In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:How Old Are Modern Rights? On the Lockean Roots of Contemporary Human Rights DiscourseS. Adam SeagraveArguing for the proper placement of John Locke’s natural rights theory within intellectual history is a particularly high-stakes enterprise for historians of political thought and political theorists alike. This is due in large part to the fact that, as Brian Tierney notes in his recent study, it is “widely agreed that Locke’s work was (...) an important influence in the formation of modern liberal ideas, including ideas concerning rights.”1 Our understanding of Locke thus contributes to our reflective self-understanding as “modern liberals” (of one stripe or another) to an extent perhaps unequaled by any other thinker so far removed from our own time.As a result of the rare promise of studying Locke’s natural rights theory, there has been no shortage of scholarly attempts to determine its place in intellectual history on the basis of Locke’s own writings and their relation both to preceding and subsequent traditions and modes of thought. Although John Dunn had argued in his influential study that Locke’s political thought was too thoroughly steeped in theology to remain relevant in the contemporary context, this thesis has since been persuasively challenged (albeit in very different ways) by Simmons, Zuckert and Waldron, among others.2 Each of these scholars has contributed to an emerging agreement [End Page 305] that the thread of Locke’s natural rights theory may indeed be carried all the way up to current political and moral debates in some form or another. The precise length of this thread as it extends in the other historical direction has, however, remained a point of heated controversy. The scholarly literature on this issue may be broadly described in terms of a spectrum determined by two opposing emphases in understanding the relation of Locke’s natural rights theory to its medieval predecessors: a continuity emphasis and a discontinuity emphasis.On the discontinuity end of the spectrum stand those such as Michel Villey, Leo Strauss, C. B. Macpherson and, more recently, Michael Zuckert who argue for the existence of some sort of “Copernican moment” separating medieval natural rights theories from their modern counterparts.3 Whether this moment is identified with William of Ockham in the fourteenth century or Hobbes in the seventeenth century, these scholars tend to emphasize the distinctively “modern” character of Lockean natural rights theory and its significant departures from medieval modes of thought. According to many of the advocates of discontinuity, Lockean natural rights are not only “modern” in their political applications but also in their more profound meaning as foundations for morality, and particularly in their newly conceived relation to the concept of natural law.4The continuity end of the spectrum is, perhaps, more variegated, including scholars such as Tuck, Tierney, Tully, Oakley, Nederman, Coleman, and Swanson, among others.5 Despite their many important differences, [End Page 306] these scholars each focus upon the similarities between various elements or strains of medieval thought and modern natural rights theories rather than the differences between them. Insofar as the scholars on this end of the spectrum explicitly consider Locke’s natural rights theory, they tend to emphasize Locke’s intellectual debt to various preceding traditions and thinkers rather than his innovations upon them. Building explicitly upon the work of Tuck, Tierney and Tully, Janet Coleman finds “some extraordinarily Lockean moments” in the medieval thinkers John of Paris and Godefroid of Fontaines, and argues that Locke ought to be understood as contributing to this medieval tradition of thought rather than departing from it.6 Scott Swanson, in turn, builds upon Coleman’s scholarship in carefully connecting medieval understandings of the rights of subsistence and the principle of extreme necessity to Locke’s natural rights theory. Swanson initially goes even further than Coleman in asserting that “all of Locke’s celebrated doctrine is here [in John of Paris’s writings] offered in a nutshell” before concluding on the more moderate note, echoed by Cary Nederman, that Locke’s “application of natural rights of subsistence to politics” may indeed have been something “new under the sun.”7Brian Tierney, who has long been a prominent... (shrink)

Philosophers and social scientists largely agree that fake news is not just necessarily untruthful, but necessarily insincere: it’s produced either with the intention to deceive or an indifference toward its truth. Against this, I argue insincerity is neither a necessary nor obviously typical feature of fake news. The main argument proceeds in two stages. The first, methodological step develops classification criteria for identifying instances of fake news. By attending to expressed theoretical and practical interests, I observe how our classification practices (...) turn on worries about fake news’s unique political-epistemic risks. From this, I argue (i) theories of fake news should capture independent mechanisms that realise these risks and (ii) the manifestation of them suffices for classifying a news story as fake news. The second step applies the classification criteria to bad science journalism. I argue the systematic epistemic faults in bad science journalism manifest the same political-epistemic risks we see in fake news, which suffices to justify classifying it as fake news. But since such faults aren’t plausibly attributed to its propagators being insincere, insincerity doesn’t function independently as a mechanism for realising fake news’s political-epistemic risks. Thus, I conclude, we should exclude insincerity from our accounts of the phenomenon. (shrink)

We are often confronted with attempts to debunk our aesthetic tastes, like: “You only like jazz because you’re a pretentious hipster,” or, “Your love of the Western canon is just colonialism speaking.” Such debunking arguments often try to give a socio-historical accounting, intended to de-legitimize our tastes by showing that they arise from processes uninterested in real aesthetic value. One common version is the Art Populist debunk: that claims of aesthetic expertise in esoteric arts are really just elitist gatekeeping. Then (...) we have its mirror twin, the Art Expert debunk: that the populist love of simple arts serves the interests of profiteering entertainment corporations dispensing simplified slop. Suppose we accept one of these debunking argument. How are we supposed to got on? Are we supposed to not like the things we like, or force ourselves to choke down food we don’t enjoy? And suppose we accept both of these debunking arguments — what then? Are we supposed to simply give up our grip on beauty altogether? This is hard to imagine. Aesthetic debunking arguments have a harder time getting a grip on us, because aesthetic life involves a distinctively tight relationship between our felt aesthetic phenomena and our aesthetic judgments. Aesthetic life gives us phenomenal resistance to debunking arguments, when our felt loves lag behind our endorsed beliefs. I suggest a way through that offers a livable accommodation. We may be able to treat such debunking arguments, not as targeting the positive content of our taste, but as targeting the boundaries and limitations on our taste. That is, a Populist may not be able to debunk my deep felt love of opera, but they may be able to debunk my dismissal of dance-pop. In this case, we can take onboard both the Art Expert’s and the Art Populist’s debunking arguments, as targeting different varieties of narrowness and dismissal. These debunkings, then, move us, not towards aesthetic nihilism, but aesthetic expansionism. (shrink)

With the increasing prices of newly approved anti-cancer treatments contributing to rising healthcare costs, healthcare systems are facing complex economic and ethical dilemmas. Especially in countries with universal access and mandatory health insurance, including many European countries, the organizing of funding or reimbursement of expensive new treatments can be challenging. When expensive anti-cancer treatments are deemed safe and effective, but are not (yet) reimbursed, ethical dilemmas arise. In countries with universal healthcare systems, such as the Netherlands, this gives rise to (...) a rather new ethical dilemma: should patients be allowed to pay out of pocket, using private funds, for medical treatments? On the one hand, to allow patients to pay for treatments out of pocket would be in line with the medical-ethical principles of beneficence and autonomy. On the other hand, allowing patients to pay out of pocket for anti-cancer treatments may lead to unequal access to medical treatments and could be considered unfair to patients who are less well-off. Thus, it could undermine the values of equality and solidarity, on which the Dutch healthcare system is built. Furthermore, out-of-pocket payments could potentially lead to financial hardship and distress for patients, which would conflict with the principle of non-maleficence. Does this mean that patients can rightfully be denied access to approved but not (yet) reimbursed anti-cancer treatments? In this article, we will use the Dutch healthcare system, which is based on equal access and solidarity, as a case study to draw attention to this—currently relatively unknown and unresolved—dilemma and to clarify the values at stake. This article contributes to current discussions about the societal problem of rising healthcare costs by informing policymakers, healthcare professionals, and ethicists about the ethical dilemma of out-of-pocket payments in universal healthcare systems, and aims to support health authorities, policymakers and health professionals in developing policy for whether to allow out-of-pocket payment-based access to newly approved but (too) expensive anti-cancer treatments. (shrink)

This book describes a program of research in computable structure theory. The goal is to find definability conditions corresponding to bounds on complexity which persist under isomorphism. The results apply to familiar kinds of structures (groups, fields, vector spaces, linear orderings Boolean algebras, Abelian p-groups, models of arithmetic). There are many interesting results already, but there are also many natural questions still to be answered. The book is self-contained in that it includes necessary background material from recursion theory (ordinal notations, (...) the hyperarithmetical hierarchy) and model theory (infinitary formulas, consistency properties). (shrink)

In their simplest form, hybrid languages are propositional modal languages which can refer to states. They were introduced by Arthur Prior, the inventor of tense logic, and played an important role in his work: because they make reference to specific times possible, they remove the most serious obstacle to developing modal approaches to temporal representation and reasoning. However very little is known about the computational complexity of hybrid temporal logics.In this paper we analyze the complexity of the satisfiability problem of (...) a number of hybrid temporal logics: the basic hybrid language over transitive trees; nominal Until logic; and referential interval logic. We discuss the effects of including nominals, the @ operator, the somewhere modality E, and the difference operator D. Adding nominals to tense logic leads for several frame-classes to an increase in complexity of the satisfiability problem from PSPACE to EXPTIME. On transitive trees, however, the satisfiability problem for this language can be decided in PSPACE. Along the way we make a detour through hybrid propositional dynamic logic: we establish upper bounds for a number of temporal logics by generalizing results due to Passy and Tinchev [29] and De Giacomo [16]. We conclude with some remarks on the relevance of our results to description logic, and draw attention to the utility of the spypoint technique for proving upper and lower bounds. (shrink)

While music education practice has moved towards greater diversity, the philosophy of music education remains rather Western-centric, with limited scholars drawing on philosophical resources beyond the West. This is problematic, as a truly inclusive approach to music education ought to embrace multiple philosophical voices. In this paper, we examine a quartet of approaches (that is, world philosophy, multiculturalism, internationalization, and decolonization) that scholars in academic philosophy have used to tackle the lack of philosophical diversity and argue that they have limited (...) applicability to music education. We then forward what we term a “multi-philosophical” approach to music education, one that takes into consideration diverse philosophical sources regardless of their political, cultural, national, racial, gender, or any other divisional association. Through this approach, music education philosophy moves towards “boundarylessness” while maintaining, evolving, and affirming individual identities, with philosophia advancing from a “love of wisdom” to a “love of all wisdoms.”. (shrink)

Mind-body dualism conceptualizes mind and body as distinct, but there are different ways that dualism may be instantiated. In this study, we examined how Hierarchical Dualism (the belief that mind and body are distinct, and the mind is superior) and Mutual-Influence Dualism (the belief that mind and body are separate but interrelate) related to health behaviors and mental health in three student samples: exclusively queer, exclusively straight, and a mixed university subject pool (N = 535). Participants in each sample endorsed (...) Mutual-Influence Dualism at a higher rate than Hierarchical Dualism. Mutual-Influence dualism was consistently associated with greater engagement in health-promoting behaviors and greater well-being, whereas Hierarchical Dualism differed by sample. These results suggest that dualist beliefs do not uniformly shape the lives of those who hold them: rather, the relation between dualist beliefs and health differs as a function of the type of dualism and the identities we hold. (shrink)

In recent years there has been increasing concern about the various forms of abuse faced by birthing patients during labour and childbirth. Common examples include being scolded, slapped, pinched, stabbed with scissors or struck with a ruler or other instruments. This mistreatment is collectively termed obstetric violence.A growing body of literature examines legal responses to obstetric violence including the potential use of the criminal law. The present article explores whether, in South Africa, common-law crimes or statutory offences could be used (...) to prosecute healthcare workers for the range of harms falling within the broad definition of obstetric violence. It does not question whether criminal law is an appropriate response in this instance.The article concludes that existing crimes are sufficient to address obstetric violence. It is clear that the common-law crimes of crimen iniuria, assault, assault with intention to commit grievous bodily harm and the statutory offence of involuntary sterilisation, could be used to address both physical and emotional forms of obstetric violence. It is submitted that they cater adequately for the broad range of conduct that potentially falls into the definition of obstetric violence. Further research is required in this area and it may mean that prosecutorial guidelines are needed. (shrink)

Decisions are central to engineering processes and hold them together. It is argued that better decisions will lead to better engineering. To achieve better decisions requires that they be understood in detail. A typical decision is broken down into its essential requirements and processes, thus displaying the components of its framework. The process leads to the identification of a number of concerns. The components are discussed and a set of issues where more work needs to be done is identified. There (...) are significant implications for both engineering practice and engineering education. © 2013 © 2013 Taylor & Francis. (shrink)

BackgroundResuscitation and treatment of critically ill newborn infants is associated with relatively high mortality, morbidity and cost. Guidelines relating to resuscitation have traditionally focused on the best interests of infants. There are, however, limited resources available in the neonatal intensive care unit, meaning that difficult decisions sometimes need to be made. This study explores the intuitions of lay people regarding resource allocation decisions in the NICU.MethodsThe study design was a cross-sectional quantitative survey, consisting of 20 hypothetical rationing scenarios. There were (...) 119 respondents who entered the questionnaire, and 109 who completed it. The respondents were adult US and Indian participants of the online crowdsourcing platform Mechanical Turk. Respondents were asked to decide which of two infants to treat in a situation of scarce resources. Demographic characteristics, personality traits and political views were recorded. Respondents were also asked to respond to a widely cited thought experiment involving rationing.ResultsThe majority of respondents, in all except one scenario, chose the utilitarian option of directing treatment to the infant with the higher chance of survival, higher life expectancy, less severe disability, and less expensive treatment. As discrepancy between outcomes decreased, however, there was a statistically significant increase in egalitarian responses and decrease in utilitarian responses in scenarios involving chance of survival, life expectancy, and cost of treatment. In the classic ‘lifeboat’ scenario, all but two respondents were utilitarian.ConclusionsThis survey suggests that in situations of scarcity and equal clinical need, non-health professionals support rationing of life-saving treatment based on probability of survival, duration of survival, cost of treatment or quality of life. However, where the difference in prognosis or cost is very small, non-health professionals preferred to give infants an equal chance of receiving treatment. (shrink)

In a 1998 article, Bohman argued that the contemporary deliberative turn in democratic theory had reached its ‘coming of age’, as deliberative democrats began to show greater interest in the institutionalization of their proposal. Moreover, Bohman referred to this growing interest with an expression that was unprecedented at the time: ‘deliberative constitutionalism’. At present, deliberative constitutionalism has become one of the most original and relevant contemporary proposals. In this context, my article proceeds as follows. I begin by arguing that the (...) contemporary deliberative turn in democratic theory also gave rise to a deliberative turn in constitutionalism—that is, a trend aimed at orienting constitutionalism and judicial review towards democratic deliberation. Next, I argue that, at that embryonic yet promising stage, deliberative constitutionalism had shortcomings that hindered the aim assumed since its origins. Finally, I argue that, over recent decades, these shortcomings have been finessed, which shows that deliberative constitutionalism has also reached its coming of age. (shrink)

This article aims to trace Plato’s thought in Berkeley’s idealism, which emerges from the statement “to be is to be perceived.” In doing so, rather than comparing the views of both thinkers, the focus will be on how Berkeley reads Plato. In this context, it is aimed to present a general presentation of Berkeley’s system of thought, on the one hand, abstract ideas and criticism of materialism, and on the other hand, to determine whether Berkeley’s writing style, especially in the (...) form of dialogue, and his idealism are in contact with Plato’s ideas. In conclusion, a general, though not exhaustive, evaluation of the literature on the connection between Berkeley’s and Plato’s views will be made, and an attempt will be made to answer the question ‘Berkeley’s Plato or Platonism?’ and ‘What would Plato have said if he had read Berkeley?’. (shrink)

In the context of the agroecological transition, the ability of alternative ways of farming to develop themselves in the long run without being co-opted by mainstream input intensive agriculture is essential. Biodynamic farming (BF), which began a century ago in 1924, was one of the first alternatives to modern agriculture, associated with specific agricultural practices, worldview and human-nature relationships. Over the last 100 years, BF has developed worldwide in a context of growing industrialization, without becoming industrialized itself, and it is (...) still considered today as a radically alternative way of farming. To better understand the resistance of BF, this paper provides an overview of its history, with particular emphasis on its complex relationships with the broader organic agriculture (OA) movement. Three overlapping historical stages are distinguished: (1) _Agronomic consolidation stage_: from Rudolf Steiner’s agricultural courses to the first “Agricultural Experimental Circle”, the creation of the Demeter label and the emergence of OA (first half of 20th century); (2) _Institutionalization stage;_ Initially, BF was coevolving closely with the growing OA movement, but then the differentiation between both progressively increased. Meanwhile the first collaborations with academic research institutes were initiated; (3) _Expansion stage_: With growing commercialization opportunities for biodynamic products, the 21st century corresponds to a stage of economic development for BF and a new wave of geographic expansion in every continent. In the final section of the paper, the implications for sustainability transformations are discussed. Particularly, it is argued that the ability of BF to combine strategies of agronomic consolidation, institutionalization and expansion over time could be the key to its resilience. The complementarities between BF and other alternative ways of farming might play an important role in future evolutions. (shrink)

Theories of truth and vagueness are closely connected; in this article, I draw another connection between these areas of research. Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth is converted into an approach to vagueness. I show how revision sequences from a general theory of definitions can be used to understand the nature of vague predicates. The revision sequences show how the meaning of vague predicates are interconnected with each other. The approach is contrasted with the similar supervaluationist approach.

In “Aristotle, Empedocles, and the Unity of All Things,” Michael Shaw has provided a novel and intriguing account of Empedocles’ cosmology, wherein he attempts to outline a few ways in which interpreters (beginning with Aristotle) have failed to capture fully Empedocles’ most important ideas. Central to Shaw’s account of Empedoclean cosmology is a distinctive interpretation of the life cycle of the cosmos that presupposes that the four elements that make up everything and the twin forces that govern them—Love and Strife—interact (...) in ways quite different than often is supposed. The upshot of this is that Shaw thinks Empedocles’ theory may not fall prey to the Aristotelian critiques designed to undermine it because they are based on a misunderstanding of his actual view. While I am sympathetic to his impulse to defend Empedocles against Aristotle’s attacks, I am not convinced that Shaw’s reading should be widely adopted, both because I highly doubt that the depiction of Empedoclean cosmology developed by Shaw is Empedocles’ own and because I think the traditional interpretation of Empedocles’ cosmology fares better against Aristotelian critiques than Shaw’s interpretation of it does. Such are the contentions I intend to show in what follows. (shrink)

An updated collection of essays on the European cultural history of the period 950-1150, with new research and analysis, updated notes, several excursus and appendices, a comprehensive and updated bibliography, and an index.

In this clear, straightforward introduction to Foucault's thought, Prado focuses on "Discipline and Punish" and the first volume of "The History of Sexuality, " in which Foucault most clearly comes to grips with the historicization of truth and knowledge and the formation of subjectivity. This sympathetic but critical introduction is especially suited for readers more familiar with Anglo-American philosophy than with Continental.

We extend results of Harizanov and Barker. For a relation R on a recursive structure /oA, we give conditions guaranteeing that the image of R in a recursive copy of /oA can be made to have arbitrary ∑α0 degree over Δα0. We give stronger conditions under which the image of R can be made ∑α0 degree as well. The degrees over Δα0 can be replaced by certain more general classes. We also generalize the Friedberg-Muchnik Theorem, giving conditions on a pair (...) of relations R and S under which the images of R and S can be made ∑α0 and independent over Δα0 in a recursive copy of /oA. (shrink)

Let be a recursive structure, and let R be a recursive relation on . Harizanov isolated a syntactical condition which is necessary and sufficient for to have recursive copies in which the image of R is r.e. of arbitrary r.e. degree. We had conjectured that a certain extension of Harizanov's syntactical condition would be necessary and sufficient for to have recursive copies in which the image of R is ∑α0 of arbitrary ∑α0 degree, but this is not the case. Here (...) we give examples illustrating some restrictions on the possible ∑α0 degrees. In these examples, the image of R cannot be ∑α0 of degree d unless d possesses an “α-table”. (shrink)

It is now commonly accepted that N. Goodman's predicate "grue" presents the theory of confirmation of C. G. Hempel (and other such theories) with grave difficulties. The precise nature and status of these "difficulties" has, however, never been made clear. In this paper it is argued that it is very unlikely that "grue" raises any formal difficulties for Hempel and appearances to the contrary are examined, rejected and an explanation of their intuitive appeal offered. However "grue" is shown to raise (...) an informal, "over-arching" difficulty of great magnitude for all theories of confirmation, including Hempel's theory. (shrink)

In this paper I present a range of substructural logics for a conditional connective ↦. This connective was original introduced semantically via restriction on the ternary accessibility relation R for a relevant conditional. I give sound and complete proof systems for a number of variations of this semantic definition. The completeness result in this paper proceeds by step-by-step improvements of models, rather than by the one-step canonical model method. This gradual technique allows for the additional control, lacking in the canonical (...) model method, that is required. (shrink)

Contemporary issues such as euthanasia, surrogate motherhood, organ transplantation and gene therapy, which occupy the minds of ethicists in the industrialized countries are, for the moment, irrelevant in most developing countries. There, the ethics of scarcity, sacrifice, cross-cultural research, as well as the activities of multinational companies, are germane. In this article, only the ethics of scarcity and sacrifice will be discussed. Structural adjustment programmes, designed to solve the economic problems of the developing countries, muddied the waters. The dilemma confronting (...) practitioners in developing countries is how to adhere to the basic principles of medical ethics in an atmosphere of hunger, poverty, war and ever-shrinking and often non-existent resources. Nowhere else in the world is the true meaning of scarcity portrayed as vividly as in the developing countries. Consequently, the doctor's clinical freedom may have to be sacrificed by the introduction of an essential drugs list and practice guidelines. The principle of greater good, while appealing, must be carefully interpreted and applied in the developing countries. Thus, while health promotion and disease prevention must be the primary focus, health planners should avoid pushing prevention at the expense of those currently sick. Health care reform in developing countries must not merely re-echo what is being done in the industrialized countries, but must respond to societal needs and be relevant to the community in question. (shrink)