One of the world's most renowned theoretical physicists, Carlo Rovelli has entranced millions of readers with his singular perspective on the cosmos. In Helgoland, Rovelli examines the enduring enigma of quantum theory. The quantum world Rovelli describes is as beautiful as it is unnerving. Helgoland is a treeless island in the North Sea where the 21-year-old Werner Heisenberg first developed quantum theory, setting off a century of scientific revolution. Full of alarming ideas (ghost waves, distant objects that seem to (...) be magically connected, cats that appear both dead and alive), quantum physics has led to countless discoveries and technological advancements. Today our understanding of the world is based on this theory, yet it is still profoundly mysterious. As scientists and philosophers continue to fiercly debate the theory's meaning, Rovelli argues that its most unsettling contradictions can be explained by seeing the world as fundamentally made of relationships, not substances. We and everything around us exist only in our interactions with one another. This bold idea suggests new directions for understanding the structure of reality and even the nature of consciousness. Rovelli makes learning about quantum mechanics an almost psychedelic experience. Shifting our perspective once again, he takes us on a riveting journey through the universe so we can better understand our place in it. (shrink)

Why do we remember the past and not the future? What does it mean for time to "flow"? Do we exist in time or does time exist in us? In lyric, accessible prose, Carlo Rovelli invites us to consider questions about the nature of time that continue to puzzle physicists and philosophers alike. For most readers this is unfamiliar terrain. We all experience time, but the more scientists learn about it, the more mysterious it remains. We think of it (...) as uniform and universal, moving steadily from past to future, measured by clocks. Rovelli tears down these assumptions one by one, revealing a strange universe where at the most fundamental level time disappears. He explains how the theory of quantum gravity attempts to understand and give meaning to the resulting extreme landscape of this timeless world. Weaving together ideas from philosophy, science and literature, he suggests that our perception of the flow of time depends on our perspective, better understood starting from the structure of our brain and emotions than from the physical universe. (shrink)

Dans le livre Λ de la Métaphysique, en accord avec sa thèse fondamentale de la primauté ontologique de l’individu sur l’universel, Aristote refuse d’attribuer le statut de substances immatérielles et de principes premiers de la réalité aux Formes platoniciennes et aux Nombres de la tradition académicienne. Il croit que ces principes platoniciens – selon lui des universels privés de vie – doivent être remplacés par une série d’êtres vivants, d’individus doués d’intelligence, en activité contin...

Relational quantum mechanics (RQM) is an interpretation of quantum mechanics based on the idea that quantum states do not describe an absolute property of a system but rather a relationship between systems. There have recently been some criticisms of RQM pertaining to issues around intersubjectivity. In this article, we show how RQM can address these criticisms by adding a new postulate which requires that all of the information possessed by a certain observer is stored in physical variables of that observer (...) and thus is accessible by measurement to other observers. This makes it possible for observers to reach intersubjective agreement about quantum events that have occurred in the past. We suggest a possible ontology for a version of RQM employing this postulate; this ontology upholds the principle that quantum states are always relational, but it also postulates a set of quantum events that are not strictly relational. We show that the new postulate helps address the preferred basis problem in RQM. (shrink)

This paper suggests that libertarians should avail themselves of a system of natural and autonomy-friendly motivational foundations—intrinsic motives. A psyche equipped with intrinsic motives could allow for some degree of character-formation that is genuinely and robustly autonomous. Such autonomy would rest on motives that are one’s own in the most direct way: they are part of one’s natural make-up. A model with intrinsic motives can help libertarians in multiple ways: to deal with skeptics regarding the very idea of robust self-making; (...) to explain the importance of autonomy (it helps explain how the agent can set her dominant life-goals on the basis of her own motives); to explain why an artificially induced, albeit rational, autonomy is less than genuine (it would not rely on the agent’s own motives). (shrink)

The book is a comprehensive introduction to the work of the Estonian-German biologist Jakob von Uexküll. After a first introductory chapter by Morten Tønnessen and a second chapter on Uexküll's life and philosophical background, it contains four chapters devoted to the analysis of his main works; they are followed by a vast eighth chapter which deals with the influence Uexküll had on other philosophers and scientists, and by a conclusions focused on the possibility of updating Uexküll's work. The monograph combines (...) a careful reconstruction of the historical context in which the Uexküllian concepts emerged (the debate between mechanism and vitalism, contemporary scientific studies) and a thorough analysis of the philosophical contents of the Uexküllian views. As far as the key issue is concerned, Uexküll's notion of Umwelt refers to the perceptive and operative world which surrounds animal species; it is a subjective species-specific construction which provides living organisms with great security and behaviour stability. Moreover, the relationship that the animal carries out with its environment proves to be a complex system of semiotic interactions: its behaviour is not a set of mechanical reactions, but the result of a spontaneous attribution of meaning to the outside world, whose environmental elements are actively interpreted by the subject. The environment of animal species becomes a field of meaning, an exceedingly complex subjective elaboration; this can lessen the distance between animals and men, crediting both with the cognitive ability to grasp meanings and to use signs. (shrink)

Ethical veganism is the view that raising animals for food is an immoral practice that must be stopped because of the harm it causes to the animals, the environment, and our health. Carlo Alvaro argues the only way to stop that harm is to acquire the virtues that enable us to act justly and benevolently toward animals.

ABSTRACT The mainstreaming of environmental concerns paradoxically obscures their political dimension: as the goals of environmentalism become accepted, they are reduced to administrative problems to be solved in a purely technocratic way. This technocratic environmentalism has fueled a populist backlash that challenges the scientific basis of environmentalism. As a result, contemporary environmentalism appears to be stuck in a depoliticizing opposition between technocracy and populism. A possible way out of this depoliticizing trap consists in recognizing the intrinsic contestability of the core (...) premises on which environmentalism is based, since it is not merely the result of a straightforward application of scientifically provable facts, but also depends on normative principles and value choices. This opens the possibility for an internal pluralization of environmentalism, which shifts emphasis from the depoliticizing struggle between technocratic environmentalism and populist anti-environmentalism to the inherently political rivalry between different types of environmentalism. (shrink)

This article argues for a new interpretation of the realist claim that politics is autonomous from morality and involves specific political values. First, this article defends an original normative source: functional normativity. Second, it advocates a substantive functional standard: political institutions ought to be assessed by their capacity to select and implement collective decisions. Drawing from the ‘etiological account’ in philosophy of biology, I will argue that functions yield normative standards, which are independent from morality. For example, a ‘good heart’ (...) is one that pumps blood well, and a good army is one that it is effective at exerting military force. I then interpret realism’s naturalistic conception of politics as an etiological function of social groups: namely making binding collective decisions under persistent disagreement. I conclude that political institutions should be evaluated realistically by how well they perform this task. Finally, I assess trade-offs between this functional political normativity and other moral values. I conclude that justice, fairness, freedom and equality remain obviously important concerns, but only once the basic political function is secured. (shrink)

This volume examines the limitations of mathematical logic and proposes a new approach to logic intended to overcome them. To this end, the book compares mathematical logic with earlier views of logic, both in the ancient and in the modern age, including those of Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant. From the comparison it is apparent that a basic limitation of mathematical logic is that it narrows down the scope of logic confining it to the study of deduction, without (...) providing tools for discovering anything new. As a result, mathematical logic has had little impact on scientific practice. Therefore, this volume proposes a view of logic according to which logic is intended, first of all, to provide rules of discovery, that is, non-deductive rules for finding hypotheses to solve problems. This is essential if logic is to play any relevant role in mathematics, science and even philosophy. To comply with this view of logic, this volume formulates several rules of discovery, such as induction, analogy, generalization, specialization, metaphor, metonymy, definition, and diagrams. A logic based on such rules is basically a logic of discovery, and involves a new view of the relation of logic to evolution, language, reason, method and knowledge, particularly mathematical knowledge. It also involves a new view of the relation of philosophy to knowledge. This book puts forward such new views, trying to open again many doors that the founding fathers of mathematical logic had closed historically. (shrink)

The concept of design, and designing, is so ambiguous that even the most obvious cornerstones, commonly built around opposite couples like the opposition between ontology and epistemology, or architectural theory and design theory. Going beyond those couples, as difficult as it may be, requires a third glance, whose reasoning may generate a new way of looking at things and, thus, act. That’s why we propose a Side-by-side Reading: on the one hand, a philosophical though about design, on the other, an (...) architectural one. No intersections are provided, other than paragraph articulation. The reader will have the chance, and the power, to build as many bridges between the two parts as he’ll desire, so that the punctual inspiration of one part could serve also for the other. Concerning the general meanings, the premises and the actual conceptual outcomes, the two parts are totally on the same side. But at the same time, their ultimate meaning should not be limited to the words, without those conceptual bridges, even unconscious ones: also, that’s consistent with the contents of the paper. No dialogues of the deaf, here: the paper propose something more like the Fourth Simphony by Charles Ives, where two orchestra plays two different things at the same time, connected by a third element – a distant chorus. Here, the chorus, the referent, is the act of design, or the act of knowing, unveiling, deciding, hoping a future: and the key for breaking the opposite couples is a new glance aimed at considering design as the effective strategic exploitation of potential. (shrink)

In twentieth-century continental philosophy, German philosophical anthropology can be seen as a sort of conceptual laboratory devoted to human/animal research, and, in particular, to the discontinuity between human and non-human animals. Its main notion—the idea of the special position of humans in nature—is one of the first philosophical attempts to think of the specificity of humans as a natural and qualitative difference from non-human animals. This school of thought correctly rejects both the metaphysical and/or religious characterisations of humans, and the (...) positivistic gradualism, that sees the human being as an animal endowed with a greater degree of certain faculties. At the same time, German philosophical anthropology still takes it for granted that such natural-qualitative novelty is unique in the realm of the living, that in correspondence with humans there is the hiatus, the discontinuity par excellence. The semiotic side of this view is the distinction between signs and symbols developed by Ernst Cassirer and Susanne Langer: animal signs would be mere proxies for perceptive elements or stimuli, whereas only human symbols could convey complex representation of objects and situations. The goal of this contribution is to criticise the alleged uniqueness of the hiatus and its semiotic implications through the opposite approach of the diffuse discontinuities. This approach that focuses on the semiotic traits of different species-specific environments can be traced back to Jakob von Uexküll’s biosemiotical phenomenology, which thinks of discontinuities as a normal phenomenon of animal life. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics is not about 'quantum states': it is about values of physical variables. I give a short fresh presentation and update on the *relational* perspective on the theory, and a comment on its philosophical implications.

Nel breve spazio del presente lavoro, intendo dar conto dell’“habitus teologico” che caratterizza lo stile filosofico di Alasdair MacIntyre : “religiously musical” è infatti — a mio avviso — il più insolito, e allo stesso tempo il più suadente, epiteto attribuito al filosofo scozzese dai teologi James Gustafson e Stanley Hauerwas. Tale habitus è altresì esaltato dalla diffusa propensione a saldare insieme — senza apparente soluzione di continuità — il modus philosophandi macintyriano e alcune recenti figure della teologia cristiana post–liberale (...) e post–moderna, di cui ci occuperemo in seguito: soprattutto la “teologia narrativa” di Hans Frei, George Lindbeck, et. al., ma anche la “radical orthodoxy” di John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, Graham Ward, et. al. Sebbene MacIntyre non abbia replicato direttamente a simili tentativi di “appropriazione teologica” del suo pensiero, ritengo, comunque, che i tempi siano maturi per riconoscere — a lui e al “tomismo analitico” — un ruolo sui generis nell’evoluzione della tradizione aristotelico–tomista del XX secolo : ruolo distinto, ma non separato, rispetto a quello coevo di quanti — in ambito continentale — hanno tenacemente proseguito la ricerca filosofica e teologica nel solco di Tommaso, come ad esempio Marie–Dominique Chenu, Yves Congar, Cornelio Fabro, Etienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, Edith Stein, et al. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the tragic poets of the fifth century BC used an engine called ekkyklema in order to reveal the scenes supposed to take place inside. I think I can indicate a passage, that clearly demonstrates the use of such an engine (Eur. Her. 1028 ff.), since the chorus’ words are otherwise unintellegibile. Comic poets used this engine only for paratragic purpose, because the distinction inside/outside was not relevant for comedy.

Many moral philosophers have criticized intensive animal farming because it can be harmful to the environment, it causes pain and misery to a large number of animals, and furthermore eating meat and animal-based products can be unhealthful. The issue of industrially farmed animals has become one of the most pressing ethical questions of our time. On the one hand, utilitarians have argued that we should become vegetarians or vegans because the practices of raising animals for food are immoral since they (...) minimize the overall happiness. Deontologists, on the other hand, have argued that the practices of raising animals for food are immoral because animals have certain rights and we have duties toward them. Some virtue ethicists remain unconvinced of deontic and consequentialist arguments against the exploitation of animals and suggest that a virtue-based approach is better equipped to show what is immoral about raising and using animals for food, and what is virtuous about ethical veganism. (shrink)