I’ve been both fascinated and distressed by the arguments raging over how best to respond to the covid-19 pandemic. In particular, I’ve been struck by the way people claim scientific authority for their confident assurances of what needs to be done. And I’m especially intrigued by the scorn they often lavish on those who hold differing views on what science is telling us. The heat generated by the resulting debates is strikingly similar to the heat generated by debates over the (...) science connected with human-caused climate change. And in both cases, the disputants too often presuppose indefensibly naïve views about scientific authority and certitude, apparently unaware that even the allegedly most obvious logical truths lack the certainty attributed to scientific authority in these debates. As a rule, I dislike re-circulating my Editorials, but I think it’s time to resurrect one (modestly tweaked) from a few years ago, addressing precisely this issue (Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 379–386, 2017). …………………………………… “Man is a rational animal who always loses his temper when he is called upon to act in accordance with the dictates of reason.” --Oscar Wilde I’ve often noticed how debates within the SSE community sometimes parallel debates in the political arena, perhaps especially with respect to the passion they elicit and the intolerance and condescension sometimes lavished on members of the “opposition.” Occasionally, of course, the debates in the SSE are nearly indistinguishable from those in the political arena—say, over the evidence for human-caused climate change. But what I find most striking is how the passion, intolerance, etc.—perhaps most often displayed by those defending whatever the “received” view happens to be—betrays either a surprising ignorance or else a seemingly convenient lapse of memory, one that probably wouldn’t appear in less emotionally-charged contexts. What impassioned partisans tend to ignore or forget concerns (a) the tentative nature of both scientific pronouncements and knowledge claims generally (including matters ostensibly much more secure than those under debate), as well as (b) the extensive network of assumptions on which every knowledge claim rests. So I’d like to offer what I hope will be a perspective-enhancer, concerning how even our allegedly most secure and fundamental pieces of a priori knowledge are themselves open to reasonable debate. A widespread, but naïve, view of logic is that no rational person could doubt its elementary laws. But that bit of popular “wisdom” is demonstrably false. And if that’s the case, then so much the worse for the degree of certitude we can expect in more controversial arenas. Let me illustrate with a few examples.[1] [1] I’m indebted to Aune, 1970 for much of what follows. (shrink)

Quasi-realists aspire to accommodate core features of ordinary normative thought and discourse in an expressivist framework. One apparent such feature is that we can be more or less confident in our normative judgments—they vary in credence. Michael Smith has argued that quasi-realists cannot plausibly accommodate these distinctions simply because they understand normative judgments as desires, but desires lack the structure needed to distinguish these three features. Existing attempts to meet Smith’s challenge have accepted Smith’s presupposition that the way to meet (...) the challenge is to show that normative judgments have more structure than they initially seem to have. I argue that accepting this presupposition is accepting too much. The orthodox view of certitude, insofar as there is one, understands certitude very roughly in terms of counterfactual betting behaviour. Counterfactual betting behaviour, though, is not in any useful sense a structural feature of a given judgment. It is rather a more holistic feature of a given agent’s cognitive system. Insofar as it can meet the other challenges it faces, quasi-realism can characterize credences in terms of counterfactual betting behaviour and effectively say exactly what many realists will want to say about credences, thus meeting Smith’s challenge much more directly. (shrink)

En prenant l'article "Certitude" pour point focal, on veut donner à voir comment Diderot a su rassembler toute la puissance critique de l’Encyclopédie pour bousculer les certitudes de ses contemporains. Une lecture attentive de l’article permettra de voir comment Diderot se livre une composition singulière faite de pièces empruntées à des autorités. On verra ensuite que Diderot fissure lui-même ce collage en le mettant en dialogue avec des éléments externes selon une méthode sophistiquée de renvois à d’autres articles de (...) l’Encyclopédie ou à d’autres textes de collaborateurs du dictionnaire. (shrink)

The presence of Neoplatonism in contemporary french phenomenology has a pregnance that crosses its most relevant points. Jean-Luc Marion's work does not escape this. In this work we approach the marionian appropriation of Nicholas of Cusa's thought, in the light of his writing Certitudes négatives, with the intention of understanding the cusanu´s ignorant doctrine as a way of negative certainty. La presencia del neoplatonismo en la fenomenología francesa contemporánea posee una pregnancia que atraviesa sus puntos más relevantes. La obra de (...) Jean-Luc Marion no escapa a esto. En este trabajo abordamos la apropiación marioniana del pensamiento de Nicolás de Cusa, a la luz de su escrito Certitudes négatives, con la intención de comprender la doctrina ignorante del Cusano como un modo de certeza negativa. (shrink)

L’examen de certains manuscrits inédits du Fonds Foucault déposé par Daniel Defert à la BnF, en 2013, montre que le Descartes de Foucault est une variante simplifiée de celui de Heidegger. Foucault reprend en effet à la lecture heideggérienne de Descartes la liaison que le philosophe allemand met en place entre la mathesis universalis et le cogito, qui ne se trouve assurément pas chez Descartes. C’est de cette manière que ces deux auteurs critiquent ce qu’ils mettent eux-mêmes au jour chez (...) Descartes – le sujet de la certitude – et qu’ils font de l’inquiétude l’affect historique propre à la pensée. La présente étude reconstruit le lien entre la mathesis et le cogito et la critique de la vérité comme certitude, tel qu’il est élaboré dans les cours de Heidegger sur Descartes, Augustin et Aristote, au début des années 20. La manière dont Heidegger établit ce lien suit l’évolution de la pensée de Heidegger, mais nous prenons le parti de mettre l’accent sur le cours sur Descartes de 1922-1923 (Introduction à la recherche phénoménologique), car dans les années 20, Heidegger fait de l’inquiétude la figure de l’ipséité. Nous reconstruisons en parallèle la manière dont Foucault intègre la lecture heideggérienne de Descartes à la sienne et comment il en déplace la signification, en évoquant certains textes connus de l’Histoire de la folie, mais aussi en analysant des manuscrits inédits de Foucault. Car le rapprochement que nous proposons entre les deux auteurs, tout comme la mise en relief de ce qui les distingue, se fait à la faveur de l’occasion historique que constitue la mise à disposition de textes qui étaient auparavant inédits. Et, en effet, les cours de Heidegger que nous analysons ont été publiés dans la Gesamtausgabe après la mort de Foucault, et leur traduction en français est toute récente. En procédant ainsi, nous voulons montrer comment la redéfinition contemporaine de la subjectivité s’est élaborée, au XXe siècle, à partir de la notion d’inquiétude, et plus spécifiquement de l’inquiétude historique. (shrink)

When paternalism is deemed morally justified, weak paternalism—which restricts itself to assisting the target of paternalism realize his own preferences—is the preferred (less problematic) alternative. In determining the appropriateness of weak paternalism, the level of certitude of the paternalist regarding the correctness of her assessment of the true preferences of the one‐paternalized is obviously a crucial factor. Yet in the ethics of paternalism this parameter has escaped systematic treatment. This paper aims to initiate discussion on this indispensable consideration for (...) weak paternalism. Analysing a real‐life dilemma of paternalism in healthcare, the paper focuses on the theoretical question of how the paternalist can optimize her certitude by combining personal knowledge of the individual patient with population data on treatment refusal/consent of patients facing similar decisions. The paper presents an outline of a decision‐making scheme that can be valuable in medical ethics and beyond. (shrink)

L’article se propose d’analyser le rôle joué par la pensée de Christian August Crusius dans la genèse et l’articulation de la Preisschrift kantienne de 1762. Décidément anti-wolffien, Kant opte pour la méthode analytique comme seule capable d’assurer la scientificité de la philosophie. Dans un double mouvement de rapprochement et de prise de distance par rapport à certaines thèses crusiennes centrales, il entend démontrer que la certitude atteignable en métaphysique est suffisante pour la conviction, qu’elle est toute aussi « sûre (...) » et « complète » que la certitude mathématique. Ne pouvant fonder cette certitude sur une simple conviction subjective, selon le principe de Crusius, Kant s’éloignera définitivement de ce dernier, non sans avoir intégré dans sa propre doctrine des éléments crusiens fondamentaux. (shrink)

De l'antiquité à la Renaissance, la notion de certitude est au coeur de la structuration de la pensée. Cet ouvrage réunit les contributions de spécialistes, qui explorent tous la littérature latine en mettant cette notion à l'épreuve de différentes disciplines et époques.

José Antonio Valdivia Fuenzalida | Résumé : Pendant le xiiie siècle, plusieurs auteurs scolastiques ont adopté des théories aristotéliciennes pour expliquer la connaissance humaine. Ces théories supposent que l’homme est capable d’acquérir la science en se servant de ses forces naturelles. Notre âme est capable de saisir l’essence des choses en obtenant une connaissance certaine à leur propos. Pourtant, un bon nombre de ces auteurs estimaient que, même en admettant les théories mentionnées, on ne saurait se passer de l’assistance de (...) Dieu afin d’expliquer l’acquisition des connaissances scientifiques. Cet article s’interroge sur les raisons qui ont conduit lesdits auteurs à adopter une telle position. L’analyse de certains textes de saint Bonaventure permet de comprendre ce que la doctrine de l’illumination divine veut expliquer, à savoir : que nous pouvons obtenir de la certitude malgré le fait que les choses créées ne possèdent qu’une « nécessité conditionnelle ». En effet, même l’essence des choses créées n’aurait pas le degré minimum de nécessité qui est requis pour fonder la certitude absolue présupposée dans le concept médiéval de scientia. |: During the 13th century, several scholastic authors adopted Aristotelian theories to explain human knowledge. These theories assume that man is capable of acquiring science by using his natural powers. Our soul is able to grasp the essence of things by obtaining a knowledge that is certain about them. Yet, many of these authors believed that even admitting those theories, God’s assistance could not be dispensed with in order to explain the acquisition of scientific knowledge. This paper examines the reasons that led these authors to such a position. The analysis of several texts by St. Bonaventure allows one to understand what the doctrine of divine illumination aims to explain : namely that we can obtain certainty in spite of the fact that created things only possess a “conditional necessity”. Indeed, even the essence of created things would not have the minimum level of necessity that is required to be the foundation of the absolute certainty presupposed in the medieval concept of Scientia. (shrink)

In the late 19th century great changes in theories of light and electricity were in direct conflict with certitude, the view that scientific knowledge is infallible. What is, then, the epistemic status of scientific theory? To resolve this issue Duhem and Poincaré proposed images of fallible knowledge, Instrumentalism and Conventionalism, respectively. Only in 1919–1922, after Einstein's relativity was published, he offered arguments to support Fallibilism, the view that certainty cannot be achieved in science. Though Einstein did not consider Duhem's (...) Instrumentalism, he argued against Poincaré's Conventionalism. Hitherto, Einstein's Fallibilism, as presented at first in a rarely known essay of 1919, was left in the dark. Recently, Howard obscured its meaning. Einstein's essay was never translated into English. In my paper I provide its translation and attempt to shed light on Einstein's view and its context; I also direct attention to Einstein's images of philosophical opportunism in scientific practice. (shrink)

Parmi les auteurs qui au xx e siècle ont dénoué le lien traditionnel entre connaissance et certitude, on s’intéressera particulièrement à Whitehead, qui allie un enthousiasme indiscutable pour les progrès dont fait preuve la connaissance scientifique à partir du xvii e siècle à l’idée que toute certitude absolue est un frein aux développements de la connaissance.

Dans la formulation de la question du concours de l’Académie de Berlin de 1763, le texte français utilise le mot « évidence » là où le texte allemand mentionne des deutliche Beweisen. Que manifeste cette différence ? Quelles en sont les conséquences ? Les termes « évidence », Deutlichkeit, « certitude » apparaissent de manières très différentes dans les réponses. La multiplication terminologique et conceptuelle correspond à une profonde ambiguïté épistémologique. Au sein des réponses rédigées en allemand, la notion (...) de Deutlichkeit n’est pas centrale, tandis que l’est celle de Gewißheit. Les réponses rédigées en français font, quant à elles, toutes référence à l’« évidence », mais ce terme apparaît peu défini et trop ample. Ainsi, c’est l’esprit plutôt que la lettre de la question qui a été en jeu. La plupart des réponses se rejoignent cependant sur une analyse de la « nécessité de croire » à l’œuvre à la fois dans l’évidence, la certitude et la Deutlichkeit et sur la force coercitive de la démonstration. (shrink)

In the French version of the question set by the Berlin Academy in 1763, the word évidence is used whereas the German document mentions deutliche Beweisen. What is this difference the sign of? What are its consequences? The terms évidence, Deutlichkeit, certitude occur in very different ways in the answers provided. The various terminological and conceptual meanings reflect a deep epistemological ambiguity. Among German-language answers, the notion of Deutlichkeit is not central unlike that of Gewißheit. French-language answers all refer (...) to évidence but this term is little defined and too broad. As a result, it was the spirit rather than the letter of the question that prevailed. However, most answers converge on the “need to believe” found both in évidence, certitude, Deutlichkeit and the constraining force of demonstration. (shrink)

This Is A New Release Of The Original 1883 Edition.

Claiming the legacy of revolutionary of 1789, the Republicans organise at the end of nineteenth century the French school in its modern form and developpe a philosophy that is “fondationnaire” placing educational institution as foundation of the nation. The idea of the emancipation of the people by rational instruction without neglecting the moral and civic education is well located in the heart of the French school project and aims abstract rational subjects, despite their unique characteristics and affiliations. The phrase “the (...) Republic will be educator or she will not! “claim this fundamentally political intent stay up until the Second World War. After this period, the school system begin to be invested by the economy; during the period of the welfare state, an original synthesis seems to occur between “republican meritocracy, [...] social equality mass... [the] concern individualistic “(Gauchet, 2002), the rising concerns of the economy and employment, making the question of the qualifications of a concern more central. This delicate balance then seems to break during the Twenty pitiful’s years, then the school is characterized by a multiplicating of its missions, the lost of landmarks and the difficulty to make sense. The actual siginification of the scholar system will be questioned regarding to economic and anthropological influence of neo-liberalism, the requirement for long life education and its consequences, and also the education-socialization-qualification relations. (shrink)

Death by neurological criteria has been at the center of ethical debates. I argue that brain death is a valid determination of death. This follows from an understanding that the brain is the effective integrator of the body and that following the death of the brain the body stops functioning as an integrated whole. Questions regarding this certainty have been reignited, however, by a study out of Yale that demonstrated synthetic perfusates, such as the compounds dubbed BrainEx and OrganEx, could (...) restore cellular and even organ function in a porcine body and brain after death. Through analyzing medical, scientific, and theological literature I argue that even in the face of developing scientific technology moral certitude in brain death determinations is secure. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce que la foi? Sous ce nom on met un peu tout et n'importe quoi. Et comme le fait remarquer Claude Tresmontant, il règne de nos jours un malentendu sur le sens de ce mot. Cet auteur a le mérite de rétablir ce que l'orthodoxie, depuis les débuts de l'Église, entend par la 'foi'. En traduisant l'Évangile il lui préfère le terme de 'certitude de la vérité'. Car le terme apparaît de nombreuses fois dans le Nouveau Testament. Il a (...) paru approprié à Michèle Juin de répertorier toutes ces occurrences, qui sont riches de compréhension, pour cerner tout ce qui concerne la foi, ainsi que ce que cela implique, et d'en faire un livre. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Scientism, Certitude, and the Recovery of PoliticsChristopher Justin Brophy O.P.In Natural Law and Human Rights, Pierre Manent begins his analysis of the contemporary political situation by discussing the intractable tension between the relativism surrounding moral action and the absolutism surrounding "human rights." Later, drawing heavily from Aristotle's Politics, Manent discusses the necessity of a command-obey structure to resolve the tension such that human beings can fruitfully engage in (...) political life. These two claims, one about the tension between relativism and absolutism and the other about the command-obey structure, are closely linked. If it is true that human beings have an innate need for authority, then it is also the case that the extreme abuses of that need, as they manifest themselves in the political realm, will be either wholesale embrace of such authority (absolutism) or wholesale rejection (relativism). We should be clear that the authority Manent discusses is not arbitrary or autocratic exercise of power, but a legitimate authority towards which citizens can offer rational assent. But any human need or desire can be abused and knowledge of the abuses is necessary to understand the proper object.It is the contention of this piece that Manent, in his explication of command-obey, wrote better than he knew. Manent authored his text before the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet, his analysis provides some of the best explanatory power for understanding the politics surrounding COVID. This politics has significance that transcends the particular crisis of the pandemic and merits serious attention. Specifically, Manent's analysis of the human need for a command-obey structure both offers an explanation for the concurrent tension between relativism and absolutism, at least as it pertains to the relationship between science and politics, and gives explanatory [End Page 239] power for the rise of scientism in contemporary society. The widespread conception that the natural sciences have the potential to answer questions that reside out of their proper purviews leads to abuses of authority in both directions, by both sides—the political left and political right. I will flesh out my argument first by showing the usefulness of Manent's analysis for explaining how easily so many in the United States fall prey to a false conception of "science" that undermines a healthy politics and reveals, at root, a dangerous aversion to ambiguity. I will then explain the implications of the elevation of scientism for the relationship between politics and Christianity. I will conclude with some reflections on the common good and the future of politics in the United States given Manent's important observations. I anticipate that a common criticism of Manent's book will be that it lacks clear prescriptions for the political problems that ail us. I will argue that clear prescriptions cannot follow from the logic of Manent's argument, and ultimately that the lack of prescription is one of the strengths of the book.Before I begin, I wish to make two qualifications. First, Manent's argument ultimately is about the (un)tenability of liberalism without some common conception of the good. He treats several moral and political problems in his book that fall outside of the scope of this short paper. I am not attempting in the analysis that follows to reduce the moral scope of Manent's claims or even to take up the mantle of his argument. I simply wish to show how his analysis is helpful in explaining a contemporary political problem and how the implications of this analysis should affect the way Christians think about political practice in the United States. Second, I want to make clear at the outset that I positively wish to avoid a discussion about the various policies enacted as responses to COVID-19. I also want to avoid any cavalier political discussion of COVID that does not sufficiently respect the over one million persons (given the latest CDC tally) who have lost their lives in this country and the hardships that many more have endured due to the pandemic. It is essential for our purposes here though to treat the political significance of the pandemic. I will attempt to do that now.The Appeal of ScientismNumerous thinkers... (shrink)

Dans la première partie de La Certitude (Certainty) sont analysées plusieurs assertions comme « Je suis debout », « Je porte des vêtements », « J'ai dans la main quelques feuilles de papier », etc. Moore insiste sur le fait que leur caractère contingent n'empêche pas que leur vérité soit connue. Il serait absurde de dire : « Je pense que je porte des vêtements mais il est possible que ce ne soit pas le cas. » Possibilité logique et (...) possibilité épistémique doivent être distinguées. Dans la seconde partie, jugeant sa position épistémique optimale, Moore pense pouvoir décider s'il sait ou non qu'il existe un monde extérieur. Il met alors en œuvre l'argument dit « de la certitude différentielle », mais en contraposant le modus ponens de son adversaire il commet une erreur qui met à mal l'ensemble de sa démarche. Son attaque de l'argument du rêve ne réussit pas davantage. Cependant la remarquable richesse conceptuelle de La Certitude compense ces erreurs. Dans cette présentation, nous montrons comment Moore aurait pu corriger celles-ci et aussi de quelle manière l'analyse « pré-suppositionnelle » de « S ne sait pas que p » génère le « Paradoxe de Moore ». Enfin, nous examinons la forme singulière de scepticisme à laquelle Moore veut se confronter. (shrink)

Existe-t-il une tension entre la Loi de continuité (LC) d’Émilie du Châtelet et sa conviction qu’il existe une différence de nature entre les propositions absolument certaines et les propositions moralement certaines? Dans cet article, je soutiens qu’il n’y a pas de tension, car les commentateurs peuvent faire au moins deux choix d’interprétation. Tout d’abord, ils pourraient affirmer que pour du Châtelet, la LC ne devrait s’appliquer qu’au domaine empirique : il existe un fossé épistémique entre le monde naturel et empirique (...) à partir duquel nous obtenons des vérités moralement certaines, et le monde abstrait et métaphysique à partir duquel nous obtenons des vérités absolument certaines. L’autre alternative, que je défends ici, est la suivante : interpréter du Châtelet comme croyant en une formulation épistémologique de la LC, auquel cas (i) il n’y a pas de différence de nature entre les propositions absolument certaines et moralement certaines, et (ii) le domaine de toutes les vérités est constitué de toutes les vérités, même les vérités absolument certaines (contrairement aux positions de Brading en 2019, Detlefsen en 2014, et de Wells à venir). Cette interprétation résout la tension car elle signifie que du Châtelet n’est pas engagée – à proprement parler – dans une différence de nature entre les vérités absolument et moralement certaines, ce qui est donc cohérent avec une formulation épistémologique de la LC (puisqu’il n’y aurait pas de sauts ou de lacunes entre l’une et l’autre). Selon cette interprétation, il est en principe possible que des vérités moralement certaines deviennent des vérités absolument certaines, une fois que le Principe de contradiction (PC) ou Dieu est la raison suffisante pour laquelle les premières sont en fait absolument certaines. (shrink)

Offers an internalist and perspectivalist reading of G. E. Moore's epistemological views. Challenges Barry Stroud's influential interpretation and defends Moore's rejection of scepticism, his ‘defence of common sense’ and his ‘proof of an external world’ against Stroud's criticisms. The conception of knowledge‐yielding enquiry, as addressed to determinate questions, within a setting of defeasible agreements regarding epistemic methods, norms, and background beliefs, is worked out in greater detail.

The concept of ‘‘certitude” is central in Arabic discussions of the theory of demonstration advanced by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics. In the Arabic tradition it is ‘‘certitude,” rather than ‘‘knowledge”, that is usually identified as the end sought by demonstrations. Al-Fārābī himself devotes a short treatise, known as the Conditions of Certitude, to determining the criteria according to which a subject can claim to have absolute certitude of any proposition. In this article the author traces (...) the roots of the concept of certitude to the Arabic translation of the Posterior Analytics. She then offers a close reading of the text of al-Fārābī's Conditions and its parallels in his Epitome of the Posterior Analytics. She argues that the identification of certitude as a cognitive state distinct from knowledge enabled al-Fārābī to introduce a number of interesting and sometimes problematic innovations into Arabic epistemology. Foremost amongst his positive innovations is the recognition that contingent as well as necessary propositions allow for an attenuated form of certitude, and the introduction of reliabilism into the justification of claims to certitude. But al-Fārābī is also one of the first philosophers to articulate explicitly the idea that certitude must include an element of ‘‘knowing that one knows,” a controversial principle that tends to undermine both al-Fārābī’s reliabilism and his efforts to loosen some of the strictures in traditional Aristotelian epistemology. (shrink)

Michael Smith has recently argued that non-cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucial structural features of moral belief, and in particular that non-cognitivists have trouble accounting for subjects' certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge have independently constructed 'ecumenical' versions of non-cognitivism, intended to block this objection. We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non-cognitivism, a hybrid view which incorporates both non-cognitivist and cognitivist elements, fails to meet Smith's challenge, it is unlikely (...) that 'purer' and more familiar versions of non-cognitivism will succeed. (shrink)

Bien que la vérité pour Spinoza soit "norma sui", le sens et la portée de sa célèbre thèse ne sont pas évidents et suscitent des lectures divergentes. Contre les interprètes qui attribuent à Spinoza une théorie de la vérité comme correspondance et ceux qui lui accordent une théorie de la vérité comme cohérence, l'examen de l'articulation interne de son système montre que son originalité consiste à nier cette opposition et à soutenir un lien indissoluble entre les deux aspects de l'idée (...) vraie : l'adaequatio et la convenientia. À la lumière de cette position, l'ouvrage montre que le rationalisme absolu de Spinoza, loin d'être le modèle de philosophie dogmatique qui efface le problème de la certitude, affronte ce problème et en offre une solution."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This article is a reflection on chance as a scientific object, starting from a materialistic point of view. I analyze the relationship between motion and complexity by introducing the notion of an open system and the categories that result from it: state of nature and observable, to review the debate on chance and certainty.

Chenu, M.-D. Foi, certitude et recherche.--Gilson, É. Réponse à Louis-Marie Régis, On some difficulties of interpretation.--Dubarle, D. Logique et épistémologie du signe chez Aristote et chez les Stoïciens.--Geiger, L.-B. Ce qui est, se dit en plusiers sens.--Owens, J. "Diversificata in diversis."--Cauchy, V. Être et connaître, l'irréductibilité de l'aristotélisme au platonisme.--Joós, E. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, de l'intentio intellectus, à l'intentio rei.--Murin, C. Pour une démystification de la "mort-de-Dieu" nietzschéenne.--Joós, E. Post-scriptum, la nouvelle scolastique de Louis-Marie Régis.--Landry, A.-M. Louis-Marie Régis, O.P., quelques (...) dates et faits marquants de sa vie.--Lettre d'Henri-Irénée Marrou à Louis-Marie Régis. (shrink)