In this article I examine the role of anxiety in our motivation to reassess our epistemic states, by taking as a starting point a proposal put forward by Levy, according to which anxiety is responsible for the ruminations and worries about threatening possibilities that we sometimes get caught up into in our everyday life. Levy’s claim is that these irrational persistent thoughts about possible states of affairs are best explained by anxiety, rather than by beliefs, degrees of belief, or other (...) mental states. I will take Levy’s article as a starting point into my study of the role of anxiety in our inclinations to question the epistemic quality of our cognitive states. While I believe that Levy is right in directing our attention to the role of anxiety in these cases, his claim calls for further explanation into the nature of anxiety, and into the mechanisms through which anxiety generates these doubts. Although the relation between anxiety and doubt has already been highlighted, there has been little effort to elaborate on the mechanisms through which an affective state like anxiety generates a motivation to reassess our beliefs. This paper is an attempt at providing such an elaboration. Clarifying the role of anxiety in these phenomena will lead me to revise a common assumption about the interactions between anxiety and higher-level cognitive processes, such as the ones involved in representing hypothetical threatening scenarios through mental imagery. (shrink)

For creatures like us, entertaining possible future scenarios of how our life might play out is often accompanied or “charged” with emotions like hope and anxiety. What will interest me in this article is whether the epistemic profile of hope and anxiety, and in particular the fact that they are directed at uncertain outcomes, might pose a threat to the stability of their valence. Hope and anxiety are not emotions which relate us to evaluative properties of actual events, they relate (...) us to evaluative properties of relevant possibilities (Gordon, 1969; Kurth, 2018; Benton, 2019). I will present and discuss two philosophical accounts according to which hope and anxiety do not have a proprietary and consistent valence. According to the first account, anxiety is an intrinsically ambivalent emotion, as a result of involving an awareness of conflicting possibilities or ways in which the future might unfold (Miceli and Castelfranchi, 2015). According to the second, hope is not a strictly positive emotion, as certain specific occurrences of hope are negatively valenced (Stockdale, 2019). Finally, I argue that an evaluative theory of valence helps us clearly conceive of hope and anxiety as two polar opposite experiences of uncertainty. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction Juliette Kennedy and Roman Kossak; 2. Historical remarks on Suslin's problem Akihiro Kanamori; 3. The continuum hypothesis, the generic-multiverse of sets, and the [OMEGA] conjecture W. Hugh Woodin; 4. [omega]-Models of finite set theory Ali Enayat, James H. Schmerl and Albert Visser; 5. Tennenbaum's theorem for models of arithmetic Richard Kaye; 6. Hierarchies of subsystems of weak arithmetic Shahram Mohsenipour; 7. Diophantine correct open induction Sidney Raffer; 8. Tennenbaum's theorem and recursive reducts James (...) H. Schmerl; 9. History of constructivism in the 20th century A. S. Troelstra; 10. A very short history of ultrafinitism Rose M. Cherubin and Mirco A. Mannucci; 11. Sue Toledo's notes of her conversations with Gödel in 1972-1975 Sue Toledo; 12. Stanley Tennenbaum's Socrates Curtis Franks; 13. Tennenbaum's proof of the irrationality of [the square root of] 2́. (shrink)

We ask, when is a property of a model a logical property? According to the so-called Tarski–Sher criterion this is the case when the property is preserved by isomorphisms. We relate this to model-theoretic characteristics of abstract logics in which the model class is definable. This results in a graded concept of logicality in the terminology of Sagi [46]. We investigate which characteristics of logics, such as variants of the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem, Completeness theorem, and absoluteness, are relevant from the logicality (...) point of view, continuing earlier work by Bonnay, Feferman, and Sagi. We suggest that a logic is the more logical the closer it is to first order logic. We also offer a refinement of the result of McGee that logical properties of models can be expressed in $L_{\infty \infty }$ if the expression is allowed to depend on the cardinality of the model, based on replacing $L_{\infty \infty }$ by a “tamer” logic. (shrink)

What is the use of trying to describe a philosophy as ‘materialistic’ or ‘idealistic’? Why multiply the species of each genus? We have ‘subjective’, ‘absolute’, and ‘objective’ idealism, ‘mechanistic’ and ‘dialectical’ materialism, to which we must now add ‘uncertain’ or ‘random’ materialism. Must we worry if a philosophy belongs to this or that ‘trend’, ‘current’, or ‘tradition’? We find ourselves asking all these types of questions when reading Louis Althusser’s later work, in which he appears to have devoted some effort (...) to developing the idea of an “underground” or “subterranean” trend in philosophy. After some hesitation, he termed this “materialism of the encounter” or “uncertain materialism,” which I will refer to hereafter in abbreviated form as UM. (shrink)

Is mathematics 'entangled' with its various formalisations? Or are the central concepts of mathematics largely insensitive to formalisation, or 'formalism free'? What is the semantic point of view and how is it implemented in foundational practice? Does a given semantic framework always have an implicit syntax? Inspired by what she calls the 'natural language moves' of Gödel and Tarski, Juliette Kennedy considers what roles the concepts of 'entanglement' and 'formalism freeness' play in a range of logical settings, from computability (...) and set theory to model theory and second order logic, to logicality, developing an entirely original philosophy of mathematics along the way. The treatment is historically, logically and set-theoretically rich, and topics such as naturalism and foundations receive their due, but now with a new twist. (shrink)

Emotions might contribute to our being rational cognitive agents. Anxiety – and more specifically epistemic anxiety – provides an especially interesting case study into the role of emotion for adaptive cognition. In this paper, I aim at clarifying the epistemic contribution of anxiety, and the role that ill-calibrated anxiety might play in maladaptive epistemic activities which can be observed in psychopathology. In particular, I argue that this emotion contributes to our ability to adapt our cognitive efforts to how we represent (...) the practical factors relevant to the task at hand, by sig- naling the need for increased cognitive processing and evidence gathering in high- stakes situations. I hypothesize that dysfunctional or ill-calibrated epistemic anxiety might play an important role in the motivation driving persons with obsessive- compulsive disorder (OCD) to invest high amounts of cognitive resources into the resolution of apparently simple and innocuous questions. As I argue, OCD might be conceived as a case in which epistemic anxiety is inappropriately elicited, represent- ing these as high-stakes questions, and inadequately signaling a need for cognition. In this paper, I thus make use of the concept of (epistemic) anxiety as developed in the philosophy of emotion and in epistemology, to propose an account of the role of anxiety in the pathological doubt that is central to obsessive-compulsive disorder. (shrink)

If the object of Althusser’s main theoretical work was Marx’s historical materialism, the form this work took was philosophy. Philosophy was his most important object. His reflections focused on the question of the existence of a Marxist philosophy, on philosophy as practice, the practice of philosophy and its role in ideological and political class struggles. This article sets out to understand how what is somewhat improperly called Althusser’s ‘last’ philosophy, the materialism of the encounter or aleatory materialism, is the philosophy (...) that renounces the dominant form of philosophy to take the form of what I would call a counter-philosophy. (shrink)

La tradition sociologique a habituellement considéré la mobilité, qu’elle soit sociale ou spatiale, comme le déplacement entre des positions établies, l’essentiel étant d’analyser le système formé par ces positions. On trouve cependant, dans la sociologie même, les moyens pour élargir cette perspective. Des travaux sur la mobilité sociale, on tire une interrogation sur l’accès aux ressources qui prend en compte diverses formes de mobilité. Simmel développe l’analyse du rôle de la proximité et de la distance dans la construction du social. (...) Des travaux contemporains qui portent sur les déplacements ou sur la télématique s’inscrivent dans la même perspective. Tocqueville introduit la notion d’une mobilité individuelle, notamment spatiale, consommatoire, et qui n’a d’autre objectif qu’elle-même. Ces trois orientations permettent à la sociologie de contribuer à une théorie de la mobilité généralisée, qui croise l’interrogation sur la modernité.Sociological tradition used to consider mobility – whether social or spatial – as a movement from an established position to another, but it put more emphasis on the positions system than on the movement itself. Yet sociology itself provides the means to widen the scope. Studies on social mobility have eventually resulted in the larger problématique of resource acquisition involving various forms of mobility. Simmel developed an in-depth analysis of the influence of presence vs absence in the set up of social relationships, interrelated with current studies dealing with movements and telematics. Earlier Tocqueville had introduced the concept of individual mobility, notably spatial, consumption-focussed, and with a life of its own ; which eventually resulted in the philosophy of self-reference. These three orientations enable sociology to contribute to a theory of generalized mobility intersecting with the questioning on modernity. (shrink)

Rousseau avait tout lieu, dans la controverse qui oppose au xviii e siècle partisans et pourfendeurs des voyages d’éducation, de prendre position contre ces voyages, suivant en cela les déclarations de Béat de Muralt, qu’il approuvait dans une large mesure. Nous constatons pourtant qu’en abordant « la question des voyages », l’auteur de l’Émile se voit obligé, tout en condamnant cette « mode », à la manière de Muralt, d’opérer un glissement théorique et de conférer à l’expérience du voyage, comme (...) expérience critique de la pluralité et de la liberté, une place essentielle dans son système, place rendue nécessaire par sa théorie des affects politiques. (shrink)

This study aimed at providing evidence that prior knowledge and its organization prompted either through pictures alone, pictures and associated words, words only have different impacts on several components of text produced by fourth graders. The results showed that the semantic relatedness affected three dependent measures: prompt words recalled, coherence and quality of texts. The nature of the prompts impacted on planning and translating processes. Findings, instructional applications, limitations, and proposals for future research are discussed.

The motivations of jihadist suicide attacks seem incomprehensible. However, numerous testimonies indicate that their death as martyrs is their only way to access paradise and its wondrous promises. Martyrdom appears as an option for those who feel a deep resentment and know themselves incapable of being “good Muslims” during their whole earthly life. René Girard, who was interested in this phenomenon (especially in his last book Battling to the End) provides us with some key elements to understand what we will (...) call a neo-pascalian wager undifferentiating selfsacrifice and the sacrifice of others. (shrink)

La nature, l'environnement sont au centre des préoccupations de tous, mais peinent à entrer dans le discours politique sous une forme cohérente. Mouvement contestataire et libertaire - particulièrement en France - l'écologie politique manque de bases théoriques, préfère les déclarations d'éthique au travail législatif, met en doute l'efficience des institutions et dénonce parfois de manière irréaliste la technique, les sciences, l'industrie. Ce livre intègre la dimension écologique à la philosophie politique moderne et particulièrement à un républicanisme rénové. La protection de (...) la nature comme "Bien commun" y est considérée comme le nouveau visage du " Bien public". En annexe, l'auteur propose quelques idées concrètes. (shrink)

I hold up my hand and I count five fingers. I take it on faith that the mapping from fingers onto numbers is recursive in the sense of the mathematician’s definition of the informal concept, “human calculability following a fixed routine.” I cannot prove the mapping is recursive—there is nothing to prove! Of course, mathematicians can prove many theorems about recursiveness, moving forward, so to speak, once the definition of the concept “recursive” has been isolated. Moving backwards is more difficult (...) and this is as it should be: for how can one possibly hope to prove that a mathematical definition captures an informal concept? This paper is about just that one word, capture, or more precisely the rela- tion “x captures y,” and the question, if y is taken to be computability, definabil- ity or provability, does there exist an adequate and unique choice of x? (shrink)

Qu'est-ce qui fonde la souveraineté? De quand date-t-elle? Quelle était sa place dans les régimes politiques antérieurs à la Révolution française? Pour répondre à ces questions, un économiste laïque, Jacques Sapir, et un philosophe dominicain, Bernard Bourdin, se confrontent. Quand le premier évoque les fondements du pouvoir à Athènes, dans la Rome impériale et au Moyen Age, l'autre revient aux origines de la notion de peuple dans l'Ancien Testament, sur l'essence de l'autorité papale et la doctrine de La Trinité. (...) C'est aussi l'occasion pour eux de dialoguer avec d'illustres penseurs : Platon, saint Augustin, Bodin, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke ou encore Marx. Cette réflexion d'ordre historique et philosophique montre qu'il n'y a pas d'humanité sans racines, sans origines, sans legs, que ce soit pour celui qui croit au ciel comme pour celui qui n'y croit pas. Un ouvrage indispensable pour comprendre les enjeux de la souveraineté nationale dans son rapport au phénomène religieux en Occident. (shrink)

Is the capacity to experience hope central to our ability to entertain desirable future possibilities in thought? The ability to project oneself forward in time, or to entertain vivid positive episodic future thoughts, is impaired in patients with clinical depression. In this article, I consider the causal relation between, on the one hand, the loss of the affective experience of hope in depressed patients, and on the other hand, the reduced ability to generate and entertain positive episodic future thinking. I (...) suggest that findings in the philosophy of emotion may shed light on this causal relation. (shrink)

Assume $\langle \aleph_0, \aleph_1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle \lambda, \lambda^+ \rangle$ . Assume M is a model of a first order theory T of cardinality at most λ+ in a language L(T) of cardinality $\leq \lambda$ . Let N be a model with the same language. Let Δ be a set of first order formulas in L(T) and let D be a regular filter on λ. Then M is $\Delta-embeddable$ into the reduced power $N^\lambda/D$ , provided that every $\Delta-existential$ formula true (...) in M is true also in N. We obtain the following corollary: for M as above and D a regular ultrafilter over $\lambda, M^\lambda/D$ is $\lambda^{++}-universal$ . Our second result is as follows: For $i < \mu$ let Mi and Ni be elementarily equivalent models of a language which has cardinality $\leq \lambda$ . Suppose D is a regular filter on λ and $\langle \aleph_0, \aleph_1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle \lambda, \lambda^+ \rangle$ holds. We show that then the second player has a winning strategy in the $Ehrenfeucht-Fra\ddot{i}ss\acute{e}$ game of length λ+ on $\prod_i M_i/D$ and $\prod_i N_i/D$ . This yields the following corollary: Assume GCH and λ regular (or just $\langle \aleph_0, \aleph_1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle \lambda, \lambda^+ \rangle$ and 2λ = λ+). For L, Mi and Ni be as above, if D is a regular filter on λ, then $\prod_i M_i/D \cong \prod_i N_i/D$. (shrink)

The logician Kurt Gödel published a paper in 1931 formulating what have come to be known as his 'incompleteness theorems', which prove, among other things, that within any formal system with resources sufficient to code arithmetic, questions exist which are neither provable nor disprovable on the basis of the axioms which define the system. These are among the most celebrated results in logic today. In this volume, leading philosophers and mathematicians assess important aspects of Gödel's work on the foundations and (...) philosophy of mathematics. Their essays explore almost every aspect of Godel's intellectual legacy including his concepts of intuition and analyticity, the Completeness Theorem, the set-theoretic multiverse, and the state of mathematical logic today. This groundbreaking volume will be invaluable to students, historians, logicians and philosophers of mathematics who wish to understand the current thinking on these issues. (shrink)

Les énoncés philosophiques spéculatifs matérialistes de Diderot constituent une ontologie que Diderot expose dans une métaphysique où se nouent trois plans. Le premier est dominé par la catégorie de possible. Diderot pense le possible en termes de possibilité non téléologique : elle concerne le mode de manifestation de l'être. Le deuxième, portant sur la natura naturata et sa connaissance scientifique, s'adosse à la nécessité. Le troisième, s’inscrivant au cœur de la natura naturans et concernant le statut de l'existence des êtres, (...) est l’aléatoire. Comment ces trois plans et ces trois catégories s'articulent-ils rationnellement ? Comment se réalisent-ils dans l’écriture même de la philosophie ?Diderot’s philosophical pronouncements are both speculative and materialist. They make up an ontology and Diderot sets this out in a metaphysics which has three levels. The category of the possible dominates the first level. Diderot thinks the possible in terms of a non-teleological possibiliy, one concerned with the mode in which being manifests itself. The second level, concerned with « natural naturata » and the scientific knowledge that can be had of it, relies on necessity. The third, operating at the very heart of « natura naturans » is concerned with the status of the existence of beings, and is random. How do these three levels and these three categories relate to each other rationally ? How are they realised in the very way that philosophy is written ? (shrink)

There has been a renewed interest in the role of hope for our ability to act rationally under uncertainty, where accounts have tended to focus on either one of two (apparently contradictory) aspects of this attitude. On the one hand, like faith, hope is viewed as an attitude which grants us resolve and determination to continue striving towards uncertain goals. On the other hand, like worry, hope is also viewed as a process in which we cognitively engage with possible futures, (...) motivated to reduce the epistemic uncertainty surrounding the occurrence of goal-relevant outcomes. I spell out how an emotional account of the psychological nature of hope is able to accommodate both of these claims, as well as classic challenges (such as cases of “recalcitrant hopes”). Within this framework, hope is both a positive emotion (it consistently evaluates its object as good) and also an “emotion of uncertainty” or epistemic emotion, through which we apprehend that a given goal-relevant outcome is possible, albeit uncertain. (shrink)

Juliette Roussin | : Cet article a pour objet d’interroger la tendance actuelle des démocraties à s’entourer d’institutions indépendantes au fort degré de compétence en vue de limiter et de corriger les défaillances éventuelles des corps démocratiques élus et représentatifs. La légitimité démocratique de ces institutions contre-majoritaires leur viendrait, selon certains théoriciens de la démocratie, de ce qu’elles offrent la possibilité de contester les décisions collectives lorsque celles-ci sont mauvaises ou injustes, contribuant ainsi à l’amélioration globale des performances du (...) régime démocratique. À partir notamment d’une lecture des travaux de Philip Pettit sur la démocratie contestataire et d’une réflexion sur l’approche épistémique défendue par David Estlund, nous questionnons au contraire le caractère démocratique de ces formes institutionnelles de contestation et montrons que, tant qu’elles ne font pas l’objet d’un contrôle démocratique plus étroit, elles peuvent être interprétées comme des modes de contestation de la démocratie plutôt que comme des instruments de son amélioration. | : This paper investigates a current tendency among democracies to appeal to highly competent independent institutions in order to constrain and amend the potential deficiencies of elected and representative democratic bodies. According to some democratic theorists, these counter-majoritarian institutions enjoy democratic legitimacy because they allow the contestation of ill-devised or unjust collective decisions, and hence contribute to the global improvement of democratic results. Based on a reading of Philip Pettit’s work on contestatory democracy and of David Estlund’s epistemic approach, the paper questions the democratic nature of these institutional forms of contestation and shows that, as long as they are not subjected to tighter democratic control, these institutions can be interpreted as ways of contesting democracy rather than as implements for its improvement. (shrink)

By proposing the notion of aleatory materialism, or Marxism of encounter, Althusser had three goals in mind: to give Marxism, finally in crisis, its philosophy; to identify this philosophy with an underground current starting with Epicure and Democritus; to provide the means to introduce points of heresy from which the crisis would gain intelligibility. This article purports to show that this form of materialism consists less in a new philosophy than in an ontology and a logic of the “not-much”, of (...) the impoverishment of meaning and reason. The encounter is not a thesis on the materiality of the world, but on the conditions of thought of its very being: without origin, without purpose, without meaning, without necessity. By subscribing to such a thesis, one reintegrates within a reflection inhabited by emptiness, gap and difference, its outside, constituted by the singular practices of those who suffer and struggle in the emptiness and delinkage of the world. (shrink)

This study investigates how business leaders dynamically narrate their aspirational ethical leadership identities. In doing so, it furthers understanding of ethical leadership as a process situated in time and place. The analysis focuses on the discursive strategies used to narrate identity and ethics by ethnic Chinese business leaders in Indonesia after their conversion to Pentecostal–charismatic Christianity. By exploring the use of metaphor, our study shows how these business leaders discursively deconstruct their ‘old’ identities and construct their ‘new’ aspirational identities as (...) ethical leaders. This leads to the following contributions. First, we show that ethical leadership is constructed in identity talk as the business leaders actively narrate aspirational identities. Second, the identity narratives of the business leaders suggest that ethical leadership is a context-bound and situated claim vis-à-vis unethical practice. Third, we propose a conceptual template, identifying processes of realisation and inspiration followed by significant shifts in understanding, for the study of aspirational ethical leadership. (shrink)

In earlier work by the first and second authors, the equivalence of a finite square principle $\square^{\mathrm{fin}}_{\lambda,D}$ with various model-theoretic properties of structures of size $\lambda $ and regular ultrafilters was established. In this paper we investigate the principle $\square^{\mathrm{fin}}_{\lambda,D}$—and thereby the above model-theoretic properties—at a regular cardinal. By Chang’s two-cardinal theorem, $\square^{\mathrm{fin}}_{\lambda,D}$ holds at regular cardinals for all regular filters $D$ if we assume the generalized continuum hypothesis. In this paper we prove in ZFC that, for certain regular filters (...) that we call $\mathit{doubly}^{+}$ regular, $\square^{\mathrm{fin}}_{\lambda,D}$ holds at regular cardinals, with no assumption about GCH. Thus we get new positive answers in ZFC to Open Problems 18 and 19 in Chang and Keisler’s book Model Theory. (shrink)

1936 was a watershed year for computability. Debates among Gödel, Church and others over the correct analysis of the intuitive concept “human effectively computable”, an analysis at the heart of the Incompleteness Theorems, the Entscheidungsproblem, the question of what a finite computation is, and most urgently—for Gödel—the generality of the Incompleteness Theorems, were definitively set to rest with the appearance, in that year, of the Turing Machine. The question I explore here is, do the mathematical facts exhaust what is to (...) be said about the thinking behind the “confluence of ideas in 1936”? I will argue for a cultural role in Gödel’s, and, by extension, the larger logical community’s absorption of Turing’s 1936 model. As scaffolding I employ a conceptual framework due to the critic Leo Marx of the technological sublime; I also make use of the distinction within the technological sublime due to Caroline Jones, between its iconic and performative modes—a distinction operating within the conceptual art of the 1960s, but serving the history of computability equally well. (shrink)

How does doubt come about? What are the mechanisms responsible for our inclinations to reassess propositions and collect further evidence to support or reject them? In this paper, I approach this question by focusing on what might be considered a distorting mirror of unreasonable doubt, namely the pathological doubt of patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD). Individuals with OCD exhibit a form of persistent doubting, indecisiveness, and over-cautiousness at pathological levels (Rasmussen and Eisen in Psychiatr Clin 15(4):743–758, 1992; Reed in Obsessional (...) experience and compulsive behaviour: a cognitive-structural approach, Academic Press, Cambridge, 1985; Tolin et al. in Cogn Ther Res 27(6):657–669, 2003). I argue that the failure in OCD is of an affective nature, involving both excessive epistemic anxiety and hyperactive feelings of uncertainty. I further argue that our adaptive disposition to inquire about the right matters—that is, about propositions which are both epistemically risky and imply harmful possibilities—might depend on these affective mechanisms. (shrink)

Precise spatiotemporal control of gene expression during normal development and cell differentiation is achieved by the combined action of proximal (promoters) and distal (enhancers) cis‐regulatory elements. Recent studies have reported that a subset of promoters, termed Epromoters, works also as enhancers to regulate distal genes. This new paradigm opened novel questions regarding the complexity of our genome and raises the possibility that genetic variation within Epromoters has pleiotropic effects on various physiological and pathological traits by differentially impacting multiple proximal and (...) distal genes. Here, we discuss the different observations pointing to an important role of Epromoters in the regulatory landscape and summarize the evidence supporting a pleiotropic impact of these elements in disease. We further hypothesize that Epromoter might represent a major contributor to phenotypic variation and disease. (shrink)

In April and May 1994, several thousand Tutsi were massacred by militiamen in the convent of Sovu in Rwanda, with the complicity of the Mother Superior, Sister Gertrude. In 2001, a Brussels court found her guilty and sentenced her to prison for involvement in the killings. Using the trial records, this article examines the way her authority was exercised in the convent at the time of the genocide. Her defence lawyers adopted a gendered strategy, claiming the impossibility of her being (...) engaged in violence. But the testimony of victims pointed to the nun’s integration in local political networks, and the way in which she mobilized the resources available to her to exclude from the convent’s protection the Tutsi seeking refuge there. (shrink)

A social and political philosophy that ignores invisibility and visibility are not the matters of perception but of violent conditions, methods and social processes of confirming or infirming human existing that disprove the claims of a pure and abstract philosophy, is nothing more than ideology. A critical reflection of the 'normal' state of things implies an option for mutilated and unclassified existence of excluded, subordinates, poor, unemployed, beggar, caretakers, domestic workers, housewives, who are present but do not exist, and are (...) violated by discriminatory agendas of what is visible and invisible in modern society. Phenomenology and logic of the social question would analyze the living conditions of the public sphere, unravel this kind of violence, and discern the meaning and value of the struggle of invisible people to become visible ones. (shrink)

[Volume 1]. René Girard, philosophe politique, malgré lui -- [volume 2]. René Girard, promoteur d'une science des rapports humains.

L’histoire européenne s’est construite sur des mariages entre familles souveraines européennes. Pourtant, ce modèle n’est pas universel : de l’autre côté de la Méditerranée, l’Empire ottoman proposa un autre modèle d’unions matrimoniales royales, qui étonnait les voyageurs occidentaux : les sultans ottomans ne prenaient pas d’épouses de noble lignée ; ils cessèrent même progressivement de prendre des épouses tout court, pour leur préférer des concubines esclaves. Leurs filles mêmes, plutôt que d’être mariées “selon leur rang”, étaient données à des “esclaves”. (...) C’est le pragmatisme politique des Ottomans, ainsi que leur constante volonté d’afficher leur supériorité lignagère, qui explique l’apparition de ce modèle à la fin du xve siècle. L’objectif de l’article est de mettre en perspectives les ressorts politiques d’une telle transformation des règles matrimoniales dynastiques et d’en expliciter les conséquences. (shrink)

Ce volume collectif traite des relations entre philosophie et pouvoir politique dans l’Antiquité, des sophistes jusqu’aux néoplatoniciens, dans huit contributions issues pour la plupart du Hannah Arendt and Reiner Schürmann Symposium in Political Philosophy - Tyrants, Kings, Emperors, and Philosophers : Philosophy and Political Power in Antiquity à la New School for Social Research à New York en mai 2013. Les éditeurs rappellent dans l’introduction l’invention de la philosophie politique par...

My dissertation, entitled "The Anxious Inquirer: Emotions and Epistemic Uncertainty", concerns the relation between the epistemic attitude of doubt and the emotion of anxiety. In this dissertation, I propose a model of the affective architecture of doubt inspired in part by research in psychiatry on the persistent and recurring doubt of patients with Obsessive-compulsive disorder.

If we replace first-order logic by second-order logic in the original definition of Gödel’s inner model L, we obtain the inner model of hereditarily ordinal definable sets [33]. In this paper...