In this paper, we provide a new formulation of a coherence theory of truth using the resources of the partial structures approach − in particular the notions of partial structure and quasi-truth. After developing this new formulation, we apply the resulting theory to the philosophy of mathematics, and argue that it can be used to develop a new account of nominalism in mathematics. This application illustrates the strength and usefulness of the proposed formulation of a (...) coherence theory of truth.Neste artigo, propomos uma nova formulação de uma teoria coerentista da verdade utilizando os recursos da abordagem de estruturas parciais - em particular as noções de estrutura parcial e quase-verdade. Após desenvolver esta formulação, aplicamos a teoria resultante à filosofia da matemática, e argumentamos que aquela pode ser usada para desenvolver um novo tratamento do nominalismo na matemática. Esta aplicação ilustra a força e utilidade da formulação proposta de uma teoria coerentista da verdade. (shrink)

In this paper, we provide a new formulation of a coherence theory of truth using the resources of the partial structures approach − in particular the notions of partial structure and quasi-truth. After developing this new formulation, we apply the resulting theory to the philosophy of mathematics, and argue that it can be used to develop a new account of nominalism in mathematics. This application illustrates the strength and usefulness of the proposed formulation of a (...) coherence theory of truth. (shrink)

Haig Khatchadourian is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukie. He received his PhD in philosophy from Duke University and has been awarded several prizes for poetry and literary essays. In 1973 he received the Outstanding Educator of America Award.

A massive series of meticulous clarifications and arguments is marshalled to attempt to refute, first, the doctrine that all relations are "internal", next, the claims that coherence is the sole criterion of the nature of truth, and finally, the theory of degrees of truth and falsity. The author's great familiarity with the literature of the coherence theorists proves almost a drawback: he prefers to cite texts extensively, but must then acknowledge important differences among them. There (...) is little in the way of a constructive alternative theory of truth, but the criticism is formidable.--W. L. M. (shrink)

Arguments pro and contra convergent realism - underdetermination of theory by observational evidence and pessimistic meta-induction from past falsity- are considered. It is argued that, to meet the counter-arguments challenge, convergent realism should be considerably changed with a help of modification of the propositions from this meta-programme’s “hard core” and “protecting belt”. Maybe one of the ways out is to turn to the coherent theory of truth. Some of the works of Hegel (as interpreted by Merab Mamardashvili (...) and Alexandre Kojev), Husserl and Heidegger can help to dig still deeper into the background of this theory. Key words: Husserl, Heidegger, Hegel, convergent realism, internal realism, coherent theory of truth. -/- . (shrink)

Quine argues, in “On the Nature of Moral Values” that a coherence theory of truth is the “lot of ethics”. In this paper, I do a bit of work from within Quinean theory. Specifically, I explore precisely what a coherence theory of truth in ethics might look like and what it might imply for the study of normative value theory generally. The first section of the paper is dedicated to the exposition of (...) a formally correct coherence truth predicate, the possibility of which has been the subject of some skepticism. In the final two sections of the paper, I claim that a coherence theory in ethics does not reduce the practice of moral inquiry to absurdity, in practice as well as in principle. (shrink)

Although its use is not universal, there is a map of the logical space of theories of truth that is widely applied. According to this map, the most foundational divide amongst theories of truth is that between deflationary and inflationary theories, where, roughly, the former hold that truth is an insubstantial, logical property of little philosophical interest and the latter that it is a substantial property suitable for philosophical attention. Amongst the inflationary theories, there are other fundamental (...) divisions. For example, on the one hand, correspondence theorists hold that the truth of a proposition is a matter of the proposition’s standing in a relation to something else which is not a proposition, such as a fact. On the other hand, coherence theorists hold that the truth of a proposition is a matter of its relations to other propositions. And again, pragmatists hold that the truth of a proposition is a matter of its being useful to believe. Throughout the twentieth century, philosophers used one or other version of this map to orient themselves and their students in the often complex and confusing debates about truth, even while acknowledging that the map may be incomplete in crucial respects (it does not include functionalist and pluralist views, for example). Our objection to the map is not that it is incomplete—although it obviously is—, but that it needs to be radically redrawn. In particular, the familiar division between coherence theories and correspondence theories needs to be rethought. The coherence theory is so often glibly dismissed as absurd that labelling someone as a coherence theorist is often seen as reason enough to ignore them.1 While none of the philosophers usually so labelled should be ignored, we shall argue (§3) that none of them actually held this view anyway. The difficulty—perhaps impossibility—of finding a genuine coherence theorist of truth strikes us as more than just an indication that this is a rare animal. Rather, it suggests the possibility of something significant, namely, that the only occupant of this position in historical space is a set of slogans; this would give us some reason to suppose that the logical space of theories is just as empty at this point.. (shrink)

In this paper I examine five essential themes in Brand Blanshard's coherence theory of truth. Blanshard defines truth in terms of the rational or the interdependence of concepts, where concepts determine objects of experience rather than merely conform to them. On this view, truth is contextual and is the approximation of thought to reality or the systemization of the two ends - the immanent and transcendent. I raise some worries for this account of truth, (...) foremost of which is the worry that it commits us to a deep-seated skepticism, both theoretical and practical. In order to be able to tell when the immanent end is achieved and if it is making progress towards the transcendent end (i.e., when the ultimate systematization is realized), we require an omniscient standpoint of cosmic order or overarching system of beliefs. While this seems possible in principle it is not so in practice. (shrink)

Recent critics of the coherence theory of truth (notably Ralph Walker) have alleged that the theory is incoherent, since its defence presupposes the correctness of the contrary correspondence theory of truth. Coherentists must specify the system of propositions with which true propositons cohere (the specified system). Generally, coherentists claim that the specified system is a system composed of propositions believed by a community. Critics of coherentism maintain that the coherentist’s assertions about which system is (...) the specified system must be true, not because they cohere with a system of beliefs, but because of facts about what a community believes. I argue that coherentists can admit that there are facts about what systems of beliefs communities accept, without being committed to the claim that these facts are the truth conditions of sentences about what communities accept. (shrink)

1. Introduction. In recent years Brand Blanshard’s formulation of the coherence theory of truth, as he articulated it in The Nature of Thought, has come under formidable attack by Professor Nicholas Rescher of the University of Pittsburgh. In his otherwise excellent book, The Coherence Theory of Truth, later excerpted for P. A. Schilpp’s Library of Living Philosophers volume on Professor Blanshard, he criticizes Blanshard on two main counts.

Against blanshard's classic argument for coherence, i maintain that coherence is neither the sole criterion nor nature of truth. in the face of blanshard's insistence that, since truth cannot be a matter of correspondence it must necessarily be a matter of coherence, i propose and defend a third option which combines the two polar positions. i develop this option through analysis of kant's writings on truth.

It is easy to fall for a conceptual beauty and simplicity of the coherence theory of truth. But the texts in which its foundations were for the first time explicitly developed are rich in subtleties, defying a consistent interpretation and inviting various forms of criticism. That is why the following study will take one more look at the writings of Harold H. Joachim and Brand Blanshard, in order to prove that in the analyses which they proposed there (...) is an additional, so far unrecognised element – namely the process of translation – which plays a crucial role in making their accounts valid and complete. Initially then, the article will specify how the notion of translation should be here understood. Next, key postulates of both theories will be recalled, with an indication of several potential inconsistencies which they might entail. Finally, the analysis exposes translative ground of each reconstructed model. What will be thereby underscored, is not only the interpretative depth of Joachim’s and Blanshard’s legacy, but also significance of translation for the philosophical enquiry into the nature of truth. (shrink)

This work attempts to develop a workable formal theory of coherence that avoids the objections traditionally advanced against the earliest versions of the theory. Basically it construes the coherence theory as a criterial rather than definitional approach to truth, i.e., as furnishing a criterion rather than a definition of truth. The problem of criterion is seen as a problem not of guaranteeing but of authorizing criterion. Coherence is a criterion applying to a (...) set of propositions that satisfies the conditions of consistency and connectiveness of the systemic sort. A detailed logical machinery is developed. The pivotal concept is the notion of data as a truth-candidate, "a proposition to be taken not as true, but as potentially or presumptively true.". (shrink)

Theories of Truth provides a clear, critical introduction to one of the most difficult areas of philosophy. It surveys all of the major philosophical theories of truth, presenting the crux of the issues involved at a level accessible to nonexperts yet in a manner sufficiently detailed and original to be of value to professional scholars. Kirkham's systematic treatment and meticulous explanations of terminology ensure that readers will come away from this book with a comprehensive general understanding of one (...) of philosophy's thorniest set of topics. -/- Included are discussions of the correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, semantic, performative, redundancy, appraisal, and truth-as-justification theories. There are also chapters or sections of chapters on the liar paradox, three-valued logic, Field's critique of Tarski, Davidson's program, Dummett's theory of linguistic competence, satisfaction, recursion, the extension/intension distinction, and an explanation of how theories of justification, properly understood, differ from theories of truth. -/- A persistent theme is that philosophers have too often failed to recognize that not all theories of truth are intended to answer the same question. When the various questions are made distinct, it is apparent that many of the "debates" in this field are really cases of philosophers talking past one another. There is much less disagreement within the field than has commonly been thought. (shrink)

I argue that coherentists can admit that there are facts about what systems of beliefs communities accept, without being committed to the claim that these facts are the truth conditions of sentences about what communities accept. (edited).

Truth and philosophy -- A short history of truth -- Coherence -- Pragmatism -- Deflationism -- Correspondence -- Phenomenology -- Realism -- Truth and freedom, economics, and religion.

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein maintains that “The world is all that is the case.” Some philosophers have seen an advantage in introducing into a formal language either a constant which will represent the world, or an operator, e.g., ‘Max’, such that indicates that p gives a complete description of the actual world, of the world at some instant of time, or of a possible world. Such propositions are called world propositions, possible world propositions, or maximal propositions. For us, a maximal (...) proposition is a possible world proposition; it gives a complete description of one way the world might be. A maximal proposition p is not logically false, and for any proposition q, either p entails q or p entails not-q. (shrink)

Werkmeister's new book, The Basis and Structure of Knowledge is the second major attempt in recent years to defend the idealistic theory of knowledge. The first was Blanshard's Nature of Thought; and it is worth noticing that both authors, in undertaking the defense of a position long in the shadows, are well aware of contemporary developments in logic and technical philosophy. Werkmeister freely acknowledges his debt to Blanshard; yet his work differs in scope from the latter's in at least (...) two ways. Firstly, the more recent book is concerned largely with the epistemological analysis of meaning and truth and hardly at all with what an older generation called "philosophical psychology," while philosophical psychology fills all of the first and part of the second volume of Blanshard's work. In my opinion, this is all to the good. (That our generation inverts the error and too often indulges in psychological philosophy is another story!) Secondly, Werkmeister presents us with detailed analyses of scientific method, of the structure of scientific theories, and of mathematics, all three areas to which Blanshard pays virtually no attention. The First Part of Werkmeister's book treats of Language and Meaning; the Second of Truth and the World About Us, the Third of Formal Knowledge, and the Fourth Part deals with Empirical Knowledge. But there is a fundamental thesis that runs through all of this. The analysis of each of these four domains reveals, according to Werkmeister, that only a coherence theory of meaning and truth can adequately reflect the criteria actually used by science and commonsense. It is not my intention to rehearse here the familiar dialectic of the arguments for and against this doctrine; the less so, since Werkmeister himself gives a useful review of both sides of the controversy. Rather, I want to try to fix as precisely as possible, within the context of Werkmeister's discussion, the nature of the difference between coherence theories on the one hand and correspondence theories on the other. This difference has not always been too clearly stated; it even seems that recent developments in linguistic analysis have been the occasion for some new confusions on this very point. For coherence theorists who have recognized that philosophical semantics is a "formal" discipline now insist that "to say what a symbol means is not to relate it to an object, but to give it an interpretation in terms of other symbols," as Ayer2 has recently put it. This seems to contradict the "comparison with fact" feature of the traditional realistic formulations of the correspondence view. A superficial bystander could even believe that the correspondence theorists have given up their original position, since both sides now agree that truth is a matter of a relation between symbols. Such agreement, as I hope to show, is more apparent than real, for what is now at stake is the nature of that "intrasymbolic relation." And on this nature the two parties disagree. There is little doubt that Werkmeister's book appears at a moment more propitious for the advocacy of the coherence theory of truth than did Blanshard's. In the near decade that separates the two works the intellectual climate has become, for better or for worse, considerably more favorable to a reconsideration of, and possibly even a reconciliation with, some of the major tenets of rationalism. This is reflected in the current discussion regarding the contrary-to-fact conditional, the dissatisfaction with material implication, and the correlative concern for a more adequate analysis of the concept of a natural law. It is evident too in the revived enthusiasm for intensional logic and in the related interest in the modalities. As uncompromising an empiricist as C. L. Lewis, with whom, by the way, Werkmeister shares a common Kantian background, has introduced into his latest work a "congruence" theory of truth which, despite the substitution of a so-called "probability" inference for necessary inference, looks very much like the coherance criterion all over again. So Werkmeister's book should be welcome for its clear presentation of the relevant issues; and even those who disagree with him can admire the candor and forthrightness with which he champions what remains, despite vacillations, an essentially unpopular position. (shrink)

The aim of this dissertation is to present a systematic account of F. H. Bradley's philosophy in so far as it is relevant to an understanding of his conception of the nature and criterion of truth. I argue that, for Bradley, the nature of truth is the identity of thought with reality given in immediate experience. There is no absolute separation between thought and its object. Bradley therefore rejects both the correspondence theory and epistemological realism. Thought is (...) not just a mirror which reflects an independently existing reality. ;Concerning the criterion of truth, I argue that his criterion for our ordinary and scientific beliefs is practice, and the criterion for philosophical positions is a kind of coherence based on the doctrine of relative truth. For Bradley, some positions are truer than others, and the best philosophy is a comprehensive system which contains the truth of all different positions. ;Bradley does not accept the coherence theory of justification as it is understood today, since it is based on the standard account of negation and the doctrine of absolute truth. Bradley has a different approach to negation and inconsistency, according to which there are no absolutely inconsistent beliefs. Further, he insists that truth is not absolute but "relative," a matter of degree. All philosophical positions contain some truth, and none is completely false. The truth in philosophy is a position which accounts for the whole of reality and includes all apparently inconsistent positions within it. ;I explain Bradley's place in the history of philosophy and show his connections with the British empiricist tradition. I believe one of Bradley's central concerns is to explain the nature and criterion of truth in philosophy within the constraints of empiricism. I also contrast Bradley's positions on important issues with those of philosophers in the Anglo-American analytic tradition, such as Russell, Moore, Ayer, Tarski, Quine, Churchland, Lehrer and Campbell. I argue that most recent commentators on Bradley overlook the importance of understanding his philosophy as a system constructed according to the doctrine of relative truth. (shrink)

There are often said to be five main 'theories of truth': correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, redundancy, and semantic theories. The coherence theory of truth equates the truth of a judgment with its coherence with other beliefs. Different versions of the theory give different accounts of coherence, but in all its forms the point is to exhibit truth as an internal relation between beliefs. The pragmatic theory of truth is akin (...) to a coherence theory of this Kantian kind. No coherence theorist need deny the uncontentious claim that for a judgment to be true is for it to stand in a certain relationship, which can be called correspondence, with some state of affairs in the world. The conflict with the redundancy theory may be more apparent than real. For the redundancy theory is not a theory of what truth consists in, but a theory about the meaning of the words 'is true'. (shrink)

The classic and contemporary readings in this collection represent the four most influential theories of truth – correspondence, pragmatist, coherence, and deflationary theories. A collection of classic and contemporary philosophical reflections on the nature of truth. Opens with an introduction to theories of truth, designed for readers with little or no prior knowledge of the subject. Divided into four sections on the most important theories of truth - correspondence, pragmatist, coherence, and deflationary theories. Brings (...) together articles in the recent debate over the correspondence theory and deflationism that are not otherwise available in one place. Includes contributions by C.S. Peirce, William James, Bertrand Russell, Alfred Tarski, Hartry Field, Dorothy Grover, Anil Gupta and others. Concludes with an extensive bibliography of recent articles on truth. (shrink)

First published in 1998, this book is an investigation of the possibility of articulating a coherent thesis of truth relativism within first, a host correspondence theory of truth and second, a host coherence theory of truth. The type of relativism addressed in the book is what is sometimes called 'framework relativism' - that where truth is relativised to a framework of belief or conceptual scheme. A further restraint is that a global relativistic thesis (...) is sought - one which is relativistic about all truths. The book does not set itself the task of defending relativism but just that of seeking a coherent articulation of it. (shrink)

In a number of influential articles published since 1972, Dorothy Grover has developed the prosentential theory of truth. Brought together and published with a new introduction, these essays are even more impressive as a group than they were as single contributions to philosophy and linguistics. Denying that truth has an explanatory role, the prosentential theory does not address traditional truth issues like belief, meaning, and justification. Instead, it focuses on the grammatical role of the (...) class='Hi'>truth predicate and asserts that “it is true” is a prosentence, functioning much as a pronoun does. Grover defends the theory by indicating how it can handle notorious paradoxes like the Liar, as well as by analyzing some English truth-usages. The introduction to the volume surveys traditional theories of truth, including correspondence, pragmatic, and coherence theories. It discusses the essays to come and, finally, considers the implications of the prosentential theory for other theories. Despite the fact that the prosentential theory dismisses the “nature of truth” as a red herring, Grover shows that there are important aspects of traditional truth theories that prosentential theorists have the option of endorsing. (shrink)