The essay presents an analysis of most of the approaches to the theme of solidarity between generations. For several decades the time of generations has met the history of ideas. Today, at the intersection of conceptual history and general sociology, and of the analysis of cultural processes and social history, a political reflection is taking place about the "political generation" as a paradigm unavoidably characterized by a kind of semantic vagueness. The same reflection is also confronted with the relationship of (...) complicity or conflict between generations characterized by the growing weight acquired by the issue of intergenerational solidarity. This, in turn, is reflected both in the space of life relationships between old, adults and young people, and, in terms of history, among the living, the dead and the unborn. The so-called "non-contemporaneity of contemporary" is imposing its logic, but it requires new forms of understanding and representation of today's global dynamics. (shrink)

1 Le Lezioni di Husserl e il problema del sensibile Le Lezioni per una fenomenologia della coscienza interna del tempo (1905) rappresentano le ricerche filosofiche che meglio di ogni altra descrivono la dinamica del tempo, come pure il suo irrinunciabile radicamento nella sensibilità, che assilla costantemente l’intenzionalità della coscienza, l’intuizione delle “essenze”. Penetrando attraverso ciò che Husserl chiama in queste lezioni “l’impressione originaria”, il “sensibile” trascina l’inte...

Comment: This translation contains a correction of an argument in the original English edition, a correction that was subsequently made in the 1999 English Paperback edition, The correction is described below in the final paragraph. Differences in language can seriously restrict one's access to, and knowledge of, the philosophical work that's being done in other countries, and before the publication in 1997 of my book Time, Tense, and Causation, I was not aware of the depth of interest, in Italy, in (...) analytical philosophy in general, and metaphysics in particular. Since that time, however, I've had the opportunity of talking to, and corresponding with, Italian philosophers who are currently working very intensely on problems in the philosophy of time. I very much enjoyed those discussions, and so I'm very pleased indeed that my book has now been translated into Italian. -/- The introduction to the book will provide readers with quite a detailed overview of my approach to the philosophy of time, and of the main theses that I am defending. But perhaps it will be helpful here if I try to sketch, very briefly, the big picture. -/- The central issue in the philosophy of time concerns the choice between tensed and tenseless accounts of the nature of time – or, as I prefer to express it, between dynamic and static conceptions of reality. According to tensed (or dynamic) accounts, there are significant ontological differences between the past, the present, and the future – either because the world contains intrinsic tensed properties of passiveness, presentness, and futurity, or else because the past, the present, and the future are not all equally real. In contrast, according to tenseless (or static) views of the nature of time, there are no intrinsic tensed properties, and the past, the present, and the future are all equally real. In this book, I defend a dynamic view of time dash specifically, one according to which, while the past and the present are now real, the future is not. This view has, of course, a very long history, with a version of it having been defended by Aristotle in his famous discussion of the sea battle tomorrow, in which he argued that, although it is now true – indeed necessarily so – that either there will be a sea battle tomorrow or there will not be one, it is not now true that there will be a sea battle tomorrow, and not now true that there will not be one. Only when tomorrow comes will the world contain states of affairs that make one of these propositions true, and the other false. -/- But while this general view of the nature of time has a very long and distinguished history – and also seems, intuitively, quite appealing – it has become clear, especially in this century, that it is exposed to very strong objections – objections moreover, that come not merely from philosophy, but also from contemporary physics, and especially from Einstein's special theory of relativity. One of the main challenges accordingly, for any defense of a tensed or dynamic view of time, is to show that those objections can be answered. -/- In grappling with those objections, however, one thing that emerged very clearly was that some theses that defenders of tensed approaches to time have traditionally viewed as absolutely essential must be abandoned as unsound. The result is that. I was led to a view of the nature of time that is, in many respects, intermediate between tenseless views of time and traditional tensed approaches. In particular, advocates of traditional tensed views almost always maintain that the simplest temporal facts are themselves inherently tensed: they consist of facts such as, for example, that is certain apple is now red. But I maintain that, on the contrary, the simplest temporal facts, rather than being intrinsically tensed, are facts to the effect, for example, that a certain apple is now red at time t. On this fundamental issue, then, I agree with those who accept a tenseless or static view of time, since they too hold that the simplest tensed facts ¬– and indeed all tensed facts – are not tensed facts. How, then, does my approach to the nature time differ from a tenseless or static approach? The answer is that I also maintain that, although basic tensed facts are not inherently tensed, the world is nevertheless a dynamic one, since every present moment is a point at which things come into existence. Events, therefore, are not merely actual or nonactual – as is maintained by advocates of tenseless approaches to time. Rather an event is actual as of some time, and not actual as of other times. One needs, therefore, a temporally indexed notion of actuality, according to which an event is not actual until the time at which it occurs, and given that notion, one can explain, in a straightforward fashion, what it is for events to lie in the past, the present, and the future, and in the way that entails that the past and the present are real, but the future is not. -/- One task, as I have said, is to show that the many objections that have been advanced against dynamic conceptions of the world dash by philosophers – such as McTaggart, Quine, Smart, Putnam, and Mellor – can be answered. But even if, as I claim, this can be done, one is still left, of course, with the question of what positive reason there is, if any, for accepting a tensed or dynamic view of the world. -/- The argument that I develop in response to this question centers upon the concept of causation, and here I argue, first, that there are decisive objections to reductionist approaches to causation; secondly, that it is possible to set out a very plausible realistic account of the nature of causation; and, thirdly, that the crucial postulates that are involved in that account can only be satisfied in a dynamic world – indeed only in a dynamic world in which the past and the present are real, but the future is not. -/- This way of defending the view that our world is a dynamic one also has implications for some other issues – in particular, issues connected with the subtle and very difficult metaphysical question of the relation between time and causation. Thus, after setting out the above argument, I attempt to show that if causation can exist only in a dynamic world, then one can both demonstrate that backward causation is logically impossible and defend the view that the direction of time is to be defined in terms of the direction of causation, rather than vice versa. -/- Finally, a comment on the text. It involves one major change from the original English edition – namely in sections 4. 6.2 and 4.7. The change in those sections involves the crucial part in my argument both for the claim that our world is one where the past and present are real, but the future is not, and for the claim that backward causation is logically impossible. It was pointed out to me by Kenji Murota, a graduate student of philosophy at Keio University, that there was a problem in my original formulation of that argument. I'm grateful to him for his incisive criticism, and I'm pleased that I've had the opportunity of correcting that argument in the present edition. (shrink)

Il presente contributo mira a dare una lettura fenomenologica della disputa sulla natura del tempo e sull’interpretazione della teoria della relatività che ha avuto luogo tra Bergson ed Einstein dopo la pubblicazione di Durata e simultaneità, il volume in cui Bergson condensa le sue critiche alla concezione di Einstein. La tesi di Bergson può essere radicalizzata in senso fenomenologico, suggerendo un nuovo legame tra la dimensione qualitativa e quella quantitativa della temporalità, al di là di un’interpretazione psicologica. Il nucleo (...) contro-intuitivo della teoria della relatività di Einstein emerge come problema fenomenologico: è una teoria scientifica “rigorosa” che comunque entra in conflitto con il principio dell’intuizione che, secondo Husserl, è il solo garante di una fondazione rigorosa delle scienze. Bergson fu il primo a dare un’interpretazione filosofica di questo problema che può essere chiarito solo con il metodo fenomenologico, il quale ci permette anche una nuova delucidazione, non conflittuale, del rapporto tra filosofia e fisica. (shrink)

Prendendo le mosse dall’esame del ciclo pianistico Quatre études de rythme, di Olivier Messiaen , scritto fra il 1949 e il 1950, l’articolo delinea un sintetico confronto fra due differenti espressioni dell’arte musicale. Da un lato una composizione della metà del Novecento: repertorio profano, strumentale, frutto di concezioni individuali, testimonianza della fase post-tonale del pensiero musicale. Dall’altro la monodia gregoriana: repertorio sacro, vocale, anonimo, che esprime concetti formali pre-tonali. Occasione di tale raffronto è l’indagine sulla portata concettuale e tecnica di (...) termini chiave come “modo” e “neuma”, che Messiaen mutua dalla teoria musicale medioevale facendone oggetto di riflessione teorica e principio di concezioni tecniche. L’articolo tenta di sondare la complessa trama di rapporti mediante la quale due espressioni artistiche apparentemente agli antipodi entrano in contatto e si illuminano a vicenda. Expanding on the study of the piano cycle Quatre Études de Rythme by Olivier Messiaen , composed in 1949–1950, this article provides a brief comparison between two different expressions of art music. On the one hand we have a composition dating back to the mid-1900s: profane instrumental music, the result of individual conceptions, bearing witness to the post-tonal development in musical thought. On the other, Gregorian monody: sacred vocal music, anonymous, expressing formal pre-tonal concepts. This comparison is developed by looking at the conceptual and technical meaning of key terms, such as “mode” and “neume”, which Messiaen turned from Mediaeval musical theory into subjects for theoretical reflection and a principle of technical conceptions. The article sets out to discuss their complex inter-relationships whereby these two artistic, seemingly opposing, expressions converge and are thus reciprocally enhanced. (shrink)

Le nozioni di spazio e di tempo sono tra le piu correnti al giorno d'oggi, sia nel linguaggio comune che in quello filosofico e scientifico. Anche nella storia del pensiero filosofico il problema del tempo occupo un posto privilegiato. Gia Anassimandro diceva: „Tutte le cose hanno la propria genesi nell'Indeterminate e tutte in esso terminano „secondo rordine del tempo". Platone affermava che il tempo ha la sua origine con il cosmos e lo identificava con il movimento (...) dei corpi celesti. II primo rilievo che Aristotele avanza nella sua indagine sul tempo e questo: il tempo e in immediata relazione col movimento e non esiste senza di esso. (shrink)

Nella notazione musicale ancora alla metà del Duecento i valori di durata sono organizzati in raggruppamenti di piedi ritmici costruiti su un minimo di durata , che è anche unità di misura del tempo musicale, corrispondente alla sillaba. Con la nascita della notazione mensurale, verso la fine del Duecento, ma soprattutto in seguito all'evoluzione della prassi compositiva, nei primi decenni del Trecento fu necessario ridefinire il rapporto tra tempo, minimo di durata e unità di misura. I musici al (...) di qua e al di là delle Alpi ovviarono diversamente dando vita a due sistemi musicali e notazionali, italiano e francese, differenti proprio nei loro presupposti teorici. In ambito italiano Marchetto da Padova dimostra come l'unità di misura del tempo musicale non coincida con il minimo di durata in senso assoluto, ma con ciò che è minimo all'interno del genere musicale: pur chiamandosi ancora breve, l'unità di misura nel sistema notazionale italiano può arrivare a contenere fino a dodici suoni. L'articolo mette a fuoco come Marchetto da Padova giunga alla definizione dell'unità di misura del tempo musicale nel suo trattato Pomerium e mostra le implicazioni di tale presupposto sulla prassi compositiva e la specificità del repertorio medesimo rispetto al coevo repertorio francese. During the latter half of the thirteenth century and particularly in the the fourteenth century, the mensural notation redefines the relationship between tempo, beat and temporal units. Italian and French musicians use different notational systems each with their own theoretical assumptions. In Italy Marchetto da Padova demonstrates that the beat does not coincide with the minimum in a quantitative understanding of musical time, but with the minimum in a qualitative undestanding of musical time: even it is called 'brevis', the beat in the Italian notational system can be divided up to twelve notes. The article focuses on how Marchetto of Padua explains it in his treatise Pomerium, and shows the implications of this assumption in compositional practice. (shrink)

Il saggio si propone di approfondire i rapporti tra la filosofia di Bloch e l'idealismo tedesco, a proposito della particolare tematica della concezione del tempo, riguardo al plesso di problemi relativi alla filosofia della natura e alla filosofia della storia, tentando di enucleare gli aspetti teorici significativi della originale lettura blochiana dei materiali filosofici offerti dalla filosofia classica tedesca. In particolare la visione romantica della natura implicava per Bloch una connessione tra lo spazio e il tempo profondamente diversa (...) da quella rigida del meccanicismo e il contatto con Schelling offriva la prospettiva di un tempo della natura aperto alla dimensione del futuro. Nell'ambito storico invece le filosofie idealistiche della storia proponevano alcune tematiche, su tutte quella della libertà dell'uomo, che diventeranno cardini della filosofia di Bloch, legandosi proprio ad una concezione aperta e indecisa del futuro, ad una ontologia del non-ancora-essere caratterizzata dalla necessità del proprio compimento. (shrink)