Using data collected from 280 full-time employees from a variety of organizations, this study examined the effects of employee perceptions of the behavioral integrity (BI) of their supervisors on job tension. The moderating effect of procedural justice (PJ) on this relationship also was examined. Substitutes for leadership theory (Kerr and Jermier, 1978) and psychological contract theory (Rousseau, Empl Responsib Rights J 2:121–139, 1989) were used as the theoretical foundations for the hypothesized relationships. Results indicated a negative relationship between BI and (...) job tension. PJ moderated this relationship such that it was weakened under conditions of high PJ. Implications for research and managers are discussed. (shrink)

Leveraging perspectives from social cognitive theory, the attention-based view, and social networks literatures, we tested the relationship between unethical choice and network unethicality, which we define as respondents’ perceptions of their peer advisors’ unethical choices. Although social cognitive theory predicts that perceptions of peer advisor unethical choice are positively associated with unethical choice, we theorize that the nature of this relationship depends on the personality of the actor and the situation. Results from a lagged study suggest that individual and situational (...) variables may act as key buffers to the adverse impact of unethical social influence on ethical choice. Strengths, limitations, and directions for future research are discussed. (shrink)

This paper posits that ethical leadership increases important organizational and individual outcomes by reducing politics in the workplace. Specifically, we propose that perceptions of organizational politics serve as a mechanism through which ethical leadership affects outcomes. We further argue that the modeled relationships are moderated by political skill. By means of data from 136 matched pairs of supervisors and subordinates employed by a state agency in the southern US, we found support for our predictions. Specifically, we found that perceptions of (...) organizational politics fully mediated the relationship between perceptions of ethical leadership and helping and promotability ratings. In addition, political skill was found to moderate the direct and indirect effects. (shrink)

C A Wringe; Reply to Antony Flew, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 13, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 149–158, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1979.t.

Practical and theoretical shortcomings of an approach to moral education based on the development of moral reasoning are noted and the alternative of promiting the virtues is considered. The identification of apprpriate virtues with modes of commitment and conduct supportive of a particular way of life is held to raise the further question of why a particular way of life should be favored, and how our own way of life should e characterized. This latter, permitting social and geographical mobility, anonymity (...) and value pluralism, is contrasted with that of small, more traditional communities paradigmatic of communitarian ethics. an ethic of respect for equal freedom is held to be compatible with the current nature of society and to be favored by the virtue of appropriate self-assertion. The educational implications of such a conclusion are explored. (shrink)

Philosophers and social scientists largely agree that fake news is not just necessarily untruthful, but necessarily insincere: it’s produced either with the intention to deceive or an indifference toward its truth. Against this, I argue insincerity is neither a necessary nor obviously typical feature of fake news. The main argument proceeds in two stages. The first, methodological step develops classification criteria for identifying instances of fake news. By attending to expressed theoretical and practical interests, I observe how our classification practices (...) turn on worries about fake news’s unique political-epistemic risks. From this, I argue (i) theories of fake news should capture independent mechanisms that realise these risks and (ii) the manifestation of them suffices for classifying a news story as fake news. The second step applies the classification criteria to bad science journalism. I argue the systematic epistemic faults in bad science journalism manifest the same political-epistemic risks we see in fake news, which suffices to justify classifying it as fake news. But since such faults aren’t plausibly attributed to its propagators being insincere, insincerity doesn’t function independently as a mechanism for realising fake news’s political-epistemic risks. Thus, I conclude, we should exclude insincerity from our accounts of the phenomenon. (shrink)

I argue that mind-independence realism should be characterised in terms of what I call 'essential', rather than 'modal', independence from our mental lives. I explore the connections between the two kinds of independence, and argue that characterizations in terms of essence respect more intuitions about what realism is, harmonize better with standard characterizations of anti-realism, and avert the threat of subversion from Blackburn's quasi-realist.

The aesthetics of tea, in some practices, seems to focus on appreciating the mental effects of tea — the altered states of mind. Wine aesthetics, on the other hand, seems to actively exclude any inebriative effects. Wine experts are supposed to spit, in order to avoid inebriation when they judge wine. Why? The answer, I suggest, lies deep in several key suppositions in the traditional model of aesthetic experience: that aesthetic experience needs to be accurate of its object, and that (...) it needs to be inseparable from the particular details of its object. But, I argue, that model is not really incompatible with an aesthetics of drugs. The problematic presupposition is that the aesthetics of drugs is either an aesthetics of the world, as experienced while drugged, or an aesthetics of the physical substance itself. The aesthetics of some drugs, such as LSD, will turn out, instead, to be a self-reflective aesthetics — one in which the primary object of appreciation is the alteration of one’s own cognitive faculties. This can be valuable as a humbling aesthetic vision, of one’s own cognitive fragility. But the aesthetics of gastronomical drugs, such as wine and tea, will turn out to be even more complicated. Gastronomical drugs demand that we bridge the inwardly-focused aesthetics of inebriation and an outwardly focused gastronomical aesthetics. They open the door to the possibility of an aesthetic reconciliation between our capacity to get onto the world, and our fears about the fragility of that capacity. (shrink)

We are often confronted with attempts to debunk our aesthetic tastes, like: “You only like jazz because you’re a pretentious hipster,” or, “Your love of the Western canon is just colonialism speaking.” Such debunking arguments often try to give a socio-historical accounting, intended to de-legitimize our tastes by showing that they arise from processes uninterested in real aesthetic value. One common version is the Art Populist debunk: that claims of aesthetic expertise in esoteric arts are really just elitist gatekeeping. Then (...) we have its mirror twin, the Art Expert debunk: that the populist love of simple arts serves the interests of profiteering entertainment corporations dispensing simplified slop. Suppose we accept one of these debunking argument. How are we supposed to got on? Are we supposed to not like the things we like, or force ourselves to choke down food we don’t enjoy? And suppose we accept both of these debunking arguments — what then? Are we supposed to simply give up our grip on beauty altogether? This is hard to imagine. Aesthetic debunking arguments have a harder time getting a grip on us, because aesthetic life involves a distinctively tight relationship between our felt aesthetic phenomena and our aesthetic judgments. Aesthetic life gives us phenomenal resistance to debunking arguments, when our felt loves lag behind our endorsed beliefs. I suggest a way through that offers a livable accommodation. We may be able to treat such debunking arguments, not as targeting the positive content of our taste, but as targeting the boundaries and limitations on our taste. That is, a Populist may not be able to debunk my deep felt love of opera, but they may be able to debunk my dismissal of dance-pop. In this case, we can take onboard both the Art Expert’s and the Art Populist’s debunking arguments, as targeting different varieties of narrowness and dismissal. These debunkings, then, move us, not towards aesthetic nihilism, but aesthetic expansionism. (shrink)

Using a neutron interferometer and the phase difference calculated from spatial discrete quantum mechanics, a test for discrete quantum theory may implemented by measuring the X spin polarization and its variation with position.

After a discussion of the possible connections between quantum mechanics and consciousness, and an examination of the circumstances under which some properties of a macroscopic system may be described by a quantum mechanical wave function, we propose three types of experiments in which one may search for the possible existence of quantal interference in mental events.

In almost all cultures, intriguingly, care has both positive and negative connotations as in taking care of something or somebody and, at the same time, carrying the burden of something or somebody...

De uma perspectiva comportamentalista radical, o eu é um repertório verbal complexo, que, como tal, tem uma gênese social. O reconhecimento da origem social do “eu” abre caminho para uma análise política, incluindo uma discussão do pa- pel das relações de poder na constituição do eu. Entretanto, uma concepção radicalmente social do “eu”, como a proposta pelo comportamentalismo, suscita um problema político: se o eu é integralmente produto do ambiente social, de onde viria uma eventual “vontade” de romper com esse (...) sistema? Parece que para reconhecer a possibilidade de ação política transformadora seria preciso preservar uma noção descontextualizada de “eu”. Considerando essa dificuldade, o objetivo deste artigo é propor uma interpretação política da constituição do “eu” no âmbito do comportamentalismo radical, mantendo no horizonte a possibilidade de uma ação política transformadora. Para tanto, destacamos como “eus” oprimidos são tornados submissos, mas também como de certas contingências podem emergir “eus” subversivos, que se opõem a um sistema social opressivo. Esse “eu” subversivo é caracterizado por um repertório de autoconhecimento mais amplo, que inclui a discriminação do papel das relações de poder e do controle promovido por instituições. Concluímos, com isso, que um “eu” socialmente constituído pode ser politicamente ativo. (shrink)

Recently, Brukner and Zeilinger 3354) have claimed that the Shannon information is not well defined as a measure of information in quantum mechanics, adducing arguments that seek to show that it is inextricably tied to classical notions of measurement. It is shown here that these arguments do not succeed: the Shannon information does not have problematic ties to classical concepts. In a further argument, Brukner and Zeilinger compare the Shannon information unfavourably to their preferred information measure, I , with regard (...) to the definition of a notion of “total information content.” This argument is found unconvincing and the relationship between individual measures of information and notions of “total information content” investigated. We close by considering the prospects of Zeilinger's Foundational Principle as a foundational principle for quantum mechanics. (shrink)

This note concerns a puzzle about probability which has recently caught the attention of a number of philosophers. According to the current philosophical consensus, the solution to the puzzle reveals that one can acquire new information, sufficient to change one's credences in certain events, just by having a certain experience, even though one knew all along that one would have an experience which felt exactly like this. I argue that the philosophical consensus is mistaken.

Lewis has argued that quasi-realism is fictionalism. Blackburn denies this, offering reasons which rely on a descriptive reading of quasi-realism. This note offers a different, more general argument against Lewis's claim, available to prescriptive as well as descriptive quasi-realists.

While music education practice has moved towards greater diversity, the philosophy of music education remains rather Western-centric, with limited scholars drawing on philosophical resources beyond the West. This is problematic, as a truly inclusive approach to music education ought to embrace multiple philosophical voices. In this paper, we examine a quartet of approaches (that is, world philosophy, multiculturalism, internationalization, and decolonization) that scholars in academic philosophy have used to tackle the lack of philosophical diversity and argue that they have limited (...) applicability to music education. We then forward what we term a “multi-philosophical” approach to music education, one that takes into consideration diverse philosophical sources regardless of their political, cultural, national, racial, gender, or any other divisional association. Through this approach, music education philosophy moves towards “boundarylessness” while maintaining, evolving, and affirming individual identities, with philosophia advancing from a “love of wisdom” to a “love of all wisdoms.”. (shrink)

In this article, I show that David Hume’s argument of Section 10 of the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding does not encourage dogmatism. Instead, it suggests a program for how to categorically deny the existence of miracles without bringing about the stagnation of science. In recognizing the entailments of Hume’s notion of proof while realizing his commitments regarding the laws of nature, we must acknowledge that miracles are possible. Yet this is consistent with Hume’s claim that we are never justified in (...) believing the testimony affirming them. This conclusion is strengthened when we realize that only a doxastic notion of lawlikeness is at work in Hume’s argument rather than a robust, efficacious notion of metaphysical laws. When properly understood, we see that the course he advocates does not impede the advances of science, as has sometimes been suggested. Instead, Hume’s deliberate use of specific examples of two very different sorts propounds a procedure for dealing with purported miracles that is much richer than merely denying them, and tells us when revisions to our conception of the laws of nature are necessary and when they are not. (shrink)

Although Sibawayh dealt with it in a scattered manner under different headings there have been different views on na't (adjective), which is gene-rally included in the tawabi group in Arabic syntax, and there have been debates around these views. Na't, which is categorized as a proper adjective and qualifies the meaning of man'ut (mawsuf), has different characteristics from the sentence elements that indicate the subject. Nahiv scholars have mostly divided na't into two parts: real and causal na't, and they have (...) formulated certain rules for these two parts in accordance with the structure of the Arabic language. Since na't and man'ut are accepted as nouns, the i'rab of na't is subject to men'ut. However, some examples in the Qur'an and some expressions used by the Arabs caused objections to the i'rab of na't being the same as men'ut. It is observed that these objected examples are the cases where men'ut is known and the exceptional cases of madih, zam and jarri jivar. It is also obligatory for the na't to conform to the man'ut in terms of ma'rifiyyah, nekiriyyah, custom and gender. While Sibawayh (d. 180/796) considered it qabh (ugly) for non-propositional words to be na't, scholars such as Ibn Hisham (d. 218/833), Ibn al-Ḥajib (d. 646/1249), and Abd ar-Rahman Jami (d. 898/1492) accepted that na't could be either propositional or non-propositional and cited many examples of na't in the case of non-propositional words. Scholars such as Ibn Jinni (d. 392/1002) and Ibn al-Hajib gave an explanation of the causative na't without naming it, scholars such as Ebu’l-Bekā al-Ukbari (d. 616/1219) analyzed the subject under the title of causative adjective or causative na't, and Halid b. Abdullah al-Azhari discussed it under the title of al-wasf al-majazi. The subject of our study is to examine the handling of na't, which is one of the sentence elements in the Arabic language, in the works written on the field, its parts, the dimension that affects the meaning and the controversial aspects. The aim of the research is to examine the rules that Sibawayh deals with in his al-Kitâb on na'ta and the objections of later Arab linguists to these rules, and to contribute to the field by revealing different views on the subject. (shrink)

This article shifts the emphasis away from debates on how to study the history of the Mediterranean. Instead, it examines the utopian perspectives that Mediterranean as a context and as a framework generates for artists and scholars. Arslan argues that the Mediterranean's _longue-durée_ history does not have to be thought of as a prison or a burden; rather, this history can provide new future visions. The article claims that artists can draw upon the Mediterranean's history to simultaneously resist against Western (...) imperialism and criticize discriminatory practices in their communities. Furthermore, recent works in Mediterranean studies can generate what the author calls a "disciplinary utopia," wherein critics can engage with theoretical issues without foregoing attention to the languages and historical contexts of the traditions they study. The Mediterranean is not solely a sea in which narratives are produced; it is also a context in which they can be reassessed. (shrink)