한 것이다. (shrink)

This book is written for anyone, anywhere sitting down to write a constitution. The book is designed to be educative for even those not engaged directly in constitutional design but who would like to come to a better understanding of the nature and problems of constitutionalism and its fundamental building blocks - especially popular sovereignty and the separation of powers. Rather than a 'how-to-do-it' book that explains what to do in the sense of where one should end up, it instead (...) explains where to begin - how to go about thinking about constitutions and constitutional design before sitting down to write anything. Still, it is possible, using the detailed indexes found in the book, to determine the level of popular sovereignty one has designed into a proposed constitution and how to balance it with an approximate, appropriate level of separation of powers to enhance long-term stability. (shrink)

Abstract: In Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997), the Supreme Court for the first time in American case law explicitly applied the principle of double effect to reject an equal protection claim to physician-assisted suicide. Double effect, traced historically to Thomas Aquinas, proposes that under certain circumstances it is permissible unintentionally to cause foreseen evil effects that would not be permissible to cause intentionally. The court rejected the constitutional claim on the basis of a distinction marked out by the (...) principle, i.e., between directly intending the death of a terminally ill patient as opposed to merely foreseeing that death as a consequence of medical treatment. The Court held that the distinction comports with fundamental legal principles of causation and intent. Id. at 802. -/- Critics allege that the principle itself is intrinsically flawed and that, in any event, its employment in Vacco is without legal precedent. I argue in response to contemporary objections that double effect is a valid principle of ethical reflection (Part II); claims to the contrary notwithstanding, double effect analysis is a pervasive, albeit generally unacknowledged principle employed regularly in American case law (Part III); and drawing on the preceding two sections, Vacco's application of the principle of double effect is appropriate (Part IV). -/- My conclusion is that [o]peration of some form of the principle, by whatever name, is inevitable. In an imperfect world where duties and interests collide, the possibility of choices of action foreseen to have both good and evil consequences cannot be avoided. In rare circumstances, ethics and the law require that a person refrain from acting altogether. More often, however, they provide that a determination of whether an actor may pursue a good effect although knowing it will or may unintentionally cause an harmful effect requires a more complex analysis - a double effect analysis. -/- Keywords: Equal protection, double effect, intention, physician-assisted suicide, Constitutional Law, Bioethics. (shrink)

The four essays by Jeremy Bentham assembled in this volume date from the spring and summer of 1822 and are based exclusively on manuscripts, many of which have never before been published. In the essays `Economy as Applied to Office', `Identification of Interests', `Supreme Operative', and `Constitutional Code Rationale', Bentham develops the general principles of constitutional law and government which underpin the detailed administrative provisions set out in Constitutional Code. In addition, original and penetrating discussions of such topics as (...) sovereignty, constitutional rule, democratic and monarchical government, public finance, the aptitude and powers of officials, corruption, the influence of public opinion, and the delusive effect of religion and titles of honour, affirm Bentham's status as a political theorist of the first rank. As an important application of utilitarian principles to the structure and organization of government, and a major contribution to the theory of representative democracy, this volume will be of interest to students of philosophy, law, politics, economics, and history. (shrink)

This essay on law and religion appears in the second edition of the Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, edited by Dennis Patterson. It is a revision of a similar entry in the book’s first edition. The essay opens by broadly discussing the complex relationships between law and religion writ large as movements in human history – social, cultural, intellectual, and institutional phenomena with distinct but often overlapping logics and concerns. It then hones in on the efforts (...) of secular law to make sense of religion and determine its place in the civil state. The essay argues that, while the questions raised by the American Bill of Rights’ religion clauses connect in some important respects to broader constitutional principles such as free expression and equality, the most interesting and theoretically excruciating conundrums involving religion need to be approached on their own unique terms. Two useful rubrics for such understanding are “separation” and “deference.” Any honest account must also admit, however, that there is an “intractable residue,” questions in the relation of religion and law to which there simply is no determinate or completely satisfactory answer. Finally, the essay emphasizes that the full texture of the legal imagination’s effort to grapple with religion only becomes apparent in the wider range of subconstitutional and nonconstitutional contexts beyond the standard litany of constitutional discourse. (shrink)

Legal and sociological theories of sovereignty disagree about the role of legal and social matters in grounding state power. This paper defends a constructivist view, according to which the constitution is a judgment of practical reason. The paper argues that a constitution sets out a comprehensive institutional architecture of social life in terms of principles and official roles that are necessary for any legitimate scheme of social cooperation to exist. It follows that legal and sociological theories of sovereignty capture (...) only part of the truth of sovereignty. Legal reasoning engages with political power, but it is not determined by it. There is no causal chain between power and validity, as suggested by the legal positivists. The relation between power and law is interpretive, not causal. It follows that the circularity of law and the constitution, namely the fact that the law makes the constitution and the constitution makes the law, is not a vicious circle. It is part of an ordinary process of deliberation. (shrink)

E.J. Lowe is one of the few philosophers who defend both the existence of spatially coincident entities and the Principle of Weak Extensionality that no two objects which have proper parts have exactly the same proper parts at the same time. Lowe maintains that when spatially coincident things like the statue and the lump of bronze are in a constitution relation, the constituted entity (the statue) has parts that the constituting entity (the lump) doesn’t, hence the compatibility with Weak Extensionality. (...) My contention is that his argument for why the statue has parts the lump of bronze lacks can also be used to show that the lump of bronze has parts the statue doesn’t. This will mean that there is no basis for saying the statue and the lump are in a constitution relation. I argue for accepting a modified account of constitution and abandoning the Principle of Weak Extensionality. (shrink)

My thesis is that modern neurological discoveries overthrow the classical dualism which assigns all the constitutive activity of perception to the mind and leaves the body a purely passive role. The paper is in four parts: first I will present the traditional theory, using Berkeley's concept of activity as the key; then I will summarize the relevant aspects of contemporary neurology; third, the incompatibility of these two approaches will be discussed; finally, I will propose that we must reject the (...) materialistic notion of the body and grant it a power of activity which was formerly held to be the monopoly of the mind. Throughout, I will take the spatialization of sensation as the prime example of a constitutive activity. (shrink)

‘四象醫學’으로 象徵되는 동무 이제마(1837~1900)의 四象說은 이제 학적체계를 구축한 하나의 학문으로서 정립되어, 그 학문적 위상은 매우 높다고 할 수 있다. 하지만 그의 사상설에는 기초적인 이론적 토대에 관한 논의에 있어서조차 아직 해결하지 못한 뜨거운 쟁점 또한 존재한다.BR 크게 보면 두 가지 정도인데, 그중 하나가 ‘사상의학은 한의학의 기초 이론인 오행론을 수용하는가?’의 與否문제이며, 또 다른 하나는 “동무 자신의 醫論에 (본래 ‘四象’이라는 용어의 출처인) 『주역』의 ‘易理’를 적용했을까?”라는 문제이다.BR 이에 대한 견해는 현재 학자에 따라 긍정 혹은 부정으로 크게 갈린다. 동무의 주요 저작으로는 철학서인 『格致藁』(1880~1893)와 의학적 내용을 (...) 담고 있는 『東醫壽世保元』(1894)이 있고, 이외에도 易理로 『東醫壽世保元』을 풀이한 『東武遺稿』(시기 미상), 五行에 관한 서술이 들어 있는 『東醫壽世保元草本卷』(1882~1883?) 등이 있으나, 후자의 문헌들은 典據로서의 신뢰를 얻지 못하고 있다. ‘四象’의 주역설을 옹호하는 이들은 주로 『東武遺稿』를 전거로 제시하지만, 반론을 제기하는 이들은 필사본 초고 형태로 발견된 이미상의 문집이 동무의 직접적인 저작물이 아닐 수 있다는 의구심을 품는다.BR 본고에서는 『東醫壽世保元』을 역리로 해석한 斗庵韓東錫(1911~1968)의 『東醫壽世保元註釋』(1967)을 통해 『東醫壽世保元』 ｢性命論｣서두에 나오는 개념들의 敍述方式을 분석하였다. 이 서술 방식을 相異한 방식으로 서술한 다른 문장들과 비교해 보면, ‘四象’의 導出이 易理에 근거하고 있음을 추론해 보는 것이 가능하다. 즉 『동의수세보원』 ｢性命論｣과 『東武遺稿』에 나타난 四象에 관한 서술 순서[방식]는 易理[天機]의 관점과 인간주체적[四象人] 관점을 병행했을 때라야 비로소 이해 가능하다. 다시 말해 본고에서는 ‘四象’의 도출 과정에 관한 중요한 단서를 동무가 직접 저술한 문헌들을 통해 얻고자 하였다. (shrink)

The article explores some aspects of the intellectual climate of the first half of the nineteenth century and the new ideas about race and national identity. These in turn help to explain contemporary changes in historical perspective, particularly in respect to the English Reformation. Disraeli‘s novels reflect the ideas of the time on the above topics and echo contemporary historians in their views on the Reformation, its causes, and the religious and social changes that it brought about.

玄庵 李乙浩(1910∼1988)는 東武 李濟馬(1937∼1900)의 제자 海初 崔承達(1888∼1967)에게 사상의학을 사사받았으며, 처음에는(1935년 동아일보에 기사 연재) 사상의학을 오행론으로 해명한다. 하지만 바로 이듬 해 오행설은 對待原理가 아니라 상생상극의 循環原理이기 때문에 동무가 오행설에 대해 한 마디 언급도 하지 않은 것으로 보았다. 무엇보다도 사상의학의 오행론 부정설의 가장 큰 근거는 동무의 『東醫壽世保元』에 일절 오행설이 나오지 않는다는 사실이다. 그리고 이 견해는 후학들의 사상의학의 오행관 설정에 결정적인 지침 역할을 한다.BR 하지만 동무의 저작으로 인정받고 있는 『東醫壽世保元四象草本卷』에는 오행과 장부의 관계가 직접 언급되어 있다. 또한 동무 자신이 직접 주해한 저술로 알려진 「東武自註」 (...) 역시 철저하게 오행의 논리로 사상의학을 설명하고 있다. 더구나 사상의학의 형성에 결정적인 영향을 주었다는 운암 한석지의 『明善錄』[「溫故贊圖」] 역시 철두철미 오행원리를 바탕으로 한 것이다. 그리고 사상의학설의 형성과정에서 나왔다는 『濟命眞篇』과 『普濟演說』 또한 동무의 생전 제자 혹은 주변인물이 쓴 것으로 추정되는데, 兩者 모두 五運六氣와 사상육경설 등을 기초로 삼고 있다.BR 사상의학은 곧 ‘體質醫學’으로서 기존의 한의학과는 차별화된 새로운 의학으로 인식되고 있다. 물론 ‘體質’이라는 용어는 기존의 의서에서는 찾아 볼 수 없다. 하지만 그 이전부터 ‘素’, ‘質’, ‘稟質’, ‘氣質’, ‘賦稟’, ‘稟賦’, ‘氣稟’, ‘氣體’ 등으로 쓰이다가 청나라 말기부터 ‘체질’이라는 개념을 본격적으로 사용했다는 사실에 비춰 보면 사상의학은 기존의 한의학과 차별화된 새로운 의학이론이라기보다는 기존 한의학의 계승 · 발전이라고 할 수 있다. (shrink)

Preparatory Principles is not a linear text in the conventional sense, but consists of a series of short passages on a variety of topics, whose themes are summarised in marginal headings. The material constitutes a philosophical commonplace book, compiled by Bentham in the mid-1770s, in which he worked out the foundational ideas for his new science of legislation. He then drew on this material when composing such works as A Fragment on Government and An Introduction to the Principles (...) of Morals and Legislation. Inspired by such figures as John Locke and Claude Adrien Helvetius, Bentham developed an original ontological and epistemological basis for legal terminology, with the aim of replacing the traditional terminology of English law with that of universal jurisprudence. The work that dominates the text, in that Bentham returns to it time and time again in order to offer criticism of it, is William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England. While unorganized and fragmentary, the material in Preparatory Principles constitutes a remarkable record of the evolving ideas of a major legal philosopher at a formative stage of his career. (shrink)

In his new book, Constitutional Essentials, Frank Michelman provides a splendid elaboration and defense of ‘the constitutional theory of political liberalism’ implicit in John Rawls’s classic work, Political Liberalism. In this essay, we make some observations about what a difference 30 years makes, comparing the political and constitutional climate in which Rawls wrote and published Political Liberalism in 1993 with the climate in which Michelman wrote and published this exegesis of it. We focus on (1) changes in our circumstances of (...) pluralism, including the accentuation of polarization and unreasonable views, and (2) the simultaneous breakdown of trust in the Supreme Court authoritatively to resolve disputes concerning constitutional essentials. Throughout, we acknowledge and seek to reckon with the possibility that Michelman may have given Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy its fullest, most coherent account just at the moment when the possibility of realizing it seems to be passing. (shrink)

Whenever an object constitutes, makes up or composes another object, the objects in question share a striking number of properties. This paper is addressed to the question of what might account for the intimate relation and striking similarity between constitutionally related objects. According to my account, the similarities between constitutionally related objects are captured at least in part by means of a principle akin to that of strong supervenience. My paper addresses two main issues. First, I propose independently plausible (...) class='Hi'>principles by means of which to delineate, in a non-ad-hoc, non-stipulative and non-circular fashion, those properties which can be expected to be shared among constitutionally related objects in virtue of their being so related from those which in general cannot be expected to be shared, or which are shared for other reasons. Secondly,I spell out in detail the nature of the supervenience-principle at work in this context. My account thus aims at isolating, in a methodologically responsible fashion, the particular sort of restricted indiscernibility principle which is a component of the constitution-relation. (shrink)