A patient is not always told when a student is performing a procedure for the first time. Withholding this information is a form of deception. It is justified on paternalistic grounds (it is in the patient's interest not to know), or on public policy grounds (given the choice, patients would refuse, thus compromising the training of future physicians). Using the spinal tap procedure (lumbar puncture) as a paradigm, 173 patients were surveyed to determine how they felt about first time procedures (...) by medical students, interns, and residents. The patients indicated that they would be willing to be the subject for a student's (52%), intern's (62%), or resident's (66%) first spinal tap. This paper reassesses the ethics of consent for first time procedures based on responses to this survey. (shrink)

In “The Meaning of Rights,” Norman Wilde offers an original account of rights, still of interest. Rights, he contends, are possessed by an individual by virtue of the social function she fulfills. It is because individuals belong to a common social order, in which each has her part to play, that they are “entitled to the conditions necessary for playing it” [288]. This approach allows for a nuanced view, according to which rights are neither absolutely inherent to the individual (...) nor entirely dependent on social conventions. But is such a function-based justification of rights plausible? (shrink)

Against the turbulent backdrop of Enlightenment Scotland, Adam Smith lays out a succinct and highly engaging account of Smith's life and times, reviews his work as a whole and traces his influence over the past two centuries. Dispelling myths and debunking caricatures, this book explores his ideas in detail, from ethics to law to economics and government and the impact of those ideas on thinkers as diverse as Karl Marx, Charles Darwin, John Maynard Keynes and Friedrich Hayek. Adam Smith (...) emerges as one of the founders of modern social psychology and behavioural theory, offering a strikingly modern evolutionary theory of political economy, which recognises the often complementary roles of markets and the state. (shrink)

My topic is the parallels between attacks on free speech by the U.S. war party, and attacks on free speech by what Charles Alan Kors and Harvey Silverglate have called “the shadow university”; and the blindness to these parallels of that part of the left and right that is not libertarian on free speech and due process.

Rue, Charles Inserting a Season of Creation into the Catholic liturgical year during September is one way to structurally help implement the vision of Pope Francis given in his encyclical Laudato Si'. As a pastoral initiative a new liturgical season would help believers face the twenty-first-century ecological challenge. This article first looks at the liturgical reform initiated by the Second Vatican Council as an example of reform. The second part explores recent initiatives to express the creation dimension of theology (...) in communal worship. In 1993 the ecumenical association, Church and Environment, proposed a Creation Time running from 1 September to 4 October. In 2004 Norman Habel in Adelaide developed a set of scriptural readings and ecological themes on this timetable. It was adapted by some Protestant communities around the world. Catholic and Orthodox communities wanting to celebrate creation during September have tended to focus on a particular day, often 1 September. Taking a more systematic approach, for the last three years the Columban Mission Institute in Sydney has prepared resources as an ecological reading of the existing lectionary to celebrate a Catholic Season of Creation during September. Creating a new lectionary would be a more radical reform. (shrink)

In Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (6: 61), Kant provided an ethical interpretation of kenosis, the 'self-emptying' of Christ described by St Paul in Philippians 2: 6-8. This type of interpretation is distinct to Hegelian interpretations of Christ's kenosis, which read the 'self-emptying' in ontological terms. In this essay, I explore how the British Idealists received both interpretations of the doctrine, and constructed a range of Christologies of both types. Types of kenosis in the work of Thomas Hill (...) Green and Charles Gore are examined in detail, revealing their dependence on Kant's work. Following thework of DonaldMacKinnon in this area, I argue that Gore eventually adopted a Kantian Christology for political and ethical reasons. (shrink)

Despite increased efforts to ensure diversity in genomic research, the exclusion of minority groups from data analyses and publications remains a critical issue. This paper addresses the ethical implications of these exclusions and proposes accountability for reasonableness (A4R) as a framework to promote fairness and equity in research. Originally conceived by Norman Daniels and James Sabin to guide resource allocation in the context of health policy, A4R emphasizes publicity, relevance of reasons, enforcement, and revision as essential for legitimacy and (...) trust in the decision‐making process. The authors argue that A4R is also relevant to resource allocation in research and that, if adequately informed and incentivized by funding agencies, institutional review boards, and scientific journals, researchers are well‐positioned to assess data‐selection justifications. The A4R framework provides a promising foundation for fostering accountability in genomics and other fields, including artificial intelligence, where lack of diversity and pervasive biases threaten equitable benefit sharing. (shrink)

This volume explores the ethical dimensions of a wide selection of philosophical and theological topics in Aquinas's texts.

The Post-Modern Reader edited by Charles Jencks An Anthology of a World Movement Post-Modernism has been debated, attacked, and defended for a generation, but only in the last few years has it come into focus as a coherent way of thought embracing all areas of culture. This is the first anthology that presents the synthesising trend in all its diversity, a convergence in architecture and literature, film and cultural theory, sociology, feminism and theology, science and economics. It is however, (...) a synthesis with a difference; it is one which stresses a contested pluralism, the ‘dialogic' that underlies the growth of sciences as well as the development of other art forms such as the novel. Some of the key historical texts are reprinted in part - those of Daniel Bell on the post-industrial society and Jean-François Lyotard on the post-modern condition. The new cultural logic of contested pluralism is analysed in seminal papers by Andreas Huyssen and Jim Collins. The fundamental ideas on post-modern literature are defined by Umberto Eco, John Barth and David Lodge and the theories they present challenge the notion of post-modernism as an ultra avant-garde movement and the expression of a consumer society. New Cultural Theory Late Modernism Literature, Art, Architecture and Film Sociology, Politics and Geography Feminism Science and Religion Tito Arecchi, John Barth, Jean Baudrillard, Daniel Bell, Charles Birch, David Bohm, Jim Collins, Norman K Denzin, Umberto Eco, Edward Goldsmith, David Ray Griffin, Jürgen Habermas, David Harvey, Ihab Hassan, Linda Hutcheon, Andreas Huyssen, Charles Jencks, Heinrich Klotz, Hans Küng, David Lodge, Jean-François Lyotard, Robin Murray, Craig Owens, Paolo Portoghesi, Margaret Rose, Susan Rubin Suleiman, Edward W Soja. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Concepts, Judgments, and Unity in Kant's Metaphysical Deduction of the Relational Categories CHARLES NUSSBAUM 1. INTRODUCTION TO ANY ATTENTIVEREADERof the section of the Critique of Pure Reason' known as the "Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories" (A67/B92-A83/B to9), one paragraph in that section stands out particularly by virtue of its special importance for Kant's developing argument: The same function Which gives unity to the various representations in ajudgment also (...) gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding. The same understanding, through the same operations by which in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a judgment, also introduces a transcendental content into its representations, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in general.... (CPR A79/B loS) The importance of this paragraph is, however, more than equaled by its difficulties, which center on the question of how the function which operates by means of analytical unity can be the same as one that operates by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in general. Put shortly, the problem is this. If the functions are really the same, then how do we distinguish at all between analytic and synthetic operations? But if they are different, then how can these forms of judgment serve as a clue for the discovery of the categories? ' Immanuel Kant, Critiqueof Pure Reason, trans. Norman KempSmith (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1963).Hereafter CPR. [89] 9~ JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28:1 JANUARY 1990 The results of this dilemma which can be observed in the literature are not surprising: commentators tend to grasp one horn or the other. They either emphasize the difference between analysis and synthesis, and reject or dilute the claims as to sameness of function; or they take seriously Kant's argument concerning sameness of functions, and try to minimize the difference between analysis and synthesis. The major twentieth-century representant of the former approach is Kemp Smith," and of the latter, Paton. 3 This latter approach has found a formidable contemporary champion in the person of Henry Allison. By Allison's own admission,4 however, his position on this controversial topic was suggested (in part) by arguments first put forward over fifty years ago by Klaus Reich in a most remarkable book entitled Die Volls~ndigkeit der Kantischen Urteilstafel, 5 a book, by the way, also greatly admired by Paton. 6 In the first section of this paper I will try to show that Reich's arguments are rather more subtle than Allison apparently takes them to be, and that Reich is one commentator who attempts to go between the horns of the dilemma described above, and who essays an interpretation of our crucial paragraph that unifies its seemingly divergent tendencies. In the second section of the paper I will introduce some interpretive elements of my own. 2. Let us begin by reacquainting ourselves with Kant's notion of analytical unity, one aspect of this debate which is not particularly controversial and is largely agreed upon by all parties. For Kant, analytical unity is the sort of unity achieved by all general concepts (conceptus communes) insofar as they abstract from all differences that subsist between the objects under them, or the lower concepts subordinated to them. 7 A general concept unifies these objects or concepts by means of a common mark or set of marks. Thus Kant's example at CPR A69/B94 of the unification of bodies under the concepts 'body' and 'divisible' is a perfectly representative instance of unification via analytical unity, as the function upon which such concepts "rest." Let us note that the " Norman KempSmith,A CommentarytoKant's "Cr/t~rueofPureReason"(NewYork:HumanitiesPress, 196~). 3 H.J. Paton, Kant's MetaphysicofExperience, 2 vols.(London:George Allenand Unwin,Ltd., 1936). 4 Henry Allison,Kant's TranscendentalIdealum (NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress, 1983), 144 n. 3o. Hereafter KTI. 5 KlausReich,Die Vollst~ndigkeitderKantischenUrteilstafel,3rd. ed. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986). Hereafter VKU. 6 Paton, Kant's Metaphysic, 1:302. Kant, we should note, does not makethis important logicaldistinctionbetweensubordination... (shrink)

Recovering Reason: Essays in Honor of Thomas L. Pangle is a collection of essays composed by students and friends of Thomas L. Pangle to honor his seminal work and outstanding guidance in the study of political philosophy. These essays examine both Socrates' and modern political philosophers' attempts to answer the question of the right life for human beings, as those attempts are introduced and elaborated in the work of thinkers from Homer and Thucydides to Nietzsche and Charles Taylor.

This book offers a critical analysis of the rise of the US to global hegemony against a background of increased erosion of democracy and rule of law, and a rising linear pattern of near-absolute capitalist development. The author argues that the significant shrinkage of the ideological spectrum globally, as a result of worrisome levels of business and government interpenetration, has created a dangerous 'prefascist configuration' whereby unthinkable levels of violence have been normalized through the use of technologies such as drones, (...) increasingly condoned even by 'liberal' groups and the so-called political left. Using the example of the Obama administration and its increased reliance on drone assassinations, the volume makes a case for the dangers that lie in today's unique convergence of lack of transparency in government, business-government interpenetration, informal social regimentation, and militarization of capitalism. (shrink)

A recurring problem in psychiatry is the meaningfulness, or otherwise, of its domain. Critics of psychiatry accuse the discipline of misconstruing mental phenomena and behavior, including the verbal sort, as meaningless symptoms, in keeping with other medical specialisms. A myoclonic jerk is taken by the neurologist to mean nothing beyond signaling pathology of the nervous system. But this approach, critics argue, strips psychiatric phenomena of their meaning. Accordingly, Louis Sass has described a tendency, "particularly among organic psychiatrists… to ignore the (...) psychological interpretation or empathic understanding of mental symptoms". Neuropsychiatric symptoms such as visual hallucinations... (shrink)

En el núcleo de nuestra imagen de sentido común se encuentra la idea de que los seres humanos somos agentes, es decir, orientamos nuestras acciones a partir de pensamientos, intenciones y deseos. En este texto, Norman Malcolm examina si disponer de una teoría neurofisiológica completa podría llevarnos a abandonar esta suposición. Malcolm argumenta que nuestras explicaciones cotidianas del comportamiento humano dependen de principios a priori que conectan a lo mental con la acción. Puesto que las explicaciones proporcionadas por una (...) teoría neurofisiológica completa dependerían de leyes contingentes, no de verdades conceptuales, tales explicaciones estarían en competencia con las explicaciones psicológicas. Para respaldar esta afirmación, Malcolm introduce un supuesto que se ha vuelto extremadamente influyente en el debate sobre la causación mental: el ‘principio de exclusión causal’. Si las leyes neurofisiológicas fuesen suficientes para explicar la acción, entonces podría prescindirse por completo de las explicaciones psicológicas. La incompatibilidad entre explicaciones psicológicas y explicaciones neurofisiológicas sumada a que las primeras involucran verdades conceptuales parecería conducir a una refutación a priori de la posibilidad de una teoría neurofisiológica completa. Pero la conclusión de Malcolm es más moderada. Él afirma que tal teoría es inconcebible; aun así, sigue siendo una posibilidad lógica. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Schopenhauer and the Nature of Philosophy by Jonathan HeadJudith NormanJonathan Head. Schopenhauer and the Nature of Philosophy. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2021. Pp. xviii + 183. Hardback, $95.00.It is a bit strange to read an overview of Schopenhauer's philosophy that does not center on the obvious and attention-grabbing idea of will, but Jonathan Head has brought a fresh and welcome perspective to the topic by focusing instead on (...) Schopenhauer's notion of philosophy itself. This perspective enables Head to paint a more sympathetic picture of Schopenhauer than is often the case—more coherent in his systematic pretensions, more consistent in his philosophical project over the long course of his writings, and (perhaps most surprisingly) more solicitous for the welfare of his readers.Head's thesis is that Schopenhauer analyzed ('diagnosed' might be a better word) the human need for metaphysics and constructed his own philosophy carefully to address this need. "The need for metaphysics," Head explains, "is a natural desire that all human beings have for explanation and consolation, in the face of the recognition of pessimistic truths regarding the world we live in" (xiv), specifically recognition of the "wrongness of the world" (51) and "the illusory nature of the principle of individuation" (70). Several quite specific metaphilosophical insights and methods arise from this seemingly straightforward statement. [End Page 528] For one thing, Head points out that explanation and consolation are rather different goals for philosophy, uniting theoretical and practical concerns in a way that might not be expected from a self-declared Kantian. But he argues for this dual functionality by tracing the notion of "better consciousness" from Schopenhauer's earliest writings to its evolution into a "denial of the will," a form of consciousness with directly salvific consequences (interestingly, according to Head, not just for the individual but intergenerationally), now rooted in a metaphysics of will.The second and more philosophically fruitful peculiarity about Schopenhauer's diagnosis of the human "need for metaphysics" is the manner in which it arises from "the recognition of pessimistic truths" (xiv). There is a lot packed into the notion of recognition here. Schopenhauer has a distinctive philosophical method that grounds philosophical thinking in intuitive apprehension of basic truths. And, as Head argues, while this intuition functions as the ground for truth-seeking, it also hampers philosophy as a discursive discipline, since the concepts in which truth claims are presented cannot capture or communicate the unique proximity to truth characteristic of intuition. Thus, philosophical truths cannot be communicated directly, and the function of philosophical texts is to inspire an intuitive insight on the part of the readers so that they are able to see for themselves what the philosophy purports to say. (Stoicism, for instance, is for Schopenhauer an admirable but ultimately limited philosophical perspective in that it develops a system that relies exclusively on reason without promoting a grounding intuition.) Head argues that insight into the basic nature of the will is the intuition that Schopenhauer spins his philosophy around.This has both metaphysical and metaphilosophical implications. As for the former, it means that metaphysics is possible as a discipline, even in the wake of (and while by and large respecting) the limits Kant imposed on epistemology. Metaphysics has an empirical aspect, relying on empirical cognitive sources to provide a worldview for which it provides a key. Head emphasizes the irreducibility of this "objective" perspective, for offering both understanding as well as consolation (namely, knowledge that we have cognitive resources that other creatures do not). But Head argues that Schopenhauer gives primacy to the (compatible and complementary) subjective standpoint, and in particular our (quasi-speculative) intuition into the thing-in-itself via insight into our own basic essence as will. This peek into a nonrepresentational reality provides the reader with a guiding intuition (and the text with a central thought) that has an "inbuilt [implicitly] inferential structure" (72) from which an extraordinarily fruitful set of implications follows for constructing a metaphysics of will.The implications for metaphilosophy are no less interesting, and the central claim of Head's text is that Schopenhauer carefully constructed his central work, The World as Will and Representation, to guide... (shrink)

Indexes to the Dhammapada. Compiled by Moriichi Yamazaki, Yumi Ousaka and Masahiro Miyao. Pali Text Society, Oxford 1995. vii, 139 pp. £12. ISBN 0-86013-337-0.