Forgiveness has traditionally been characterized an affective response to a wrongdoing, i.e. a psychological process that involves ridding oneself of resentment or other negative reactive attitudes. In contrast to the prevailing model, this paper advocates for the emerging position that forgiveness should be understood as a normative power akin to a promise. In particular, I argue that forgiveness involves surrendering the right to discount the interests of a perpetrator (a special permission the victim acquires in virtue of having been wronged). (...) I argue that this model fits and/or explains important features of forgiveness, such as the idea that forgiveness is a personal response to a blameworthy wrong, that forgiveness re-establishes a relation of equality, and that forgiveness is ‘normatively significant’. I further develop the position by showing how it can provide a unified case of paradigmatic forgiveness, self-forgiveness, and third-party forgiveness—this explanatory power distinguishes the view from previous articulations of the idea that forgiveness is a normative power. The final section further explores these distinctions by delimiting the scope of forgiveness to exclude powers related to apologies, compensation, or ‘redemption’. (shrink)

There is a need to explore educational strategies that translate ethics knowledge into ethical behavior. Commonly used pedagogical approaches steeped in traditional normative ethical theory are less powerful than sensemaking in preparing clinicians to respond to ethical problems in practice. This integrative review of 15 articles explores the use of sensemaking as an instructional method for clinical ethics. Whittemore and Knafl’s :546–553, 2005) integrative review method guided a systematic appraisal of data from both qualitative and quantitative research traditions, synthesizing disparate (...) studies in analyzing literature about the use of sensemaking as a pedagogical approach in teaching ethics. Findings supported the use of Weick’s sensemaking theory to develop instructional methods that encourage ethical decision making in students as well as promote ethical response by health care providers. The review reveals important theoretical and training implications for introducing sensemaking as a means to promote ethical action in clinical practice. (shrink)

At the outset of the Republic, Polemarchus advances the bold thesis that “justice is the art which gives benefit to friends and injury to enemies”. He quickly rejects the hypothesis, and what follows is a long tradition of neglecting the ethics of enmity. The parallel issue of how friendship affects the moral sphere has, by contrast, been greatly illuminated by discussions both ancient and contemporary. This article connects this existing work to the less explored topic of the normative significance of (...) our negative relationships. I explain how negative partiality should be conceptualized through reference to the positive analogue, and argue that at least some forms of negative partiality are justified. I further explore the connection between positive and negative relationships by showing how both are justified by ongoing histories of encounter. However, I also argue that these relationships are in some important ways asymmetrical. (shrink)

Die Vorlesung zur Anthropologie oder Menschenkunden, die Kant jeweils im Wintersemester 1772/73 bis 1795/96 hielt, sollte den Studenten zur Orientierung in ihren künftigen Welterfahrungen außerhalb der Universität dienen. Sie ist außerhalb seines eigenen philosophischen Systems angesiedelt und nicht als Philosophie geführt worden. Trotzdem gibt es sowohl in den Vorlesungsnachschriften als auch in dem 1798 von Kant herausgegebenen Buch Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht vielfache Beziehungen zur eigenen Philosophie Kants; in dieser wird jedoch nie eindeutig auf die pragmatische Anthropologie Bezug genommen noch (...) kommen in dieser letzteren die Begriffe "Imperativ", "kategorisch", "transzendentalphilosophisch" vor. Der Kommentar sucht das spannungsreiche Verhältnis der erhaltenen Kantischen Handschrift zum gedruckten Buch zu klären; es werden die werkimmanenten Verknüpfungen herausgearbeitet, Verbindungen zu anderen Kantischen Schriften angezeigt und Quellen und thematische Parallelentwicklungen in der europäischen Literatur erörtert. (shrink)

This article explores the collaborative research of the Nobel laureate Hans Spemann (1869–1941) and the Swiss zoologist Fritz Baltzer (1884–1974) on problems at the intersection of development and heredity and raises more general questions concerning science and politics in Germany in the interwar period. It argues that Spemann and Baltzer’s collaborative work made a significant contribution to the then ongoing debates about the relation between developmental physiology and hereditary studies, although Spemann distanced himself from _Drosophila_ genetics because of his anti-reductionist (...) position. The article analyzes how Spemann framed the issues of heredity in terms of an epigenetic principle in the context of his work on the “organizer,” and it explores the experimental dynamics of research on newt merogones carried out by Baltzer in a methodological development of Spemann’s constriction experiments. Finally, these research attempts are discussed as part of a broader “prehistory” of the mid-twentieth century cell nuclear transplantation experiments, which provided the basis for later animal cloning. (shrink)

Den danske filosof Frithiof Brandts doktorafhandling blev udarbejdet i Paris og færdiggjort i 1921, hvorefter han blev professor i filosofi. Den tager udgangspunkt i den engelske filosof Thomas Hobbes hovedtanke om 'bevægelse' som naturens grundfænomen. Brandt leverer i sin bog en grundig gennemgang af Hobbes' ide. Desuden rummer bogen argumenter for Hobbes' autonomi i forhold til tidligere betydningsfulde tænkere som Galilei og Descartes. Frithiof Brandt (1892-1968) var en dansk filosof og forfatter. Han beskæftigede sig i løbet af sin (...) karriere både med filosofi og psykologi. Han udgav blandt andet bøger om Hobbes og Kirkegaard - filosoffer, der på hver deres måde, havde afgørende indflydelse på hans egen tænkning. (shrink)

Richard Brandt is one of the most eminent and influential of contemporary moral philosophers. His work has been concerned with how to justify what is good or right not by reliance on intuitions or theories about what moral words mean but by the explanation of moral psychology and the description of what it is to value something, or to think it immoral. His approach thus stands in marked contrast to the influential theories of John Rawls. The essays reprinted in (...) this collection span a period of almost 30 years and include many classic pieces in metaethical and normative ethical theory. The collection is aimed at both those moral philosophers familiar with Brandt's work and at those philosophers who may be largely unfamiliar with his work. The latter group will be struck by the lucid unpretentious style and the cumulative weight of Brandt's contributions to topics that remain at the forefront of moral philosophy. (shrink)

Der Streit der Fakultäten (von 1798) stellt den Antagonismus der drei oberen Fakultäten (Theologie, Jurisprudenz, Medizin) und der unteren Philosophischen Fakultät dar. Die Streitfragen sind Probleme der praktischen, nicht der theoretischen Vernunft; die in ihrer Wahrheitssuche freie Philosophie konfrontiert die oberen Interessen-Fakultäten, die unter der inhaltlichen Direktive der Regierung spätere Beamte ausbilden, erstens mit der autonomen Moral (gegen den äußerlichen Buchglauben der Theologen), zweitens mit der autonomen Republik der Französischen Revolution (gegen die Fremdbestimmung durch die von den Juristen unterstützten Despoten) (...) und drittens mit der Diätetik (gegen die äußerliche pharmakologische und chirurgische Medizin). Die Universität hat ihr vereinigendes Zentrum in dieser dreifachen kritischen Auseinandersetzung, sie läßt sich als ein Realsystem der praktischen Metaphysik fassen. Heideggers Rektoratsrede bildet den Gegenpol zur liberalen Kultur der Auseinandersetzung bei Kant; sie ist nicht nur Reflex der Machtergreifung der Nationalsozialisten von 1933, sondern verdankt einen wesentlichen Impuls der Spätphilosophie Friedrich Schlegels. Die Selbstbehauptung der Universität kündet von der lebendigen Einheit der völkischen Universität und stellt deren Selbstbejahung gegen den Verneinungsgeist der üblichen Wissenschaften. Die geltenden sittlichen Maßstäbe werden in der neuen Lebens- und Wesenseinheit außer Kraft gesetzt. (shrink)

Scholars of ethics, and of human behavior more generally, will find this book consistently stimulating and rewarding.

Sophisticated arguments advanced by Harry Silverstein, David Boonin, and Jeff McMahan attempt to show that being responsible for an individual's existence need not result in an obligation to ensure that the needs of that individual are satisfied. While these arguments take place within the abortion debate, by extension they threaten causal accounts of procreative responsibility more generally. In this article, I defend causal accounts of procreative responsibility by showing that these arguments do not succeed, but without thereby undermining the permissibility (...) of abortion. Further, while being causally involved in the existence of a person is not sufficient for acquiring procreative responsibilities, I argue that there is an especially strong case for ascribing such responsibilities to gamete donors. (shrink)

In clinical practice, evidence suggests that teaching ethics using normative ethical theory has little influence on the ethical actions of providers in practice. Thus, new training methods are needed that improve clinician response to ethical problems. A sensemaking approach to ethics training has demonstrated promise as an evidence-based pedagogical method to improve ethical reasoning and response. Project ECHO is theoretically linked to improved sensemaking. This study examines the effectiveness of ECHO and training in use of sensemaking approaches to ethical response (...) by clinicians. A quasi-experimental design study using univariate linear regression was used to examine the effect of the three types of ethics training on ethical response self-efficacy scores, while controlling for participant characteristics of years in practice, discipline and sex. We found evidence that training in sensemaking through participation in ECHO promotes improved ethical response self-efficacy of clinicians. However, results also suggest that a traditional ECHO format that does not explicitly introduce sensemaking strategies into the training does not result in the same learning outcomes as measured through an ethical response self-efficacy survey. This study found important preliminary results to support use of sensemaking approaches in clinical ethics training. (shrink)

Reuven Brandt on anonymity and mitochondrial donation.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Significant Interests and the Right to KnowReuven Brandt (bio)1. IntroductionDaniel Groll's book Conceiving People (2021) attempts a novel and insightful defence of why individuals ought to choose open over anonymous gamete donation, barring any special circumstances. In broad strokes, the overall argument proceeds by defending three main claims: (1) that failing to disclose to children that they are donor-conceived is morally problematic, (2) that children who are informed (...) that they are donor-conceived (either intentionally by their social parents or otherwise) are likely to have a worthwhile, significant, subjective interest1 in having knowledge about their gamete donor(s), and (3) that parents have a duty to advance their children's worthwhile subjective significant interests. Groll's account departs from other criticisms of anonymous gamete donation in that it does not rest on the view that knowledge about one's genetic progenitors is essential to self-knowledge, identity formation, or other elements of wellbeing for creatures like us. The view thus attempts to avoid the pitfalls plaguing other criticisms of anonymous gamete donation, which tend to rely on controversial (and likely false) claims of genetic essentialism and/or genetic exceptionalism.Groll's thesis rests on the much more modest (and likely correct) claim that seeking information about one's genetic progenitors is one of many permissible, fruitful, and valuable routes to identity formation. According to Groll, it just so happens that a large portion of donor-conceived individuals aware of the absence of biological ties to one or more social parents choose this route to identity formation. And this empirical fact combined with plausible views about parents' obligations to promote their offspring's wellbeing gives prospective pro-creators strong reason to choose open donors over anonymous donors.Although many aspects of the picture Groll paints are attractive, I remain unconvinced that the overall argument succeeds. My criticism of the argument is multipronged. I am skeptical that failing to disclose to a child that they were donor-conceived and/or failing to disclose information to a child that they are [End Page 201] likely to find important violates the parental duty to build intimate relationships with one's offspring. This shifts the force of Groll's argument to the empirical claim that donor-conceived children are likely to have a significant subjective interest in knowing information about their biological relations. As I will show, the empirical evidence for this claim is not as strong as Groll presumes. In the absence of a deontic argument for disclosure, Groll must provide more robust empirical evidence that anonymous gamete donation is likely to result in off-spring with their weighty interests frustrated, or else argue that the risk is not worth taking. These are not fatal flaws but show that more empirical and normative work needs to be done to defend this line of argument.A more serious set of worries arise in response to Groll's claim that the interest that donor-conceived individuals have in genetic information is likely to be significant. Little is said about what constitutes a significant interest, except that interests fall along a linear spectrum and that the significance of an interest is a factor of "the space, so to speak, it takes up in a person's mental economy (do they think about it a lot?) and the extent to which they organize their lives around it" (2021, 63). My worries here are three-fold. First, it is unclear whether the empirical data support the claim that donor-conceived individuals are likely to have an interest in genetic knowledge that is significant in the sense that it occupies a large portion of their mental energy and is a locus around which they organize their lives. Second, there is scant discussion about whether an interest can become morally problematic (and so no longer worthwhile on Groll's account) if it is given too much weight. I will argue that a plausible reading of Groll's account requires that we treat overvalued interests as no longer worthwhile. Consequently, Groll's argument risks presuming the kind of genetic chauvinism—the view that genetic knowledge is essential to wellbeing—that he seeks to reject. Third, if... (shrink)

The article explains a rule-Utilitarian normative thesis about when actions are morally excused; that an act otherwise morally objectionable in some way is excused if a moral system, The acceptance of which in the agent's society would be utility-Maximizing, Would not condemn it. What is meant by a "moral system condemning" an action is explained. The parallel between this moral thesis and the benthamite theory of criminal justice is developed. It is argued that this rule-Utilitarian thesis implies that an action (...) is morally excused (not blameworthy) if it does not manifest a defective trait of character. (shrink)

Søren Kierkegaard is well-known as an original philosophical thinker, but less known is his reliance upon and development of the Christian tradition of the Seven Deadly Sins, in particular the vice of acedia, or sloth. As acedia has enjoyed renewed interest in the past century or so, commentators have attempted to pin down one or another Kierkegaardian concept (e.g., despair, heavy-mindedness, boredom, etc.) as the embodiment of the vice, but these attempts have yet to achieve any consensus. In our estimation, (...) the complicated reality is that, in using slightly different but related concepts, Kierkegaard is providing a unique look at acedia as it manifests differently at different stages on life’s way. Thus, on this “perspectival account”, acedia will manifest differently according to whether an individual inhabits the aesthetic, ethical, or religious sphere. We propose two axes for this perspectival account. Such descriptions of how acedia manifests make up the first, phenomenal axis, while the second, evaluative axis, accounts for the various bits of advice and wisdom we read in the diagnoses of acedia from one Kierkegaardian pseudonym to another. Our aim is to show that Kierkegaard was not only familiar with the concept of acedia, but his contributions helped to develop and extend the tradition. (shrink)

This chapter discusses reasons why we have no prospect of knowing whether or not matter thinks. It focuses on the mechanist hypothesis, its purported explanatory scope, and John Locke's commitment to it. The chapter then demonstrates God's immateriality and its implications for the possibility that God has given perception and thought to some material things. It addresses the notion of divine superaddition elaborated in letters to Stillingfleet and considers how thinking, extension, solidity, and motion are connected in case they do (...) coexist in the same substance. The whole difference between Locke and his opponents on the epistemic possibility of thinking matter comes down to this. He maintains, and they deny, that we know the fixed nature of substances of various kinds, a constituent of a substance that determines the powers it necessarily has and those it necessarily lacks. (shrink)

One area in which the moral philosopher might say something useful for the thinking of economists is that of welfare economics – not by improving formalizations or criticizing proofs as to conditions necessary or sufficient for an optimum situation, much less by suggesting what particular state of society would be optimal. Rather, he can do this by pointing out some distinctions, by suggesting how some terms used by economists can profitably be defined, and by questioning some assumptions which seem to (...) lie behind the thinking of some economists. The following discussion is aimed along these lines. The main goal of the argument will be to produce helpful definitions of “increase the welfare of an individual” and “increase social welfare.”. (shrink)