Results for 'Colour Eliminativism'

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  1. Color Eliminativism and Color Experience.Emmett L. Holman - 2002 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (1):38-56.
    Anyone who is a color eliminativist‐i.e., believes that the physical world is colorless‐must explain how our sense experience of color can be so systematically illusory. As it turns out, it is difficult to do this without committing oneself to dualism. In this paper I explore the options available to the color eliminativist in this regard, and argue that his/her prospects are more promising, though still far from certain, if s/he adopts the position that sense experience is strictly intentional.
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  2. Color Eliminativism and Intuitions about Colors.Valtteri Arstila - 2010 - Rivista di Estetica 43:29-45.
    The philosophical debate over the nature of color has been governed by what we have learnt from color vision science and what color phenomenology suggests to us. It is usually thought that color eliminativism, which maintains that physical objects do not have any properties that can be identified with colors, can account for the former but not the latter. After all, what could be more obvious than the external world to be colored? Here I outline one color eliminativistic response (...)
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  3. Colour eliminativism.Barry Maund - 2011 - In Lawrence Nolan, Primary and secondary qualities: the historical and ongoing debate. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
     
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  4. Color Eliminativism (2006 Manuscript).Adam Pautz - manuscript
    This paper (from 2006) is now defunct. I argue against "realist primitivism". One of my arguments is a kind of "evolutionary debunking argument". Some of the material of this was incorporated into “Can Disjunctivists Explain Our Access to the Sensible World?” and "How Does Color Experience Represent the World?".
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  5. Colour Eliminativism or Colour Relativism?Berit Brogaard - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (2):305 - 321.
    Philosophical Papers, Volume 41, Issue 2, Page 305-321, July 2012.
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  6.  83
    Colour Relationalism and Colour Irrealism/Eliminativism/Fictionalism.Barry Maund - 2012 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):379-398.
    Jonathan Cohen has produced a powerful argument for Colour Relationalism: the metaphysical thesis that colours are relational properties of a certain sort—relational with respect to perceivers and circumstances. Cohen makes two important assumptions: one is that Colour Relationalism and Colour Irrealism (which include Colour Eliminativism, Fictionalism and other “error theories”) are rivals; the second is that “error theories” are theories of last resort. In this paper, I challenge both assumptions. In particular, I argue that there (...)
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  7.  72
    Colour Relationalism and Colour Irrealism/Eliminativism/Fictionalism.John Barry Maund - 2012 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):379-398.
    Jonathan Cohen has produced a powerful argument for Colour Relationalism: the metaphysical thesis that colours are relational properties of a certain sort—relational with respect to perceivers and circumstances. Cohen makes two important assumptions: one is that Colour Relationalism and Colour Irrealism (which include Colour Eliminativism, Fictionalism and other “error theories”) are rivals; the second is that “error theories” are theories of last resort. In this paper, I challenge both assumptions. In particular, I argue that there (...)
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  8.  29
    Colour variation without objective colour.Derek Brown - 2022 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 3:1-31.
    Colour variation is the fact that what colour physical objects look to have depends on viewing conditions and a perceiver’s visual system. Both Colour Relationalists and Colour Eliminativists regard their analyses of colour variation as central to the justification for their respective views. Yet the analyses are decidedly different. Colour Relationalists assert that most instances of colour variation are veridical and infer from this that colours are relational properties of objects that are partly (...)
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  9.  26
    Eliminativism, First-Person Knowledge and Phenomenal Intentionality A Reply to Levine.Charles Siewert - 2003 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 9.
    Levine suggests the following criticisms of my book. First, the absence of a positive account of first-person knowledge in it makes it vulnerable to eliminativist refutation. Second, it is a relative strength of the higher order representation accounts of consciousness I reject that they offer explanations of the subjectivity of conscious states and their special availability to first-person knowledge. Further, the close connection I draw between the phenomenal character of experience and intentionality is unwarranted in the case of both color (...)
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  10. Unknowable Colour Facts.Brian Cutter - 2021 - Mind 130 (519):909-941.
    It is common for an object to present different colour appearances to different perceivers, even when the perceivers and viewing conditions are normal. For example, a Munsell chip might look unique green to you and yellowish green to me in normal viewing conditions. In such cases, there are three possibilities. Ecumenism: both experiences are veridical. Nihilism: both experiences are non-veridical. Inegalitarianism: one experience is veridical and the other is non-veridical. Perhaps the most important objection to inegalitarianism is the ignorance (...)
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  11. Eliminativism and indeterminate consciousness.Glenn Braddock - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):37-54.
    One of Daniel Dennett's most sophisticated arguments for his eliminativism about phenomenological properties centers around the color phi phenomenon. He attempts to show that there is no phenomenological fact of the matter concerning the phenomenon of apparent motion because it is impossible to decide between two competing explanations. I argue that the two explanations considered by Dennett are both based on the assumption that a realist account of the phenomenon must include a neat mapping between phenomenological time and objective (...)
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  12. (1 other version)Color Primitivism.David R. Hilbert & Alex Byrne - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):73 - 105.
    The typical kind of color realism is reductive: the color properties are identified with properties specified in other terms (as ways of altering light, for instance). If no reductive analysis is available — if the colors are primitive sui generis properties — this is often taken to be a convincing argument for eliminativism. That is, realist primitivism is usually thought to be untenable. The realist preference for reductive theories of color over the last few decades is particularly striking in (...)
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  13.  80
    A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour.Keith Allen - 2016 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK.
    A Naive Realist Theory of Colour defends the view that colours are mind-independent properties of things in the environment, that are distinct from properties identified by the physical sciences. This view stands in contrast to the long-standing and wide-spread view amongst philosophers and scientists that colours don't really exist - or at any rate, that if they do exist, then they are radically different from the way that they appear. It is argued that a naive realist theory of (...) best explains how colours appear to perceiving subjects, and that this view is not undermined either by reflecting on variations in colour perception between perceivers and across perceptual conditions, or by our modern scientific understanding of the world. A Naive Realist Theory of Colour also illustrates how our understanding of what colours are has far-reaching implications for wider questions about the nature of perceptual experience, the relationship between mind and world, the problem of consciousness, the apparent tension between common sense and scientific representations of the world, and even the very nature and possibility of philosophical inquiry. (shrink)
  14. Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot.Pär Sundström - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.
    Colours and consciousness both present us with metaphysical problems. But what exactly are the problems? According to standard accounts, they are roughly the following. On the one hand, we have reason to believe, about both colour and consciousness, that they are identical with some familiar natural phenomena. But on the other hand, it is hard to see how these identities could obtain. I argue that this is an adequate characterisation of our metaphysical problem of colour, but a mischaracterisation (...)
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  15. The illusory theory of colours: An anti-realist theory.Barry Maund - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (3):245-268.
    Despite the fact about colour, that it is one of the most obvious and conspicuous features of the world, there is a vast number of different theories about colour, theories which seem to be proliferating rather than decreasing. How is it possible that there can be so much disagreement about what colours are? Is it possible that these different theorists are not talking about the same thing? Could it be that more than one of them is right? Indeed (...)
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  16. Hardin, Tye, and Color Physicalism.David R. Hilbert - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):37-43.
    Larry Hardin has been the most steadfast and influential critic of physicalist theories of color over the last 20 years. In their modern form these theories originated with the work of Smart and Armstrong in the 1960s and 1970s1 and Hardin appropriately concentrated on their views in his initial critique of physicalism.2 In his most recent contribution to this project3 he attacks Michael Tye’s recent attempts to defend and extend color physicalism.4 Like Byrne and Hilbert5, Tye identifies color with the (...)
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  17. Colour.Laura Gow - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (11):803-813.
    The view that physical objects do not, in fact, possess colour properties is certainly the dominant position amongst scientists working on colour vision. It is also a reasonably popular view amongst philosophers. However, the recent philosophical debate about the metaphysical status of colour properties seems to have taken a more realist turn. In this article, I review the main philosophical views – eliminativism, physicalism, dispositionalism and primitivism – and describe the problems they face. I also examine (...)
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  18. Colour Fictionalism.Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2010 - Rivista di Estetica 43:109-123.
    In "How to Speak of the Colors", Mark Johnston’s claims that eliminativism would require us to jettison colour discourse. In this paper, I challenge Johnston’s claim. I argue that a particular version of eliminativism, i.e., prescriptive colour fictionalism, allows us to continue employing colour discourse as we have thus far in the absence of colours. In doing so, it employs statistical models in its base discourse to derive high-level statistical constructs that can be linked to (...)
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  19. Perceived colors and perceived locations: A problem for color subjectivism.Peter W. Ross - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):125-138.
    Color subjectivists claim that, despite appearances to the contrary, the world external to the mind is colorless. However, in giving an account of color perception, subjectivists about the nature of perceived color must address the nature of perceived spatial location as well. The argument here will be that subjectivists’ problems with coordinating the metaphysics of perceived color and perceived location render color perception implausibly mysterious. Consequently, some version of color realism, the view that colors are (physical, dispositional, functional, sui generis, (...)
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  20. The Myth of the Common Sense Conception of Color.Zed Adams & Nat Hansen - 2020 - In Teresa Marques & Åsa Wikforss, Shifting Concepts: The Philosophy and Psychology of Conceptual Variability. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 106-127.
    Some philosophical theories of the nature of color aim to respect a "common sense" conception of color: aligning with the common sense conception is supposed to speak in favor of a theory and conflicting with it is supposed to speak against a theory. In this paper, we argue that the idea of a "common sense" conception of color that philosophers of color have relied upon is overly simplistic. By drawing on experimental and historical evidence, we show how conceptions of color (...)
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  21. It's not easy being green : Hardin and color relationalism.Jonathan Cohen - 2010 - In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen, Color Ontology and Color Science. Bradford.
    But Hardin hasn’t contented himself with reframing traditional philosoph- ical issues about color in a way that is sensitive to relevant empirical con- straints. In addition, he has been a staunch defender of color eliminativism — the view that there are no colors, qua properties of tables, chairs, and other mind-external objects, and a vociferous critic of several varieties of re- alism about color that have been defended by others (e.g., [Hardin, 2003], [Hardin, 2005]). These other views include the (...)
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  22. Metaphysics of Color 2: Non‐Physicalist Theories of Color.Heather Logue - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):220-231.
    This entry outlines relationalism, primitivism, and eliminativism about color and considers objections to each theory.
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  23. Forestalling a food fight over color.Daniel C. Dennett - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):788-789.
    Byrne and Hilbert provide valuable clarification of the complexities–undreamt of by the layman–that make it hard to answer the question of what color is, and that often lead color scientists to say such remarkable and extravagant things. They emphasize at the outset that their issue is not just how to define the ordinary language term “color”: “The problem of color realism is like the investigation of what humans can digest, not the investigation of the folk category of food.” [ms p4], (...)
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  24. Perceptual variation, realism, and relativization, or: How I learned to stop worrying and love variations in color vision.Jonathan Cohen - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):25-26.
    In many cases of variation in color vision, there is no non-arbitrary way of choosing between variants. Byrne and Hilbert insist that there is an unknown standard for choosing, while eliminativists claim that all the variants are erroneous. A better response relativizes colors to perceivers, thereby providing a color realism that avoids the need to choose between variants.
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  25. Do we have to be realists about colour in order to be able to attribute colour perceptions to other persons?Ralph Schumacher - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):233 - 246.
    One of the main targets of Barry Stroud’s criticism in his recent book ‚The Quest for Reality. Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of Colour’ are eliminativist theories of colour which he regards as a version of the metaphysical project of the unmasking of colours (Stroud, 2000). According to this view, no physical objects have any of the colours we see them or believe them to have. However, although this error theory describes all our colour perceptions as illusory, and (...)
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  26. Reliable Misrepresentation and Teleosemantics.Marc Artiga - 2013 - Disputatio (37):265-281.
    Mendelovici (forthcoming) has recently argued that (1) tracking theories of mental representation (including teleosemantics) are incompatible with the possibility of reliable misrepresentation and that (2) this is an important difficulty for them. Furthermore, she argues that this problem commits teleosemantics to an unjustified a priori rejection of color eliminativism. In this paper I argue that (1) teleosemantics can accommodate most cases of reliable misrepresentation, (2) those cases the theory fails to account for are not objectionable and (3) teleosemantics is (...)
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  27. Descartes’ God is a deceiver, and that’s OK.Joseph Gottlieb & Saja Parvizian - 2023 - Synthese 202 (3):1-29.
    That Descartes’ God is not a deceiver is amongst the canonical claims of early modern philosophy. The significance of this (purported) fact to the coherence of Descartes’ system is likewise canonical, infused in how we teach and think about the _Meditations_. Though prevalent, both ends of this narrative are suspect. We argue that Descartes’ color eliminativism, when coupled with his analysis of the cognitive structure of our sensory systems, entails that God is a deceiver. It’s doubtful that Descartes recognized (...)
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  28.  73
    The unique hues and the argument from phenomenal structure.Wayne Wright - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1513-1533.
    Hardin’s empirically-grounded argument for color eliminativism has defined the color realism debate for the last 30 years. By Hardin’s own estimation, phenomenal structure—the unique/binary hue distinction in particular—poses the greatest problem for color realism. Examination of relevant empirical findings shows that claims about the unique hues which play a central role in the argument from phenomenal structure should be rejected. Chiefly, contrary to widespread belief amongst philosophers and scientists, the unique hues do not play a fundamental role in determining (...)
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  29.  32
    Race, Intellectual Racism, and the Opened Door.Edwin Etieyibo - 2023 - Critical Philosophy of Race 11 (2):309-338.
    ABSTRACT There are forms of discriminations that are not defensible, and unjustified discriminations manifest in different forms. One such manifestation is racism, which involves the use of morally arbitrary natural and moral constituents (characteristics, abilities, qualities) to demarcate racial or ethnic groups and consequently designate some groups as superior and others as inferior. In this article, I discuss one form of racism (intellectual racism), namely, racism in relation to color, as a way of highlighting how the notion of superiority and (...)
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  30. Locating The Unique Hues.Keith Allen - 2010 - Rivista di Estetica 43:13-28.
    Variations in colour perception have featured prominently in recent attempts to argue against the view that colours are objective mind-independent properties of the perceptual environment. My aim in this paper is to defend the view that colours are mind-independent properties in response to worries arising from one type of empirically documented case of perceptual variation: variation in the perception of the «unique hues». §1 sets out the challenge raised by variation in the perception of the unique hues. I argue (...)
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  31.  11
    Colors and reflectances.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 1997 - In Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert, Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
    When we open our eyes, the world seems full of colored opaque objects, light sources, and transparent volumes. One historically popular view, _eliminativism_, is that the world is not in this respect as it appears to be: nothing has any color. Color _realism_, the denial of eliminativism, comes in three mutually exclusive varieties, which may be taken to exhaust the space of plausible realist theories. Acccording to _dispositionalism_, colors are _psychological_ dispositions: dispositions to produce certain kinds of visual experiences. (...)
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  32. Colors and reflectances.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 1997 - In Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert, Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
    When we open our eyes, the world seems full of colored opaque objects, light sources, and transparent volumes. One historically popular view, _eliminativism_, is that the world is not in this respect as it appears to be: nothing has any color. Color _realism_, the denial of eliminativism, comes in three mutually exclusive varieties, which may be taken to exhaust the space of plausible realist theories. Acccording to _dispositionalism_, colors are _psychological_ dispositions: dispositions to produce certain kinds of visual experiences. (...)
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  33. Vagueness and Normativity.Avram Hiller - 2005 - Dissertation, Duke University
    [Author's note: I am posting this dissertation since it may be of interest to some people working on vagueness and related topics. It does not represent my current views on the topic. I have never attempted to publish any of this work, though I hope some day to return to it.] -/- Philosophers have devoted a lot of attention to vagueness in recent years, but there is still no general consensus about how to resolve the Sorites paradox. Timothy Williamson‘s epistemic (...)
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  34.  25
    The Problem of Perceptual Agreement.Elay Shech & Michael Watkins - 2023 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 23 (68):133-138.
    We present the problem of perceptual agreement (of determinate color) and submit that it proves to be a serious and long overlooked obstacle for those insisting that colors are not objective features of objects, viz., nonobjectivist theories like C. L. Hardin’s (2003) eliminativism and Jonathan Cohen’s (2009) relationalism.
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  35. Phenomenal Properties: The Epistemology and Metaphysics of Qualia.Andrew R. Bailey - 1998 - Dissertation, University of Calgary
    This dissertation develops and defends a detailed realist, internalist account of qualia which is consistent with physicalism and which does not resurrect the epistemological 'myth of the Given.' In doing so it stakes out a position in the sparsely populated middle ground between the two major opposing factions on the problem of phenomenal consciousness: between those who think we have a priori reasons to believe that qualia are irreducible to the physical , and those who implicitly or explicitly treat qualia (...)
     
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  36. Review of Perry's Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. [REVIEW]Yujin Nagasawa - 2004 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 10.
    John Perry’s Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness is based on the Jean Nicod Lectures, which he gave in Paris in 1999. The main goal of this book is to defend what he calls ‘antecedent physicalism’ from various common objections to physicalism. The book is organised as follows. In Chapter 1 Perry reviews a number of antiphysicalist arguments, which have been intensively discussed in the last few years among philosophers of mind. In Chapters 2 and 3 he formulates antecedent physicalism. Unlike (...), antecedent physicalism grants the subjective character of phenomenal experiences. It then tries to construct the best possible account of them on the assumption that they are physical (p. 27). However, according to Perry, it is a mistake to think that the antecedent physicalist is ‘a complete dogmatist for whom physicalism is a religious principle’. The antecedent physicalist is rather one ‘who is committed to physicalism in the sense that she or he sees some compelling reasons for it and will not give it up without seeing some clear reason to do so’ (p. 27). In the rest of the book Perry attempts to show how his antecedent physicalism can block existing antiphysicalist arguments. In PSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ Chapter 4 he discusses the zombie argument, according to which physicalism is false because the existence of a zombie—someone physically identical to a human being but lacking conscious experience altogether—is a logical possibility. In Chapters 5, 6 and 7 Perry discusses the knowledge argument, according to which physicalism is false because there could be a scientist—call her Mary—who knows all the physical facts but does not know what it is like to see colour. In Chapter 8 Perry discusses the modal argument, according to which physicalism, the identity theory in particular, is false because psychophysical identity statements such as ‘pain=c-fibre stimulation’ cannot be true, even if we regard them as necessary and a posteriori.. (shrink)
     
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  37. Fiona Cowie.Why Isn'T. Stich an ElimiNativist - 2009 - In Dominic Murphy & Michael Bishop, Stich and His Critics. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 74.
  38.  9
    Alan street.I. Premonitions, I. I. I. Chord-Colours & I. V. Peripeteia - 1994 - In Anthony Pople, Theory, analysis and meaning in music. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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  39. Universals in color naming and memory.Eleanor R. Heider - 1972 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 93 (1):10.
  40. The Plasticity of Categories: The Case of Colour.Jaap Van Brakel - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):103-135.
    Probably colour is the best worked-out example of allegedly neurophysiologically innate response categories determining percepts and percepts determining concepts, and hence biology fixing the basic categories implicit in the use of language. In this paper I argue against this view and I take C. L. Hardin's Color for Philosophers [1988] as my main target. I start by undermining the view that four unique hues stand apart from all other colour shades (Section 2) and the confidence that the solar (...)
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  41. Parallel processing of colour steps in the presence of colour gradients.L. Galli & M. Fahle - 1996 - In Enrique Villanueva, Perception. Ridgeview Pub. Co. pp. 104-104.
     
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  42. The character of color predicates: A phenomenalist view.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 1997 - In M. Anduschus, Albert Newen & Wolfgang Kunne, Direct Reference, Indexicality, and Propositional Attitudes. CSLI Press.
     
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  43. Are there nontrivial constraints on colour categorization?B. A. C. Saunders & J. van Brakel - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (2):167-179.
    In this target article the following hypotheses are discussed: (1) Colour is autonomous: a perceptuolinguistic and behavioural universal. (2) It is completely described by three independent attributes: hue, brightness, and saturation: (3) Phenomenologically and psychophysically there are four unique hues: red, green, blue, and yellow; (4) The unique hues are underpinned by two opponent psychophysical and/or neuronal channels: red/green, blue/yellow. The relevant literature is reviewed. We conclude: (i) Psychophysics and neurophysiology fail to set nontrivial constraints on colour categorization. (...)
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  44. Can the physicalist explain colour structure in terms of colour experience?1.Adam Pautz - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):535 – 564.
    Physicalism about colour is the thesis that colours are identical with response-independent, physical properties of objects. I endorse the Argument from Structure against Physicalism about colour. The argument states that Physicalism cannot accommodate certain obvious facts about colour structure: for instance, that red is a unitary colour while purple is a binary colour, and that blue resembles purple more than green. I provide a detailed formulation of the argument. According to the most popular response to (...)
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  45.  54
    Wittgenstein's Colour Puzzles.Fay Zika - 2008 - Philosophical Inquiry 30 (1-2):191-211.
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  46. Color Perception: From Grassmann Codes to a Dual Code for Object and Illumination Colors.Rainer Mausfeld - 1998 - In Werner Backhaus, Reinhold Kliegl & John Simon Werner, Color Vision: Perspectives from Different Disciplines. De Gruyter.
  47.  22
    The lies that bind: rethinking identity, creed, country, color, class, culture.Anthony Appiah - 2018 - New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation.
    Classification -- Creed -- Country -- Color -- Class -- Culture -- Coda.
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  48.  73
    Can a physicalist notion of color provide any insight into the nature of color perception?Rainer Mausfeld & Reinhard Niederée - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):41-42.
    Byrne & Hilbert conceive of color perception as the representation of a physical property “out there.” In our view, their approach does not only have various internal problems, but is also apt to becloud both the intricate and still poorly understood role that “ color ” plays within perceptual architecture, and the complex coupling to the “external world” of the perceptual system as an entirety. We propose an alternative perspective, which avoids B&H's misleading dichotomy between a purely subjective and a (...)
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  49. Vagueness and Order Effects in Color Categorization.Paul Egré, Vincent de Gardelle & David Ripley - 2013 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 22 (4):391-420.
    This paper proposes an experimental investigation of the use of vague predicates in dynamic sorites. We present the results of two studies in which subjects had to categorize colored squares at the borderline between two color categories (Green vs. Blue, Yellow vs. Orange). Our main aim was to probe for hysteresis in the ordered transitions between the respective colors, namely for the longer persistence of the initial category. Our main finding is a reverse phenomenon of enhanced contrast (i.e. negative hysteresis), (...)
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  50. What do the colour-blind see?Justin Broackes - 2010 - In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen, Color Ontology and Color Science. Bradford. pp. 291.
    This chapter discusses color blindness and how it can be considered a guide and test for theories of normal vision. There are a multitude of stories to be told about the physiology of the receptor pigments of the eye and the genes that code for them, about the various kinds of cells in the retina and elsewhere in the visual system, and about color processing in the brain. It is a topic on which psychologists, physicists, biologists, and neurophysiologists have reason (...)
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