Resumen La dimensión ideológica de los libros de textos se evidencia en diferentes niveles y a través del despliegue de diversos mecanismos discursivos. Atento a ello, el objetivo del presente trabajo consiste en demostrar que ciertas representaciones sociales y actitudes políticamente correctas se vehiculizan en la materialidad discursiva de los libros escolares. En este sentido, planteamos que los gestos políticamente correctos no se configuran solo a través de las temáticas y las palabras, presentes o silenciadas, sino además mediante estrategias polifónico-argumentativas. (...) Entre ellas, ponemos el foco en las formas de “modalización autonímica” y las caracterizamos como modos de posicionamiento ideológico, en general, y como huellas de una postura políticamente correcta, en particular. Desde un conjunto de autores franceses, abordamos un corpus de libros de texto de ciencias sociales de nivel secundario, editados en la Argentina entre 1983 y 2005. Por un lado, mostramos que una de las funciones dadas a la “modalización autonímica” reside en la exhibición por parte del locutor-autor de un desacuerdo ante una determinada terminología disciplinar. Por otro lado, corroboramos que tal desacuerdo ideológico suele evidenciar una actitud políticamente correcta, que no necesariamente es acompañada por una transformación en las representaciones. De este modo, en el devenir discursivo se mantienen los estereotipos y los imaginarios sociales que el uso de la “modalización autonímica” pretendería desestimar. (shrink)

Moral grandstanding is a pervasive feature of public discourse. Many of us can likely recognize that we have engaged in grandstanding at one time or another. While there is nothing new about the phenomenon of grandstanding, we think that it has not received the philosophical attention it deserves. In this essay, we provide an account of moral grandstanding as the use of public discourse for moral self-promotion. We then show that our account, with support from some standard theses of social (...) psychology, explains the characteristic ways that grandstanding is manifested in public moral discourse. We conclude by arguing that there are good reasons to think that moral grandstanding is typically morally bad and should be avoided. (shrink)

En este artículo se analiza un conjunto de obras sobre ríos y represas que pertenece a la serie titulada Represa /Represión (2012-) de la artista colombiana Carolina Caycedo. La pregunta de la que se ocupa esta investigación es ¿cómo las estrategias estéticas de estas obras identifican los problemas socio-ecológicos generados por las represas y contribuyen a articular imaginarios políticos de sostenibilidad? El argumento principal es que las obras de Caycedo sobre el río Yuma o Magdalena contribuyen con la construcción (...) de una memoria histórica ambiental, a partir de saberes populares, campesinos y cosmovisiones indígenas. Con este fin, este texto caracteriza el problema de las represas a partir de los conceptos de ‘extractivismo’, de Macarena Gómez-Barris, y ‘desterritorialización’, de Rob Nixon, para luego realizar un recorrido por las obras de la artista, de cuyo análisis se va construyendo una caracterización de la memoria histórica ambiental de un segmento del río Yuma. El marco conceptual del trabajo incluye las nociones de ‘seres-tierra’, de Marisol de la Cadena y ‘territorio’, de Arturo Escobar, así como ‘memoria de los ríos’, de Kristina Lyons. La metodología se basa en el análisis conceptual y técnico de las piezas de Caycedo en el marco interdisciplinar de las humanidades ambientales. El análisis concluye que las obras de Caycedo generan espacios de memoria histórica ambiental desde perspectivas trasnacionales y, en estos espacios de encuentro que constituyen las obras, se relacionan y rearticulan los extremos de falsos antagonismos como naturaleza/cultura, humano/no humano y ciencia/arte. (shrink)

We are all guilty of it. We call people terrible names in conversation or online. We vilify those with whom we disagree, and make bolder claims than we could defend. We want to be seen as taking the moral high ground not just to make a point, or move a debate forward, but to look a certain way--incensed, or compassionate, or committed to a cause. We exaggerate. In other words, we grandstand. Nowhere is this more evident than in public discourse (...) today, and especially as it plays out across the internet. To philosophers Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke, who have written extensively about moral grandstanding, such one-upmanship is not just annoying, but dangerous. As politics gets more and more polarized, people on both sides of the spectrum move further and further apart when they let grandstanding get in the way of engaging one another. The pollution of our most urgent conversations with self-interest damages the very causes they are meant to forward. Drawing from work in psychology, economics, and political science, and along with contemporary examples spanning the political spectrum, the authors dive deeply into why and how we grandstand. Using the analytic tools of psychology and moral philosophy, they explain what drives us to behave in this way, and what we stand to lose by taking it too far. Most importantly, they show how, by avoiding grandstanding, we can re-build a public square worth participating in. (shrink)

Carolina Sartorio argues that only the actual causes of our behaviour matter to our freedom. The key, she claims, lies in a correct understanding of the role played by causation in a view of that kind. Causation has some important features that make it a responsibility-grounding relation, and this contributes to the success of the view. Also, when agents act freely, the actual causes are richer than they appear to be at first sight; in particular, they reflect the agents' (...) sensitivity to reasons, where this includes both the existence of actual reasons and the absence of other reasons. So acting freely requires more causes and quite complex causes, as opposed to fewer causes and simpler causes, and is compatible with those causes being deterministic. The book connects two different debates, the one on causation and the one on the problem of free will, in new and illuminating ways. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that there are epistemic norms on evidence-gathering and consider consequences for how to understand epistemic normativity. Though the view that there are such norms seems intuitive, it has found surprisingly little defense. Rather, many philosophers have argued that norms on evidence-gathering can only be practical or moral. On a prominent evidentialist version of this position, epistemic norms only apply to responding to the evidence one already has. Here we challenge the orthodoxy. First, we argue that (...) there is no significant normative difference between responding to evidence you have and gathering more evidence. Second, we argue that our practices of epistemically criticizing agents for their poor evidence-gathering indicate the existence of epistemic norms on evidence-gathering. Finally, we show that our thesis has important implications for recent debates about the relationship between epistemic norms and inquiry. (shrink)

A questão feminina não é um tema visado por Arendt. O paradoxo encontrado por algumas teóricas em relação ao fato desta reconhecer-se enquanto judia, mas não enquanto mulher, faz afastar a essência do pensamento político arendtiano do movimento filosófico do feminismo, acusando Arendt de ceder à hegemonia masculina. Este prisma perde muito ao não reconhecer como sua crítica da modernidade oferece uma base sólida para pensar a mulher contemporaneamente. Sobretudo, tolhe a saída mais digna: a que reconhece o humano. O (...) escrito, a partir da revisão bibliográfica de obras como Entre o Passado e o Futuro (ARENDT, 2016) e Feminism theory and Hannah Arendt’s concept of public space (BENHABIB, 1993a), propõe demonstrar como o sujeito arendtiano, na condição de original, capaz de ação e na imprevisibilidade, existe e age no ínterim do passado-futuro é o sustentáculo teórico dos principais quadros dessa última fase do feminismo. O ponto central é retomar a discussão sobre teorias que retiram do ser a capacidade de agir, reduzindo-os ao homogêneo, e fazer a crítica às teorias contemporâneas sobre as mulheres. A partir da pesquisa, foi possível levantar diversas pensadoras que, iluminadas pela teoria de Arendt, pensam horizontes femininos para uma nova política. (shrink)

American sociologist Robert Nisbet once described conservatives and libertarians as “uneasy cousins.” The description is apt. While sharing a family resemblance and many of the same political rivals, conservatism and libertarianism are fundamentally at odds. This paper explains why this is so from the conservative perspective. It surveys the starting points and major themes of conservatism and libertarianism. It identifies what conservatives and libertarians agree about. It concludes by showing what conservatives have against libertarianism.

This article discusses the definition of and relationship between two political views of the state: the rule of law of the liberal political tradition, which had its origins in the realm of the political philosophy of modern legal naturalism, and the Hegelian view of the state, which influenced the right-wing and left-wing alternatives to the liberal state in the 19th and 20th centuries. Freedom and equality, political democracy and social democracy, liberalism and socialism are the central thematic poles of this (...) debate. After the end of Nazism after World War II and the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, the state of law appears as the hegemonic and dominant political theory in the present. However, the reemergence of the debate between libertarians and communitarians, mainly in the Anglo-Saxon world, shows that the issues of the previous debate have not been solved yet and that they reappear, although in different contexts and with different meanings, in their whole complexity and dramatic character. This article attempts to define, using the human rights language, some of these crucial issues for contemporary political theory and to make proposals for the construction of a “republican” ethics and politics. Key words: Liberalism, Socialism, Democracy, Rule of law, Ethical state. (shrink)

The standard notion of formal theory, in logic, is in general biased exclusively towards assertion: it commonly refers only to collections of assertions that any agent who accepts the generating axioms of the theory should also be committed to accept. In reviewing the main abstract approaches to the study of logical consequence, we point out why this notion of theory is unsatisfactory at multiple levels, and introduce a novel notion of theory that attacks the shortcomings of the received notion by (...) allowing one to take both assertions and denials on a par. This novel notion of theory is based on a bilateralist approach to consequence operators, which we hereby introduce, and whose main properties we investigate in the present paper. (shrink)

In his paper “Fairness, Political Obligation, and the Justificatory Gap” (published in the Journal of Moral Philosophy), Jiafeng Zhu argues that the principle of fair play cannot require submission to the rules of a cooperative scheme, and that when such submission is required, the requirement is grounded in consent. I propose a better argument for the claim that fair play requires submission to the rules than the one Zhu considers. I also argue that Zhu’s attribution of consent to people commonly (...) thought to be bound to follow the rules by a duty of fair play is implausible. (shrink)

There is an emerging consensus among political philosophers that state legitimacy involves something more than—or perhaps other than—political obligation. Yet the principle of fair play, which many take to be a promising basis for political obligation, has been largely absent from discussions of the revised conception of legitimacy. This paper shows how the principle of fair play can generate legitimate political authority by drawing on a neglected feature of the principle—its stipulation that members of a cooperative scheme must reciprocate specifically (...) by submitting to the scheme's rules. (shrink)

Beliefs can be resistant to evidence. Nonetheless, the orthodox view in epistemology analyzes beliefs as evidence-responsive attitudes. I address this tension by deploying analytical tools on capacities and masking to show that the cognitive science of evidence-resistance supports rather than undermines the orthodox view. In doing so, I argue for the claim that belief requires the capacity for evidence-responsiveness. More precisely, if a subject believes that p, then they have the capacity to rationally respond to evidence bearing on p. Because (...) capacities for evidence-responsiveness are fallible and may be masked, beliefs can be held in the face of counter-evidence. Indeed, I will argue that our best science of belief supports the claim that evidence-resistant beliefs result from masks on evidence-responsiveness capacities. This account of belief not only allows for resistance to evidence, but provides us with a framework for describing and explaining actual cases of evidence-resistance. (shrink)

Moral grandstanding, or the use of moral talk for self-promotion, is a threat to free expression. When grandstanding is introduced in a public forum, several ideals of free expression are less likely to be realized. Popular views are less likely to be challenged, people are less free to entertain heterodox ideas, and the cost of changing one’s mind goes up.

In this paper we explore the relationship between forgiving and punishment. We set out a number of arguments for the claim that if one forgives a wrongdoer, one should not punish her. We then argue that none of these arguments is persuasive. We conclude by reflecting on the possibility of institutional forgiveness in the criminal justice setting and on the differences between forgiveness and acts of mercy.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:632 Feminist Studies 44, no. 3. © 2018 by Feminist Studies, Inc. Achilles Sees Life Leaving from His Heel Carolina Hotchandani The nurse asked me if I could raise my legs yet. I watched my feet to see if they’d move when I tried. The right one twitched a bit. The little one must have been taken somewhere before then to get a shot or have blood drawn. (...) Later, I would see how they draw blood from a baby. A needle stuck in the heel, of all places. All I know is her cry was not in the room as I tried to find my will in my legs. Sometimes I think she took it away. My baby, my will. As if she drew it out of my bony heel.... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Carolina Hotchandani 633 Wash That Man Right Out of My Hair Now it happened that Metis was going to have a daughter, and she sat inside Zeus’s head hammering out a helmet and weaving a splendid robe for the coming child. Soon Zeus began to suffer from pounding headaches and cried out in agony. All the gods came running to help him, and skilled Hephaestus grasped his tools (...) and split open his father’s skull. Out sprang Athena, wearing the robe and the helmet, her gray eyes flashing. Thunder roared and the gods stood in awe. —from “Athena,” in D’Aulaire’s Book of Greek Myths, 1962 I’ve never met the doctor who happens to be on call when I go into labor. A sweet-smelling aftershave precedes him into the delivery room. We’re gonna get that baby right out of you, he says, pulling a latex glove over one hand and stretching the opening wide so it snaps back with a loud smack against his wrist. I want those hands nowhere near me. I imagine him coaching little league, tapping his baseball cap to send signals to tiny players in the outfield. He chews gum for the entirety of my labor. After I push with all my might for three and a half hours and the baby has still not moved, he says with a half-wink, Poor thing. You’ll be so sore when this is all over. The baby’s been out of me for a while now, but that man is still inside. I go over what happened again and again, desperate to find the angle through which he exits the scene and stays gone. He sees himself from the outside: a hero who enters the scene in medias res, scenting the room with sweet nectars. He will stop in, introduce himself, smile his neighborly smile, before he sets off on a journey through the hospital. Doors will open, doors to women splayed on beds. Women 634 Carolina Hotchandani writhe; women scream in pain. Some will be monstrous—Scyllas and Charybdises among them. Their wounds will gape. Their wombs will pull against his virile strength. They hold the center of the earth within them; theirs, the blood of the wine-dark sea. Do not waver; do not let their currents steer you. Skate above the dark waters. Wait to come through the door till they quake, till they halve. Stand back till they split in two. Then sew them up, and it’s you, it’s you who’s made them new! Pull that man right out of my head. Let me be Zeus on this hospital bed.... (shrink)

The principle of fair play is widely thought to require simply that costs and benefits be distributed fairly. This gloss on the principle, while not entirely inaccurate, has invited a host of popular objections based on misunderstandings about fair play. Central to many of these objections is a failure to treat the principle of fair play as a transactional principle—one that allocates special obligations and rights among persons as a result of their interactions. I offer an interpretation of the principle (...) of fair play that emphasizes its similarities to another transactional principle: consent. This interpretation reveals that playing fair requires one to reciprocate specifically by following the rules of the cooperative scheme from which one benefits, just as consent requires one to act according to the terms of an agreement. I then draw on the comparison with consent to reply to some popular and persistent objections to the principle. (shrink)

This theoretical paper proposes a new perspective to understand the moral distress of nurses more fully, using virtue ethics. Moral distress is a widely studied subject, especially with respect to the determination of its causes and manifestations. Increasing the theoretical depth of previous work using ethical theory, however, can create new possibilities for moral distress to be explored and analyzed. Drawing on more recent work in this field, we explicate the conceptual framework of the process of moral distress in nurses, (...) proposed by Ramos et al., using MacIntyrean virtue ethics. Our analysis considers the experience of moral distress in the context of a practice, enabling the adaptation of this framework using virtue ethics. The adoption of virtue ethics as an ethical perspective broadens the understanding of the complexity of nurses’ experiences of moral distress, since it is impossible to create a ready model that can cover all possibilities. Specifically, we describe how identity, social context, beliefs, and tradition shape moral discomfort, uncertainty, and sensitivity and how virtues inform moral judgments. Individuals, such as nurses, who are involved in a practice have a narrative history and a purpose ( telos) that guide them in every step of the process, especially in moral judgment. It is worth emphasizing that the process described is supported by the formation of moral competence that, if blocked, can lead to moral distress and deprofessionalization. It is expected that nurses seek to achieve the internal good of their practice, which legitimizes their professional practice and supports them in moral decision-making, preventing moral distress. (shrink)

Delusions are deeply evidence-resistant. Patients with delusions are unmoved by evidence that is in direct conflict with the delusion, often responding to such evidence by offering obvious, and strange, confabulations. As a consequence, the standard view is that delusions are not evidence-responsive. This claim has been used as a key argumentative wedge in debates on the nature of delusions. Some have taken delusions to be beliefs and argued that this implies that belief is not constitutively evidence-responsive. Others hold fixed the (...) evidenceresponsiveness of belief and take this to show that delusions cannot be beliefs. Against this common assumption, I appeal to a large range of empirical evidence to argue that delusions are evidence-responsive in the sense that subjects have the capacity to respond to evidence on their delusion in rationally permissible ways. The extreme evidence-resistance of delusions is a consequence of powerful masking factors on these capacities, such as strange perceptual experiences, motivational factors, and cognitive biases. This view makes room for holding both that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive and that delusions are beliefs, and it has important implications for the study and treatment of delusions. (shrink)

The philosophical literature on state legitimacy has recently seen a significant conceptual revision. Several philosophers have argued that the state's right to rule is better characterized not as a claim right to obedience, but as a power right. There have been few attempts to show that traditional justifications for the claim right might also be used to justify a power right, and there have been no such attempts involving the principle of fair play, which is widely regarded as the most (...) promising basis for a claim right to obedience. William Edmundson argues that the principle of fair play cannot generate power rights, and so any attempt at a fair play account of legitimacy must fail. I explain how fair play could generate a power right, owing to its stipulation that the rules of a cooperative scheme specify the form of participants' repayment. (shrink)

Epistemic agents interact with evidence in different ways. This can cause trouble for mutual understanding and for our ability to rationally engage with others. Indeed, it can compromise democratic practices of deliberation. This paper explains these differences by appeal to a new notion: epistemic styles. Epistemic styles are ways of interacting with evidence that express unified sets of epistemic values, preferences, goals, and interests. The paper introduces the notion of epistemic styles and develops a systematic account of their nature. It (...) then discusses the implications of epistemic styles for central questions in epistemology, in particular, for issues surrounding rational engagement and for the debate between virtue epistemologists and epistemic situationists. (shrink)

RESUMO O presente artigo apresenta uma semântica baseada nas atitudes cognitivas de aceitação e rejeição por uma sociedade de agentes para lógicas inspiradas no First Degree Entailment de Dunn e Belnap. Diferente das situações epistêmicas originalmente usadas em E, as atitudes cognitivas não coincidem com valores-de-verdade e parecem mais adequadas para as lógicas que pretendem considerar o conteúdo informacional de proposições “ditas verdadeiras” tanto quanto as proposições “ditas falsas” como determinantes da noção de validade das inferências. Após analisar algumas lógicas (...) associadas à semântica proposta, introduzimos a lógica E B cuja relação de consequência semântica subjacente - o B-entailment - é capaz de expressar diversos tipos de raciocínio em relação às atitudes cognitivas de aceitação e rejeição. Apresentamos também um cálculo de sequentes correto e completo para E B.ABSTRACT In the present work I introduce a semantics based on the cognitive attitudes of acceptation and rejection entertained by a given society of agents for logics inspired on Dunn and Belnap’s ‘First Degree Entailment’. Distinctly from the original epistemic situation of E, the cognitive attitudes do not coincide with truth-values and it seems more suitable for logics that intend to consider the informational content of propositions “said to be true” as well as propositions “said to be false” as determinants of the notion of logical validity. After analyzing some logics associated with the proposed semantics, we introduce the logic E B, whose underlying semantic entailment relation - the B-entailment - is able to express several kinds of reasoning towards the cognitive attitudes of acceptance and rejection. Acorrect and complete sequent calculus for E B is also presented. (shrink)

In this paper we present some considerations derived from the development of the project "Indigenous knowledge and practices in a context of health emergency: contributions to health, education and the environment in the framework of the planning of control, prevention and monitoring strategies of COVID 19", aiming at identifying and evaluating the consequences of the pandemic in indigenous communities of the Metropolitan Region of Buenos Aires, as well as the responses and strategies deployed by these groups to face it. Based (...) on the information gathered in a process of mutual accompaniment -participation of indigenous people in academic spaces; of academics in collective-community spaces; dialogue between communities and governmental agencies and virtual and face-to-face meetings- we propose two key points to consider in the planning and activation of health policies, where indigenous peoples "are part of the solution" not only of the contemporary health emergency but also of the multiple emergencies we face as a society. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se plantea como un acercamiento a las cartas privadas de una mujer chilena de comienzos del siglo XX: Wanda Morla Lynch. Esta aproximación considera al género epistolar como un género discursivo complejo y contradictorio, pero propicio para dar cuenta de una intimidad, de unos sentimientos y de una subjetividad femenina dada la relación de complicidad que se establece entre las cartas y el estado de vida del sujeto femenino, marcado históricamente por una posición de subordinación y “deber (...) ser” impuesto por la sociedad patriarcal. De esta forma, este corpus epistolar nos permitirá analizarlo a la luz de una previa caracterización de las cartas privadas como un género discursivo en sí mismo y que posee una determinada singularidad formal en relación a los otros géneros que conforman el corpus de la escritura autobiográfica; pero también explorar y rescatar el valor de estas cartas como fuente documental, ya que ponen al descubierto la voz de una mujer chilena que fue testigo privilegiada de los cambios que se produjeron en el París de los años ’20, epicentro de la vanguardia modernista de ese tiempo. (shrink)

Does a person's liability to attack during a war depend on the nature of their individual causal contribution to the (unjust) threat posed? If so, how? The recent literature on the ethics of war has become increasingly focused on questions of this kind. According to some views on these matters, your liability hinges on the extent of your causal contribution: the larger your contribution to an unjust threat, the larger the amount of harm that we can impose on you in (...) order to avert the threat. Some philosophers have suggested that we can ground a quite general principle of civilian immunity on this basis. But, do causal contributions really come in degrees? Can we make sense of a graded notion of causal contribution that can be relevant to debates about liability in war? I argue there is good reason to be sceptical. The appearance that causal contributions come in degrees is just an illusion that can be explained away. (shrink)

Starting from the notions of q-entailment and p-entailment, a two-dimensional notion of entailment is developed with respect to certain generalized q-matrices referred to as B-matrices. After showing that every purely monotonic singleconclusion consequence relation is characterized by a class of B-matrices with respect to q-entailment as well as with respect to p-entailment, it is observed that, as a result, every such consequence relation has an inferentially four-valued characterization. Next, the canonical form of B-entailment, a two-dimensional multiple-conclusion notion of entailment based (...) on B-matrices, is introduced, providing a uniform framework for studying several different notions of entailment based on designation, antidesignation, and their complements. Moreover, the two-dimensional concept of a B-consequence relation is defined, and an abstract characterization of such relations by classes of B-matrices is obtained. Finally, a contribution to the study of inferential many-valuedness is made by generalizing Suszko’s Thesis and the corresponding reduction to show that any B-consequence relation is, in general, inferentially four-valued. (shrink)

The orthodox view in epistemology is that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive. I offer a novel argument for a version of this view, one that appeals to capacities to rationally respond to evidence. I do so by developing the Sellarsian idea that the concept of belief functions to mark the space of reasons in a non-intellectualist and naturalistic direction. The resulting view does justice to the role of belief in social interactions, joint deliberation, and rational persuasion, while including evidence-resistant beliefs and (...) animal beliefs as genuine beliefs. It has a range of further benefits: it helps us account for epistemic normativity, paves the way for better psychological models of belief revision, distinguishes beliefs from imaginings and mere acceptances, and helps us avoid noxious simplistic takes on human irrationality. (shrink)

Basic income policies have recently enjoyed a great deal of discussion, but they are not a natural fit with views of distributive or social justice endorsed by many moral and political philosophers. This essay develops and defends a new view of social justice, called relational sufficientarianism, which is more compatible with a universal basic income. Relational sufficientarianism holds that persons in a just society must have sufficient social status, but not necessarily equal social status. It argues that this view offers (...) a more plausible account of just social relations than relational egalitarianism, a better account of the threshold for sufficiency than distributive sufficientarianism, and can serve as a more suitable theoretical backing for a universal basic income than either of these other views, or distributive egalitarianism. (shrink)

En la actualidad, desde el punto de vista de la psicología, la hiperopcionalidad constituye una ilusión de libertad y felicidad: se considera que, a mayor número de opciones, más libre y feliz es la persona. Por otra parte, en la filosofía se ha considerado que la felicidad está directamente relacionada con una vida buena. Partiendo de ese contexto, en este artículo se analizan estos supuestos, mediante la revisión de sus líneas argumentativas y sus posibles implicaciones prácticas, teniendo en cuenta la (...) propuesta de Erich Fromm sobre las elecciones fundamentales en la disyuntiva existencial entre el progreso, que se asocia con la vida buena, y el retroceso, asociado a la vida malograda. Para ello, también se analizan las nociones de libertad, elecciones difíciles e inconmensurabilidad de los valores. Se concluye, con Fromm, que más allá de la hiperopcionalidad actual, la disyuntiva fundamental es entre el progreso -tendiente a la vida buena- y el retroceso. (shrink)

SummaryThe French Idea of History: Joseph de Maistre and His Heirs, 1794–1854 is a monograph by Carolina Armenteros describing the historical thought of Joseph de Maistre and recounting its posterity among French traditionalist, socialist and positivist thinkers. This article presents Armenteros's reflections on some of her book's themes and on the place they occupy in current scholarly debates. She notes that commentators today tend to assume politics' primacy over spirituality as a human motivator. A product of the de-spiritualisation of (...) human experience in late modernity, this view is associated with the polarisation of the concepts of tradition and Enlightenment, and with ideas of liberty and reason ill-adapted to interpreting Maistre's thought. Armenteros shows how her portrait of an anti-absolutist, empiricist and reasonable Maistre disappointed with kings and bent on resolving the problem of violence through spiritual means is the necessary consequence of investigating his historical and political thought in context. (shrink)

En Chile, la filosofía en la segundaria, después de la última reforma a la educación, tiene un lugar contradictorio. Filosofía y globalización parecen no alcanzar un entendimiento. En los límites de la contradicción, se propone un espacio donde el diálogo con diversos conceptos trabajados por Derrida permiten entrar en la dimensión filosófica del problema político-educativo.

Delusions are standardly defined as attitudes that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence. But what evidence do people with delusion have for and against it? Do delusions really go against their total evidence? How are the answers affected by different conceptions of evidence? -/- This chapter focuses on how delusions relate to evidence. I consider what delusions-relevant evidence people with delusions have. I give some reasons to think that people typically have evidence for their delusions, and (...) that the evidence they have against them is often overstated. I draw on this discussion to consider whether delusions are evidentially supported and epistemically rational. Finally, I discuss implications for the nature of delusion, responsibility, and treatment and suggest directions for future research. Throughout, the discussion is sensitive to different conceptions of evidence and rationality in epistemology. -/- A central upshot is that what we should say about the epistemic standing of delusions depends substantively on our positions in epistemology, in particular, on the debate between internalists and externalists about evidence. If we want clarity on the epistemic standing of delusions, we need to incorporate more sophisticated tools from epistemology. (shrink)

I explore the question of how to ground the responsibility of agents in some tricky cases involving multiple agents who act in a non-coordinated fashion. These are scenarios where no single agent has the individual ability to make a difference to a harmful outcome, but where the outcome would have been avoided if they had all acted as they should have (thus, the agents collectively made a difference to the outcome’s occurrence). I argue that an important source of the problem (...) is that it’s hard to motivate a concept of cause that can be behind the agents’ responsibility in these cases. I illustrate the problem with a particular example: Yablo’s proportionality criterion on causation. I then sketch a possible solution. (shrink)

Los cibercafé o locutorios corresponden a un tipo de negocios que se han ido expandiendo con fuerza en sectores donde se congrega un número importante de migrantes en diversas ciudades del mundo. Estos lugares son apropiados, utilizados y significados de distintas maneras por los usuarios. Este artículo es parte de una investigación mayor sobre la formación de un enclave de migrantes en el sector de Plaza de Armas, en el centro de Santiago (Chile). El foco de atención está puesto en (...) los cibercafé como lugares donde se despliega el ejercicio de la maternidad a distancia, una de las prácticas transnacionales más estudiadas en el campo de las migraciones. Utilizando un enfoque etnográfico, el artículo analiza las prácticas cotidianas que realizan las mujeres para comunicarse con sus hijos y familias durante los fines de semana. Idas a llamar por teléfono y conversaciones utilizando un computador son prácticas que hacen parte de una rutina que organiza la vida de las mujeres inmigrantes con hijos en las ciudades de origen. Esta rutina va fijando un lugar desde donde se ejerce la maternidad trasnacional, y ello constituye uno de los contextos de resignificación que adquieren los cibercafés y que será analizado en el presente artículo. (shrink)

El flujo de remesas desde los lugares donde trabajan los migrantes hacia las familias que residen en los países de origen, se ha transformado en las dos últimas décadas en un tema de amplio debate internacional que concita la participación de diversos actores. Desde temprano el análisis se centró en el papel que debieran de jugar estos flujos de dinero en el desarrollo de las comunidades locales, y eventualmente, de las economías nacionales. El presente artículo analiza distintas dimensiones de la (...) discusión sobre la relación remesas y desarrollo. Se contextualiza el origen y sentido de estos flujos, dando importancia a la situación histórica que propicia la actual importancia de estas; se analizan también las distintas definiciones de remesas y los principales discursos que han articulado la relación remesa y desarrollo, para comprender los elementos políticos e ideológicos que subyacen cuando se plantea que las remesas constituyen una vía de desarrollo económico de las comunidades. Se analizan programas gubernamentales de apoyo a proyectos productivos, especialmente en México y El Salvador. La revisión bibliográfica desarrollada arroja que dichos programas son relativamente nuevos y que no es uno de sus enfoques el utilizar las remesas como elemento para combatir la pobreza, sino en vincular la migración con un concepto multidimensional de desarrollo social. (shrink)

Some classical studies in social psychology suggest that we are more sensitive to situational factors, and less responsive to reasons, than we normally recognize we are. In recent years, moral responsibility theorists have examined the question whether those studies represent a serious threat to our moral responsibility. A common response to the “situationist threat” has been to defend the reasons-responsiveness of ordinary human agents by appeal to a theory of reasons-responsiveness that appeals to patterns of counterfactual scenarios or possible worlds. (...) In this paper I identify a problem with that response and I offer a better solution. (shrink)