Though ‘evil’ is often used loosely as merely the generic opposite of ‘morally good’, used precisely it is the worst possible term of opprobrium available. In this essay it is taken as applying primarily to persons, secondarily to conduct; evil deeds must flow from the volition to do something evil. An evil action is one so horrendously bad that no ordinary decent human being can conceive of doing it, and an evil person is one who (...) knowingly wills or orders such actions. Malignant evil—doing evil because it is evil—is not just possible but real, and is one of several kinds of evil delineated. There are incidental discussions of cruelty, Rosenbaum on Explaining Hitler, Baumeister on Evil, and Benn on wickedness. Footnotes1 Dedicated to Alan Gewirth, in honour of his 90th birthday, and in appreciation of his superb, illuminating, and ground-breaking philosophical work over many years. (shrink)

Research exposes that the investigation of malevolent has flourished nearby polarise ideas, for example, Virtuous clashing with Malevolent, Lord contra Devil, Person contra Country, Ignite contra Obscurity, & Tissue contra Soul. Sympathy the idea of malicious will assist us with tracking down innovative and successful approaches to conquering insidiousness and consequently make ready for the prospering of morality. The research study exploring the concept of Evil through major world religion. As long as there is an aspect of religion (...) in human life, there is an aspect of virtue and evil also exists along with it. As we know there is no single religion across the whole world but the mixture of multiple religions that are being followed and practiced in the whole world. There are various concepts related to Evil in every religion. In this research, we are going to discuss the concepts of Evil in major world religions to know about the Roots of evil. As we know human beings have both spirits including virtue and evil. The first spirit makes human beings closer to God but later one moves human beings away from God. (shrink)

There are a number of different senses of the term “evil.” We examine in this paper the term “evil” when it is used to say things such as: “what Hitler did was not merely wrong, it was evil”, and “Hitler was not merely a bad person, he was an evil person”. Failing to keep a promise or telling a white lie may be morally wrong, but unlike genocide or sadistic torture, it is not evil in (...) this sense. In this paper we analyze the specific moral difference between “evil” and “mere wrongdoing”. In so doing we shall defend a specific conception of what acts and which persons should count as evil. On the view defended in this paper it is a necessary feature of an evil act that the victim of that act suffer what would at least normally be a life-wrecking or life-ending harm. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 25, Issue 2, pp 163 - 195 The concept of evil in 4 Maccabees differs from what we find in most ancient Jewish literature, and little attention has been paid to its philosophical background. In this article I submit that the author of 4 Maccabees has absorbed and adapted a Stoic conception of evil into his Jewish philosophy. I trace the concept of evil in Stoicism and in 4 Maccabees using the categories (...) of value theory, natural law, and the emotions. The outcome is an integrative philosophy that embraces vice as the sole evil, yet maintains a belief in the “goodness” of an afterlife; redefines natural law in terms of the Torah, reckoning any deviance from that Law as vicious; and conceives of the emotions as false belief and the cause of evil behavior, while still maintaining their God-given nature. (shrink)

There is considerable philosophical dispute about what it takes for an action to be evil. The methodological assumption underlying this dispute is that there is a single, shared folk conception of evil action deployed amongst culturally similar people. Empirical research we undertook suggests that this assumption is false. There exist, amongst the folk, numerous conceptions of evil action. Hence, we argue, philosophical research is most profitably spent in two endeavours. First, in determining which (if any) conception of (...) evil action we have prudential or moral (or both) reason to deploy, and second, in determining whether we could feasibly come to adopt that conception as the single shared conception given our psychological make-up and the content of the conceptions currently deployed. (shrink)

Evil-scepticism comes in two varieties: one variety is descriptive, where it is claimed that the concept of evil doesn’t successfully denote anything in the world; the other variety is normative, where it is claimed that the concept of evil is not a helpful or useful concept to be employing in either our social or interpersonal lives. This paper argues that evil-scepticism can be responded to by understanding the concept of evil as (...) a thin moral concept. Understood in this thin way, the descriptive challenge fades, because the concept of evil doesn’t even purport to denote anything in the world (it is purely evaluative), and so does the normative argument, since the thinness of the concept means that, first, it is ineliminable anyway, and, second, its malleability allows for it to be used for progressive and constructive means. (shrink)

Мета. Автори ставлять за мету дослідити еволюцію парадигм концепту зла в західній філософській та психологічній думці. Теоретичний базис. Дослідження ґрунтується на новітніх методологічних підходах до встановлення взаємозв’язку між філософським, психологічним і теологічним розумінням сутності зла та його проявів. Наукова новизна. Уперше в українській науці здійснено систематизацію еволюції концепту зла у філософському та психологічному розумінні. Висновки. Аналіз основних міфологічних, теологічних, філософських та психологічних концепцій зла дає можливість систематизувати їх у вигляді п’яти головних парадигм. Примордіальною парадигмою можна вважати дуалістичну, яка зберігає свій (...) вплив до нашого часу. Зло розуміється в ній як уособлення природних катастроф, хвороб, людських злочинів і силою, що протистоїть Добру. Антична філософія та християнство намагаються позбавити зло його онтологічного статусу: зло як таке не існує, а є лише відсутністю Добра. На основі такого розуміння формується привативна парадигма, яка панувала в європейській філософсько-теологічній свідомості понад тисячоліття. Вона стала підґрунтям для філософської теодицеї: виправдання всеблагого Бога перед лицем зла, що насправді існує. Але наприкінці ХVІІІ сторіччя ця парадигма поступилася місцем діалектико-романтичній, найбільш яскравими представниками якої є Шеллінг, Гегель та Ніцше. Концепт зла переосмислено й подано як необхідну складову світу, яка разом із добром належить до вищої реальності. Нове розуміння концепт зла отримує в психоаналізі Фройда, Юнга та Фрома: його джерелом визначено підсвідоме людини, а зовнішнім виявом – агресію. Подібне розуміння зла притаманне і багатьом іншим психологічним школам, деякі з них проводили навіть психологічні експерименти щодо первісно злої природи людини. Утім, подібні "експерименти" характерні для соціальних практик тоталітарних режимів, на підставі чого виникає концепція "банальності" зла. Поява ж останньої постмодерністської парадигми розуміння зла пов’язана зі спробою деяких мислителів відкинути всі попередні концепції та повернутися до найдавнішої дуалістичної парадигми. Здавалося б, падіння більшості тоталітарних режимів та очікування "кінця історії" не давали підстави для популяризації цієї парадигми, але події початку 20-х років нашого століття вказують на необхідність її актуалізації. (shrink)

The central aim of this article is to set out the essential elements of Hegel’s conception of evil. I demonstrate that Hegel understands evil primarily as a moral phenomenon. In particular, he identifies evil as a pernicious subjectivism and hypocrisy that undermines the social and institutional conditions for ethical action. An appropriate understanding of his conception of evil points to the centrality of trust to ethicality (die Sittlichkeit).

__The Concept of Evil__ is dedicated to the analysis of the concept of evil. The term "evil" is used widely in ordinary language and yet philosophers have disagreed on what, if anything, distinguishes an evil act from a wrong act or an evil person from a bad one. Is "evil" a distinct and important moral category? Which agents and acts can and should be classified as "evil"? In which areas of practice does (...) evil arise? These questions indicate three essential categories that belong to a thorough analysis of the concept of evil: meta-evil, the nature of evil, and applied evil. The articles presented in this volume provide insight into these categories. (shrink)

All morally wrong actions deserve some form of moral condemnation. But the degree of that condemnation is not the same in all cases. Some wrongs are so morally extreme that they seem to belong to a different category because they deserve our very strongest form of moral condemnation. For example, telling a white lie to make a friend feel better might be morally wrong, but intuitively such an act is in a different moral category to the sadistic, brutal, and violent (...) rape and torture of a child. The former act is merely wrong and not evil. In contrast, the latter act seems so morally extreme that we need to call it “evil” and not merely “wrong” if we are to do justice both to the moral seriousness of that act and the strength of our condemnation of it. The task of a theory or substantive conception of evil is to spell out what is an evil action and how it differs from a merely wrongful action. But what does a plausible substantive theory of evil look like? To explore this question, I spell out the concept of evil and illustrate four different types of substantive conceptions of evil actions: victim, perpetrator, spectator, and mixed theories. Of these four options, I argue that mixed theories are the most plausible type of theory, before investigating in detail the promising mixed theory recently defended by Matthew Kramer (2014b). Finally, in light of my analysis of Kramer’s view, I present a reformulated version of my combination theory of evil (Formosa 2008; Formosa 2013). (shrink)

Matthew Caswell - The Value of Humanity and Kant's Conception of Evil - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.4 635-663 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents The Value of Humanity and Kant's Conception of Evil Matthew Caswell Recent years have seen the development of a powerful reinterpretation of Kant's basic approach in ethical thought. Kant, it is argued, should not be read as defending the stark, metaphysics-laden formalism for which his (...) theory is so famous. Rather, the reinterpreters claim that the heart of Kantian practical philosophy is the absolute value of humanity, or human rational nature. Kant's ethics can thus be understood as a "theory of value," in which the singular value of our own end-setting capacity as rational agents is taken as supreme, or even as the source of all value. On this reading, morality is just acting in such a way that respects or promotes the value of humanity. Moreover, this value may be deduced through an immanent, regressive argument about the conditions of practical agency as such, according to which any adequate conception of ourselves as agents commits us, finally, to moral norms. The consequences of this approach to Kantian ethics for such central issues as the doctrine of transcendental freedom, ethical formalism, the meaning of Kantian deontology, and indeed the very picture of human moral life for which Kant's theory is meant to account are profound... (shrink)

The Concept of Intrinsic Evil and Catholic Theological Ethics examines the origin and meaning of the concept of intrinsic evil and its use in sexual ethics in the teachings of the Catholic Church, and in the construction of a systematic approach to theological ethics. It concludes with a suggestion of how the concept might be used in future ethical discourse.

In recent years, there has been a growing interest in Kant's doctrine of radical evil, arising from as diverse quarters as philosophy, psychoanalysis and the social sciences. This interest has contributed to the revival of the notion of evil, which had been displaced from the center of philosophical discussion in the 20th century. A common trait in the recent literature is that it takes the relevance of the use of the concept of evil for granted. Yet, (...) before understanding what Kant really means by radical evil, it seems appropriate to ask first whether the notion of evil as such is necessary. For, given its religious background, this notion elicits expectations that may be incompatible with the secular concerns of moral philosophy. Such misgivings are aggravated by additional doubts about the concept's explanatory function in the first place. The pertinence of reviving a concept so allegedly flawed cannot be taken at face value. Thus, the task I set for myself here is to show the necessity of the concept of evil as it lies at the core of Kant's moral philosophy already in the Groundwork, far before he actually coins the notion of “radical evil” in the Religion. Whether this latter account is defensible or not, we will at least be sure that talk about an evil which is said to be radical is not in vain. (shrink)

In recent years there has been widespread interest in assimilating forgiveness into a rational conception of the moral life. This project usually construes forgiveness as a way of “moving past” evil and resuming the moral narrative it disrupted. But to develop a philosophical sound conception of forgiveness, we must recognize that moral evil is world-shattering and cannot be assimilated into the moral narrative of our lives. It is not an event that happens in one’s world but to one’s (...) world. In this respect it is similar to death as Heidegger has described it. But, contrary to what Heidegger implies, evil is more traumatic than death because, unlike the latter, it shatters moral reasoning and moral narrative. Evil is a monstrosity; it traumatizes historical existence by impossibilizing the future. A philosophical account of forgiveness must therefore be traumatological: recognizing the traumatizing impact that evil has on historicity, it has provide us a heuristic that will help us to imagine the unimaginable possibility of transforming historical horror into good. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of whether the concept of evil is philosophically adequate. It sets out a secular conception of evil that is sufficiently clear to be used in philosophical theorising. Evil, so conceived, is not merely a fiction or an illusion, but is a moral property possessed by some actions and some persons in the real world. While several philosophers have claimed that it is inescapably dangerous to use the concept of evil, (...) the reality is that the concept of evil, when used carefully, is not prohibitively dangerous. Evil actions are not merely the opposite of good actions. Rather evil actions are are a small subset of extreme moral wrongs. (shrink)

Inspired by research on the Rwanda genocide and the decapitation, in July 2008, of a passenger on a Canadian Greyhound bus, this occasional paper explores the shared agitation with which we may respond to two seemingly disparate instances of evil such as these. Arguing against discontinuous claims that distinguish between pre- and post-metaphysical conceptions of evil pivoting around the figure of Kant, the article identifies three logics suggestive of continuity in Western thought on evil: negativity, functionalism and (...) the messianic. Focusing on the theme of negativity, the article argues that the essentially apophatic doctrine of the privation of evil is reconstituted in postmodern thinking as the liminal nature of evil. While acts of evil relate to what is both/either mathematically or qualitatively sublime (Kant), and while this experience may account for our agitation, we nonetheless employ figures like ‘hubris’, the ‘uncanny’ (Freud) and the ‘state of exception’ (Agamben) to traverse the liminal in order to interpret instances of human praxis which, given their liminal nature, will always remain brute fact. The article argues that these figures, in particular the temporal structure implicit in Freud’s account of the uncanny, can usefully be explored to account for the agitation with which we respond to instances of evil as diverse as the two that inspired this article. (shrink)

Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 8, August 2022.

The problem of evil is the problem of reconciling the world's afflictions with the fundamental attributes and justice of God. Throughout their lives people encounter painful events originating from nature and other individuals. Furthermore, it is believed that God created everything, particularly in divine religions. Scholars and thinkers have debated for centuries why an omniscient, omnipotent, just, and compassionate God would create evil. The problem of evil is sometimes employed by atheists as evidence against religion, and at (...) times as philosophical proof for the absence of God. Nowadays, it exerts a profound impact on people's beliefs within social media platforms. This article aims to address doubts and objections surrounding the problem of evil. Numerous studies have been conducted on this current issue. The subject, which is basically examined as natural and moral evil in the philosophy of religion, has been examined under the titles such as justice and cruelty, goodness and evil, will and power in classical theology. In this study, the subject is examined in terms of the relationship between the subject of evil and its object, and attention is drawn to the role of man in the formation of evil. In this context, a general overview of the problem of evil is presented in the introduction. The second section delves into how the problem of evil is approached in philosophical and theological traditions, specifically examining the viewpoints of classical kalam schools. In the later parts of the study, the subject has been tried to be reinterpreted under different titles. Within this framework, it is suggested that some doubts and questions about the problem of evil arise from a lack of understanding of religion, while others stem from interpretations perceived as religious within the tradition. To propose a solution to the problem, the concept of God, known for its power and authority in classical times, should be reevaluated. In the context of Islam, God should be considered as an entity possessing complete knowledge, absolute will and power, and creating the universe for goodness, possesses justice and mercy and bestows numerous blessings upon humanity. This perspective finds ample support in the verses of the Qur'an. The problem of evil sometimes emerges from misconceiving the relationship between God and nature as equivalent to a God-human relationship. However, God designed the universe's order to support the emergence of life in nature and make it conducive to the lives of all living beings, particularly humans. Natural phenomena and events unfold by the laws set by Allah. Evils such as diseases, fires, earthquakes, floods, storms, volcanic eruptions, rain, and lightning are not events directly orchestrated by God to harm humans. The harm they cause is primarily a result of humans' negative interactions with nature. Precautions can mitigate these harms. Yet, humans who pollute air, water, and forests and build poorly located structures hastily attribute the resulting evils to God. A careful examination of the numerous blessings in nature underscores that the universe was created by God as a benevolent order. God created humanity to undergo tests within such a world, aiming for human happiness in both this world and the hereafter. Thus, the entirety of God's will be goodness. Evil, conversely, arises from humanity's exercise of free will and the potential to commit malevolent acts. Consequently, evil stems from human interactions with nature and fellow beings. Destiny is another frequently misconstrued aspect. It refers to the natural and moral laws established by Almighty Allah to govern the order of nature and human existence. Destiny presents a realm of possibilities and does not coerce anyone's actions. To address the problem of evil, the portrayal of God, whose sole intent is good, must be reconstructed. Additionally, concepts like testing, fate, death, and sustenance need to be reinterpreted in alignment with this conception. Furthermore, methods that facilitate the acquisition of accurate religious information through social media should be developed to suit contemporary requirements. (shrink)

This timely book by philosopher Peter Dews explores the idea of evil, one of the most problematic terms in the contemporary moral vocabulary. Surveys the intellectual debate on the nature of evil over the past two hundred years Engages with a broad range of discourses and thinkers, from Kant and the German Idealists, via Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, to Levinas and Adorno Suggests that the concept of moral evil touches on a neuralgic point in western culture Argues (...) that, despite the widespread abuse and political manipulation of the term ‘evil’, we cannot do without it Concludes that if we use the concept of evil, we must acknowledge its religious dimension. (shrink)

A series of attempts have been made to determine Kant’s exact position towards theodicy, and to understand whether it is a direct consequence of his critical philosophy or, rather, whether it is merely linked to some inner development within his critical philosophy. However, I argue that the question of Kant’s critical relation to theodicy has been misunderstood; and that in fact, Kant redefines the essence of the theodicean question anew. After introducing some major aspects of Kant‘s new conception of theodicy, (...) I show how understanding this conception is necessary for correctly analysing his specific arguments against theodicy. I demonstrate this point by examining Kant’s second argument against theodicy, in which he tackles the Leibnizian problem of ‘metaphysical evil’, and show why, in light of the above, interpretations thus far have failed to capture the essence of Kant’s claim in this regard. (shrink)

Early in the Preface to Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant claims that “morality leads ineluctably to religion”. This thesis is hardly an innovation of the Religion. Again and again throughout the critical corpus, Kant argues that religious belief is ethically significant, that it makes a morally meaningful difference whether an agent believes or disbelieves. And yet these claims are surely among the most doubted of Kant's positions – and they are often especially doubted by readers who consider (...) themselves Kantians. That Kant of all people should have so cherished religion is perhaps surprising: his moral view enshrines the notion that moral worth arises solely form the “good will”, that is, from a will determined by the moral law. Kant claims to be able to deduce this law and to account for how it motivates without ever relying on religious propositions. Rather, he grounds morality in the conception of autonomy, in the absolutely free self-legislation of the moral principle. So why, after effecting this dramatic Copernican revolution in ethics, does Kant appear to backslide, insisting on the moral necessity of religious belief? (shrink)

This timely book by philosopher Peter Dews explores the idea of evil, one of the most problematic terms in the contemporary moral vocabulary. Surveys the intellectual debate on the nature of evil over the past two hundred years Engages with a broad range of discourses and thinkers, from Kant and the German Idealists, via Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, to Levinas and Adorno Suggests that the concept of moral evil touches on a neuralgic point in western culture Argues (...) that, despite the widespread abuse and political manipulation of the term ‘evil’, we cannot do without it Concludes that if we use the concept of evil, we must acknowledge its religious dimension. (shrink)

Discussion of the concept of evil in Indian philosophy.

본 논문의 목표는 칸트의 『이성의 한계 안에서의 종교』에 관한 선행 연구에서 덜 주목받았던 “자기애Selbstliebe” 개념을 중심으로 『종교』에 제시된 악의 이론을 명료하게 하는 것이다. 칸트의 악의 이론을 이해하기 위해 자기애 개념에 주목해야 할 이유는 다음과 같다. 『종교』에서 인간의 악은 “인간 본성 안에 있는 선으로의 근원적 소질”이 타락하여 “인간 본성 안에 있는 악으로의 성벽”이 발현됨으로써 생겨난다. 여기서 “선으로의 소질”과 “악으로의 성벽”에서 핵심을 이루는 것이 바로 자기애라는 개념이다. 자기애는 한편으로는 세 개의 “선으로의 소질” 중 두 개의 이름이자, 다른 한편으로는 “악으로의 성벽”의 원천이기 때문이다. (...) 본 논문은 칸트의 악론에서 자기애의 의미와 역할을 밝힘으로써, 특히 자기애가 어떻게 해서 “선으로의 소질”의 다른 이름이자 “악으로의 성벽”의 원천일 수 있는지를 밝힘으로써 칸트의 악의 이론을 명확히 할 것이다. (shrink)

Witches, Whores, and Sorcerers: The Concept of Evil in Early Iran. By S. K. Mendoza Forrest. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011. Pp. x + 231.

1.1 The Concept of Evil The problem of evil, in the sense relevant here, concerns the question of the reasonableness of believing in the existence of a deity with certain characteristics. In most discussions, the deity is God, understood as an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect person. But the problem of evil also arises, as Hume saw very clearly, for deities that are less than all-powerful, less than all-knowing, and less than morally perfect. What is the (...) relevant concept of evil, in this context? Here it is useful to distinguish between axiological concepts and deontological ones. First, there are judgments about whether certain states of affairs make the world better or worse, whether those states are good or bad, desirable or undesirable. Such normative concepts – of good and bad, or desirable and undesirable, states of affairs – are axiological concepts. Secondly, there are judgments about the rightness and wrongness of actions, about what one morally ought or ought not do, of what one’s duty is, of whether a certain action violates someone rights, and these concepts – of the rightness and wrongness of actions, of duties, of the rights of individuals, of what one should or should not do – are deontological concepts. Given this distinction, should the problem of evil be understood axiologically or deontologically? Often, and I think most commonly in this context, evils are equated with states of affairs that, all things considered, are bad or undesirable: they are states of affairs that make the world a worse place. But one can also interpret the problem of evil in a deontological fashion, equating evils with states of affairs that a person should have prevented, if he could have done so. Elsewhere (2008, 105-6), I have argued that the deontological interpretation is preferable. But for present purposes, either interpretation will be fine. 1.2 Evil and the Reasonableness of Belief in the Existence of God That many things in the world – tsunamis, earthquakes, the suffering of non-human animals and innocent children, human actions such as the carrying out of the Holocaust – certainly appear to be evil is not a controversial matter. But whether such things are really evils, all things considered, is disputed. Assume, however, that the world does continue genuine evils, and not merely apparent ones. How, then does the existence of such evils bear upon the reasonableness of belief in the existence of God? First, the existence of evils can be used to show that certain arguments for the existence of God cannot establish that conclusion, or even render it probable. For some arguments, of course, one need not appeal to evil to make that point. If someone argues for the existence of a first cause, or an unmoved mover, or a necessary being having its necessity of itself, and then claims that this is what everyone understands by the term “God”, one can point out that no reason has been offered for thinking that the entity in question is even a person, let alone omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good. By contrast, with the type of argument that Hume was concerned with when he discussed the problem of evil – namely, arguments from the existence of order in the world to the existence of a designer, or intelligent cause of that order – one does have a type of argument that, if sound, shows that there is a person who, even if not omnipotent and omniscient, is at least extremely powerful and very knowledgeable. But such arguments do not support for conclusions about the moral character of such a person, and so it is at this point that the existence of evils becomes crucial. For in providing a reason for holding that the one is not justified in attributing even moral goodness to such a being, let alone moral perfection, it supports the conclusion that that argument in question cannot be a successful argument for the existence of God. The existence of evils, then, can serve to block arguments for the existence of God. But a second, and very familiar possibility, is that the existence of evils can also provide the basis of arguments against the existence of God. A very important distinction here is between deductive, or logical incompatibility, versions of the argument from evil, and inductive, or evidential, or probabilistic versions of the argument. According to the former, there are facts about the existence of evils in the world that are logically incompatible with the existence of God. Thus, some have held that the mere existence of any evil whatsoever is incompatible with the existence of God; others, that that certain types of evil – such as natural evils – are incompatible with the existence of God; and others, that it is the amount of evil in the world, or the fact that some people suffer horrendous evils, that logically precludes the existence of God. Inductive (or evidential, or probabilistic) versions of the argument from evil, by contrast, do not claim that there are facts about the evils in the world that are logically incompatible with the existence of God. The claim is rather that there are facts about the evils found in the world that render the existence of God at the very least unlikely, and perhaps extremely so. 1.3 Hume’s Use of the Existence of Evils The preceding discussion suggests two very different ways in which Hume might be employing the existence of evils. First, he might be appealing to the existence of evils simply to undercut certain arguments for the existence of God. In particular, he might be appealing to evils to show that, whatever the merits of the argument from order to design may be, it can nether establish, nor render probable, the existence of a morally good deity. Secondly, Hume might be advancing a version of the argument from evil, and that in turn could take the form either of an argument that claims that facts about evil are logically incompatible with the existence of God, or of an argument that claims, more modestly, that the apparent evils found in the world render the existence of God unlikely. (shrink)

Svojim kritickim filozofskim stavovima i idejama Kant je cesto izazivao burne reakcije ne samo filozofske vec i najsire kulturne javnosti svoga vremena. Medju njegovim idejama koje su pokrenule ostre filozofske sporove i kontroverze, najpoznatije su: sto ne vredi u teoriji, to ne vredi ni u praksi; o toboznjem pravu da se laze iz covekoljublja; protiv prava gradjana na pobunu i dr. Ipak, najvise paznje u evropskoj kulturnoj javnosti izazvala je Kantova ideja o radikalnom zlu, koja se u svom konacnom obliku (...) pojavila u njegovim poznim spisima o filozofiji religije. Negativne reakcije i osude Kantovih savremenika zamenili su, u XX veku, nista manje zbunjujuci prigovori savremenih Kantovih tumaca koji tvrde da Kantovo shvatanje radikalnog zla nije dovoljno radikalno. Pokusacemo da u ovom kratkom razmatranju ukazemo na glavne tacke tog filozofskog spora i Kantov pojam radikalnog zla ucinimo jasnijim. PR Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 43007. (shrink)

Two philosophers look at religion without any preconceived notions about the nature of God and the problem of evil and suffering in the world. They demonstrate that their conclusions are the same as those of many others who have explored those problems: God cannot exist if there is evil in the world!--W. A. J.

선은 갑골문에 나타나는 글자인데 비해 악은 그보다는 후대에 만들어진 글자이다. 두 개념 모두 초기의 용법들은 도덕과 무관한 의미에서 주로 사용되었다. 선이 도덕적 의미로 사용되면서 유학적 가치들과 중첩되어지기 시작하는 것을 볼 수 있는 문헌은 『논어』이지만, 그 용례들은 매우 빈약한 편이다. 『맹자』에서도 선과 악은 도덕과 무관한 의미로 많이 사용되어지기는 했지만 도덕적 용법이 상당히 늘어났다. 특히, 맹자가 성선을 주창함으로써, 선은 본성의 발현이요, 악은 선이 실현되지 못한 결과(不善)이거나 욕구에 가려진 것(蔽)으로 정의 되게 되었다. 『순자』에서 선과 악은 성악과 예란 개념을 통해 정의된다. 인간의 본성은 이기적이어서 (...) 악으로 흐르기 쉽지만(性惡), 잘만 관리하면 사회적 선으로 연결될 수 있다. 그러한 역할을 하는 것이 예이다. 그러므로 순자에게서는 ‘예=욕망의 길러줌=욕망과 물질 간의 인위(僞)적인 균형=선’이라는 등식이 성립된다. 반면 악은 인위적 노력이 실패한 결과로서의 욕망과 물질간의 불균형이다. 그러므로 순자에게서도 악은 본래부터 존재한 것이 아니다. 맹자와 순자가 본성에 대해 상반된 견해를 주장하였고, 그에 따라 공부하는 방법이나 도덕의 정당화에서 차이가 있기는 하지만, 악이 실체가 아니라 현상(不善)이라는 점에서는 차이가 없는 것이다. 이는 비단 이 둘만의 공통점이 아니라 후대의 성리학, 나아가 대승불교와 도교에 이르기까지 공통적으로 발견되는 특징이기도 하다. (shrink)