Health care reforms, in particular the expansion of public and/or private health care benefit coverage to some or all population groups, is becoming an increasingly hot topic for discussion—and in some cases for action—at all levels of government. With almost 16% of Americans estimated to be uninsured for at least part of the year, opinion polls show health care near the top of the general public’s list of concerns. Little wonder that presidential candidates for the 2008 election are incorporating ‘‘universal (...) health care coverage’’ proposals in their campaign platforms. Will ‘‘cradle-to-grave’’ coverage for all become a reality or will they just experience cradle-to-grave debates over this issue? That is essentially one of the questions posed in the following discussion on the role of nonprofit health care organizations in promoting, and operating under, universal health care coverage. (shrink)

Turning his back on neoliberalism, voicing 'the end of history' and the unstoppable spread of liberal values across the globe, Gray's was a lone voice of scepticism. The thinking he criticised would lead to the invasion of Iraq. Today, its folly might seem obvious, but Gray has been trying to warn us for years.

Isaiah Berlin was the greatest intellectual historian of the twentieth century. But his work also made an original and important contribution to moral and political philosophy and to liberal theory. In 1921, at the age of eleven, Isaiah Berlin arrived in England from Riga, Latvia. By the time he was thirty he was at the heart of British intellectual life. He has remained its commanding presence ever since, and few would dispute that he was one of Britain's greatest thinkers. His (...) reputation extends worldwide--as a great conversationalist, intellectual historian, and man of letters. He has been called the century's most inspired reader. Yet Berlin's contributions to thought--in particular to moral and political philosophy, and to liberal theory--are little understood, and surprisingly neglected by the academic world. In this book, they are shown to be animated by a single, powerful, subversive idea: value-pluralism which affirms the reality of a deep conflict between ultimate human values that reason cannot resolve. Though bracingly clear-headed, humane and realist, Berlin's value-pluralism runs against the dominant Western traditions, secular and religious, which avow an ultimate harmony of values. It supports a highly distinctive restatement of liberalism in Berlin's work--an agnostic liberalism, which is founded not on rational choice but on the radical choices we make when faced with intractable dilemmas. It is this new statement of liberalism, the central subject of John Gray's lively and lucid book, which gives the liberal intellectual tradition a new lease on life, a new source of life, and which comprises Berlin's central and enduring legacy. In a new introduction, Gray argues that, in a world in which human freedom has spread more slowly than democracy, Berlin's account of liberty and basic decency is more instructive and useful than ever. (shrink)

Debates in animal cognition are frequently polarized between the romantic view that some species have human-like causal understanding and the killjoy view that human causal reasoning is unique. These apparently endless debates are often characterized by conceptual confusions and accusations of straw-men positions. What is needed is an account of causal understanding that enables researchers to investigate both similarities and differences in cognitive abilities in an incremental evolutionary framework. Here we outline the ways in which a three-dimensional model of causal (...) understanding fulfills these criteria. We describe how this approach clarifies what is at stake, illuminates recent experiments on both physical and social cognition, and plots a path for productive future research that avoids the romantic/killjoy dichotomy. (shrink)

The paper engages Christopher Boorse’s Bio-Statistical Theory (BST). In its current form, BST runs into a significant challenge. For BST to account for its central tenet—that lower-level part-dysfunction is sufficient for higher-level pathology—it must provide criteria for how to decide which lower-level parts are the ones to be analyzed for health or pathology. As BST is a naturalistic theory, such choices must be based solely on naturalistic considerations. An argument is provided to show that, if BST is to be preserved, (...) such parthood choices are based on non-naturalistic considerations. We demonstrate that even when parthood choices are based on the best way to preserve BST, there are counterintuitive results which bring the central tenet of BST into question. (shrink)

Pregnant women and their interests have been underrepresented in health research. Little is known about issues relevant to women considering research participation during pregnancy. We performed in-depth interviews with 22 women enrolled in either one of two trials sponsored by the National Institutes of Health to assess the safety and immunogenicity of the H1N1 vaccine during pregnancy. Three themes characterized women’s decisions to participate in research: they valued early access to the vaccine, they perceived a safety advantage when participating in (...) research, and they wanted to help advance scientific knowledge. However, there were also some considerations that would disincline them to participate in research—for instance, a significant risk of maternal or fetal harm, the presence of a placebo arm in a study, or a requirement to significantly change planned therapy or behavior. Pregnant women who participated in the H1N1 vaccine trials viewed research favorably, citing its advantages over standard clinical care. These findings emphasize that access to benefit should guide policy for including pregnant women in research. (shrink)

Many philosophers of psychology fail to appreciate the constructivist process of science as well as its pragmatic aspects. A well-developed philosophy of science helps to clear many conceptual confusions. However, ridding ourselves of popular complaints only opens more sophisticated worries regarding how we generalize specific events and how we use those generalizations to build physical systems and abstract models. These questions can still be answered though by realizing that science is largely a social enterprise, and how and what we explain (...) depends a great deal upon who is asking the question of whom and when. (shrink)

Fine has introduced an important distinction between constitutive and consequential essence. The constitutive essence of an object comprises truths directly definitive of the object whereas the consequential essence comprises the class of truths following logically from the directly definitive truths (subject to certain constraints). Essence theorists then face a challenge: how shall we draw the line between the truths directly definitive of an object and those that are mere consequences of them? Fine offers an answer. We start with the object’s (...) consequential essence and then filter out from its consequential essence the propositions that are there on account of being partly grounded in others. The object’s constitutive essence comprises what’s left. I argue against this account by presenting a range of cases where it is clear that certain truths ought to count as constitutively essential for certain objects but where Fine’s account rules them out. (shrink)

SAMANTHA GREY | : Prevailing connotations of reconciliation orbit concord or harmonious coexistence, meaning that concern for justice is necessarily subordinated to a more casually pragmatic peace. Bringing justice considerations to the fore means focusing on reparations as a key element of reconciliation’s suite of activities—but reparations are necessarily a matter of process, which precludes considering elements of the “package” in isolation from one another, as is the case with traditional evaluative criteria of motivation or proportion. Accordingly, this article proposes (...) that reparations are better framed as a considered reaction to the unjust allocation of burdens, so that subsequent reallocations serve justice by answering the needs and demands of survivors. Taking cues from a variety of sources both within and beyond the transitional justice literature, the work at hand attempts just such a retrospective reframing by looking at a recently completed Canadian reparations process: the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement. | : Les connotations dominantes de la réconciliation gravitent autour de la concorde ou de la coexistence harmonieuse, signifiant que le souci de la justice est nécessairement subordonné à une paix plus pragmatique. Mettre les considérations de justice au premier plan implique de mettre l’accent sur les réparations comme un élément clé de la série d’activités de la réconciliation, mais les réparations sont nécessairement une question de processus, ce qui exclut de considérer ses éléments isolément, comme c’est le cas des critères évaluatifs traditionnels de motivation ou de proportion. En conséquence, cet article propose que les réparations sont mieux conçues comme une réaction réfléchie à l’attribution injuste des charges, de sorte que les réallocations ultérieures servent la justice en répondant aux besoins et aux exigences des survivants. S’inspirant d’une variété de sources à l’intérieur et à l’extérieur de la littérature sur la justice transitionnelle, le présent travail tente un tel recadrage rétrospectif en examinant un processus canadien de réparations récemment terminé : la Convention de règlement relative aux pensionnats indiens. (shrink)

Three pivotal claims of Kant’s moral philosophy are that: the obliged agent’s will is some form of practical reason; the supreme principle of obligation is an a priori moral law which can in some way determine the agent’s choices; the obliged agent must be thought of as some kind of being with a will free in both a negative sense and a positive sense. The traditional explication of these takes Kant to be claiming that: the obliged agent’s will is pure (...) practical reason; the a priori moral law can determine the agent’s choice in a wholly a priori way; we must suppose the obliged agent is a noumenon. I shall call this the “pure, a priori, noumenal reading” or “PAN.” My aim here is to make out a case for taking Kant instead to claim that: the obliged agent’s will is empirical practical reason; the a priori moral law can determine the obliged agent’s will as applied in an a posteriori way and only as applied in that way; we must suppose the obliged agent is neither a phenomenal object nor a thing in itself but of a third ontological kind I shall refer to as a “subject.” I shall call this the “empirical, a posteriori, subject reading” or “EAS.” There is ample textual support for PAN but philosophically it is a radically unacceptable, because self-defeating, view. EAS is equally plausible as a reading of Kant’s texts and markedly superior philosophically. (shrink)

Hopes for biasing the odds towards the development of AGI that is human-friendly depend on finding and employing ethical theories and practices that can be incorporated successfully in the construction; programming and/or developmental growth; education and mature life world of future AGI. Mainstream ethical theories are ill-adapted for this purpose because of their mono-logical decision procedures which aim at “Golden rule” style principles and judgments which are objective in the sense of being universal and absolute. A much more helpful framework (...) for ethics is provided by a dialogical approach using conflict resolution and negotiation methods; a “Rainbow rule” approach to diversity; and a notion of objectivity as emergent impartiality. This conflict resolution approach will also improve our chances in dealing with two other problems related to the “Friendly AI” problem; the difficulty of programming AI to be not merely smarter but genuinely wiser and the dilemmas that arise in considering whether AGIs will be Friendly to humans out of mere partisanship or out of genuine intent to promote the Good. While these issues are challenging; a strategy for pursuing and promoting research on them can be articulated and basic legislation and corporate policies can be adopted to encourage their development as part of the project of biasing the odds in favor of Friendly and Wise AGI. (shrink)

This work systematically explicates and defends four key claims in Kant's moral philosophy: The human will is some form of practical reason. The supreme criterion for determining the morality of our choices is provided by an a priori moral law. We find this law to be a source of felt value; it commands unqualified respect. We must suppose the human will is free. ;Traditionally, Kant has been read as holding that these claims imply that the responsible moral agent is a (...) noumenon whose will is a pure practical reason structured completely a priori by the moral law. I show that this position must be rejected on philosophical grounds because it implies that the agent is not free, has an impotent and vacuous will, and is neither obligated nor capable of acting out of a sense of respect for the moral law. ;I argue an alternative reading of Kant is textually sound and philosophically superior. This alternative view, which is explicated and defended in detail, holds that: The human will is empirical practical reason. The moral law is an a priori structure which is always applied a posteriori. It is not constitutive but regulative. The feeling of respect is an intuition of the formal pattern of the subjective time order which results insofar as the a priori structure of empirical practical reason directs or commands the movement of our attention. The responsible moral agent is neither a phenomenal object or a noumenal object but rather a subject, a being of a third and distinct ontological kind. ;In working out such an interpretation, I also reconstruct Kant's account of the relations between the faculties of imagination, understanding, reason, and will, holding them to be simply alternative employments of a single, underlying power of synthesis. I also recharacterize the fundamental project of Kant's critical enterprise in order to locate his moral philosophy within it, arguing that his central concern is with how judgment is possible. (shrink)

Reinforcement learning (RL) models of decision-making cannot account for human decisions in the absence of prior reward or punishment. We propose a mechanism for choosing among available options based on goal-option association strengths, where association strengths between objects represent previously experienced object proximity. The proposed mechanism, Goal-Proximity Decision-making (GPD), is implemented within the ACT-R cognitive framework. GPD is found to be more efficient than RL in three maze-navigation simulations. GPD advantages over RL seem to grow as task difficulty is increased. (...) An experiment is presented where participants are asked to make choices in the absence of prior reward. GPD captures human performance in this experiment better than RL. (shrink)

This is a section of Mr. Gray's recent paper read before The Philosophers' Academy covering "The Catholic Movement in France and the Philosophy of de Lamennais".Complete ignorance of the system of the Medieval Schoolmen seems responsible for the contempt in which he held Scholasticism, and indirectly for the vagaries of his own philosophy, and the ultimate shipwreck of his faith.

James Van Cleve here shows why Thomas Reid (1710-96) deserves a place alongside the other canonical figures of modern philosophy. He expounds Reid's positions and arguments on a wide range of topics, taking interpretive stands on points where his meaning is disputed and assessing the value of his contributions to issues philosophers are discussing today. -/- Among the topics Van Cleve explores are Reid's account of perception and its relation to sensation, conception, and belief; his nativist account of (...) the origin of the concepts of space and power; his attempt to clear the way for the belief that the things we directly perceive are external things, not ideas in our minds; his stand on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities; his account of his externalist reply to philosophical skepticism, his volitional theory of action, his use of the distinction between event causation and agent causation to understand freedom of the will, and his criticism of Hume and anticipation of Moore on the analysis of moral judgment. -/- The most comprehensive work on Reid in a quarter century, this book will be welcomed by students of early modern philosophy, epistemology, the philosophy of perception, and the philosophy of action. (shrink)

Why is the human imagination to blame for the worst crimes of the twentieth century? Why is progress a pernicious myth? Why is contemporary atheism just a hangover from Christian faith? John Gray, author of Straw Dogsand Black Mass, is one of the most original and iconoclastic thinkers of our time. In this pugnacious and brilliantly readable collection of essays from across his career, he smashes through humanity's most cherished beliefs to overturn our view of the world, and our (...) place in it. 'If humans are different from other animals it is chiefly in being governed by myths, which are not creations of the will but creatures of the imagination.' 'No traditional myth is as untruthful as the modern myth of progress. All prevailing philosophies embody the fiction that human life can be altered at will. Better aim for the impossible, they say, than submit to fate. Invariably, the result is a cult of human self-assertion that soon ends in farce.'. (shrink)

Lang, B. Philosophy and the manners of art.--Hofstadter, A. Freedom, enownment, and philosophy.--Mehta, J. L. A stranger from Asia.--Fox, D. A. A passage past India.--Rucker, D. Philosophy and the constitution of Emerson's world.--Schneider, H. W. The pragmatic movement in historical perspective.--Barnes, H. E. Reflections on myth and magic.--Cauvel, J. The imperious presence of theater.--Seay, A. Musical conservatism in the fourteenth century.--Hochman, W. R. The enduring fascination of war.--Davenport, M. M. J. Glenn Gray and the promise of wisdom.