This introduction consists of two sections. The first section focuses on the understanding of the nature and identity of Chinese Buddhist philosophy by delving into the relationship of Chinese Buddhist philosophy with its other. This “other” mainly involves Indian Buddhist philosophy, Daoist and Confucian philosophies, and Western philosophy in modern time. The section pays attention to the subversive process of the Chinese assimilation of Indian Buddhist philosophy, a process (...) of interaction, interchange and interpenetration, which is conditioned by multiple social-historical, linguistic-conceptual and practical factors. The process defies the clear-cut distinction of assimilator and assimilated. The outcome is close to something that is neither originally Indian nor originally Chinese. In modern time this dynamic relationship with the other is extended to Western philosophy. The section conducts a survey of this relationship, and promotes a mutual inclusive attitude towards, and benefiting from, each other. The second section offers the outline for each of the remaining 17 chapters. (shrink)

Too often Buddhism has been subjected to the Procrustean box of western thought, whereby it is stretched to fit fixed categories or had essential aspects lopped off to accommodate vastly different cultural norms and aims. After several generations of scholarly discussion in English-speaking communities, it is time to move to the next hermeneutical stage. Buddhist philosophy must be liberated from the confines of a quasi-religious stereotype and judged on its own merits. Hence this work will approach Chinese (...) Buddhism as a philosophical tradition in its own right, not as an historical after-thought nor as an occasion for comparative discussions that assume the west alone sets the standards for or is the origin of philosophy and its methodologies. Viewed within their own context, Chinese Buddhist philosophers have much to contribute to a wide range of philosophical concerns, including metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and perhaps most especially philosophy of mind. Moreover they have been enormously influential in the development of Buddhist philosophy in Korea, Vietnam, and Japan. (shrink)

The philosophy of time and change in Chinese Buddhism originated in a short treatise written by an early Chinese monk, Sengzhao (c. 384-414 CE). In this treatise, “On the Immutability of Things (wubuqianlun),” Sengzhao proposed a revolutionary theory of time and change that opposed the traditional Chinese notion of change established by Confucianism and Daoism. His thesis of the immutability of things also seemingly defies a fundamental Buddhist teaching about the impermanence of things. More than (...) a thousand years after Sengzhao, a monk in the Ming dynasty, Kongyin Zhencheng (1546–1617) published the “Logical Investigation of the Thesis of No-Motion of Things (Wubuqian zhengliang lun) to refute Sengzhao's theory of the immutability of things. Because of Sengzhao's esteemed status as one of the early founders of Chinese Buddhism, Zhencheng's critique of Sengzhao caused an uproar among his contemporaries. The ensuing exchange constituted one of the major debates in the history of Chinese Buddhism (Lin 2018; Liu et al., 2020; Fang 1998; Zhu 2012) and was considered a significant event in the “rise of Buddhist scholasticism” (Liu et al., 2020: 7). This entry will carefully analyze Sengzhao's treatise on time and the immutability of things, highlighting the philosophical disagreements between him and Zhencheng. It will also place Sengzhao in his philosophical lineage to examine how he derived insights from Kumarajiva and Nāgārjuna, and how he might have influenced Chan Buddhism's conception of time. This entry will present the uniqueness of Sengzhao's conception of time that marks his departure from the Chinese tradition. (shrink)

Presenting a comprehensive portrayal of the reading of Chinese and Buddhist philosophy in early 20th-century German thought, Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in early Twentieth-Century German Thought examines the implications of these readings for contemporary issues in comparative and intercultural philosophy. Through a series of case studies from the late 19th-century and early 20th-century, Eric Nelson focuses on the reception and uses of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism in German philosophy, covering figures as diverse (...) as Buber, Heidegger, and Misch. He argues that the growing intertextuality between traditions cannot be appropriately interpreted through notions of exclusive identities, closed horizons, or unitary traditions. Providing an account of the context, motivations, and hermeneutical strategies of early twentieth-century European thinkers' interpretation of Asian philosophy, Nelson also throws new light on the question of the relation between Heidegger and Asian philosophy. Reflecting the growing interest in the possibility of intercultural and global philosophy, Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in early Twentieth-Century German Thought opens up the possibility of a more inclusive intercultural conception of philosophy. - See more at: http://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/chinese-and-buddhist-philosophy-in-early-twentieth-century-german-thought-9781350002562/#sthash.1lY6OTYj.dpuf. (shrink)

Academic studies of Chinese Buddhist views of language generally focus on issues such as paradox, contradiction, and the limits of expression and thought. However, such studies seldom seem to focus on the fact that many Buddhist texts deliberately use an ambiguous mode of linguistic expression, one that actually constitutes their compositional patterns and is designed to enhance and promote the Mahāyāna Buddhist soteriological goal—namely, liberation from suffering via detachment from falseness. In fact, many of the (...) class='Hi'>Chinese masters’ treatises and exegetical commentaries develop a textual pragmatics rooted in the ambiguous and paradoxical rhetoric of early Madhyamaka scriptures translated by Kumārajīva. This paper discusses the philosophical and soteriological significance of such a linguistic pragmatics as we find it in the early Chinese Madhyamaka scriptures. The Buddhist doctrines such as “the two truths of the conventional and ultimate,” “emptiness,” “non-duality,” “differentiation,” as well as “the middle way” are the focus of the present paper. (shrink)

This chapter sheds new light on the interaction between Chinese Buddhism and Confucianism by exploring and comparing the thoughts of the ninth century Huayan-Chan Buddhist Zongmi 宗密 and the twentieth century Neo-Confucian Mou Zongsan 牟宗三. It reveals the structural parallel between their opposing theories: both hold a doctrine of true mind as the central component, and both are influenced by the tathāgatagarbha 如來藏 doctrine of The Awakening of Faith. The former uses them to synthesize Huayan and Chan (...) class='Hi'>Buddhist soteriology; the latter assimilates them into his framework of Neo-Confucian moral metaphysics. Seen as a response to Zongmi’s criticism of Confucian metaphysics in general, and the shortcomings of the mandate of heaven and the lack of causal theory in particular, Mou stresses the universality of the Confucian Dao, which is supported by the Song Neo-Confucian Zhu Xi’s unified ontological principle. Rather than appealing to the mandate of heaven, Mou makes clear in following Wang Yangming that the Confucian Dao can be manifested by the sage through his infinite intellectual mind, which is immanent in every human being, so as to solve the problem of the highest good without postulating a transcendent god nor appealing to the karmic causality. Mou’s response, supplemented by other Neo-Confucian theories such as Xiong Shili’s and Tang Junyi’s, is a prominent example of how Confucian tradition meets the challenge of Chinese Buddhism while absorbing Buddhist influence. However, the author also points out that Mou’s Neo-Confucian philosophy provides a possibility of defending Chinese Buddhism in face of the critique raised by Critical Buddhism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Chinese Buddhism and the Threat of Atheism in Seventeenth-Century EuropeThierry MeynardWhen the Europeans first came to Asia, they met with the multiform presence of Buddhism. They gradually came to understand that a common religious tradition connected the different brands of Buddhism found in Sri Lanka, Thailand, Japan, and China. I propose here to examine a presentation of Buddhism written in Guangzhou by the Italian Jesuit Prospero Intorcetta (1626-1696) (...) around the year 1668. This text was later edited by the Flemish Jesuit Philippe Couplet (1623-1693) and published in Paris in 1687, within an encyclopedia on Chinese thought titled Confucius Sinarum Philosophus (The Chinese Philosopher Confucius, hereafter called CSP).In the first part of this study, I shall introduce the background of the Jesuit encounter with Buddhism, first in Japan and then in China, as well as their literary production on the subject. Then, I shall examine Intorcetta's presentation of Chinese Buddhism, especially his understanding of the two faces of Buddhism: Pure Land Buddhism, which he categorized as superstition, and Chan Buddhism, categorized as atheism. These two notions of superstition and atheism seem contradictory, but in fact they are derived from Intorcetta's interpretation of the Buddhist theory of the "two truths." I shall conclude with an evaluation of Intorcetta's account. Because this early presentation of Buddhism exists only in Latin, I have inserted excerpts that I have translated.Historical Background of the Encounter with BuddhismSince the sixteenth century, missionaries have traveled to different regions of Asia and collected information about the religions they encountered, including Buddhism. They also exchanged information among themselves, asking questions of colleagues in order to confirm and complete information. The missionary reports were sent to Europe for their superiors and were sometimes published as such, but more often incorporated into larger works. [End Page 3]The First Encounter, from Japan to ChinaAmong the first reports reaching Europe about Buddhism were the letters of the Spanish Jesuit Francis-Xavier (1506-1552), who drew information from Yajiro, a Japa nese he met in Malacca in 1547. During his own stay of more than two years in Japan, in 1549-1551, Francis-Xavier had exchanges with monks and could progress in his understanding of Buddhism. His letters were very influential among the network of Jesuit schools in Europe, being copied and read at many venues.1 Other missionaries in Japan, like Cosme de Torres (1510-1570), Luís Fróis (1532-1597), and Baltasar Gago (1515-1583), went further in understanding Buddhism.Also, when, at the end of the sixteenth century, the Jesuit missionaries approached Buddhism in China, their understanding was already shaped by fifty years of knowledge gained in Japan. Just as in Japan, the China Jesuits were interested in Buddhism because it provided them with an indigenous vocabulary in which to express Christian ideas. Thus, the missionary was perceived as a kind of Buddhist monk. The symbolic identification with Buddhism went even further than in Japan, because for more than ten years in Guangdong, from 1579 to 1595, they adopted Buddhist dress and shaved their heads.However, as the missionaries deepened their understanding of the Buddhist doctrine, they realized that many tenets could not be reconciled with Christianity. Since they were greatly concerned about disseminating the orthodox faith and avoiding dubious theories, which they believed to be the tricks of the devil, they distanced themselves from Buddhism and became closer to Confucianism, whose discourse, which focused on moral life in the present world, did not directly conflict with the supernatural truths of Christianity. While Michele Ruggieri (1543-1607) and Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) had initially started interacting with Chinese culture by using Buddhism, later on Ricci abandoned this approach and started to use Confucianism as the main medium. In the Tianzhu shiyi (True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven), Ricci wrote for his Chinese readers a strong refutation of the Buddhist doctrine from the standpoint of Aristotelian philosophy.2 He criticized the concept of selflessness (wuwo) on metaphysical grounds, writing that everyone should draw their existence from an ultimate origin. In his Della entrata della Compagnia di Gesù e Christianità nella China (Entry of the Society of Jesus into... (shrink)

This review article defends Brook Ziporyn against the charge, quite common in graduate classroom discussions, if not in print, that his readings of early Chinese philosophy are ‘overly Buddhist’. These readings are found in his three most recent books: Ironies of Oneness and Difference: Coherence in Early Chinese Thought, Beyond Oneness and Difference: Li and Coherence in Chinese Buddhist Thought and Its Antecedents, and Emptiness and Omnipresence: An Essential Introduction to Tiantai Buddhism. His readings (...) are clearly Buddhist-influenced, but this is not in and of itself problematic. The core issue is rather to what degree these ‘Buddhist elements’ are actually already existent in, and have subsequently been carried over from, early Chinese thought in the development of Chinese Buddhism. Indeed, some scholars of Chinese Buddhism have pointed out that much of the vocabulary, concepts, and logic used in schools such as Tiantai may owe more to Daoist influences than to Buddhist ones. Accordingly, Ziporyn’s ‘overly Buddhist’ approach might simply be an avenue of interpretation that is actually quite in line with the thinking in the early texts themselves, albeit one that is less familiar. The article also aims to show how Ziporyn’s theory concerning the importance of ‘coherence’ in early and later Chinese philosophy is also quite important in his above work on Tiantai Buddhism, Emptiness and Omnipresence. While in this work Ziporyn almost entirely abstains from using the language of coherence, much of it actually rests on a strong coherence-based foundation, thereby demonstrating not Ziporyn’s own prejudice, but rather the thoroughgoing importance and versatility of his arguments on coherence. Indeed, understanding the importance of coherence in his readings of Tiantai Buddhism only bolsters the defense against the claims that he makes ‘overly Buddhist’ readings of early Chinese philosophy. (shrink)

Eric Nelson's Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought opens with the following: "The work before you is an interpretive journey through the historical reception of Chinese and Buddhist philosophy in modern German thought, focusing in particular--albeit not exclusively--on the early twentieth century. Its intent is to describe and analyze the intertextual nexus of intersecting sources for the sake of elucidating implications and critical models for intercultural hermeneutics and intercultural philosophy. The (...) possibility of such a philosophy is confronted by the persistent myth and prejudice that philosophy is and can only be a unique and exclusive Western spiritual achievement" (p.... (shrink)

_An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy_ unlocks the mystery of ancient Chinese philosophy and unravels the complexity of Chinese Buddhism by placing them in the contemporary context of discourse. Elucidates the central issues and debates in Chinese philosophy, its different schools of thought, and its major philosophers. Covers eight major philosophers in the ancient period, among them Confucius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi. Illuminates the links between different schools of philosophy. Opens the door to further study (...) of the relationship between Chinese and Western philosophy. (shrink)

Eric Nelson has written a very comprehensive study of the reception of Chinese and EasternBuddhist philosophy in Western thought, with a special focus on the German thinkers of theearly twentieth century. Nelson shows great erudition in bringing together a wide variety ofthinkers from both East and West, including importantly some lesser known, but very relevantthinkers from both the Western tradition and Eastern philosophy. Although Nelson focusesmostly on the encounters and interactions between German philosophers and Chinese thinkers,his (...) aim with this commendable book is wider. Nelson employs the encountersbetween German and Chinese thinkers in the wider context of comparative and/or interculturalphilosophy, and his aim is therefore stated as being an attempt to consider ‘whether amore nuanced and historically appropriate conception of philosophy can emerge through criticallyengaging and reflecting on the modern encounter between Western and non-Westernphilosophy, and articulating its intercultural and intertextual dynamics’. (shrink)

The research examines the features of the Mahayana world of Chinese Buddhism in the system of worlds of Mahayana Buddhism. A definition is given of the concept of “worlds of Mahayana Buddhism” as divergent constructs formed in the areas of distribution of Buddhism, as well as the world of Chinese Mahayana Buddhism. The specific features of Mahayana Buddhism in China, formed as a result of its assimilation on traditional religious and sociocultural grounds, are shown. The factors that prevented (...) the entry of Buddhism into the civilizational space of China and determined its formation there over the course of several centuries are indicated. The role of the Prajnaparamita texts, the Lotus Sutra, the Nirvana Sutra and the Avatamsaka Sutra in the formation of schools of Chinese Buddhism is revealed. The role of the Mahaparinirvana Sutra in the formation of the idea of an instant path to salvation in China is especially emphasized. The importance of the idea of an instant way of salvation for the formation of Chinese schools itself is shown. An analysis is given of the formation of the philosophical and soteriological direction in China, which took a different direction than in India, where the development of Madhyamaka ideas led to an emphasis on the epistemological aspects of the doctrine of emptiness, while in China attention was focused on its ontological aspects. The significance of the problem of truly existing is indicated as one of the main problems of philosophical research of the Tiantai, Chan, Huayan schools of Chinese Buddhism, as well as the idea of instantly achieving Buddhahood, which became the main soteriological guideline of these schools. It is indicated that in Tibet the development of philosophical and soteriological directions was developed in line with Indian Buddhism. The reasons for the Tibetans' choice of the soteriological path of the gradual movement of nirvana, which determined the development of Buddhism in their country, are considered. The role of Atisha in choosing the gradual path to nirvana is revealed. The difference between the worlds of Mahayana Buddhism, formed in China and Tibet, is shown. (shrink)

Chinese Buddhist thought is more than a case of “Indianization” or “Sinicization,” and even less, “Distortion.” Chinese Buddhist thought should be grasped, first, in its own terms and only then in terms of the possible influences or confluences that flowed into it. The present article will seek to look into the concept of “Suchness vasana” (perfumation by the Buddhist absolute, Suchness, upon avidya, ignorance) as used by the Huayan school in China. Then it will show (...) how, in the elaboration of this idea, Fazang, the key patriarch of the Huayan school, apparently drew on a mode of thought that is derived from the Yijing, the Book of Changes. It is in the nature of the present article that only the Chinese influence will be underlined and that the Indian contributions to the formation of a theory of a “dynamic Suchness” will only be briefly touched upon. Scholars have long noticed the Daoist influence of Chinese Buddhological thinking, especially within the Ch'an and the Hua-yen circles. However, too often scholars only suggest impressionistic parallels, between, say, the book Laozi and the Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch or between Mencian humanism (“Every man can be Sage Yao and Shun”) and the idea that “Every man can be Buddha.” Such presentations of Chinese influence bypass the various problems involved in the long and thorny history of conflict, compromise, mutual self-discovery, and fertilization between the two cultural traditions. The present article will try to be much more concrete by documenting and analyzing the series of incidents that led to a datable innovation on Fazang's part. (shrink)

Journal of Chinese Philosophy, EarlyView.

These are the first two of a series of three volumes on Buddhism in modern China; the first deals with the system and institutions of modern Chinese Buddhism, the second with its history. The third volume which is yet to be published will deal with Buddhism in China under the communists. The books are amazingly well written; they show excellent research, much of which was in interviewing monks who had escaped from China. The presentation is well ordered, and the (...) author's style makes even what one would think was uninteresting fascinating. His own divisions best explain what the volumes contain. The first is divided into two parts, Monastic Institutions and the Individual Buddhist. The first part contains chapters on the people of the monastery, the meditation hall, the Buddha recitation hall, observance of the rules, hereditary and branch temples, the abbot, rites for the dead, and the economy of monasteries. The second part on the Individual Buddhist contains chapters on entering the sangha, the monastic career, the lay Buddhist, and the nature of the system. His account shows, contrary to the usual view, that Chinese Buddhism up to the time of communist take-over was still a vibrantly practiced religion. The second volume takes up the problem of the so-called revival of Buddhism in China beginning around the turn of the century. The chapter headings are: the beginnings of the revival, the struggle for national leadership, T'ai-hsü, the lay Buddhist movement, building and publishing, Buddhist education, social action by the sangha, sangha and state, foreign contacts, sects and dissension, Christian stereotypes and Buddhist realities, the meaning of the revival, and a postscript. The "revival" is shown to be mainly a lay movement and a reaction to political pressures which probably would have brought about the diminishment of Buddhism in China even if the communists had not taken over. As with the first volume there is here very little explanation of Buddhist doctrine which the author considered to be beyond the scope of the book. Both volumes warrant repeating that the author researched his topic thoroughly and then wrote his story in excellent prose. Highly recommended.--P. J. H. (shrink)

The modes of thought in Chinese Buddhism and Indian Buddhism refer to the structures of understanding, the modes and methods of thinking about problems and theories of explanation on the part of the Buddhist scholars in China and in India; this belongs to the deeper and higher-level contents of Buddhist culture. To study and compare the Chinese Buddhist and Indian Buddhist modes of thought will help us to understand the framework of response with which (...) the Buddhist scholars of the two countries and cultures respond to external stimuli, and how they approach the task of processing intellectual information. It will help us to comprehend better the specific forms of the intuitive thought, analytical thought, and the thinking in images on the part of the Buddhist scholars of the two countries, as well as their mental and psychological structure and their national character—even the psychological structure and national characteristics of the common Buddhist in the two countries and cultures. This would be significant for the study of religion, of philosophy, of the science of thought, and for the study of psychology. This essay hopes, through focusing on explaining and demonstrating the evolution of the modes of thought of Chinese and Indian Buddhism, to reveal certain similarities as well as differences between the Chinese Buddhist and Indian Buddhist modes of thought, and to arrive at some conclusion with regard to this matter. (shrink)

Did Chinese mysticism vanish after its first appearance in ancient Taoist philosophy, to surface only after a thousand years had passed, when the Chinese had adapted Buddhism to their own culture? This first integrated survey of the mystical dimension of Taoism disputes the commonly accepted idea of such a hiatus. Covering the period from the Daode jing to the end of the Tang, Livia Kohn reveals an often misunderstood Chinese mystical tradition that continued through the ages. (...) Influenced by but ultimately independent of Buddhism, it took forms more various than the quietistic withdrawal of Laozi or the sudden enlightenment of the Chan Buddhists. On the basis of a new theoretical evaluation of mysticism, this study analyzes the relationship between philosophical and religious Taoism and between Buddhism and the native Chinese tradition. Kohn shows how the quietistic and socially oriented Daode jing was combined with the ecstatic and individualistic mysticism of the Zhuangzi, with immortality beliefs and practices, and with Buddhist insight meditation, mind analysis, and doctrines of karma and retribution. She goes on to demonstrate that Chinese mysticism, a complex synthesis by the late Six Dynasties, reached its zenith in the Tang, laying the foundations for later developments in the Song traditions of Inner Alchemy, Chan Buddhism, and Neo-Confucianism. (shrink)

The question of Hegel's views on Buddhism and its place within his system must be asked again as the history of effects, transmission, and reception continues to unfold. This unfolding highlights not only Hegel's effect on the Western European reception and understanding of Buddhism (and its sharp orientalist critique), but also the canny use of Hegel's philosophy by certain members of the so-called Kyoto School of Japanese neo-Buddhist philosophy, who, though primarily concerning themselves with Heidegger, were notable (...) in their creative use of Hegel's philosophy of spirit (especially Nishida, Nishitani, Tanabe, and Abe). Our present task is likewise to look back to Hegel's own writing on Buddhism through the lens of the history of its effects—that is, to read Hegel again with his legacy in mind—so that we might, as strange as it may perhaps seem, see things more clearly. Our goal is relatively modest, as it aims only to seek out and coordinate Buddhism within Hegel's history of philosophy. Thus, as we have a proximate goal in mind, we also have an order of importance with respect to Hegel's texts, which, of course, brings the Lectures on the History of Philosophy to the fore. (shrink)

The chapters in this book focus on a phenomenon that is named by a conjunction of three terms: Japanese, Buddhist, philosophy. Each of these terms implies a distinction demarcating one domain of inquiry from other related domains: Japanese as distinct from Chinese, Korean, or Indian; Buddhist as distinct from Confucian or Shintō; and philosophy as distinct from religion or psychology. Each of these terms, the three in question as well as their contrasts, reflects a distinctly (...) modern category that abstracts from historical realities that blur the distinctions. With this qualification in mind, this chapter clarifies the terms in question, then selects two themes: language-reality-truth, and the nature of Buddhist practice, and gives a sample of philosophical methods and styles of argumentation that characterize “Japanese Buddhist philosophy.” For the most part, the selection here is limited to examples from pre-modern times, before Japanese Buddhists had encountered western philosophy and began to present Buddhism in its terms. (shrink)

_Continues the author’s inquiry into the development of the Chinese philosophical concept Li, concluding in Song and Ming dynasty Neo-Confucianism._.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Books ReceivedThe Act of Being: The Philosophy of Revelation in Mullā Sadrā. By Christian Jambet. Brooklyn: Zone Books, 2006. Pp. 497. Hardcover $38.95.Analysis in Śaṅkara Vedānta: The Philosophy of Ganeswar Misra. Edited by Bijayananda Kar. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2006. Pp. xxv + 190. Hardcover Rs. 240.00.Bhakti and Philosophy. By R. Raj Singh. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006. Pp. 112. Hardcover $65.00.Brahman and the (...) Ethos of Organization. By Leonard R. Silos. Paseo de Roxas: Asian Institute of Management, 2006. Pp. xix + 344. Price not given.Buddhist Inclusivism: Attitudes Towards Religious Others. By Kristin Beise Kiblinger. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005. Pp. viii + 145. Hardcover $89.95.Classical Northern Wu Style Tai Ji Quan: The Fighting Art of the Manchurian Palace Guard. By Tina Chunna Zhang and Frank Allen. Berkeley: Blue Snake Books, 2006. Pp. xiii + 203. Paper $21.95.Classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga: An Indian Metaphysics of Experience. By Mikel Burley. London and New York: Routledge, 2007. Pp. xiv + 226. Price not given.Comparative Philosophy and Religion in Times of Terror. Edited by Douglas Allen. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006. Pp. xiv + 257. Hardcover $62.00. Paper $32.00.Contemplative Science: Where Buddhism and Neuroscience Converge. By B. Alan Wallace. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. Pp. vii + 211. Hardcover $29.50, £19.00.Contexts and Dialogue: Yogācāra Buddhism and Modern Psychology on the Subliminal Mind. By Tao Jiang. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006. Pp. xi + 198. Paper $20.00.Dialogue Transcultural. Edited by Yue Diayun et al. Nanjing: Jiangsu Peoples Press, 2006. Pp. 335. Price not given.Dōgen on Meditation and Thinking: A Reflection on His View of Zen. By Hee-Jin Kim. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006. Pp. xiii + 169. Hardcover $65.50. Paper $21.95.The Garden of Loneliness: A Translation of Jayshankar Prasad's Āṅsū, "Tears." By Charles S. J. White. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2006. Pp. xv + 136. Hardcover Rs. 295. [End Page 608]The Happening of Tradition: Vallabha on Anumāna in Nyāyalīlāvatī. By Anna-Pya Sjödin. Stockholm: Elanders Gotab, 2006. Pp. 195. Price not given.Head, Eyes, Flesh, and Blood: Giving Away the Body in Indian Buddhist Literature. By Reiko Ohnuma. 2006. Pp. xvii + 372. Hardcover $45.00, £29.00.Hwa Yu T'ai Chi Ch'uan: Unlocking the Mysteries of the Five-Word Song. By Glenn D. Newth. Berkeley: Blue Snake Books, 2007. Pp. xiii + 160. U.S. $18.95. Can $24.95.A Jewish Philosopher of Baghdad: 'Izz al-Dawla Ibn Kammūna (d. 683/1284) and His Writings. By Reza Pourjavady and Sabine Schmidtke. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006. Pp. xii + 274. Hardcover $130.00, €100.Letting Be: Fred Dallmayr's Cosmopolitical Vision. Edited by Stephen F. Schneck. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006. Pp. x + 382. Paper $35.00.Myth and the Existential Quest. By Vassilis Vitsaxis and translated by Deborah Brown Kazazis and Vassilis Vitsaxis. Boston: Somerset Hall Press, 2006. Pp. 301. Hardcover $49.95. Paper $39.95.Nietzsche-Buddha-Zarathustra: Eine West-Ost Konfiguration. By Michael Skowron. Daegu: Kyungpook National University Press, 2006. Pp. 293. Paper $18.00, Won 17,000.Popularizing Buddhism: Preaching as Performance in Sri Lanka. By Mahinda Deegalle. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006. Pp. xiii + 241. Hardcover $65.00. Paper $21.95.Ramana Maharashi: The Sage of Arunachala. By Arvind Sharma. New Delhi: Penquin Group, 2006. Pp. 215. Hardcover Rs. 295.Readings in Han Chinese Thought. Edited and translated by Mark Csikszentmihalyi. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2006. Pp. xxx + 220. Hardcover $39.95. Paper $14.95.Religions of Korea in Practice. Edited by Robert E. Buswell Jr. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007. Pp. xx + 542. Paper $24.95, £15.95.The Scripture on Great Peace: The Taiping jing and the Beginnings of Daoism. By Barbara Hendrischke. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006. Pp. x + 410. Hardcover $60.00, £38.95.The Self 's Awareness of Itself: Bhaṭṭa Rāmakantha's Arguments against the Buddhist Doctrine of No-Self. By Alex Watson. Vienna: Sammlung de Nobili, 2006. Pp. 433. Price not given... (shrink)

Discussions of Chinese Buddhism rarely address the crucial period of transition during which a philosophy from India gradually underwent a process of sinification. The historical record for this period of several hundred years between the Han and Tang dynasties, which coincided with social, political, and cultural upheavals, is sparse. Two key sources for consideration are the Chinese monk Zhi Dun and The Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna. Liu Yiqing ’s A New Account of Tales of the (...) World provides tantalizing glimpses of the philosophical reconfiguration, including mutations of Confucianism and the emergence of Xuanxue in Daoism. (shrink)

In this essay I attempt a philosophical analysis of the Chinese Buddhist thought of linguistic reference to shed light on how the Buddhist understands the way language refers to an ineffable reality. For this purpose, the essay proceeds in two directions: an enquiry into the linguistic thoughts of Sengzhao (374-414 CE) and Jizang (549-623 CE), two leading Chinese Madhyamika thinkers, and an analysis of the Buddhist simile of a moon-pointing finger. The two approaches respectively constitute (...) the horizontal and vertical axes of this essay. The simile of a moon-pointing finger originated in Indian Buddhism and later received much attention in Chinese Buddhism. In light of the Chinese Buddhist interpretations of the simile, I set forth six theses to make explicit the philosophic implications there involved. They are: (1) words in no way correspond with the ineffable Real and cannot say or properly express the Real; (2) words can point toward the Real by means of the forms meant or properly expressed by them; (3) the forms are plainly different from the Real and so are to be negated; (4) one who takes the forms for the Real not only misunderstands the Real but is also ignorant of the function of language; (5) the forgetting of words and their forms can dissolve the entanglement of language and thought and even lead to the intuition of the Real; (6) the intuition of the Real depends upon extra-linguistic factors as well as language. In elaborating the theses, I resort to passages in Sengzhao’s and Jizang’s works to disclose their linguistic thoughts in relation to the theses. A main concern here is to show how one can speak the unspeakable, how one can refer to an ineffable reality without committing self-contradiction. This is done in relation to their views, the theses as well as a free interpretive analysis. I construe the notion of indication as involving the imposition-cum-negation method and argue that one can use words to indicate the ineffable without at the same time describing it. The ineffable is indescribable, but it can be intimated through indication. Meanwhile, I also discuss Zhuangzi’s notion of word-forgetting as it plays a role in the simile and in Jizang’s philosophy of language. One of the purposes of this essay is to show that while valuing the therapeutic and evocative functions of religious language, Chinese Buddhist thinkers also understand the language indicatively. Without taking note of the indicative function of religious language, one cannot form an adequate picture of the Chinese Buddhist -- especially, the Chinese Madhyamaka -- philosophy of language. (shrink)

한역(漢譯) 불전을 우리말로 번역할 때, 독음이 동일하여 중첩적인 동음이의 음역어가 발생하는 사례가 적지 않다. 예컨대 ‘나라, 다라, 마라, 바가, 바라, 바사, 반나, 발리, 발타, 발타라, 사라, 사리, 사타, 사파, 수라, 시라, 시파, 타라, 파나, 파라, 파리’ 등은 매우 다양하고 중첩적인 음역 용례를 보여 주고 있다. 여기서는 그러한 음역 예 중에서 ‘가라’만을 선택하여 분석하였다. 특히 동음이의 음역어가 야기하는 의미 체계에서의 난맥상이 어느 정도인지를 다각도로 분석하고, 그 해결 방안으로서 다음 네 가지를 제시했다. 첫째, 이중번역으로 인해서 발생할 수밖에 없는 동음이의어의 경우에는 음역어를 최소한으로 (...) 줄이고자 하는 노력이 필요하다. 둘째, 누역(累譯)의 경우에는 다양한 판본들을 비교 분석한 뒤에 용어를 최대한 통일시키는 작업이 긴요하다. 셋째, 동음이의 음역어의 경우에 중첩적인 의미들을 구분하기 위해서는 해당 원전 또는 한역본에는 없는 단어일지라도 문맥에 따라서 그 의미를 한정시키고 보충하는 말을 첨가할 필요가 있다. 넷째, 축역으로 인한 동음이의어의 경우에는 원음을 복원시켜서 번역함으로써 의미의 혼동을 방지할 수 있을 것이다. 특히 이 점은 원전을 반영함으로써 한역 불전의 용어를 간명하게 하고 동시에 의미의 명료성을 높이는 데에도 적잖은 역할을 할 것이다. (shrink)

?Right words are like the reverse? is the concluding remark of chap. 78 in the Daoist classic Daodejing. Quoted in treatises composed by Seng Zhao (374?414), it designates the linguistic strategy used to unfold the Buddhist Madhyamaka meaning of ?emptiness? and ?ultimate truth?. In his treatise Things Do not Move, Seng Zhao demonstrates that ?motion and stillness? are not really contradictory, performing the deconstructive meaning of Buddhist ?emptiness? via the corresponding linguistic strategy. Though the topic of the discussion (...) and the rhetoric are borrowed from Daoist sources, the point of view is rooted in the Buddhist understanding. The first section of this paper deals with the issue of exegetical methods in early Chinese Buddhism; the subsequent part explains both the Daoist background and the topics modified in Seng Zhao's discussions; the third part analyzes Seng Zhao's linguistic strategy and expounds its particular philosophical significance. (shrink)

The evolving field of neuroscience provides a fresh perspective for understanding and clarifying the nondualistic epistemology of Buddhist philosophy. Its egalitarian adherence to “wisdom embracing all species” required an epistemological shift beyond both egocentric and anthropocentric assumptions, outlined in such texts as the Lotus Sūtra and the Diamond Sūtra. Parallels can be drawn to the Triple Loop learning process, “an ‘epistemo-existential strategy’ for profound change on various levels.” Inherently hierarchical tendencies in Daoist and Confucian philosophies posed a challenge (...) to the egalitarian stance of Buddhist nondualism. Passages from Daoist, Confucian, and Neo-Confucian texts demonstrate the limits of Chinese nondualism. The hybrid brain cultivated through Buddhist practice was able to maintain the benefits of the task-driven dorsal attentional network, while being grounded in the stimulus-driven ventral attentional network. The Five Ranks of Chan meticulously trace the process of recognizing the nondualism of deluded mind and awakened mind. The final rank, “Unity Attained,” restores the role of allocentric attention, which has been described as “the basic simplicity of the undyed fabric,” as the default. Thus, inspired by the pedagogy of cognitive dissonance woven into Sanskrit texts, Chinese practitioners deployed their own “circuit-breakers” of ventral attention to disrupt the dogmatic “perseveration” of dorsal attention. The resulting epistemological reorientation reveals the nondualism of reality. (shrink)

This article investigates William James's reading of the concepts of selflessness and transcendence in relation to the Chan and Pure Land schools of Chinese Buddhism. The divide between Chan and Pure Land Buddhism may be mediated if we attend to aspects of the two traditions that James found particularly meaningful. James is drawn to selflessness as presented in the concept of emptiness in the Chan understanding of meditative experience. He is equally interested in Buddhist devotional practices of Pure (...) Land that claim to open individuals and their communities to the divine. James saw these two aspects as deeply compatible. (shrink)

In this essay, I investigate how Chinese Yogācāra scholars of the Tang dynasty explicated and supplemented the theory of apoha (exclusion) propounded by the Indian Buddhist epistemologist Dignāga, according to which a nominal word functions by excluding everything other than its own referent. I first present a brief exposition of the theory. Then, I show that although they had very limited access to Dignāga’s theory, Kuiji and Shentai provide constructive and significant explanations that supplement the theory. I also (...) show that the term zhequan has been construed in Chinese Buddhism in at least three different senses to mean: an expression that both excludes and signifies, an expression that merely excludes and does not signify, and a negative expression that merely excludes. The notion of apoha is related to the first two senses but not the third. (shrink)

How is devotion (bhakti) related to knowledge (jñāna)? Does one lead to the other? Do they correspond to different paths for different people? Commentators on the Bhagavad-Gītā have debated these questions for centuries. In this essay I will suggest, as many Indian commentators have, that the paths of devotion and knowledge described in the Gītā can be harmonized. I will not draw from Indian texts, however, but from a suggestive parallel in the history of Chinese religions: namely, the development (...) of a tradition of “dual cultivation” of Pure Land and Chan 禪. I will focus in particular on the works of Yunqi Zhuhong 雲棲祩宏 (1535–1615) and his use of the distinction between principle (li 理) and phenomenon (shi 事) to reconcile seemingly divergent religious paths. I will conclude by considering the implications of this synthesis for nondualist interpretations of the Gītā. (shrink)