DOIhttps://doi.org/10.25247/P1982-999X.2019.v19n1.p103-134• Esta obra está licenciada sob uma licençaCreative Commons Atribuição 4.0 InternacionalISSN 1982-999x|Pragmatic ambiguity and Kripke’s dialogue against DonnellanAmbiguidade Pragmática e o diálogo de Kripke contra DonnellanCarlo Penco (Universidade de Genova, Itália)AbstractIn this paper I discuss Donnellan’s claim of the pragmatic ambiguity of the distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite des-criptions. The literature on the topic is huge and full of alternative analysis. I will restrict myself to a very classical topos: the challenge posed by Kripke to (...) Donnellan’s distinction with the case of a dialogue on an attempt to update a misdescription. I claim that to treat the problem of the referential use of definite descriptions we need not only to take into account the context of utterance, but also the cognitive context with its epistemic restrictions and the possible different contexts of reception of the same utterance. I try to show different aspects of what can be called “pragmatic ambiguity”, which seem not correctly considered by Kripke, and connect them to the basic tenets of Grice Cooperative principle. (shrink)

On the basis of historical and textual evidence, this paper claims that after his Tractatus, Wittgenstein was actually influenced by Einstein's theory of relativity and, the similarity of Einstein's relativity theory helps to illuminate some aspects of Wittgenstein's work. These claims find support in remarkable quotations where Wittgenstein speaks approvingly of Einstein's relativity theory and in the way these quotations are embedded in Wittgenstein's texts. The profound connection between Wittgenstein and relativity theory concerns not only Wittgenstein's “verificationist” phase , but (...) also Wittgenstein's later philosophy centred on the theme of rule‐following. (shrink)

There are fields of research on NE which still need attention: the edition of the text the style and rhetorical and logical instruments employed by Aristotle in setting out his position. After indicating the situation of the research on the text of NE, I describe some rhetorical devices used by Aristotle in his work: the presence of a preamble, clues about how the argument will be developed, a tendency to introduce new arguments in an inconspicuous way and the articulation of (...) general definitions through more specific analyses. At a deeper level NE seems to be organised on the model of investigating definitions described in the second Book of the Postenor Analytics, and not according the so-called' dialectical method'. In conclusion I argue that NE is not an early or a confused work, as some scholars maintain, but rather a skilful construction, the fruit of a mature intelligence. (shrink)

Is reality three-dimensional and becoming real (Presentism), or is reality four-dimensional and becoming illusory (Eternalism)? Both options raise difficulties. I argue that we do not need to be trapped by this dilemma. There is a third possibility: reality has a more complex temporal structure than either of these two naive options. Fundamental becoming is real, but local and unoriented. A notion of present is well defined, but only locally and in the context of approximations.

The aim of this article is to show that intuition plays no role in mathematics. That intuition plays a role in mathematics is mainly associated to the view that the method of mathematics is the axiomatic method. It is assumed that axioms are directly (Gödel) or indirectly (Hilbert) justified by intuition. This article argues that all attempts to justify axioms in terms of intuition fail. As an alternative, the article supports the view that the method of mathematics is the analytic (...) method, a method originally used by the mathematician Hippocrates of Chios and the physician Hippocrates of Cos, and first explicitly formulated by Plato. The article examines the main features of the analytic method, and argues that, while intuition plays an essential role in the axiomatic method, it plays no role in the analytic method, either in the discovery or in the justification of hypotheses. That the method of mathematics is the analytic method involves that mathematical knowledge is not absolutely certain but only plausible, but the article argues that this is the best we can achieve. (shrink)

As a response to the semantic and logical paradoxes, theorists often reject some principles of classical logic. However, classical logic is entangled with mathematics, and giving up mathematics is too high a price to pay, even for nonclassical theorists. The so-called recapture theorems come to the rescue. When reasoning with concepts such as truth/class membership/property instantiation, (These are examples of concepts that are taken to satisfy naive rules such as the naive truth schema and naive comprehension, and that therefore are (...) compatible with a solution to paradox cast in the logics considered below. Other notions of similar kind can be added to the list.) if one is interested in consequences of the theory that only contain mathematical vocabulary, nothing is lost by reasoning in the nonclassical framework. This article shows that this claim is highly misleading, if not simply false. Under natural assumptions, some well-established approaches to recapture are incorrect. (shrink)

In his book The Value of Science Poincaré criticizes a certain view on the growth of mathematical knowledge: “The advance of science is not comparable to the changes of a city, where old edifices are pitilessly torn down to give place to new ones, but to the continuous evolution of zoological types which develop ceaselessly and end by becoming unrecognizable to the common sight, but where an expert eye finds always traces of the prior work of the centuries past” (Poincaré (...) 1958, p. 14). The view criticized by Poincaré corresponds to Frege’s idea that the development of mathematics can be described as an activity of system building, where each system is supposed to provide a complete representation for a certain mathematical field and must be pitilessly torn down whenever it fails to achieve such an aim. All facts concerning any mathematical field must be fully organized in a given system because “in mathematics we must always strive after a system that is complete in itself” (Frege 1979, p. 279). Frege is aware that systems introduce rigidity and are in conflict with the actual development of mathematics because “in history we have development; a system is static”, but he sticks to the view that “science only comes to fruition in a system” because “only through a system can we achieve complete clarity and order” (Frege 1979, p. 242). He even goes so far as saying that “no science can be so enveloped in obscurity as mathematics, if it fails to construct a system” (Frege 1979, p. 242). By ‘system’ Frege means ‘axiomatic system’. In his view, in mathematics we cannot rest content with the fact that “we are convinced of something, but we must strive to obtain a clear insight into the network of inferences that support our conviction”, that is, to find “what the primitive truths are”, because “only in this way can a system be constructed” (Frege 1979, p. 205). The primitive truths are the principles of the axiomatic system. Frege’s stress on the role of systems also determines his views on the growth of mathematical knowledge.. (shrink)

The Heythrop Journal, Volume 63, Issue 5, Page 869-885, September 2022.

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between contextual work-related factors on the one hand, in terms of job demands (i.e., risk factors) and job resources (i.e., protective factors), and work-family conflict in teachers on the other. Building on the Job Demands-Resources (JD-R) model, we hypothesized that job demands, namely qualitative and quantitative workload, are positively associated with work-family conflict in teachers. Moreover, in line with the buffer hypothesis of the JD-R, we expected job resources, in terms (...) of support from supervisor, job autonomy, and participation in decision making, to affect this association, which is expected to be stronger when job resources are low. The study was conducted in an Italian secondary school. Overall, 122 teachers completed a self-report questionnaire aimed at determining work-family conflict, as well as job demands and resources. The hypothesized relationships were tested using moderated multiple regression. The results of this study largely support our predictions. First, both aspects of workload were positively associated with work-family conflict. Secondly, job resources, including support from supervisor and participation in decision making, buffered this association, which was stronger when resources were low. On the contrary, job autonomy did not buffer the association between workload and work-family conflict. Overall, the results of this study are consistent with the Job Demands-Resources model and contribute to to the understanding of work–family conflict among teachers. More specifically, our study suggests that teachers with high levels of job resources, namely support from supervisor and participation in decision making, can effectively cope with job demands, in terms of both qualitative and quantitative workload, thus preventing negative consequences such as conflict between work and family domains. Interventions aimed at preventing work-family conflict among teachers should encourage organizations to optimize the balance between job demands and resources, as well as the identification and training of the workers at risk of work-family conflict. (shrink)

During the first months of 1887, while completing the drafts of his Mitteilungen zur Lehre vom Transfiniten, Georg Cantor maintained a continuous correspondence with Benno Kerry. Their exchange essentially concerned two main topics in the philosophy of mathematics, namely, (a) the concept of natural number and (b) the infinitesimals. Cantor's and Kerry's positions turned out to be irreconcilable, mostly because of Kerry's irremediably psychologistic outlook, according to Cantor at least. In this study, I will examine and reconstruct the main points (...) in the discussion around (a) and (b) and stress some interesting aspects of the philosophical and mathematical thought of Benno Kerry. (shrink)

Human beings are getting fatter and sicker. As we question what we eat and why we eat it, this book argues that living well involves consuming a raw vegan diet. With eating healthfully and eating ethically being simpler said than done, this book argues that the best solution to health, environmental, and ethical problems concerning animals is raw veganism―the human diet. The human diet is what humans are naturally designed to eat, and that is, a raw vegan diet of fruit, (...) tender leafy greens, and occasionally nuts and seeds. While veganism raises challenging questions over the ethics of consuming animal products, while also considering the environmental impact of the agriculture industry, raw veganism goes a step further and argues that consuming cooked food is also detrimental to our health and the environment. Cooking foods allows us to eat food that is not otherwise fit for human consumption and in an age that promotes eating foods in ‘moderation’ and having ‘balanced’ diets, this raises the question of why we are eating foods that should only be consumed in moderation at all, as moderation clearly implies they aren’t good for us. In addition, from an environmental perspective, the use of stoves, ovens and microwaves for cooking contributes significantly to energy consumption and cooking in general generates excessive waste of food and resources. Thus, this book maintains that living well and living a noble life, that is, good physical and moral health, requires consuming a raw vegan diet. Exploring the scientific and philosophical aspects of raw veganism, this novel book is essential reading for all interested in promoting ethical, healthful, and sustainable diets. (shrink)

Quantum gravity is expected to require modifications of the notions of space and time. I discuss and clarify how this happens in Loop Quantum Gravity.

In this paper we give some formal examples of ideas developed by Penco in two papers on the tension inside Frege's notion of sense (see Penco 2003). The paper attempts to compose the tension between semantic and cognitive aspects of sense, through the idea of sense as proof or procedure – not as an alternative to the idea of sense as truth condition, but as complementary to it (as it happens sometimes in the old tradition of procedural semantics).

ABSTRACTThis article investigates the recurring concepts emerging in a transnational social-media arena focusing on Brexit in the period immediately after the June 2016 referendum. It mainly focuse...

La investigación presente analizará las semejanzas y relaciones encontradas entre los planteamientos de Edmund Husserl y Simone Weil respecto al fenómeno religioso de la idolatría. Para ello, señalaremos en primer lugar el tratamiento que la religión podría tener dentro del marco fenomenológico husserliano; posteriormente, nos enfocaremos en el análisis de una de las publicaciones póstumas de autoría weiliana. Respecto al filósofo austríaco, se recurrirá a textos de distintos períodos de su obra, por lo que implícitamente se contemplará una continuación entre (...) sus denominados análisis estáticos y los genéticos. (shrink)

La presente investigación busca generar un diálogo entre la filosofía de las ciencias de Susan Haack y la teoría queer de Judith Butler. Para ello, recorreremos primero los hitos más importantes del feminismo y, en un segundo momento, veremos cómo estos desembocaron en la teoría queer. Luego, tomaremos como hilo conductor el problema del cuerpo y de la evidencia objetiva para analizar, en un tercer momento, la postura butleriana y, en un cuarto momento, la haackiana. Como sección conclusiva, pondremos ambas (...) posturas en diálogo considerando sus planteamientos en un caso concreto: la intersexualidad. (shrink)

Background: For many years the body of literature known as ‘care ethics’ or ‘ethics of care’ has been discussed as regards its status and nature. There is much confusion and little structured discussion. The paper of Klaver et al. (2014) was written as a discussion article to which we respond. Objectives: We aim to contribute to the ongoing discussion about the status and nature of care ethics. Research design: Responding to ‘Demarcation of the ethics of care as a discipline’ by (...) Klaver et al. (2014) and ‘Three versions of an ethics of care’ by Edwards (2009), we identified shared concerns and formulated criticisms of both texts in order to develop an alternative view. Participants and research context: This paper has been written from the academic context of a master in care ethics an policy. Ethical considerations: We have tried to be fair and respectful to the authors discussed. Findings: Both Klaver et al. (2014) and Edwards (2009) raise important concerns about the question if care ethics can be considered an academic discipline, and to what extend it can be seen as a moral theory. Despite shared concerns, their arguments fail to convince us in all respects. Discussion and conclusion: We propose to conceive care ethics as an interdisciplinary field of inquiry, incorporating a dialectical relation between empirical research and theoretical reflection. Departing from the notion of caring as a practice of contributing to a life-sustaining web, we argue that care ethics can only profit from a loosely organized academic profile that allows for flexibility and critical attitude that brings us close to the good emerging in specific practices. This asks for ways of searching for a common focus and interest that is inherently democratic and dialogical and thus beyond demarcation. (shrink)

We discuss the principles for a primitive, object-linguistic notion of consequence proposed by ) that yield a version of Curry’s paradox. We propose and study several strategies to weaken these principles and overcome paradox: all these strategies are based on the intuition that the object-linguistic consequence predicate internalizes whichever meta-linguistic notion of consequence we accept in the first place. To these solutions will correspond different conceptions of consequence. In one possible reading of these principles, they give rise to a notion (...) of logical consequence: we study the corresponding theory of validity by showing that it is conservative over a wide range of base theories: this result is achieved via a well-behaved form of local reduction. The theory of logical consequence is based on a restriction of the introduction rule for the consequence predicate. To unrestrictedly maintain this principle, we develop a conception of object-linguistic consequence, which we call grounded consequence, that displays a restriction of the structural rule of reflexivity. This construction is obtained by generalizing Saul Kripke’s inductive theory of truth. Grounded validity will be shown to satisfy several desirable principles for a naïve, self-applicable notion of consequence. (shrink)

One way to study and understand the notion of truth is to examine principles that we are willing to associate with truth, often because they conform to a pre-theoretical or to a semi-formal characterization of this concept. In comparing different collections of such principles, one requires formally precise notions of inter-theoretic reduction that are also adequate to compare these conceptual aspects. In this work I study possible ways to make precise the relation of conceptual equivalence between notions of truth associated (...) with collections of principles of truth. In doing so, I will consider refinements and strengthenings of the notion of relative truth-definability proposed by Fujimoto (2010): in particular I employ suitable variants of notions of equivalence of theories considered in Visser (2006) and Friedman & Visser (2014) to show that there are better candidates than mutual truth-definability for the role of sufficient condition for conceptual equivalence between the semantic notions associated with the theories. In the concluding part of the paper, I extend the techniques introduced in the first and show that there is a precise sense in which ramified truth (either disquotational or compositional) does not correspond to iterations of comprehension. (shrink)

L'auteur analyse d'abord la relation entre Theos et Daimôn dans le Poème Physique et dans les Purifications. Dans le premier, Empédocle appelle theoi le Sphairos et les éléments. Précisément, le philosophe d'Acragas appelle le Sphairos tout simplement theos. Pourtant, il appelle les éléments theoi dolichaiônes, alors qu'ils forment quatre masses séparées et avant qu'ils ne se mêlent pour constituer les « choses mortelles »; tandis que, lorsqu'ils se mêlent et abandonnent la condition de pureté pour créer un composé, il les (...) appelle daimones. D'autre part, dans les Purifications, les daimones sont les dieux tombés dans le monde : redevenir un dieu, c'est la destinée de l'homme, ou au moins l'objectif qu'Empédocle propose. Enfin, l'auteur soutient que les frgs. B131-134 pourraient provenir de l'Hymne à Apollon perdu. C'est ce que semble démontrer le fait qu'Empédocle suive dans ces fragments une ligne dogmatique à propos de la connaissance des dieux qui contraste avec la prudente gnoséologie suivie dans le Poème Physique et par la difference entre la théologie exposée dans ces fragments et le mythe eschatologique présenté dans les Purifications. The author starts by analyzing the relationship between Theos and Daimôn in the Physical Poem and in the Purifications. In the former poem it is the Sphairos and the elements which are called theoi. As a matter of fact, the Sphairos is called simply theos. The elements, instead, are called theoi dolichaiônes, when they are set in four separate masses and anyway before mingling up together in order to beget "mortal things"; whereas, when they mingle up, and pass from a pure condition into a compound, they are called daimones. On the other hand, in the Purifications it is the fallen gods who are called daimones: to become a god again is man's destiny, or at least the aim proposed by Empedocles. Lastly, the author maintains that frgs. B131-134 might belong to the lost Hymn to Apollo — this is shown by the dogmatic approach to the knowledge of the gods, which is here taken by Empedocles, contrary to the cautious gnoseology defended in the Physical Poem; and by the theology taught in those fragments, which is very different from the eschatological myth introduced in the Purifications. (shrink)

Through the elaboration of his political philosophy, Hobbes wishes to present himself as a representative of the new mechanistic and deterministic science of the seventeenth century, by applying Galilei’s method in politics and by refusing the Aristotelian metaphysics and natural philosophy as well. The aim of the present article is to challenge this claim. As a matter of fact, Hobbes’s thought seems to be characterised by an original co-existence of decisionism and mechanism and his view of the natural law does (...) not appear to be based on deterministic principles, but on a voluntarist and moral character condensed in his theory of passions. (shrink)

Following a line of research that I have developed for several years, I argue that the best strategy for understanding quantum gravity is to build a picture of the physical world where the notion of time plays no role at all. I summarize here this point of view, explaining why I think that in a fundamental description of nature we must “forget time”, and how this can be done in the classical and in the quantum theory. The idea is to (...) develop a formalism that treats dependent and independent variables on the same footing. In short, I propose to interpret mechanics as a theory of relations between variables, rather than the theory of the evolution of variables in time. (shrink)

The philosophy of mathematics of the last few decades is commonly distinguished into mainstream and maverick, to which a ‘third way’ has been recently added, the philosophy of mathematical practice. In this paper the limitations of these trends in the philosophy of mathematics are pointed out, and it is argued that they are due to the fact that all of them are based on a top-down approach, that is, an approach which explains the nature of mathematics in terms of some (...) general unproven assumption. As an alternative, a bottom-up approach is proposed, which explains the nature of mathematics in terms of the activity of real individuals and interactions between them. This involves distinguishing between mathematics as a discipline and the mathematics embodied in organisms as a result of biological evolution, which however, while being distinguished, are not opposed. Moreover, it requires a view of mathematical proof, mathematical definition and mathematical objects which is alternative to the top-down approach. (shrink)

In this paper I analyze four so-called “principles of expertise”; that is, good epistemic practices that are normatively motivated by the epistemological literature on expert judgment. I highlight some of the problems that the four principles of expertise run into, when we try to implement them in concrete contexts of application (e.g. in science committees). I suggest some possible alternatives and adjustments to the principles, arguing in general that the epistemology of expertise should be informed both by case studies and (...) by the literature on the use of experts in science practice. (shrink)

Reuben Hersh is a champion of maverick philosophy of mathematics. He maintains that mathematics is a human activity, intelligible only in a social context; it is the subject where statements are capable in principle of being proved or disproved, and where proof or disproof bring unanimous agreement by all qualified experts; mathematicians' proof is deduction from established mathematics; mathematical objects exist only in the shared consciousness of human beings. In this paper I describe my several points of agreement and few (...) points of disagreement with Hersh's views. (shrink)

The world appears to be well described by gauge theories; why? I suggest that gauge is more than mathematical redundancy. Gauge-dependent quantities can not be predicted, but there is a sense in which they can be measured. They describe “handles” though which systems couple: they represent real relational structures to which the experimentalist has access in measurement by supplying one of the relata in the measurement procedure itself. This observation leads to a physical interpretation for the ubiquity of gauge: it (...) is a consequence of a relational structure of physical quantities. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics is not about 'quantum states': it is about values of physical variables. I give a short fresh presentation and update on the *relational* perspective on the theory, and a comment on its philosophical implications.