At its inception, the training model in the Graduate School of Clinical Psychology at George Fox University was informed by the approach inaugurated at Fuller Theological Seminary School of Psychology in the 1960s. In the original model, training in Christian religion/spirituality and theology accompanied training in professional psychology. In the interim, our culture, psychological knowledge, perceived psychological needs, and training programs have changed greatly. Here we report changes in religion/spirituality training and integration over the last two decades. We describe our (...) current spiritual formation structure and process, and program evaluation efforts. Over the past several years the GSCP has shifted from relying mainly on a cognitive approach involving Bible and theology courses toward a more personal-experiential approach that includes team teaching of the theology and religion courses, an individualized spiritual direction experience spread over two years, and more intentional integration of R/s and spiritual formation components throughout the program. We anticipate this may be an ongoing area for further development in coming years as we seek to meet the needs of a changing student body with greater R/s diversity and largely postmodern worldviews. (shrink)

Ethical issues related to comparative effectiveness research, or research that compares existing standards of care, have recently received considerable attention. In this paper we focus on how Ethics Review Committees should evaluate the risks of comparative effectiveness research. We discuss what has been a prominent focus in the debate about comparative effectiveness research, namely that it is justified when “nothing is known” about the comparative effectiveness of the available alternatives. We argue that this focus may be misleading. Rather, we should (...) focus on the fact that some experts believe that the evidence points in favor of one intervention, whereas other experts believe that the evidence favors the alternative. We will then introduce a case that illustrates this point, and based on that, discuss how ERCs should deal with such cases of expert disagreement. We argue that ERCs have a duty to assess the range of expert opinions and based on that assessment arrive at a risk judgment about the study under consideration. We also argue that assessment of expert disagreement is important for the assignment of risk level to a clinical trial: what is the basis for expert opinions, how strong is the evidence appealed to by various experts, and how can clinical trial monitoring affect the possible increased risk of clinical trial participation. (shrink)

Although the presence or absence of a pitch accent clearly can play an important role in signaling the discourse and information structure of an utterance, whether the form of an accent determines the type of information it conveys is more controversial. We used an eye‐tracking paradigm to investigate whether H*, which has been argued to signal new information, evokes different eye fixations than L+H*, which has been argued to signal the presence of contrast. Our results demonstrate that although listeners interpret (...) these accents differently, their interpretive domains overlap. L+H* creates a strong bias toward contrast referents whereas H* is compatible with both new and contrast referents. (shrink)

RésuméJ'ai soutenu dans un article de 1985 que s'il y avait des miracles, cela parlerait contre l'existence du Dieu judéo-chrétien. Dans son livre de 1988 sur le concept de miracle, Robert Larmer propose une critique de mes arguments. J'évalue ici la force de cette critique. Je montre que la redéfinition de «miracle» que propose Larmer est circulaire; que sa distinction est spécieuse entre violer une hi naturelle et la surmonter grâce à la création ou la destruction d'énergie par Dieu; et (...) que sa tentative de montrer que les miracles sont le produit d'un être rationnel, bienfaisant et tout-puissant est inadéquate. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ius Gentium as Publicly Articulated Moral ScienceMatthew K. MinerdAmong the various types of law discussed in St. Thomas's theological "treatise on law"—questions 90–108 of Summa theologia [ST] I-II—the classification known as the "law of nations" (ius gentium) holds an ambiguous epistemological position. Marking a kind of halfway point between the natural law and civil law, it seems to straddle both domains. In fact, in a particularly important text dedicated (...) to this topic in the ST (I-II, q. 95, a. 4), Aquinas classes the ius gentium as being closely connected to the natural law, though in a way that is somewhat derivative, not as immediately flowing from human nature (especially in its animality) as does the natural law, but also not as marked by human contingency as is human civil law.As was recently discussed in a well-documented and insightful article by Barrett H. Turner in The Thomist, there have historically been two main lines of Thomist interpretation concerning the exact character of the "law of nations." Very broadly stated, what he refers to as the "Salamancan" line, indebted to Francisco de Vitoria, "interprets Thomas's doctrine of the ius gentium as a body of universal positive institutions (that is, specifications, determinationes) added to the natural law by agreement of the human race."1 [End Page 1043] This position, which would be common for several centuries among members of the Thomist school, would locate the law of nations essentially in the domain of nearly universally adopted customs and institutions, not strictly deduced from the natural law, but rather grounded on "the quasi-political authority of the entire human race, which promulgates the ius gentium by customs whose utility for attaining the ends of the natural law under a certain set of social conditions is easily recognized by rational creatures."2Turner calls the other line of thought "Maritain's Neo-Thomist Line,"3 an outlook that would be shared with various nuances by thinkers like Jean-Marie Aubert, Yves Simon, Marie-Michel Labourdette, John Finnis, and others. Setting aside my qualms about his appellation "neo-Thomist," which does more to obscure than to illumine (for it covers a host of Thomistic figures who have significantly different views on what constitutes "Thomism"), Turner does fairly lay out the major lines of Jacques Maritain's position, which is most directly articulated in Man and the State and La loi naturelle ou loi non-écrite.4 Basing himself on his particular view of knowledge of the natural law through connaturality,5 Maritain contrasted this sort of moral cognition with that which develops in the line of conceptual articulation, thus having a different "gnoseological" character from our knowledge of the natural law, while nonetheless still sharing the same "ontological" foundation. Such conceptually articulated law would be the ius gentium.Rather than add my voice to the dialectic of the various thinkers arrayed by Turner into the two aforementioned camps, I would like to propose a slightly different approach to the "moral epistemology of the law of nations," though one that I believe lies in line with the best aspects of Maritain's approach. Continuing a series of reflections that I have undertaken [End Page 1044] concerning moral epistemology during the past few years,6 I propose that it is most helpful to consider the "law of nations" as being a form of reasoning pertaining to what Scholastic vocabulary would refer to as "moral science,"7 namely discursive philosophical reasoning concerning the essences, properties, effects, and various other essential relationships that belong to a human acts, morally considered (the principal subject of moral philosophy), along with other subjects that are studied in relation to this principal subject (e.g., the principles of human acts, most particularly, the structure of human acts and the moral virtues). Moral science is the activity of reasoning that can be undertaken by knowing agents living together in community, seeking to discursively articulate and explain the moral truth that forms the essential basis for the contingent determinations that will then be codified in particular civil laws, the latter of which are not concerned with questions like "what are the ultimate foundations for property... (shrink)

ZusammenfassungOhne Zweifel stehen Sprachen und Konventionen in engen Beziehungen zueinander; grosse Teile der Oberflächenstrukturen unserer natürlichen Sprachen hängen von Konventionen ab, und um aussersprachliches Verhalten durch Konventionen zu regeln, benötigt man eine gemeinsame Sprache. Zu fragen ist dann, ob eine reale oder idealisierte Gemeinschaft von Personen sich eine gemeinsame Sprache durch irgendeine Art von Konvention erstmals schaffen kann, ohne dabei bereits ausdrücklich oder stillschweigend eine gemeinsame Sprache zu benützen, die nicht weniger ausdrücksreich als die zu kreierende ist. Es wird gezeigt, (...) dass dies in unserer faktischen Welt nicht der Fall ist, und diese empirischen Gründe werden durch philosophische Argumente erhärtet, die sich auf Ergebnisse der Metalogik und der Wissenschaftstheorie beziehen, wonach eine Erstschaffung einer gemeinsamen Sprache ohne Voraussetzung einer mindestens genauso aus‐drucksreichen Sprache der Teilnehmer – vom logischen Gesichtspunkt aus gesehen unmöglich ist, d. h. in keiner möglichen Welt vorkommt.SummaryThere can be no doubt that languages and conventions are interrelated one to another; large parts of the surface structure of some given natural language depends on conventions, and some common language is necessary to create conventions with regard to non‐lingual behaviour. Then the question arises, whether or not some real or idealized community may create a common language via some kind of convention without using explicitely or implicitely some common language being at least as rich as the language to be created. It is pointed out that this does not hold in our factual world, and those empirical reasons are supported by philosophical arguments referring to results of metalogic and philosophy of science indicating that radical creation of some common language without using some common language being at least as rich as the other is impossible from a logical point of view, i. e. will never occur in any possible world.RésuméSans aucun doute, langues et conventions sont en relation étroite les unes avec les autres; pour une grande part, les structures superficielles de nos langues naturelles dépendent de conventions et, pour régler par conventions notre comportement non linguistique, il faut un langage commun. On peut ensuite se demander si une communauté réelle ou idéalisée peut se constituer, par quelque genre de convention, un langage commun sans pour cela utiliser, explicitement ou implicitement, un langage commun qui n'est pas moins riche en potentialités expressives que celui qu'il s'agit ?on;établir. On montre que cela ne se produit pas dans un monde factuel, et ces arguments empiriques sont confirmés par des arguments philosophiques se référant à des résultats de la métalogique et de la théorie de la science, selon lesquels la création originelle ?on;une langue commune est, du point de vue logique, impossible sans supposer chez les participants un langage au moins aussi riche. (shrink)

This volume offers a collection of in-depth explorations of pragmatism as a framework for discussions in philosophy of science and metaphysics. Each chapter involves explicit reflection on what it means to be pragmatist, and how to use pragmatism as a guiding framework in addressing topics such as realism, unification, fundamentality, truth, laws, reduction, and more. -/- .

Three short essays on the position of the philosopher and philosophy in modern society. Maritain illuminates the situation of the philosopher in a milieu of conflicting systems. The final essay, which deals with the relation of science and religion, shows evidence of a growing appreciation by Maritain of the aims of modern science.--R. H. K.

Originally published as a long essay in Mind and Cosmos, Volume II of the University of Pittsburgh series in the philosophy of science, this study admirably fills the need for an elementary survey of problems in the area of probability and induction. But it is more than an introduction. The author is working on the general thesis that Bayes' theorem of the probability calculus holds the key to the understanding of scientific inference. Guided by this idea he attempts to salvage (...) what he thinks is of value in various current theories of probability and scientific inference, particularly, the frequency theory of probability as defended by Reichenbach, Popper's views on the falsifiability of theories, and Hanson's work on the logic of discovery. These attempts to develop a theory in the latter part of the book follow discussions of Hume's critique of induction, the probability calculus and five past and present interpretations of the calculus. This is a well-written and challenging introduction to the field.—R. H. K. (shrink)

The first part of this long two-part work is a history of the development of the modern theory of the atom from Dalton to the present. The second part offers philosophical reflections on this history beginning with a discussion of epistemological implications and following that with an account of ontological implications. The author deals with familiar questions about the reality of micro-particles, complementarity, indeterminism, the role of the observer and other topics. But he also discusses topics like holism, atomic order, (...) the intelligibility of matter and others which are less commonly discussed by philosophers in connection with modern physical theories. The author, who is trained in physics as well as philosophy, has a flair for metaphysical speculation as well as wide knowledge of contemporary physical theory. He stresses the novelties of the quantum conception of matter, argues against its critics like Bohm, and sees it as presenting a radically new conception of atomic order despite its commitment to indeterminism. The views of Werner Heisenberg, who encouraged the author to write the book and who read it in manuscript, have clearly influenced the author, although they do not dominate his thinking.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This collection contains twenty-three papers published by Suppes over the last eighteen years. For the most part they are foundational studies ranging over a wide variety of topics in the philosophy of science. The first two of four parts contain papers on methodological issues like models, measurement, probability and utility. There are two papers on models, an axiomatic treatment of extensive quantity and two papers on measurement. The six papers in Part II deal with probability theory and decision theory with (...) reference to theories of behavior, economics, and other topics. Part III contains studies in the axiomatic foundations of physics, one on relativistic kinematics and three on probability in quantum mechanics. The final and longest section contains eight papers on the foundations of psychology. Several of these deal with the psychological or behavioral bases of mathematics. Others deal with unpredictability in human behavior, finite automata, cognition and other topics. The book is nicely printed and those who have learned from Suppes work in the past will be grateful for this collection of his most important papers.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The author is a Czech physiologist who has given many years of experimental study to the temporal sense in man. He reviews the psychological literature on the sense of time, then describes his own experiments and the theory which he thinks explains them. He believes there are biological rhythms which determine our physiological sense of time and in particular that the alpha rhythm of the brain provides the fundamental reference rhythm by which the organism measures time. This rhythm is autonomous, (...) unchanging in the course of time, present when not evident externally and thus very suitable for time measurement. Experimental evidence for this view reported in the book concerns laborious studies of temporally conditioned reflexes in man carried out by the author over a number of years. He hedges his conclusions and concedes that there is much more work to be done, but his work is both interesting and important. There is little philosophizing in the book, but there is much of philosophical importance.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Rapid handwriting, popularly known as shorthand, involves writing symbols and abbreviations in lieu of common words or phrases. This method increases the speed of transcription and is primarily used to record oral dictation. Someone skilled in shorthand will be able to write as fast as the dictation occurs, and these patterns are later transliterated into actual, natural language words. A new kind of rapid handwriting scheme is proposed, called the Pattern-Based Shorthand. A word on a keyboard involves pressing a unique (...) sequence of keys in a particular order. This sequence forms a pattern that defines the word. Such a pattern forms the shorthand for that word. Speech recognition involves identifying, by a machine, the words spoken by a speaker. These spoken words form speech input signals to a computer that is equipped to correctly recognize the words and do further action, such as convert it to text. From this text input, unique shorthand patterns are generated by the system. The system employs machine learning to improve its performance with experience, by creating a dictionary of mappings from word to patterns in such a way that the access to existing patterns is faster with progression. This forms a new knowledge representation schema that reduces the redundancy in the storage of words and the length of information content. In conclusion, the speech is converted into textual form and then reconstructed into Pattern-Based Shorthand. (shrink)

The problem of perception is one of specifying correct and consistent meanings for the concepts we use in talking about it. The most frequent mistake in the history of this concept has been to "reduce" perception either to sensation or to judgment. With this in mind, the author deals primarily with the period from Descartes to Kant, though ancient, medieval, and contemporary developments are also treated.--R. H. K.

In this phenomenological approach to meaning, the author defines his task as one of taking account of the kinds of relations the logical order can have to the preconceptual order. This preconceptual order is represented by a pre-logical activity which is called "experiencing." There is experiencing of meaning as well as of things. This "experienced or felt meaning" is said to be as important a dimension of meaning as the traditional modes distinguished by philosophers, e.g., denotation, connotation. Apparent throughout is (...) the author's concern as a psychotherapist to find theoretical foundations for clinical methods.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This book is a study of meaning and meaninglessness which takes as its point of departure a discussion of sentences like "The theory of relativity is blue" which some philosophers call category mistakes and which this author calls type crossings. His answer to the question of the basis of the meaninglessness of such sentences differs from most currently fashionable ones. For example, he argues in separate chapters against the view that the basis for the meaninglessness of sentences involving type crossings (...) is in the fact that they are ungrammatical. He also rejects the view that this basis is in the fact that the sentences violate certain rules of language His answer is that type crossings are meaningless because they designate unthinkable propositions. He then devotes two long and crucial chapters to an attempt to elaborate on the notion of unthinkability. His approach is more complicated than this brief summary would suggest for he distinguishes between accidental and essential properties and relations, requiring different criteria for type crossings involving accidental or essential attributes. Drange's views run against the grain of much contemporary philosophizing about meaning, e.g., his essentialism, his advocacy of a kind of synthetic a priori and his emphasis on thinkability over rules of language. But he comes to these positions by exposing what he takes to be difficulties in alternative views, so that his views are always challenging. Aside from its main theses, the book looks into topics about meaning and type crossings which other writers have scarcely noticed or discussed. For example, he tries to come to grips with the largely uncharted region of type crossings involving relational properties and those involving types other than types of things.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The chief topics discussed in this carefully written book are the nature of definitions in science, the distinction between observational and theoretical terms, changes in scientific concepts and the role of analogies and models in science. The unifying theme is that of meaning in the sciences. Its treatment by Achinstein indicates a trend in recent philosophy of science toward finding a middle ground between two antithetical positions on the topic of the meaning of scientific terms. On the one side stands (...) the traditional positivist and logical empiricist account which distinguishes sharply between the meaning of observational and theoretical terms, and on the other side, the more recent views of Feyerabend, Kuhn, Hanson, Toulmin and others who stress the dependence of the meaning of observational terms on that of theoretical terms and the change of meaning of all terms connected with a theory when the theory changes. Achinstein argues cogently that the extreme versions of these positions will not work. Their main problem is that their treatment of meaning is too rigid and monolithic. His own discussion of meaning in the early chapters on definition bristles with distinctions, nuances, and concrete examples from the sciences. In terms of the distinctions of this part of the book he is later able to argue against Feyerabend and Kuhn that in changes of scientific concepts such as characterize scientific revolutions not all of the meaning connections of the various terms need be altered. He also argues that of the many ways proposed to distinguish between theoretical and observational terms, no one is fundamental, though each may be relevant to certain categories of questions one might want to raise about scientific terms. This book thus leads away from the simpler doctrinal statements of the past about the meaning of scientific terms toward a theory of meaning requiring more distinctions, qualifications, nuances, and more subtlety all around.--R. H. K. (shrink)

In this work R. M. Martin carries his semiotical studies into the fields of intensional semantics and pragmatics, dealing with such philosophically important concepts as meaning, preference, reasonableness and indifference. The crucial notion is that of the meaning or intension of an expression. Two major categories are distinguished, objective intensions and subjective intensions. To deal with objective intensions an intensional semantics is developed as an extension of denotational semantics in the tradition of Tarski, Carnap and Martin's earlier Truth and Denotation. (...) In the treatment of subjective intensions Martin makes an advance over his earlier study of pragmatics by utilizing the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern in their Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.—R. H. K. (shrink)