Results for 'Colour Relationalism'

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  1. Color relationalism and relativism.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2017 - Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (1):172-192.
    This paper critically examines color relationalism and color relativism, two theories of color that are allegedly supported by variation in normal human color vision. We mostly discuss color relationalism, defended at length in Jonathan Cohen's The Red and the Real, and argue that the theory has insuperable problems.
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  2. Colour Relationalism and the Real Deliverances of Introspection.Pendaran Roberts, James Andow & Kelly Schmidtke - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):1173-1189.
    Colour relationalism holds that the colours are constituted by relations to subjects. Anti-relationalists have claimed that this view stands in stark contrast to our phenomenally-informed, pre-theoretic intuitions. Is this claim right? Cohen and Nichols’ recent empirical study suggests not, as about half of their participants seemed to be relationalists about colour. Despite Cohen and Nichols’ study, we think that the anti-relationalist’s claim is correct. We explain why there are good reasons to suspect that Cohen and Nichols’ experimental (...)
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  3. Colours, colour relationalism and the deliverances of introspection.J. Cohen & S. Nichols - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):218-228.
    An important motivation for relational theories of color is that they resolve apparent conflicts about color: x can, without contradiction, be red relative to S1 and not red relative to S2. Alas, many philosophers claim that the view is incompatible with naive, phenomenally grounded introspection. However, when we presented normal adults with apparent conflicts about color (among other properties), we found that many were open to the relationalist's claim that apparently competing variants can simultaneously be correct. This suggests that, philosophers' (...)
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  4. Color relationalism and color phenomenology.Jonathan Cohen - 2010 - In Bence Nanay, Perceiving the world. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 13.
    Color relationalism is the view that colors are constituted in terms of relations between subjects and objects. The most historically important form of color relationalism is the classic dispositionalist view according to which, for example red is the disposition to look red to standard observers in standard conditions (mutatis mutandis for other colors).1 However, it has become increasingly apparent in recent years that a commitment to the relationality of colors bears interest that goes beyond dispositionalism (Cohen, 2004; Matthen, (...)
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  5.  83
    Colour Relationalism and Colour Irrealism/Eliminativism/Fictionalism.Barry Maund - 2012 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):379-398.
    Jonathan Cohen has produced a powerful argument for Colour Relationalism: the metaphysical thesis that colours are relational properties of a certain sort—relational with respect to perceivers and circumstances. Cohen makes two important assumptions: one is that Colour Relationalism and Colour Irrealism (which include Colour Eliminativism, Fictionalism and other “error theories”) are rivals; the second is that “error theories” are theories of last resort. In this paper, I challenge both assumptions. In particular, I argue that (...)
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  6. Color Relationalism, Ordinary Illusion, and Color Incompatibility.Pendaran Roberts - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (4):1085-1097.
    Relationalism is a view popularized by Cohen according to which the colors are relational properties. Cohen’s view has the unintuitive consequence that the following propositions are false: (i) no object can be more than one determinate or determinable color all over at the same time; (ii) ordinary illusion cases occur whenever the color perceptually represented conflicts, according to (i) above, with the object’s real color; and (iii) the colors we perceive obey (i). I investigate Cohen’s attempt to address these (...)
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  7.  1
    Color relationalism and color phenomenology.Jonathan Cohen - 2010 - In Bence Nanay, Perceiving the world. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 13.
    Color relationalism is the view that colors are constituted in terms of relations between subjects and objects. The most historically important form of color relationalism is the classic dispositionalist view according to which, for example red is the disposition to look red to standard observers in standard conditions (mutatis mutandis for other colors).1 However, it has become increasingly apparent in recent years that a commitment to the relationality of colors bears interest that goes beyond dispositionalism (Cohen, 2004; Matthen, (...)
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  8.  2
    Colour relationalism and the real deliverances of introspection.Pendaran Roberts, James Andow & Kelly Schmitdke - unknown
    Colour relationalism holds that the colours are constituted by relations to subjects. Anti-relationalists have claimed that this view stands in stark contrast to our phenomenally-informed, pre-theoretic intuitions. Is this claim right? Cohen and Nichols’ recent empirical study suggests not, as about half of their participants seemed to be relationalists about colour. Despite Cohen and Nichols’ study, we think that the anti-relationalist’s claim is correct. We explain why there are good reasons to suspect that Cohen and Nichols’ experimental (...)
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  9. Colour Layering and Colour Relationalism.Derek H. Brown - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):177-191.
    Colour Relationalism asserts that colours are non-intrinsic or inherently relational properties of objects, properties that depend not only on a target object but in addition on some relation that object bears to other objects. The most powerful argument for Relationalism infers the inherently relational character of colour from cases in which one’s experience of a colour contextually depends on one’s experience of other colours. Experienced colour layering—say looking at grass through a tinted window and (...)
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  10.  72
    Colour Relationalism and Colour Irrealism/Eliminativism/Fictionalism.John Barry Maund - 2012 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):379-398.
    Jonathan Cohen has produced a powerful argument for Colour Relationalism: the metaphysical thesis that colours are relational properties of a certain sort—relational with respect to perceivers and circumstances. Cohen makes two important assumptions: one is that Colour Relationalism and Colour Irrealism (which include Colour Eliminativism, Fictionalism and other “error theories”) are rivals; the second is that “error theories” are theories of last resort. In this paper, I challenge both assumptions. In particular, I argue that (...)
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  11. Colour Relationalism, Contextualism, and Self-Locating Contents.Keith Allen - 2012 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):331-350.
    In addressing the metaphysical question of what colours are, a consideration that is commonly appealed to is how colours are represented—typically in perceptual experiences, but also in beliefs and linguistic utterances. Although representations need not accurately reflect the nature of what they represent—indeed, they need not represent anything that actually exists at all—the way colours are represented is often taken to provide at least a defeasible guide to the metaphysics: all else being equal, it seems we should prefer a theory (...)
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  12.  79
    Chromatic layering and color relationalism.Jonathan Cohen - 2016 - Minds and Machines 26 (3):287-301.
    Brown highlights cases of “chromatic layering”—scenarios in which one perceives an opaque object through a transparent volume/film/filter with a chromatic or achromatic content of its own—as a way of reining in the argument from perceptual variation sometimes used to motivate a relationalist account of color properties. Brown urges that the argument in question does not generalize smoothly to all types of perceptual variation—in particular, that it fits poorly in layering cases in which there is either experiential fusion or scission. While (...)
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  13.  90
    Colouring for and Colour Relationalism.Derek H. Brown - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):433-449.
    © The Authors 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] Colour is a welcome work in history and philosophy of science.1 The opening chapters offer a fresh take on the history of perceptual theory and a broad overview of contemporary philosophy of colour. This is followed by the central fourth chapter, which introduces readers to a cluster of empirical data that to this point have not (...)
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  14. A relationalist's guide to error about color perception.Jonathan Cohen - 2007 - Noûs 41 (2):335–353.
    Color relationalism is the view that colors are constituted in terms of relations to perceiving subjects. Among its explanatory virtues, relation- alism provides a satisfying treatment of cases of perceptual variation. But it can seem that relationalists lack resources for saying that a representa- tion of x’s color is erroneous. Surely, though, a theory of color that makes errors of color perception impossible cannot be correct. In this paper I’ll argue that, initial appearances notwithstanding, relationalism contains the resources (...)
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  15. It's not easy being green : Hardin and color relationalism.Jonathan Cohen - 2010 - In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen, Color Ontology and Color Science. Bradford.
    But Hardin hasn’t contented himself with reframing traditional philosoph- ical issues about color in a way that is sensitive to relevant empirical con- straints. In addition, he has been a staunch defender of color eliminativism — the view that there are no colors, qua properties of tables, chairs, and other mind-external objects, and a vociferous critic of several varieties of re- alism about color that have been defended by others (e.g., [Hardin, 2003], [Hardin, 2005]). These other views include the so-called (...)
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  16. Color properties and color ascriptions: A relationalist manifesto.Jonathan Cohen - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (4):451-506.
    Are colors relational or non-relational properties of their bearers? Is red a property that is instantiated by all and only the objects with a certain intrinsic (/non-relational) nature? Or does an object with a particular intrinsic (/non-relational) nature count as red only in virtue of standing in certain relations - for example, only when it looks a certain way to a certain perceiver, or only in certain circumstances of observation? In this paper I shall argue for the view that color (...)
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  17. Relationalism about perceptible properties and the principle of charity.Pendaran Roberts & Kelly Ann Schmidtke - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9).
    Color relationalism holds that the colors are constituted by relations to subjects. The introspective rejoinder against this view claims that it is opposed to our phenomenally-informed, pre-theoretic intuitions. The rejoinder seems to be correct about how colors appear when looking at how participants respond to an item about the metaphysical nature of color but not when looking at an item about the ascription of colors. The present article expands the properties investigated to sound and taste and inspects the mentioned (...)
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  18.  65
    Ecumenicism, Comparability, and Color, or: How to Have Your Cake and Eat It, Too.Jonathan Cohen - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):149-175.
    Data about perceptual variation motivate the ecumenicist view that distinct color representations are mutually compatible. On the other hand, data about agreement and disagreement motivate making distinct color representations mutually incompatible. Prima facie, these desiderata appear to conflict. I’ll lay out and assess two strategies for managing the conflict—color relationalism, and the self-locating property theory of color—with the aim of deciding how best to have your cake and eat it, too.
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  19. Quality-Space Functionalism about Color.Jacob Berger - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (3):138-164.
    I motivate and defend a previously underdeveloped functionalist account of the metaphysics of color, a view that I call ‘quality-space functionalism’ about color. Although other theorists have proposed varieties of color functionalism, this view differs from such accounts insofar as it identifies and individuates colors by their relative locations within a particular kind of so-called ‘quality space’ that reflects creatures’ capacities to discriminate visually among stimuli. My arguments for this view of color are abductive: I propose that quality-space functionalism best (...)
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  20.  29
    Colour variation without objective colour.Derek Brown - 2022 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 3:1-31.
    Colour variation is the fact that what colour physical objects look to have depends on viewing conditions and a perceiver’s visual system. Both Colour Relationalists and Colour Eliminativists regard their analyses of colour variation as central to the justification for their respective views. Yet the analyses are decidedly different. Colour Relationalists assert that most instances of colour variation are veridical and infer from this that colours are relational properties of objects that are partly (...)
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  21. The Self-Locating Property Theory of Color.Berit Brogaard - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):133-147.
    The paper reviews the empirical evidence for highly significant variation across perceivers in hue perception and argues that color physicalism cannot accommodate this variability. Two views that can accommodate the individual differences in hue perception are considered: the self-locating property theory, according to which colors are self-locating properties, and color relationalism, according to which colors are relations to perceivers and viewing conditions. It is subsequently argued that on a plausible rendition of the two views, the self-locating theory has a (...)
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  22.  31
    Brentanians against Relationalism about Colours.Hamid Taieb - 2023 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 100 (1-2):231-251.
    The aim of my article is to present the critique by Brentanians – more precisely, by Brentano himself and his students Stumpf and Marty – of the thesis that colours are properties that are relational to a perceiver. For Brentanians, colours are monadic physical properties. Brentanians, I will show, think that colours do not exhibit a relationality to perception when we experience them, and that the concepts of them do not contain any mark representing a relation to perception; this phenomenological (...)
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  23. Relationalism about Perception vs. Relationalism about Perceptuals.Andrew Stephenson - 2016 - Kantian Review 21 (2):293-302.
    There is a tension at the heart of Lucy Allaiss transcendental idealism. The problem arises from her use of two incompatible theories in contemporary philosophy - relationalism about perception, or naïve realism, and relationalism about colour, or more generally relationalism about any such perceptual property. The problem is that the former requires a more robust form of realism about the properties of the objects of perception than can be accommodated in the partially idealistic framework of the (...)
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  24.  14
    Relationalism’s psychosemantic ills.William A. Sharp - 2024 - Analysis 84 (4):767-777.
    Relationalism about colour (as described in Cohen’s 2004 article on colour properties and his 2009 book The Red and the Real) is motivated by the thought that by identifying colours with relations between objects, subjects and viewing circumstances we can provide the best realist, general, ecumenical accommodation of perceptual variation data. This ‘best’-claim is supported by the charge that one of the view’s ecumenical rivals does uniquely badly in respect of fit with mainstream psychosemantics. This case for (...)
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  25.  29
    Ecumenicism, Comparability, and Color, or: How to Have Your Cake and Eat It, Too.Mazviita Chirimuuta - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):149-175.
    Data about perceptual variation motivate the ecumenicist view that distinct color representations are mutually compatible. On the other hand, data about agreement and disagreement motivate making distinct color representations mutually incompatible. Prima facie, these desiderata appear to conflict. I’ll lay out and assess two strategies for managing the conflict—color relationalism, and the self-locating property theory of color—with the aim of deciding how best to have your cake and eat it, too.
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  26. Color and perceptual variation revisited: Unknown facts, alien modalities, and perfect psychosemantics.Jonathan Cohen - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (3):307-319.
    An adequate ontology of color must face the empirical facts about per- ceptual variation. In this paper I begin by reviewing a range of data about perceptual variation, and showing how they tell against color physicalism and motivate color relationalism. Next I consider a series of objections to the argument from perceptual variation, and argue that they are un- persuasive. My conclusion will be that the argument remains a powerful obstacle for color physicalism, and a powerful reason to believe (...)
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  27. The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology.Jonathan Cohen - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    Color provides an instance of a general puzzle about how to reconcile the picture of the world given to us by our ordinary experience with the picture of the world given to us by our best theoretical accounts. The Red and the Real offers a new approach to such longstanding philosophical puzzles about what colors are and how they fit into nature. It is responsive to a broad range of constraints --- both the ordinary constraints of color experience and the (...)
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  28. Redness, Reality, and Relationalism.Jonathan Cohen - 2012 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):351-378.
    In this paper I reply to two sets of criticisms—a first from Joshua Gert, and a second from Keith Allen—of the relationalist view of color developed and defended in my book, The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology.
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  29. Objectivity and subjectivity revisited: Colour as a psychobiological property.Gary Hatfield - 2003 - In Rainer Mausfeld & Dieter Heyer, Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World. Oxford University Press. pp. 187--202.
    This chapter focuses on the notion of color as a property of the surfaces of objects. It considers three positions on what colors are: objectivist, subjectivist, and relationalist. Examination of the arguments of the objectivists will help us understand how they seek to reduce color to a physical property of object surfaces. Subjectivists, by contrast, seek to argue that no such reduction is possible, and hence that color must be wholly subjective. This chapter argues that when functional considerations are taken (...)
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  30. Color objectivism and color pluralism.Vivian Mizrahi - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (3):283-306.
    Most objectivist and dispositionalist theories of color have tried to resolve the challenge raised by color variations by drawing a distinction between real and apparent colors. This paper considers such a strategy to be fundamentally erroneous. The high degree of variability of colors constitutes a crucial feature of colors and color perception; it cannot be avoided without leaving aside the real nature of color. The objectivist theory of color defended in this paper holds that objects have locally many different objective (...)
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  31.  36
    The Self-Locating Property Theory of Color.Mazviita Chirimuuta - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):133-147.
    The paper reviews the empirical evidence for highly significant variation across perceivers in hue perception and argues that color physicalism cannot accommodate this variability. Two views that can accommodate the individual differences in hue perception are considered: the self-locating property theory, according to which colors are self-locating properties, and color relationalism, according to which colors are relations to perceivers and viewing conditions. It is subsequently argued that on a plausible rendition of the two views, the self-locating theory has a (...)
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  32. Inter-species variation in colour perception.Keith Allen - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):197 - 220.
    Inter-species variation in colour perception poses a serious problem for the view that colours are mind-independent properties. Given that colour perception varies so drastically across species, which species perceives colours as they really are? In this paper, I argue that all do. Specifically, I argue that members of different species perceive properties that are determinates of different, mutually compatible, determinables. This is an instance of a general selectionist strategy for dealing with cases of perceptual variation. According to selectionist (...)
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  33. Another look at color primitivism.Pendaran Roberts - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2489-2506.
    This article is on a precise kind of color primitivism, ‘ostensivism.’ This is the view that it is in the nature of the colors that they are phenomenal, non-reductive, structural, categorical properties. First, I differentiate ostensivism from other precise forms of primitivism. Next, I examine the core belief ‘Revelation,’ and propose a revised version, which, unlike standard statements, is compatible with a yet unstated but plausible core belief: roughly, that there are interesting things to be discovered about the nature of (...)
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  34.  16
    On Relationist Ontology of Color.Kristina Pucko - 2013 - Balkan Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):103-110.
    This paper critically discusses role functionalism about color and suggests that it is not such a sui generis position as it is often considered to be. The discussionfocuses upon one, hopefully, central point. The main proponent of the idea of role functionalism is Jonathan Cohen who in his book The Red and the Real (2009)suggests a Refined Taxonomy of positions on color ontology. Namely, his proposal implies that color ontology should be divided into relationalist and non-relationalist accounts. Generally, he endorses (...)
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  35. Metaphysics of Color 2: Non‐Physicalist Theories of Color.Heather Logue - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):220-231.
    This entry outlines relationalism, primitivism, and eliminativism about color and considers objections to each theory.
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  36. A Problem For Relational Theories of Color.Edward Wilson Averill & Allan Hazlett - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):140-145.
    We argue that relationalism entails an unacceptable claim about the content of visual experience: that ordinary ‘red’ objects look like they look like they look like they’re red, etc.
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  37. Helmholtz on Perceptual Properties.R. Brian Tracz - 2018 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 6 (3).
    Hermann von Helmholtz’s work on perceptual science had a fundamental impact on Neo-Kantian movements in the late nineteenth century, and his influence continues to be felt in psychology and analytic philosophy of perception. As is widely acknowledged, Helmholtz denied that we can perceive mind-independent properties of external objects, a view I label Ignorance. Given his commitment to Ignorance, Helmholtz might seem to be committed to a subjectivism according to which we only perceive properties of our own representations. Against this, I (...)
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  38. Parsing the rainbow.Pendaran Roberts - 2014 - Synthese 191 (8):1793-1811.
    Navigating the ontology of color used to be a simple affair. There was the naive view that colors really are in objects the way they appear, and the view that they are secondary qualities to cause certain experiences in us. Today, there are myriad well-developed views but no satisfactory taxonomy of philosophical theories on color. In this article, I first examine the two newest taxonomies on offer and argue that they are inadequate. In particular, I look at Brogaard’s taxonomy and (...)
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  39. How beliefs are like colors.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7889-7918.
    Double dissociations between perceivable colors and physical properties of colored objects have led many philosophers to endorse relationalist accounts of color. I argue that there are analogous double dissociations between attitudes of belief—the beliefs that people attribute to each other in everyday life—and intrinsic cognitive states of belief—the beliefs that some cognitive scientists posit as cogs in cognitive systems—pitched at every level of psychological explanation. These dissociations provide good reason to refrain from conflating attitudes of belief with intrinsic cognitive states (...)
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  40. What’s That Smell?Clare Batty - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):321-348.
    In philosophical discussions of the secondary qualities, color has taken center stage. Smells, tastes, sounds, and feels have been treated, by and large, as mere accessories to colors. We are, as it is said, visual creatures. This, at least, has been the working assumption in the philosophy of perception and in those metaphysical discussions about the nature of the secondary qualities. The result has been a scarcity of work on the “other” secondary qualities. In this paper, I take smells and (...)
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  41. The individual variability problem.Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (3):533-554.
    Studies show that there are widespread intrasubjective and intersubjective color variations among normal perceivers. These variations have serious ramifications in the debate about the nature and ontology of color. It is typical to think of the debate about color as a dispute between objectivists and subjectivists. Objectivists hold that colors are perceiver-independent physical properties of objects while subjectivists hold that they are either projections onto external objects or dispositions objects have to look colored. I argue that individual color variations present (...)
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  42.  25
    The Problem of Perceptual Agreement.Elay Shech & Michael Watkins - 2023 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 23 (68):133-138.
    We present the problem of perceptual agreement (of determinate color) and submit that it proves to be a serious and long overlooked obstacle for those insisting that colors are not objective features of objects, viz., nonobjectivist theories like C. L. Hardin’s (2003) eliminativism and Jonathan Cohen’s (2009) relationalism.
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  43.  51
    Colors, Perceptual Variation, and Science.Michael Watkins & Elay Shech - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (3):1157-1181.
    Arguments from perceptual variation challenge the view that colors are objective properties of objects, properties that objects have independent of how they are perceived. This paper attempts, first, to diagnose one central reason why arguments from perceptual variation seem especially challenging for objectivists about color. Second, we offer a response to this challenge, claiming that once we focus on determinate colors rather than the determinables they determine, a response to arguments from perceptual variation becomes apparent. Third, our nominal opponents are (...)
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  44. Selectionism and Diaphaneity.Paweł Jakub Zięba - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (Suppl 2):S361–S391.
    Brain activity determines which relations between objects in the environment are perceived as differences and similarities in colour, smell, sound, etc. According to selectionism, brain activity does not create those relations; it only selects which of them are perceptually available to the subject on a given occasion. In effect, selectionism entails that perceptual experience is diaphanous, i.e. that sameness and difference in the phenomenal character of experience is exhausted by sameness and difference in the perceived items. It has been (...)
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  45.  37
    Crazy Relations.Joshua Gert - 2012 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):315-330.
    In The Red and the Real, Jonathan Cohen defends a relationalist view of color: the view that colors are constituted by relations between objects, perceivers, and circumstances. Cohen’s defense of relationalism is often ingenious, but it also commits him to some extremely counterintuitive—one might say “crazy”—claims. The present paper argues that the phenomena that are captured by Cohen’s ingenious defense of his interesting view can be captured equally well by a more “boring” view. Such a view distinguishes between colors (...)
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  46.  9
    Alan street.I. Premonitions, I. I. I. Chord-Colours & I. V. Peripeteia - 1994 - In Anthony Pople, Theory, analysis and meaning in music. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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  47. The Myth of the Common Sense Conception of Color.Zed Adams & Nat Hansen - 2020 - In Teresa Marques & Åsa Wikforss, Shifting Concepts: The Philosophy and Psychology of Conceptual Variability. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 106-127.
    Some philosophical theories of the nature of color aim to respect a "common sense" conception of color: aligning with the common sense conception is supposed to speak in favor of a theory and conflicting with it is supposed to speak against a theory. In this paper, we argue that the idea of a "common sense" conception of color that philosophers of color have relied upon is overly simplistic. By drawing on experimental and historical evidence, we show how conceptions of color (...)
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  48. Universals in color naming and memory.Eleanor R. Heider - 1972 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 93 (1):10.
  49.  25
    Colour Vision: A Study in Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Perception.Evan Thompson - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (2):339-343.
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  50. Consciousness, colour, and content. Michael Tye.Bill Brewer - 2001 - Mind 110 (439):869-874.
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