Currently, many authors in public and academic discourse speak of an increasing „social divide“ that threatens social cohesion. There has been a broad discussion on social cohesion in social sciences ever since: Different conceptions could be ideally classified in a scheme with a more rational and a more emotional pole. I explore this tension by following an affective turn in conceptions of social cohesion. Therefore, I focus on the concept of solidarity as representing the rational model of cohesion and the (...) concept of affinity standing for the affective one. The affective turn brings about a twofold shift in the understanding of the central processes of social cohesion: from collectivity to connectivity and from rationality to affectivity. Still, this shift runs the danger of throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Cohesion must neither be understood as exclusively reyling upon on either rational or affective processes. I propose to overcome this dichotomy by employing Hemming´s concept of „affective solidarity“. Rationaliy and affectivity must be understood as being mutually effective, the former modulating the latter, the latter energizing the former. (shrink)

Neuroenhancement involves the use of neurotechnologies to improve cognitive, affective or behavioural functioning, where these are not judged to be clinically impaired. Questions about enhancement have become one of the key topics of neuroethics over the past decade. The current study draws on in-depth public engagement activities in ten European countries giving a bottom-up perspective on the ethics and desirability of enhancement. This informed the design of an online contrastive vignette experiment that was administered to representative samples of 1000 respondents (...) in the ten countries and the United States. The experiment investigated how the gender of the protagonist, his or her level of performance, the efficacy of the enhancer and the mode of enhancement affected support for neuroenhancement in both educational and employment contexts. Of these, higher efficacy and lower performance were found to increase willingness to support enhancement. A series of commonly articulated claims about the individual and societal dimensions of neuroenhancement were derived from the public engagement activities. Underlying these claims, multivariate analysis identified two social values. The Societal/Protective highlights counter normative consequences and opposes the use enhancers. The Individual/Proactionary highlights opportunities and supports use. For most respondents these values are not mutually exclusive. This suggests that for many neuroenhancement is viewed simultaneously as a source of both promise and concern. (shrink)

Neuroenhancement involves the use of neurotechnologies to improve cognitive, affective or behavioural functioning, where these are not judged to be clinically impaired. Questions about enhancement have become one of the key topics of neuroethics over the past decade. The current study draws on in-depth public engagement activities in ten European countries giving a bottom-up perspective on the ethics and desirability of enhancement. This informed the design of an online contrastive vignette experiment that was administered to representative samples of 1000 respondents (...) in the ten countries and the United States. The experiment investigated how the gender of the protagonist, his or her level of performance, the efficacy of the enhancer and the mode of enhancement affected support for neuroenhancement in both educational and employment contexts. Of these, higher efficacy and lower performance were found to increase willingness to support enhancement. A series of commonly articulated claims about the individual and societal dimensions of neuroenhancement were derived from the public engagement activities. Underlying these claims, multivariate analysis identified two social values. The Societal/protective highlights counter normative consequences and opposes the use enhancers. The Individual/proactionary highlights opportunities and supports use. For most respondents these values are not mutually exclusive. This suggests that for many neuroenhancement is viewed simultaneously as a source of both promise and concern. (shrink)

It is often argued that higher-level special-science properties cannot be causally efficacious since the lower-level physical properties on which they supervene are doing all the causal work. This claim is usually derived from an exclusion principle stating that if a higher-level property F supervenes on a physical property F* that is causally sufficient for a property G, then F cannot cause G. We employ an account of causation as difference-making to show that the truth or falsity of this principle is (...) a contingent matter and derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which a version of it holds. We argue that one important instance of the principle, far from undermining non-reductive physicalism, actually supports the causal autonomy of certain higher-level properties. (shrink)

Spaces in the brain can refer either to psychological spaces, which are derived from similarity judgments, or to neurocognitive spaces, which are based on the activities of neural structures. We want to show how psychological spaces naturally emerge from the underlying neural spaces by dimension reductions that preserve similarity structures and the relevant categorizations. Some neuronal representational formats that may generate the psychological spaces are presented, compared and discussed in relation to the mathematical principles of monotonicity, continuity and convexity. In (...) particular, we discuss the spatial structures involved in the connections between perception and action, for example eye-hand coordination, and argue that spatial organization of information makes such mappings more efficient. (shrink)

Some of the required characteristics for a true machine theory of mind (MToM) include the ability to (1) reproduce the full diversity of human thought and behavior, (2) develop a personalized model of an individual with very limited data, and (3) provide an explanation for behavioral predictions grounded in the cognitive processes of the individual. We propose that a certain class of cognitive models provide an approach that is well suited to meeting those requirements. Being grounded in a mechanistic framework (...) like a cognitive architecture such as ACT-R naturally fulfills the third requirement by mapping behavior to cognitive mechanisms. Exploiting a modeling paradigm such as instance-based learning accounts for the first requirement by reflecting variations in individual experience into a diversity of behavior. Mechanisms such as knowledge tracing and model tracing allow a specific run of the cognitive model to be aligned with a given individual behavior trace, fulfilling the second requirement. We illustrate these principles with a cognitive model of decision-making in a search and rescue task in the Minecraft simulation environment. We demonstrate that cognitive models personalized to individual human players can provide the MToM capability to optimize artificial intelligence agents by diagnosing the underlying causes of observed human behavior, projecting the future effects of potential interventions, and managing the adaptive process of shaping human behavior. Examples of the inputs provided by such analytic cognitive agents include predictions of cognitive load, probability of error, estimates of player self-efficacy, and trust calibration. Finally, we discuss implications for future research and applications to collective human–machine intelligence. (shrink)

We offer a critical assessment of the “exclusion argument” against free will, which may be summarized by the slogan: “My brain made me do it, therefore I couldn't have been free”. While the exclusion argument has received much attention in debates about mental causation (“could my mental states ever cause my actions?”), it is seldom discussed in relation to free will. However, the argument informally underlies many neuroscientific discussions of free will, especially the claim that advances in neuroscience seriously challenge (...) our belief in free will. We introduce two distinct versions of the argument, discuss several unsuccessful responses to it, and then present our preferred response. This involves showing that a key premise – the “exclusion principle” – is false under what we take to be the most natural account of causation in the context of agency: the difference-making account. We finally revisit the debate about neuroscience and free will. (shrink)

In his commentary on Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias,1 Abelard distinguishes the form of an expression2 (oratio) from what it says, that is, its content. The content of an expression is its understanding (intellectus). This distinction is surely the most well-known and central idea in Abelard’s commentary. It provides him with the opportunity to distinguish statements (enuntiationes) from other kinds of expressions without implying a diference in their content, since the ability of a statement to signify something true or false (verum vel (...) falsum)3 cannot be found in its content. More precisely, Abelard distinguishes statements both from complete expressions (orationes perfectae) that are not statements but rather questions, requests, commands, etc. and from incomplete expressions, that is, mere word strings (orationes imperfectae), such as homo albus. These kinds of expressions, according to Abelard, do not differ in the understanding they present but in the way they present it. (shrink)

Jürgen Habermas’ Werk Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats (1992) verdient aus zwei Gründen besonderes Interesse: Erstens gehört es zu den Hauptwerken dieses bedeutenden Philosophen, der darin eine neue Begründung der Prinzipien des demokratischen Rechtsstaats, zugleich aber auch eine Summe seiner sozialtheoretischen und ethischen Denkens (Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns und Diskursethik) präsentiert; und zweitens ist dieses Werk ein herausragender Beitrag zur neueren Rechtsphilosophie, da darin in systematischer Weise eine innovative Theorie des Rechts entwickelt wird, (...) die das Erfordernis der Faktizität des Rechts mit dessen normativer Sollgeltung in Einklang zu bringen versucht. Die Bedeutung dieses Werks für die gegenwärtige Sozial-, Rechts- und Politikphilosophie legt es nahe, ihm einen Band der Reihe „Klassiker Auslegen“ zu widmen, in dem es einer eingehenden kritischen Erörterung und Würdigung unterzogen wird. Der Band hat entsprechend der Konzeption der ganzen Reihe die Form eines kritischen Kommentars, in dem nach einer Einleitung der Herausgeber die Kapitel des Werks sukzessive von renommierten Autoren resümiert, interpretiert und kritisch diskutiert werden. (shrink)

To successfully interact with a dynamic world, our actions must be guided by a continuously changing anticipated future. Such anticipations must be tuned to the processing delays in the nervous system as well as to the slowness of the body, something that requires constant adaptation of the predictive mechanisms, which in turn require that sensory information be processed at different time-scales.

For Tarski logics, there are simple criteria that enable one to conclude that two premise sets are equivalent. We shall show that the very same criteria hold for adaptive logics, which is a major advantage in comparison to other approaches to defeasible reasoning forms. A related property of Tarski logics is that the extensions of equivalent premise sets with the same set of formulas are equivalent premise sets. This does not hold for adaptive logics. However a very similar criterion does. (...) We also shall show that every monotonic logic weaker than an adaptive logic is weaker than the lower limit logic of the adaptive logic or identical to it. This highlights the role of the lower limit for settling the adaptive equivalence of extensions of equivalent premise sets. (shrink)

The present study sheds light on a new psychological construct called “AI pessimism aversion” (AIPA) describing an overly optimistic view of the benefits of AI by neglecting its potential dangers. In an international sample of N = 543 participants, we observed that the construct of AIPA strongly overlaps with single-item measures for positive and negative AI attitudes. Furthermore, the structural equation model suggests that the positive association between the internal locus of control (a personality measure describing persons who see themselves (...) as steering their own lives) and positive AI attitudes was in part mediated by AIPA. We also assessed risk aversion in the present work, because high aversion of risky situations might go along with lower AIPA (the coming AI wave is characterised by high uncertainty). Surprisingly, this was not the case, and these two constructs seem to be (rather) independent. The present work should be a starting point to dive deeper into the study of AI attitudes, a highly relevant research theme for societies standing at the eve of the coming AI wave. (shrink)

We argue that cognitive models can provide a common ground between human users and deep reinforcement learning (Deep RL) algorithms for purposes of explainable artificial intelligence (AI). Casting both the human and learner as cognitive models provides common mechanisms to compare and understand their underlying decision-making processes. This common grounding allows us to identify divergences and explain the learner's behavior in human understandable terms. We present novel salience techniques that highlight the most relevant features in each model's decision-making, as well (...) as examples of this technique in common training environments such as Starcraft II and an OpenAI gridworld. (shrink)

The welfare of farmed fish is often regarded with less concern than the welfare of other husbandry animals, as fish are not universally classified as sentient beings. In Norway, farmed fish and other husbandry animals are legally protected under the same laws. Additionally, the legislature has defined a number of aquaculture-specific amendments, including mandatory welfare courses for fish farmers who have a key role in securing animal welfare, also with regards to noting welfare challenges in the production process. This article (...) uses fish welfare courses as a site from which to inquire about the common-sense understanding of fish welfare in Norwegian fish farming. The focus is specifically on fish farm employees, their experiences of welfare-related issues and contradictions in their daily work, and the struggle to act responsibly in aquaculture settings. Through participant observation at welfare courses, as well as interviews and conversations with fish farm workers, the article details how challenges are experienced ‘on the ground’, and suggests how fish farm workers’ own experiential knowledge might be mobilized to improve the general welfare of farmed fish. (shrink)

This article introduces the Verbal Irony Procedure (VIP), a first systematic method for identifying irony in natural discourse. The first section discusses previous operationalizations of irony and demonstrates that these are not explicit about which criteria were used to separate irony from non-irony. The second section argues why irony can be defined as an “utterance with a literal evaluation that is implicitly contrary to its intended evaluation.” This section also explains why ironic utterances can be placed on an evaluation scale. (...) In the third section, clauses are proposed as a good unit of analysis when looking at irony in natural discourse. The different steps of the VIP are then introduced in the fourth section and subsequently applied in a sample analysis of a natural text in the fifth section. The sixth section discusses a reliability analysis of the VIP protocol. The article ends with an outlook on how future research on verbal irony might benefit from applying the VIP. (shrink)

This paper revisits the strained yet ubiquitous notion of sustainability to see where and how it can make a contribution to improved agricultural and natural resource management and policy making. The case of a three-year EU network on farm animal breeding and reproduction is used as a practical illustration. In this network, commercial breeders and breeding scientists were required, with professional assistance from philosophers and social scientists, to develop a definition of sustainable farm animal breeding. The word ‘sustainability’ does not (...) define a unique ethical perspective. At best it indicates a willingness to open an ethical agenda. However if the agenda is not specified in some detail, there is a real danger that necessary ethical discussion will be swept under the carpet. Even worse, the word may be used as a fig leaf in an attempt to legitimise projects which are ethically dubious. Used conscientiously, the framework of sustainability has two benefits: First, it invites parties involved in the planning of future activities in a company or sector to take a comprehensive look at potentially conflicting concerns and to face any difficult trade-offs. Second, it encourages concerns to be presented within a framework that is endorsed by society as a whole, and this enables the stakeholders to make room for communication to, and dialogue with, a broader audience than the rather narrow group of people directly involved. Adapting the definition of sustainability to specific conditions and circumstances is more than a technical or scientific task. It requires us to address carefully underlying questions about values. The fundamental dilemmas that emerge when the notion of sustainability is considered have no easy solutions, but they can be addressed by taking into account four key characteristics of sustainability discussed in this paper. (shrink)

The systems studied in the special sciences are often said to be causally autonomous, in the sense that their higher-level properties have causal powers that are independent of the causal powers of their more basic physical properties. This view was espoused by the British emergentists, who claimed that systems achieving a certain level of organizational complexity have distinctive causal powers that emerge from their constituent elements but do not derive from them. More recently, non-reductive physicalists have espoused a similar view (...) about the causal autonomy of special-science properties. They argue that since these properties can typically have multiple physical realizations, they are not identical to physical properties, and further they possess causal powers that differ from those of their physical realisers. Despite the orthodoxy of this view, it is hard to find a clear exposition of its meaning or a defence of it in terms of a well-motivated account of causation. In this paper, we aim to address this gap in the literature by clarifying what is implied by the doctrine of the causal autonomy of special-science properties and by defending the doctrine using a prominent theory of causation from the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Reinforcement learning systems usually assume that a value function is defined over all states (or state-action pairs) that can immediately give the value of a particular state or action. These values are used by a selection mechanism to decide which action to take. In contrast, when humans and animals make decisions, they collect evidence for different alternatives over time and take action only when sufficient evidence has been accumulated. We have previously developed a model of memory processing that includes semantic, (...) episodic and working memory in a comprehensive architecture. Here, we describe how this memory mechanism can support decision making when the alternatives cannot be evaluated based on immediate sensory information alone. Instead we first imagine, and then evaluate a possible future that will result from choosing one of the alternatives. Here we present an extended model that can be used as a model for decision making that depends on accumulating evidence over time, whether that information comes from the sequential attention to different sensory properties or from internal simulation of the consequences of making a particular choice. We show how the new model explains both simple immediate choices, choices that depend on multiple sensory factors and complicated selections between alternatives that require forward looking simulations based on episodic and semantic memory structures. In this framework, vicarious trial and error is explained as an internal simulation that accumulates evidence for a particular choice. We argue that a system like this forms the “missing link” between more traditional ideas of semantic and episodic memory, and the associative nature of reinforcement learning. (shrink)

De-domestication is the deliberate establishment of a population of domesticated animals or plants in the wild. In time, the population should be able to reproduce, becoming self-sustainable and incorporating 'wild' animals. Often de-domestication is part of a larger nature restoration scheme, aimed at creating landscapes anew, or re-creating former habitats. De-domestication is taken up in this paper because it both engages and raises questions about the major norms governing animals and nature. The debate here concerns whether animals undergoing de-domestication should (...) be looked upon as wild or non-wild and the effect this has on questions about how they should be treated. It also concerns the value of nature, and the kind and degree of nature management considered appropriate. The paper first describes actual de-domestication practices and considers the character of human duties to animals in process of de-domestication. Secondly, the paper explores the implications of de-domestication for nature management, focusing on notions of naturalness and wildness. Finally, because the current division of ethical topics, with its dependence upon whether animals and nature are domesticated, hampers rather than helps, a new perspective is offered on the issues raised by de-domestication. More 'thinking outside the box' with regard to animals and nature is recommended. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Die Sportgeographie als ein noch sehr junges Teilgebiet der Sportwissenschaft und der Geographie begann sich erst vor circa vier Jahrzehnten zu entfalten. Abgesehen von einigen Vorläufern nahm die Sportgeographie ihren eigentlichen Anfang in den 1970er und insbesondere in den 1980er Jahren. Für den internationalen Aufschwung sorgten seitdem vor allem Wissenschafder des englischsprachigen Kulturraumes, wo sich die Sportgeographie im Laufe der 1990er Jahre in der Vielzahl der so genannten Bindestrich-Wissenschaften etablierte. In der deutschsprachigen Geographie und Sportwissenschaft hingegen ist dieser Etablierungsprozess (...) soweit noch nicht vorangeschritten, wenngleich auch hier erste Schritte einer Institutionalisierung unternommen wurden. (shrink)

According to recent studies in developmental psychology and neuroscience, symbolic language is essentially intersubjective. Empathetically relating to others renders possible the acquisition of linguistic constructs. Intersubjectivity develops in early ontogenetic life when interactions between mother and infant mutually shape their relatedness. Empirical fndings suggest that the shared attention and intention involved in those interactions is sustained as it becomes internalized and embodied. Symbolic language is derivative and emerges from shared intentionality. In this paper, we present a formalization of shared intentionality (...) based upon a quantum approach. From a phenomenological viewpoint, we investigate the nonseparable, dynamic and sustainable nature of social cognition and evaluate the appropriateness of quantum interaction for modelling intersubjectivity. (shrink)

Spirituality is a growing research theme, especially in relation to health issues. The term is often poorly defined and one’s understanding is often so broad that it becomes a mere frame word devoid of meaning. In this study, we asked 514 adult Danes about their understanding of the word ‘spirituality’. Factor analysis of the answers resulted in six different understandings of spirituality: positive dimensions in human life and well-being; New Age ideology; an integrated part of established religious life; a vague (...) striving, opposed to religion; selfishness; and ordinary inspiration in human activities. It is concluded that a common understanding of the term spirituality does not exist, at least in a modern secular setting. Suggestion for future research is that the term spirituality is not used without an indication, notions or keywords of what is meant by the term in a specific context. (shrink)