Using state-of-the-art observational datasets and results from a large archive of computer model simulations, a consortium of scientists from 12 different institutions has resolved a long-standing conundrum in climate science—the apparent discrepancy between simulated and observed temperature trends in the tropics. Research published by this group indicates that there is no fundamental discrepancy between modeled and observed tropical temperature trends when one accounts for: the uncertainties in observations; and the statistical uncertainties in estimating trends from observations. These results refute a (...) recent claim that model and observed tropical temperature trends “disagree to a statistically significant extent”. This claim was based on the application of a flawed statistical test and the use of older observational datasets. (shrink)

Social distancing has become the most prominent measure many countries have implemented to combat the spread of COVID-19. The aim of the current study was to explore the potential role of empathy and self-construal styles, as individual personality traits, on self-reported social distancing. Participants completed the Interpersonal Reactivity Index, the Singelis Self-Construal Scale, and were asked to rate their level of social distancing and how much they endorsed social distancing on a five-point Likert-scale. Across a large and diverse sample, results (...) showed that trait-levels of empathic concern and perspective taking positively correlates with social distancing. However, we did not find evidence to suggest that trait-levels of personal distress correlates with social distancing. We interpret these findings as suggesting that empathy, both its altruistic and cognitive dimensions, plays an important role in motivating people to socially distance and should be emphasized during times of crisis. Furthermore, we suggest that emphasizing a person’s self-distress during times of crisis may not be an effective approach in promotion social distancing policies. We also found that both independence and interdependence self-construal styles positively correlates with social distancing. While we expected the latter result, we did not expect the former. This suggests that more work is needed to fully understand how self-construal styles, along with their cultural level analogs, influences social distancing. Overall, these results provide us with novel multi-national data about the role of individual differences on social distancing tendencies specifically, and human behavior during a global health crisis more generally. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss some conditions forunderstanding teaching as an act ofresponsibility towards an other, rather than asan instrumental act identified throughepistemology. I first put the latter intocontext through a critical reading of teachingas it is inscribed in humanistic discourses oneducation. Within these discourses, I explorehow students are treated as objects ofknowledge that reinforce the teacher's ego. Icontend that the taking up of this positionmakes not only an ethical relation to thestudent impossible, but also disqualifies anytype of meaningful social (...) relation. Therefore Iargue that teachers have to give up theirposition on the safe side of knowledge andparticipate in the time of risk when meetingthe other means to take responsibility for thatother from a position of vulnerability.Moreover, it is precisely because of this riskthat teaching as an ethical relation becomespossible and where it begins to resound withpoetry. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the multilevel selection -1 to MLS-2 model of a major transition is incomplete because it overlooks a crucial component of fitness. It addresses that the evolution of individuality literature has failed to account for expansive fitness and that expansive fitness differences play an important role in the transition to regimes sensitive to the fitness of the corporate agent. It discusses multilevel evolution during the three phases of transitions in individuality: the aggregate phase, the group phase, and (...) the individual phase. This chapter shows that the path a lineage takes through the phases of transitions is not fixed, but determined by ecology. (shrink)

BackgroundThe state of the world is one with scarce medical resources where longevity is not equally distributed. Given such facts, setting priorities in health entails making difficult yet unavoidable decisions about which lives to save. The business of saving lives works on the assumption that longevity is valuable and that an early death is worse than a late death. There is a vast literature on health priorities and badness of death, separately. Surprisingly, there has been little cross-fertilisation between the academic (...) fields of priority setting and badness of death. Our aim is to connect philosophical discussions on the badness of death to contemporary debates in health priorities.DiscussionTwo questions regarding death are especially relevant to health priorities. The first question is why death is bad. Death is clearly bad for others, such as family, friends and society. Many philosophers also argue that death can be bad for those who die. This distinction is important for health priorities, because it concerns our fundamental reasons for saving lives. The second question is, ‘When is the worst time to die?’ A premature death is commonly considered worse than a late death. Thus, the number of good life years lost seems to matter to the badness of death. Concerning young individuals, some think the death of infants is worse than the death of adolescents, while others have contrary intuitions. Our claim is that to prioritise between age groups, we must consider the question of when it is worst to die.ConclusionsDeprivationism provides a more plausible approach to health priorities than Epicureanism. If Deprivationism is accepted, we will have a firmer basis for claiming that individuals, in addition to having a health loss caused by morbidity, will have a loss of good life years due to mortality. Additionally, Deprivationism highlights the importance of age and values for health priorities. Regarding age, both variants of Deprivationism imply that stillbirths are included in the Global Burden of Disease. Finally, we suggest that the Time-Relative Interest Account may serve as an alternative to the discounting and age weighting previously applied in the Global Burden of Disease. (shrink)

This paper develops a theory of how democratic governance is possible. It analyses democracy as a laminated system consisting of three interdependent levels – the political/institutional, the social/interactional, and the psychological/intrapsychic – each of which is necessary for the others to exist. Each level is subject to a regulatory principle that is necessary for it to function appropriately. At the political/institutional level, competing political parties must be governed by the regulatory principle of ‘loser’s consent,’ in which the losing party must (...) agree to cede power to the winning party. At the social/interactional level individuals from opposing political parties must be governed by the regulatory principle of a superordinate identity as citizen, which allows them to transcend their partisan political identities. At the psychological/intrapsychic level individuals must be governed by the regulatory principle of mutuality/thirdness which allows the possibility of an alternative to the binary identities that result from the doer/done-to position. (shrink)

We study the degrees of unsolvability of sets which are cohesive . We answer a question raised by the first author in 1972 by showing that there is a cohesive set A whose degree a satisfies a' = 0″ and hence is not high. We characterize the jumps of the degrees of r-cohesive sets, and we show that the degrees of r-cohesive sets coincide with those of the cohesive sets. We obtain analogous results for strongly hyperimmune and strongly hyperhyperimmune sets (...) in place of r-cohesive and cohesive sets, respectively. We show that every strongly hyperimmune set whose degree contains either a Boolean combination of ∑2 sets or a 1-generic set is of high degree. We also study primitive recursive analogues of these notions and in this case we characterize the corresponding degrees exactly. MSC: 03D30, 03D55. (shrink)

Intentionality and the Problem of Transcendental Friction -- The Epistemic Given and the Semantic Given in C. I. Lewis -- Discursive Intentionality and 'Nonconceptual Content' in Sellars -- The Retreat from Nonconceptualism: Discourse and Experience in Brandom and McDowell -- Somatic Intentionality and Habitual Normativity in Merleau-Ponty's Account of Lived Embodiment -- The Possibilities and Problems of Bifurcated Intentionality.

A hyperintensional semantics for natural language is proposed which is agnostic about the question of whether propositions are sets of worlds or worlds are sets of propositions. Montague’s theory of intensional senses is replaced by a weaker theory, written in standard classical higher-order logic, of fine-grained senses which are in a many-to-one correspondence with intensions; Montague’s theory can then be recovered from the proposed theory by identifying the type of propositions with the type of sets of worlds and adding an (...) axiom to the effect that each world is the set of propositions which are true there. Senses are compositionally assigned to linguistic expressions by a categorial grammar with only two rule schemas, based on the implicative fragment of intuitionistic linear propositional logic, and a fully explicit grammar fragment is provided that illustrates the compositional assignment of sense to a variety of constructions, including dummy-subject constructions, infinitive complements, predicative adjectives and nominals, raising to subject, ‘tough-movement’, and quantifier scope ambiguities. Notably, the grammar and the derivations that it licenses never make reference to either worlds or to the extensions of senses. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis essay argues that in spite of the powerful arguments by Kolodny and Broome there is a reason to be rational. The suggested reason to be rational is that if an agent complies with ratio...

Law provides a rich language for thinking about bioethical issues and is a tool for action as well as talk. But the language of the law, often inapt, regularly fails to achieve its desired effect.

本书阐述了技术哲学的两大传统,即工程传统和人文传统中主要人物的基本思想,提出了两大传统融合的可能性,对作为物体、知识、活动和意志的四种技术类型作了系统的哲学分析.

We show, roughly speaking, that it requires ω iterations of the Turing jump to decode nontrivial information from Boolean algebras in an isomorphism invariant fashion. More precisely, if α is a recursive ordinal, A is a countable structure with finite signature, and d is a degree, we say that A has αth-jump degree d if d is the least degree which is the αth jump of some degree c such there is an isomorphic copy of A with universe ω in (...) which the functions and relations have degree at most c. We show that every degree d ≥ 0 (ω) is the ωth jump degree of a Boolean algebra, but that for $n no Boolean algebra has nth-jump degree $\mathbf{d} > 0^{(n)}$ . The former result follows easily from work of L. Feiner. The proof of the latter result uses the forcing methods of J. Knight together with an analysis of various equivalences between Boolean algebras based on a study of their Stone spaces. A byproduct of the proof is a method for constructing Stone spaces with various prescribed properties. (shrink)

For Māori, a real opportunity exists to flesh out some terms and concepts that Western thinkers have adopted and that precede disciplines but necessarily inform them. In this article, we are intent on describing one of these precursory phenomena—Foucault’s Gaze—within a framework that accords with a Māori philosophical framework. Our discussion is focused on the potential and limits of colonised thinking, which has huge implications for such disciplines as education, among others. We have placed Foucault’s Gaze alongside a Māori metaphysics (...) and have speculated on the Gaze’s surveillant/expectant strategies with some key Māori primordial phenomena in mind, such as ‘te kore’ and ‘āhua’. We posit the Gaze as an entity and thus aim to render it more relevant to Māori, so that it can be addressed appropriately. We also preface that discussion by theorising on some of the challenges that confront us as Māori authors in even referring counter-colonially to the Gaze. Whilst we do not seek to destabilise the Gaze by positing it as a metaphysically based entity, we do hint at the possibility that critical indigenous philosophy may even for a short time bring the Gaze into focus for Māori. By introducing an awareness of an alternative metaphysics, we may have unsettled the self-certainty of the Gaze. (shrink)