The title is unashamedly plagiarized from Stephen Todd's excellent book, The Shape of Athenian Law. The plagiarism is slightly misleading, however, since my interest is in law as enactment while Todd's title expresses his interest in law as system . The issue I wish to address is the formulation of written laws in Athens during the late archaic and classical period, specifically the balance between procedural and substantive law. Substantive law deals with rights, obligations, offences, etc. Its role is to (...) define behaviour which is required, allowed, or prohibited. These are what Hart terms ‘primary rules’. Procedural law, on the other hand, deals, as the name suggests, with the administration of justice, that is with jurisdiction, process, etc. Hart's term for these is ‘secondary rules’. The two cannot be separated quite as neatly as I have suggested, of course. A procedural law can scarcely avoid mentioning the offences or rights whose punishment or protection it regulates, while a substantive law may need to address issues such as jurisdiction. This is therefore an issue of orientation, not a simple binary division. However, as a broad basis for classification it is of value. (shrink)

Pindar's Eighth Olympian celebrates the victory of Alkimedon of Aigina in the boys' wrestling at Olympia in 460. This victory was the sixth won by a member of this family . The absence of detail about most of these victories suggests that the family had had little success in the great Panhellenic competitions and that the majority were won at minor festivals. However, one of the remaining five victories was certainly won in one of the four festivals which made up (...) the periodos. In lines 15–18, after preparatory generalizations about the diversity of paths to achievement, all with divine aid, Pindar describes the path of achievement, and the source of divine aid, which features in the victor's family: Tιμσθενες, μμε δ' κλρωσεν πτμος Zην γενεθλωι. ς σ μν Nεμαι πρπατον, 'Aλκιμδοντα δ πρ κρνου λ៹φωι θκεν 'Oλυμπινκαν. Timosthenes, in your case fate allotted you to Zeus as your family god, who made you pre-eminent at Nemea and Alkimedon Olympic victor by the Hill of Kronos. (shrink)

This paper addresses itself to two transitional passages in Pindar which are frequently misunderstood. In both we appear at first sight to have an awkward change of direction, with the myth terminated abruptly and the following item of praise merely juxtaposed. In reality, both transitions are effected smoothly, and the same technique is employed in both odes.

Douglas Macdowell, one of the most distinguished students of Greek oratory, law and comedy of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, was for 30 years Professor of Greek at Glasgow University. He was elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 1993 and was also a Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. Obituary by Chris Carey.

The first strophe opens with a wish and a syntactical problem:εἴ μοι ξυνείη φέροντι μοῖρα τὰν εὔσεπτον ἁγνείαν λόγων ἔργων τε πάντων,…The sentence is often interpreted as though φέροντι were φέρειν: ‘may it be my destiny to possess’. However, for this meaning the infinitive is clearly required; there is no valid parallel for the use of the participle supposed here. Burton offers: ‘may a share of life be my companion provided that I win or possess purity’; purity is a precondition (...) for life. This interpretation is possible but improbable, for the use of μοῖρα as a synonym for βίος would be obscure in this context. It is altogether easier to interpret with Kamerbeek: ‘would that Destiny were with me when I ’; the chorus hopes for the favour of fate, provided that this is earned by purity of word and deed. The hope thus embraces an intention to avoid all impurity of word or action. Against this interpretation it has been objected that μοῖρα is a constant presence, not a helpful power which might desert. However, συνεῖναι is attested with the sense ‘favour’ ; and the notion that fate may favour individuals or groups is attested. (shrink)

This volume brings together eighteen articles which examine erôs as an emotion in ancient Greek culture. Taking into account all important thinking about the nature of erôs from the eighth century BCE to the third century CE, it covers a very broad range of sources and theoretical approaches, both in the chronological and the generic sense.