This paper presents a formalism that combines useful properties of both logic and probabilities. Like logic, the formalism admits qualitative sentences and provides symbolic machinery for deriving deductively closed beliefs and, like probability, it permits us to express if-then rules with different levels of firmness and to retract beliefs in response to changing observations. Rules are interpreted as order-of-magnitude approximations of conditional probabilities which impose constraints over the rankings of worlds. Inferences are supported by a unique priority ordering on rules (...) which is syntactically derived from the knowledge base. This ordering accounts for rule interactions, respects specificity considerations and facilitates the construction of coherent states of beliefs. Practical algorithms are developed and analyzed for testing consistency, computing rule ordering, and answering queries. Imprecise observations are incorporated using qualitative versions of Jeffrey's rule and Bayesian updating, with the result that coherent belief revision is embodied naturally and tractably. Finally, causal rules are interpreted as imposing Markovian conditions that further constrain world rankings to reflect the modularity of causal organizations. These constraints are shown to facilitate reasoning about causal projections, explanations, actions and change. (shrink)

Contra an expanding number of deflationary commentators onWittgenstein, I argue that philosophical questions about meaningare meaningful and that Wittgenstein gave us ample reason tobelieve so. Deflationists are right in claiming that Wittgensteinrejected the sceptical problem about meaning allegedly to befound in his later writings and also right in stressing Wittgenstein''s anti-reductionism. But they are wrong in taking these dismissals to entail the end of all constructive philosophizing about meaning. Rather, I argue, the rejection of the sceptical problem requires that we (...) abandon the questions that philosophers have traditionally addressed and that we replace them with more appropriate ones, to which constructive answers are forthcoming. However, though quietism is not the only alternative to reductionism, the rejection of reductionism does oblige us seriously to revise our sense of what constructive philosophy can achieve. (shrink)

The fictional beings are another story ourselves, and tell us another way to recover what we, wanting to be what we want; Stories in which they live, not knowing that his life is a story, a story that does not live as if it were, as if they lived their lives. The fictions of the world show us, not necessarily, as others do not, who am not! But who still am not, because I have not discovered completely all myself, and (...) sometimes I am without be them in this otherness for myself it is mine, but not mine yet, I am part of stories that are not my history, the world of text, stories where I am another, even myself, intratextual entity and not intraworld, reowned those others who just the text opens so imaginary and that the actual closure and silent, to the point where it is discovered that about me are the many stories that tell me I have the me or other me, where the mirror the other gives me an identity different readings, Be-who-I-am-and-who-else-to be-said-that-I, because I have built my own history identity, but the pair, others tell my story as the story of another, stories over and over that overlap but without being the same but the same, the stories of others that I am for others, who suspect without built my otherness, my other identities. (shrink)

We defend the moral and legal right to secede in accordance with plebiscitary theory. Our paper has three main goals. First, by offering a schematic characterization of plebiscitary theory, the main arguments in its favour (and the main objections to them), we contribute to clarify the structure of this complex debate. Second, we stress the point that, if the moral right to secede is established, the resistance for its inclusion into positive law is unjustified. Finally, by addressing old and new (...) objections to plebiscitary theory, we hope to make a compelling case for a wider recognition of secessionist rights. (shrink)

Central to the discourse on the intentional structure of consciousness encompasses further forms of experience, for instance, the notion of one’s direct experience of others. In essence, one’s experience of others is materialized through intersubjective engagement which is fundamental in comprehending the relation of the Self and Other. Intersubjective engagement between the two cognizing subjects is evidently interactive negotiation of understanding, thus necessarily meditational. This paper will substantiate the meditational or reflective nature of intersubjective engagement with the phenomenology of self-projection, (...) giving emphasis on the experience of the Self in relation to Others. The activity of self- projection onto others which is argued to take place through introspection, incorporates modes such as representation, simulation, imitation, empathic interaction and self-attribution. Furthermore, this paper will conclude intersubjectivity as an advent of joint construction of meaning and representation between the two cognizing subjects, thus, the collaborative endeavor of shared construction of meaning and representation is attained throughout the process. (shrink)

Wittgenstein and Davidson are two of the most influential and controversial figures of twentieth-century philosophy. However, whereas Wittgenstein is often regarded as a deflationary philosopher, Davidson is considered to be a theory builder and systematic philosopher par excellence. Consequently, little work has been devoted to comparing their philosophies with each other. In this volume of new essays, leading scholars show that in fact there is much that the two share. By focusing on the similarities between Wittgenstein and Davidson, their essays (...) present compelling defences of their views and develop more coherent and convincing approaches than either philosopher was able to propose on his own. They show how philosophically fruitful and constructive reflection on Wittgenstein and Davidson continues to be, and how relevant the writings of both philosophers are to current debates in philosophy of mind, language, and action. (shrink)

I distinguish among three senses in which meaning may be said to be normative, one trivial, the other two more robust. According to the trivial sense, meaningful expressions have conditions of correct application. According to the first robust sense, these conditions are determined by norms. According to the second robust sense, statements about these conditions have normative implications. Normativity in one or the other of the robust senses, but not in the trivial sense, is commonly thought to pose a threat (...) to naturalism. I argue that, given its trivial normativity, meaning cannot be normative in the first robust sense but it is normative in the sense that statements about the meaning of terms have hypothetical normative implications that are essential to meaning. I further argue that this normativity itself poses no threat to naturalism. Rather, this normativity follows from the fact that the trivial normativity of meaning precludes its naturalization. (shrink)

On examine dans cette étude les effets des flux sensoriels et informationnels continus et accélérés sur la conscience, sur les capacités de penser et de réfléchir. Ces flux conduisent – au-delà de l’inachèvement intrinsèque à toute science dont parlait Weber – à des formes instables, changeantes et illimitées, perçues comme telles par le sujet, et tendant dès lors à provoquer un état de crise de la conscience, d’insécurité psychique profonde dans la fluidité contemporaine.We deal here with the effects caused by (...) continuous, accelerated sensory and information flows on consciousness, on thinking. Quite beyond Weber’s conclusion on the intrinsically boundless character of science, those flows lead to unstable, changing and unlimited forms of knowledge, perceived as such by the individual, and tend from now on to induce a permanent state of crisis in consciousness, a strong psychological insecurity in contemporary fluidity. (shrink)

The uncertainty concerning the genre of the Ḥorvat ʿUza ostracon 1 is problematized through the lens of linguistic anthropology. Although a denotative approach to the linguistic forms in this Hebrew ostracon is well attested, less attention has been paid to the indexical meaning of specific stylistic features and their semi- otic register implications. Several linguistic-ideological concepts are drawn upon to examine how the act of inscription and specialized linguistic forms align the discursive genre of the ostracon with prophecy. I seek (...) to determine what salient discourse forms in the ostracon index the employment of habitual utterance styles of prophecy that construct context, genre, and social identity. (shrink)

Focusing especially on case studies from the Old High German glosses to the Rule of Benedict, and especially on the lexeme disciplina, one of their central ascetic terms, this contribution examines different manifestations and methods of the glossators’ annotation system from a primarily linguistic viewpoint. The Old High German words interpolated between and to the side of the Latin lines are interpreted not only as linguistic primary material, but at the same time as means of deepening our cultural-historical understanding of (...) medieval forms of life and the spheres of knowledge inherent to them in which asceticism played a major role. (shrink)

Resumen: El propósito de este trabajo es mostrar cómo la propuesta de la nueva retórica de Chaïm Perelman se constituye fundamentalmente en una teoría de la racionalidad práctica en perspectiva argumentativa. Para el desarrollo de esta tesis procedemos de la siguiente manera: primero se describe el giro pragmático que lleva a Perelman a señalar los límites de la lógica formal deductivista para el campo de los valores en algunos de sus textos de juventud; a continuación se muestra la apuesta de (...) Perelman por una nueva retórica como un tipo de aplicación de la racionalidad, desarrollada en su Tratado de la argumentación y algunos textos posteriores a 1958; y finalmente se desarrolla la noción perelmaniana de lo razonable en el marco de la argumentación jurídica, para mostrar cómo, desde esta perspectiva, Perelman se vincula al debate de la segunda mitad del siglo XX conocido como la “doctrina de los casos difíciles en derecho”.: The purpose of this work is to show how Chaïm Perelman’s new rhetoric proposal fundamentally constitutes a theory of practical rationality in an argumentative perspective. To develop this thesis, we proceed as follows: first, we describe the pragmatic turn that leads Perelman to point out the limits of formal deductivist logic in the field of values, in some of his youth texts; then, Perelman’s bet on new rhetoric is presented as a kind of application of rationality, developed in his Treaty of Argumentation and in some texts written after 1958; finally, the Perelmanian notion of reason is developed in the framework of legal argumentation, to show how, from this perspective, Perelman is linked to the debate of the second half of the twentieth century known as the “doctrine of difficult cases in law”. (shrink)

The paper presents the main lines of arguments recently offered by Brian Ellis and Steven Mumford in favor of some versions of dispositional essentialism and tries to evaluate them, especially as far as a dispositionalist account of laws is concerned. Favoring herself some form of dispositional realism (rather than essentialism), the author makes some suggestions about the major difficulties which any kind of dispositionalism should be ready to face.

À l'heure des fake news et des sciences alternatives, on pourrait facilement croire que tout est relatif. Cet essai voudrait pourtant suggérer le contraire. De nombreux malentendus circulent sur les concepts de vérité, de connaissance ou de réalité, déformés par l'idée-même de post-vérité. En nous proposant de nous méfier de nos préjugés métaphysiques les plus ancrés et d'œuvrer à une authentique connaissance métaphysique, cet essai de philosophie engagée nous invite à nous installer dans un espace académique et démocratique des raisons, (...) seul à même de garantir la liberté de conscience. Il démontre ainsi que les idéaux de vérité et de connaissance constituent moins un rempart ou un déni de la vie qu'ils ne sont les meilleurs alliés de nos idéaux de solidarité et de justice sociale"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

The aim of the text is not so much to stress the importance of Peirce's formal contributions to the semantic view in formal logic as to argue that Peirce's semantic trend is part and parcel of his semiotic treatment of a general theory of meaning, understanding, and interpretation, a theory of how signs function which enables him to classify different sorts of signs in a natural way.

According to Davidson, 'triangulation' is necessary both to fix the meanings of one's thoughts and utterances and to have the concept of objectivity, both of which are necessary for thinking and talking at all. Against these claims, it has been objected that neither meaning-determination nor possession of the concept of objectivity requires triangulation; nor does the ability to think and talk require possession of the concept of objectivity. But this overlooks the important connection between the tasks that triangulation is meant (...) to perform. One cannot fix concepts or meanings, which one must do for there to be any concepts or meanings at all, without having the concept of objectivity. (shrink)

Os sites institucionais das universidades são ferramentas importantes para que os estudantes acessem as informações referentes à instituição. Espera-se que as informações distribuídas nos sites sejam de fácil acesso e contemplem informações completas. Considera-se o cuidado com a saúde mental discente um assunto muito importante, mas pouco explorado e/ou investido. Esse estudo tem por objetivo problematizar e discutir sobre os serviços de saúde mental discente encontrados através das informações apresentadas nos sites institucionais das universidades e avaliar a facilidade de acesso (...) às informações. Foram escolhidas 11 universidades federais da região sul do Brasil por amostra de conveniência, sendo uma pesquisa qualitativa onde foi utilizado o método descritivo e interpretativo com o auxílio da etnografia virtual para construção dos dados. Ao longo da pesquisa, percebeu-se uma dificuldade em encontrar informações sobre suporte à saúde mental e informações completas sobre os serviços estudados. Durante o estudo houve o questionamento sobre a necessidade de pensar a saúde mental discente além do viés biomédico centralizado em dificuldades cognitivas e/ou possíveis adoecimentos no meio acadêmico. Existe uma urgência de criar propostas de prevenção e promoção à saúde mental universitária ampliando os campos de atuação do psicólogo escolar. (shrink)

Hannah Ginsborg has recently offered a new account of normativity, according to which normative attitudes are essential to the meaningful use of language. The kind of normativity she has in mind –– not semantic but ‘primitive’ — is supposed to help us to avoid the pitfalls of both non-reductionist and reductive dispositionalist theories of meaning. For, according to her, it enables us both to account for meaning in non-semantic terms, which non-reductionism cannot do, and to make room for the normativity (...) of meaning, which reductive dispositionalism cannot do. I argue that the main problem with Ginsborg’s account is that it fails to say what makes it possible for expressions to be governed by conditions of correct application to begin with. I do believe, however, that normative attitudes are essential to meaning, but they have to be thought of as fully semantic. And I suggest that conditions of correct application can be present only when those attitudes are present. (shrink)

According to Donald Davidson, language is social in that only a person who has interacted linguistically with another could have a language. This paper is a discussion of Davidson’s argument in defence of that claim. I argue that he has not succeeded in establishing it, but that he has provided many of the materials out of which a successful argument could be built. Chief among these are the claims that some version of externalism about meaning is true, that possession of (...) a language requires possession of the concept of objectivity, and hence that the issue here concerns the identity of the external event that makes possible possession of the concept of objectivity. I end by presenting some reasons for thinking that only interpersonal linguistic interaction could play this role. (shrink)

Two readings of Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox dominate the literature: either his arguments lead to skepticism, and thus to the view that only a deflated account of meaning is available, or they lead to quietism, and thus to the view that no philosophical account of meaning is called for. I argue, against both these positions, that a proper diagnosis of the paradox points the way towards a constructive, non-sceptical account of meaning.

This article analyzes the “Interlude” in Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments. In particular, it examines Johannes Climacus’s response to Hegel’s view that a past actuality is necessary. I provide an in-depth analysis of Hegel’s view of modality and of what he means when he says that a past actuality is necessary. In contrast to the standard scholarly interpretation, I argue that Climacus need not reject Hegel’s view because Hegel’s view of the necessity of the past is not so controversial or difficult to (...) accept. Finally, I show that Climacus’s main critique is that we cannot know the past as necessary in any meaningful way. He worries that we might get so preoccupied with the futile task of trying to know the Hegelian necessity of the past that we forget to personally appropriate the past in a way that can help us live in the present. (shrink)