Why do we remember the past and not the future? What does it mean for time to "flow"? Do we exist in time or does time exist in us? In lyric, accessible prose, Carlo Rovelli invites us to consider questions about the nature of time that continue to puzzle physicists and philosophers alike. For most readers this is unfamiliar terrain. We all experience time, but the more scientists learn about it, the more mysterious it remains. We think of it (...) as uniform and universal, moving steadily from past to future, measured by clocks. Rovelli tears down these assumptions one by one, revealing a strange universe where at the most fundamental level time disappears. He explains how the theory of quantum gravity attempts to understand and give meaning to the resulting extreme landscape of this timeless world. Weaving together ideas from philosophy, science and literature, he suggests that our perception of the flow of time depends on our perspective, better understood starting from the structure of our brain and emotions than from the physical universe. (shrink)

This book presents the life and personality, the scientific and philosophical work of Ludwig Boltzmann, one of the great scientists who marked the passage from 19th- to 20th-Century physics. His rich and tragic life, ending by suicide at the age of 62, is described in detail. A substantial part of the book is devoted to discussing his scientific and philosophical ideas and placing them in the context of the second half of the 19th century. The fact that Boltzmann was the (...) man who did most to establish that there is a microscopic, atomic structure underlying macroscopic bodies is documented, as is Boltzmann's influence on modern physics, especially through the work of Planck on light quanta and of Einstein on Brownian motion. Boltzmann was the centre of a scientific upheaval, and he has been proved right on many crucial issues. He anticipated Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions and proposed a theory of knowledge based on Darwin. His basic results, when properly understood, can also be stated as mathematical theorems. Some of these have been proved: others are still at the level of likely but unproven conjectures. The main text of this biography is written almost entirely without equations. Mathematical appendices deepen knowledge of some technical aspects of the subject. (shrink)

The past decades have seen a growing “philosophical” interest in a number of authors, but strangely enough Saramago’s oeuvre has been left somewhat aside. This volume aims at filling this gap by providing a diverse range of philosophical perspectives and expositions on Saramago’s work. The chapters explore some possible issues arising from his works: from his use of Plato’s allegory of the cave to his re-readings of Biblical stories; from his critique and “reinvention” of philosophy of history to his allegorical (...) exploration of alternative histories; from his humorous approach to our being-towards-death to the revolutionary political charge of his fiction. The essays here confront Saramago’s fiction with concepts, theories, and suggestions belonging to various philosophical traditions and philosophers including Plato, Pascal, Kierkegaard, Freud, Benjamin, Heidegger, Lacan, Foucault, Patočka, Derrida, Agamben, and Žižek. (shrink)

The paper examines the epistemological significance of the expe- rience of estrangement caused by some types of descriptions of objects and phenomena. It shows how, today, the main productive matrix of these descriptions is formed by natural science. A distinction is drawn between a reductionist and pluralist approach to the aspect of estrangement offered by science, and subsequently analysed. The paper then puts forward an argument in support of the latter attitude.

Krishnamurti et son message, sont présentés ici comme un fait nouveau et unique, concernant directement les rapports de la conscience humaine et de l'Univers. Ceux qui sentent que nous entrons dans une ère nouvelle, ne s'étonneront pas du caractère immesurable d'une telle affirmation. Directement branché sur la vie, Krishnamurti passe à travers les barrières psychiques qui emprisonnent, dans l'humain, ce phénomène extraordinaire qu'est la Conscience, aussi vaste, aussi profond que l'Univers lui-même. En un raccourci foudroyant et instantané, la conscience d'être, (...) avec lui, échappe à ses conditionnements. Aussi bien, il est temps d'affirmer qu'il est le messager de l'époque, l'esprit de vérité qui éclairera les siècles à venir. (shrink)

Is deduction of use in application to our everyday problems? Aristotle said that in practical matters we cannot use a strictly deductive attitude: "we must be content...in speaking about things which are only for the most part true, with premises of the same kind, to reach conclusions that are no better" (Nic.Eth.I,4 - my underlining). We may content ourselves with conclusions which - according to the usual views - are not true; but what happens when we realize that such conclusions (...) bring us into contradiction with some of our deepest beliefs? We have to pursue our search of rationality in the most compelling manner, and this effort forces us to express our background beliefs in order to check what may be wrong with that. In this paper I will give two classical examples, one form the history of cinema and another from the history of artificial intelligence: in comparing these two examples I claim that logical compulsion - the deep need for convention - is highly valuable where feelings are not enough. (shrink)

Dans le livre Λ de la Métaphysique, en accord avec sa thèse fondamentale de la primauté ontologique de l’individu sur l’universel, Aristote refuse d’attribuer le statut de substances immatérielles et de principes premiers de la réalité aux Formes platoniciennes et aux Nombres de la tradition académicienne. Il croit que ces principes platoniciens – selon lui des universels privés de vie – doivent être remplacés par une série d’êtres vivants, d’individus doués d’intelligence, en activité contin...

A correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-021-00451-y.

ABSTRACT ABSTRACT: I show that Aristotelian physics is a correct and nonintuitive approximation of Newtonian physics in the suitable domain in the same technical sense in which Newton’s theory is an approximation of Einstein’s theory. Aristotelian physics lasted long not because it became dogma, but because it is a very good, empirically grounded theory. This observation suggests some general considerations on intertheoretical relationships.

We observe entropy decrease towards the past. Does this imply that in the past the world was in a non-generic microstate? I point out an alternative. The subsystem to which we belong interacts with the universe via a relatively small number of quantities, which define a coarse graining. Entropy happens to depends on coarse-graining. Therefore the entropy we ascribe to the universe depends on the peculiar coupling between us and the rest of the universe. Low past entropy may be due (...) to the fact that this coupling is non-generic. I argue that for any generic microstate of a sufficiently rich system there are always special subsystems defining a coarse graining for which the entropy of the rest is low in one time direction. These are the subsystems allowing creatures that “live in time” —such as those in the biosphere— to exist. I reply to some objections raised to an earlier presentation of this idea, in particular by Bob Wald, David Albert and Jim Hartle. (shrink)

This article argues for a new interpretation of the realist claim that politics is autonomous from morality and involves specific political values. First, this article defends an original normative source: functional normativity. Second, it advocates a substantive functional standard: political institutions ought to be assessed by their capacity to select and implement collective decisions. Drawing from the ‘etiological account’ in philosophy of biology, I will argue that functions yield normative standards, which are independent from morality. For example, a ‘good heart’ (...) is one that pumps blood well, and a good army is one that it is effective at exerting military force. I then interpret realism’s naturalistic conception of politics as an etiological function of social groups: namely making binding collective decisions under persistent disagreement. I conclude that political institutions should be evaluated realistically by how well they perform this task. Finally, I assess trade-offs between this functional political normativity and other moral values. I conclude that justice, fairness, freedom and equality remain obviously important concerns, but only once the basic political function is secured. (shrink)

Nel breve spazio del presente lavoro, intendo dar conto dell’“habitus teologico” che caratterizza lo stile filosofico di Alasdair MacIntyre : “religiously musical” è infatti — a mio avviso — il più insolito, e allo stesso tempo il più suadente, epiteto attribuito al filosofo scozzese dai teologi James Gustafson e Stanley Hauerwas. Tale habitus è altresì esaltato dalla diffusa propensione a saldare insieme — senza apparente soluzione di continuità — il modus philosophandi macintyriano e alcune recenti figure della teologia cristiana post–liberale (...) e post–moderna, di cui ci occuperemo in seguito: soprattutto la “teologia narrativa” di Hans Frei, George Lindbeck, et. al., ma anche la “radical orthodoxy” di John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, Graham Ward, et. al. Sebbene MacIntyre non abbia replicato direttamente a simili tentativi di “appropriazione teologica” del suo pensiero, ritengo, comunque, che i tempi siano maturi per riconoscere — a lui e al “tomismo analitico” — un ruolo sui generis nell’evoluzione della tradizione aristotelico–tomista del XX secolo : ruolo distinto, ma non separato, rispetto a quello coevo di quanti — in ambito continentale — hanno tenacemente proseguito la ricerca filosofica e teologica nel solco di Tommaso, come ad esempio Marie–Dominique Chenu, Yves Congar, Cornelio Fabro, Etienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, Edith Stein, et al. (shrink)

The moral and political philosophy of Wilhelm Röpke is among the finest instances of European classical liberalism in the twentieth century, and in many occasions he stated that only a society which understands the importance of markets can be reconciled with human dignity. Röpke elaborated a political theory that focused on the harmony between moral principles and economic law. In this sense, his liberalism is unique not only because it defends private property and competition as pillars of a thriving economy, (...) but above all that it provides the preconditions of a society that can remain secure from the immorality of despotism and subsequent ethical degeneration. To that end he upheld an economic order based on voluntary cooperation as the basis for a more humane society, emphasizing the role of institutional competition and federalism. Röpke’s cultural conservatism should not therefore be misunderstood, as it is very much connected with his defense of the essential role of property. It is only in this sense that he found in liberal humanism a third way, which is not however situated halfway between the market and socialism, but which represents instead a defense of a competitive society that is aware of its own historical and cultural basis. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the tragic poets of the fifth century BC used an engine called ekkyklema in order to reveal the scenes supposed to take place inside. I think I can indicate a passage, that clearly demonstrates the use of such an engine (Eur. Her. 1028 ff.), since the chorus’ words are otherwise unintellegibile. Comic poets used this engine only for paratragic purpose, because the distinction inside/outside was not relevant for comedy.

This article discusses the relation between empirical and normative approaches in bioethics. The issue of dwarf tossing, while admittedly unusual, is chosen as a point of departure because it challenges the reader to look with fresh eyes upon several central bioethical themes, including human dignity, autonomy, and the protection of vulnerable people. After an overview of current approaches to the integration of empirical and normative ethics, we consider five ways that the empirical and normative can be brought together to speak (...) to the problem of dwarf tossing: prescriptive applied ethics, theoretical ethics, critical applied ethics, particularist ethics and integrated empirical ethics. We defend a position of critical applied ethics that allows for a two-way relation between empirical and normative theories. Against efforts fully to integrate the normative and the empirical into one synthesis, we propose that the two should stand in tension and relation to one another. The approach we endorse acknowledges that a social practice can and should be judged both by the gathering of empirical data and by normative ethics. Critical applied ethics uses a five stage process that includes: (a) determination of the problem, (b) description of the problem, (c) empirical study of effects and alternatives, (d) normative weighing and (e) evaluation of the effects of a decision. In each stage, we explore the perspective from both the empirical (sociological) and the normative ethical point of view. We conclude by applying our five-stage critical applied ethics to the example of dwarf tossing. (shrink)

This is a contribution to a book on quantum gravity and philosophy. I discuss nature and origin of the problem of quantum gravity. I examine the knowledge that may guide us in addressing this problem, and the reliability of such knowledge. In particular, I discuss the subtle modification of the notions of space and time engendered by general relativity, and how these might merge into quantum theory. I also present some reflections on methodological questions, and on some general issues in (...) philosophy of science which are are raised by, or a relevant for, the research on quantum gravity. (shrink)