The organism is the central entity in biological science. However, consensus with regard to the definition of the underlying concept is lacking. Moreover, several ambiguous life forms exist that challenge current definitions of the term. Based on a comprehensive analysis of the available literature, we provide an overview of the criteria and approaches that have been previously used to define organismality. In addition, we highlight non-paradigmatic biological entities to identify problems that challenge definitions of organismal units. To address these issues, (...) we propose a cross-disciplinary definition of the organism concept and provide a list of key criteria that allow both paradigmatic and non-paradigmatic cases to be unequivocally classified. In this way, our work not only provides newcomers with an overview of this exciting field, but also enhances communication across disciplines. (shrink)

Why does equality matter, as a social and political value, and what does it require? Relational egalitarians argue that it does not require that people receive equal distributive shares of some good, but that they relate as equals. Christian Schemmel here provides the first comprehensive development of a liberal conception of relational equality, one which understands relations of non-domination and egalitarian norms of social status as stringent demands of social justice. He first argues that expressing respect for the freedom (...) and equality of individuals in social cooperation requires stringent protections against domination. Taking this as a starting point, he then develops a substantive, liberal conception of non-domination and argues that non-domination is a particularly important, but not the only, concern of social justice. From there, Schemmel develops an account of the wrongness of inegalitarian norms of social status which shows how status-induced foreclosure of important social opportunities is a social injustice in its own right, over and above the role of status inequality in enabling domination, and the threats it poses to individuals' self-respect. Finally, Schemmel articulates the core requirements of liberal relational egalitarianism for political, economic, and health justice: these amount to demands for far-reaching forms of equality in all three domains, which can rarely, if ever, be overridden by competing concerns. With expert rigor and creativity, Justice and Egalitarian Relations brings together scholarship in a variety of related topics, from social justice and liberalism to distributive and relational equality, social equality, neo-republicanism, and non-denomination. (shrink)

The Capitalist Schema uses marxist philosophy to explain how money frames all social relations in our capitalist world and how money regulates and conditions social references to past and future social life. Consequently, modern life becomes ever more abstract and leveled, and all human desire becomes channeled towards profit and making money.

_The Lamp that Integrates the Practices_ is a systematic and comprehensive exposition of the most advanced yogas of the Esoteric Community Tantra as espoused by the Noble Tradition, an influential school of interpretation within the Mahayoga traditions of Indian Buddhist esoterism. Equal in authority to Nagarjuna's famous Five Stages, Aryadeva's work is perhaps the earliest prose example of the "stages of the mantra path" genre in Sanskrit. Its studied gradualism exerted immense influence on later Indian and Tibetan tradition, and it (...) is widely cited by masters from all four major lineages of Tibetan Buddhism. This volume presents the _Lamp_ in a tri-lingual format: its Sanskrit original critically-edited from recently-identified manuscripts, a critical edition of the eleventh-century Tibetan translation by Rin-chen Bzang-po, and a thoroughly-annotated English translation. Includes an introductory study discussing the history of the Guhyasamaja and its exegetical traditions, surveying the scriptural and commentarial sources of the Noble Tradition, and analyzing in detail the contents of the _Lamp_. Features a detailed, tri-lingual glossary. Published by American Institute of Buddhist Studies. (shrink)

This Savonarola of our century can fill a hall at the drop of a leaflet. But where the inflammatory friar of Florence was silenced by hanging and roasting at the stake, Chomsky's punishment is to be consigned to media oblivion in his own land.

Emu aux larmes à l'écoute d'une musique, en arrêt devant ce tableau, vous ressentez un plaisir indéfinissable que n'a su provoquer aucune autre oeuvre. Celle-ci excite vos émotions, captive votre corps, court-circuite votre réflexion. "Que c'est beau!". Perdu en elle, vous fusionnez avec le mystère de sa présence en un acte de communion proche de l'amour romantique ou de l'extase mystique. Vous l'aimez, tout simplement! Entremêlant objet, culture et sujet, la relation artistique superpose aux significations de tous, un plaisir, des (...) questionnements et des interprétations qui ne dépendent que de vous. Comment la relation esthétique s'y prend-elle pour éveiller tant d'émotions et comment l'art s'y prend-il pour transmettre du sens? Quel pourrait être l'apport des sciences cognitives à la compréhension de ces problèmes? Finalement, se pourrait-il que les relations complexes qu'entretiennent l'esthétique, l'artistique et son institutionnalisation, révèlent la nature émergente et systémique de l'Art? (shrink)

In section one of this paper, I review some of the leading research on cheating behavior, and in section two I do the same for cheating motivation. Section three then outlines several requirements for honesty and dishonesty, and I explain why, in light of the current psychological evidence, these requirements do not seem to be met. Finally in section four I step back and consider an important implication if my conclusions are correct.

Être responsable de notre conduite passée, c’est, en un sens, devoir en répondre. Cela signifie d’accepter qu’on en est l’auteur, à titre d’individu ou de membre d’un groupe. Mais cela implique aussi de devoir la défendre, c’est-à-dire de la justifier si possible ou de l’excuser et parfois d’en accepter les conséquences négatives. Bref, si nous sommes responsables, c’est que nous sommes concernés et que nous devons réagir. À la difficulté psychologique de cette prise de responsabilité s’ajoutent des défis intellectuels majeurs. (...) Peut-on être responsables si notre conduite est due à des mouvements d’atomes déterminés ou soumis au hasard? Comment pourrait-il y avoir responsabilité à titre de membre d’un groupe qui échappe à notre contrôle? -/- Ce livre contient trois chapitres principaux (« le réseau de la responsabilité », « responsabilité et métaphysique », « responsabilité et société ») et deux analyses de textes importants (un extrait du livre III de l'Éthique à Nicomaque et « La responsabilité collective et ses implications » de Margaret Gilbert). -/- // -/- To be responsible for our past conduct is, in a sense, to have the duty to answer for it. This duty implies accepting that we are its author, either qua individual or qua member of a group. It may also imply defending our past conduct, by justifying or excusing it or, in the absence of a good defence, accepting adverse consequences. If we are responsible, we are concerned and must act. Clearly, taking our responsibilities is psychologically difficult; but it also poses tricky intellectual challenges. Can we be responsible for our conduct if it is due to the determined or random movements of atoms? Can we be responsible as a member of a group whose behaviour lies outside of our control? -/- This book contains three main chapters ("The network of responsibility", "responsibility and metaphysics", and "responsability and society"), as well as comments on two seminal texts (an extract of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Book III and Margaret Gilbert's "Collective Responsibility and its Implications"). (shrink)

Time and reality.--Objectivity.--Logical coherence.--Antagonisms in the individual.

Ellen Furlong and Laurie Santos helpfully summarize a number of fascinating studies of certain influences on both human and monkey behavior. As someone who works primarily in philosophy, I am not in a position to dispute the details of the studies themselves. But in this brief commentary I do want to raise some questions about the inferences Furlong and Santos make on the basis of those studies. In general, I worry that they may be overreaching beyond what their own data (...) suggests. (shrink)

In recent years a principle for responsible risk-taking called "The Precautionarity Principle" (PP) has been put forward in several policy documents regarding risk-management of technological and environmental issues. PP involves two claims: 1. An ethical claim according to which it is irresponsible to, for example, use new technologies, regdless of how large benefits these are known to bring, unless it has been proven that they will not give rise to unacceptable long term risks. 2. An administrative/political claim according to which (...) the burden of supplying the proof spoken of in claim 1 is to be laid on the supplier of the new technology. This paper deals only with claim 1, which is the real "precautionarity claim". PP has produced much enthusiasm in different political circles, where it is often held out as a landmark for a new thinking in risk-management. However, while claim 2 is clear enough, it is rather obscure how the precautionarity claim is to be understood. In particular, it is not clear to what extent (if any) this claim implies anything new for risk-analysis. This is so since the precautionarity claim does not say anything about what is to be counted as a proof, or what constitutes an unacceptable risk. The paper explores different conlicting interpretations of the precautionarity claim and demonstrates how the choice between these actualise hard ethical issues. In particular, the issue of how much damage we are allowed to cause in order to pursue safety and certainty is discussed. This issue is actualized when new technologies with known beneficiary effects cannot be proven to be "safe enough" according to some interpretations of the precautionarity claim unless investigated for a rather long period of time, during which the technology is not allowed to be used to produce the beneficiary effects it can produce. This problem is structurally similar to a well known issue in medical ethics regarding the rsponsibility of continuing a controlled clinical trial of a drug known to cure when this means that half of the patients suffers extra agony and earlier death because they get a placebo instead of the new drug.. (shrink)