The current research is based on Senninger’s Learning Zone Model applied to the tourists’ comfort zone. This model was created in 2000 and it proved to be useful in many applied areas: Psychology, Sociology, Marketing and Management. This modes is a behavioral one and shows how a person can justify his action based on previous tested experiences or dares to step beyond in fear, learn or growth zone. Our research is extending the existent area of expertise to tourism. We aimed (...) at exploring whether the tourists’ apprehension toward choosing their next destination from a comfort zone perspective or rather from the other zones’ perspectives such as fear, learning or growth. To meet this purpose we conducted a mixed method: firstly a qualitative one, an in-depth interview based on Delphi method with 10 tourism specialists and secondly an online survey on 208 Generation Z tourists. The interviews were meant to help developing a 20 items scale to measure from which of the 4 zones are the respondents making the choice of the future travel destination. Our conclusions show that Gen Z tourists display behaviors that can be associated with learning or growth zones rather than the comfort zone. This is relevant when choosing the next travel destination, because our findings could bring about a new approach to promoting tourist destinations as part of various products. As a result, a large range of managerial tools can better adapt the promotion messages to the target market from a new psychological perspective. (shrink)

Given that it seems uncontroversial that Socrates displays considerable contempt towards rhetoric in theGorgias,the title of this paper might strike one as an oxymoron. Indeed, a reading of the text has more than once encouraged scholars to posit an Opposition between the elenctic procedures championed by Socrates and the rhetorical procedures of his interlocutors. At least three features have been highlighted that seem to indicate this contrast:1.the Socratic interest in short questions and answers versus his interlocutors’ use of long speeches(makrologia);2.the (...) Socratic interest in truth regardless of the opinion of the many, the latter seeming an important concern of the rhetorician;3.the supposed Socratic appeal to the intellectual powers of the interlocutor, which is usually contrasted with the appeal to the emotions which is distinctive of rhetoric. (shrink)

Doing research in a globalized context – regardless of the discipline – requires language decisions at different stages of the research process. Many of these language decisions have ethical implications. Existing literature and ethical guidance tend to focus on ethical concerns that arise in communication with participants who use a language different from the main research language. As this article shows, language decisions with potential ethical implications can occur in many additional ways. Two questions guided this work: how do language (...) decisions and research ethics intersect at different stages of the research process, and what potential harm is related to language decisions and how can such concerns be mitigated? Relevant literature – combined with practical research experiences – show that language decisions can potentially result in harm at the conception stage of research projects, when working with participants, during data analysis, interpretation, and dissemination, as well as when managing a research project. Thus, the article highlights that the role of language-related ethical dilemmas is not only organizational (e.g., ensuring participants can understand what the research is about), but also social (e.g., developing trust and relationships in research teams) as well as ideological (e.g., awareness of power structures and diverse worldviews). In order to support researchers in globalized contexts, this article offers a reflective framework that complements regulatory guidance issued by ethical bodies and facilitates a deeper awareness of ethical implications related to language decisions in a multilingual world. (shrink)

Este trabajo se propone leer la obra autobiográfica de Rousseau como el resultado de un litigio que opone al escritor y al público. Ambos se disputan la identidad del autor. Veremos que el proyecto autobiográfico nace como una reivindicación de la soberanía de autor sobre el texto pero culmina instituyendo la soberanía del lector. En el transcurso de la obra autobiográfica de Rousseau el autor deviene un efecto de la lectura. This paper aims to read the autobiographical work of Rousseau (...) as the outcome of a dispute between the writer and the public. Both parts dispute the author's identity. We will see that the autobiographical project starts as the claim of sovereignty of the work by the author, but culminates by establishing the sovereignty of the reader. In the autobiographical writings, the author is an effect of the reading. (shrink)

O presente artigo quer encontrar um modo de pensar a filosofia a partir de uma escrita marcada pelo que vamos seguir entendendo como “pessoas”. Jacques Derrida será o norte teórico desse texto, ao que ele próprio traz em linhas muito precisas ao longo de sua obra em torno da expressão “digno de seu nome”. Se há dignidade ou se algo detém uma dignidade e por ela um nome, se a palavra dignidade [Würdigkeit] ainda nos remete, como em Kant, à noção (...) incondicional de “pessoa” e se ela pode nesse registo e, como veremos, ser estendida ao todo-outro e ainda assim inscrever uma “majestade”, é dessa forma que a expressão “digno de seu nome” atravessa a obra de Derrida quando ele inicia um incansável trabalho com a palavra, especialmente em seus escritos tardios, cuja significação não é mais objetável. (shrink)

This paper re-evaluates the role that Plato confers to pleasure in the "Philebus." According to leading interpretations, Plato there downplays the role of pleasure, or indeed rejects hedonism altogether. Thus, scholars such as D. Frede have taken the "mixed life" of pleasure and intelligence initially submitted in the "Philebus" to be conceded by Socrates only as a remedial good, second to a life of neutral condition, where one would experience no pleasure and pain. Even more strongly, scholars such as Irwin (...) have seen the "Philebus'" arguments against false pleasures as an actual attack on hedonism, showing -- in Irwin's words -- "why maximization of pleasure cannot be a reasonable policy for the best life." Against these claims, I argue that the mixed life of pleasure and intelligence is presented in the "Philebus" as a first best and not just as a second best for humans, and that, accordingly, Socrates proposes to incorporate -- rather than reject -- pleasure as one of the intrinsically desirable aspects of the happy life. Thus, I offer alternative readings of controversial passages that have given rise to the prevalent interpretation criticized here, and advance positive evidence that at least some pleasures are seen by Plato as inherently good. In addition, I demonstrate that Plato's arguments against false pleasures do not by themselves constitute an attack on hedonism. Rather, they can be seen as a strategy to show the hedonist that, in order to be a maximal, or even a consistent, hedonist, he should go for true, and not fake pleasures, if after all pleasure is the object of his pursuit. But, since this cannot be achieved without intelligence, then the mixed life of pleasure and intelligence is to be accepted even by hedonist themselves. (shrink)

Although a great deal has been written on Plato's ethics, his cosmology has not received so much attention in recent times and its importance for his ethical thought has remained underexplored. By offering accounts of Timaeus, Philebus, Politicus and Laws X, the book reveals a strongly symbiotic relation between the cosmic and human sphere. It is argued that in his late period Plato presents a picture of an organic universe, endowed with structure and intrinsic value, which both urges our respect (...) and calls for our responsible intervention. Humans are thus seen as citizens of a university that can provide a context for their flourishing even in the absence of good political institutions. The book sheds light on many intricate metaphysical issues in late Plato and brings out the close connections between his cosmology and the development of his ethics. (shrink)

Empirical research in bioethics has developed rapidly over the past decade, but has largely eschewed the use of technology-driven methodologies. We propose “design bioethics” as an area of conjoined theoretical and methodological innovation in the field, working across bioethics, health sciences and human-centred technological design. We demonstrate the potential of digital tools, particularly purpose-built digital games, to align with theoretical frameworks in bioethics for empirical research, integrating context, narrative and embodiment in moral decision-making. Purpose-built digital tools can engender situated engagement (...) with bioethical questions; can achieve such engagement at scale; and can access groups traditionally under-represented in bioethics research and theory. If developed and used with appropriate rigor, tools motivated by “design bioethics” could offer unique insights into new and familiar normative and empirical issues in the field. (shrink)

In this paper I re-examine the status of the mind-body relation in several of Plato’s late dialogues. A range of views has been attributed to Plato here. For example, it has been thought that Plato is a substance dualist, for whom the mind can exist independently of the body; or an attribute dualist, who has left behind the strong dualistic commitments of the Phaedo by allowing that the mind may be the subject of spatial movements. But even in cases where (...) a classification of Plato as a holder of a particular ontology of the mind has been left undefined, it has been a shared assumption that in the late dialogues the mind itself must be immaterial. I take issue with these various views and show that none of them is necessitated by the text. In the first place, I argue there is strong evidence against the view that Plato should, in his late period, be committed not only to substance dualism, but also to attribute dualism. Furthermore, it is possible that Plato may have allowed that the mind itself be a three-dimensional corporeal entity (in a way that sets up a precedent for later Stoic developments). But even if this is not the only possible reading of the text, it is shown how at any rate the mind must be seen in late Plato as the principle of organization of a body and ontologically inseparable from it. Despite prima facie affinities with Aristotle here, we shall see a Plato emerge for whom the mind (without exception) and the body cannot exist without one another – a thesis more radical than that of Aristotle’s. To bring out the provocative nature of this suggestion, I start, in section I, by laying out the state of the question and compare what I shall argue is the late Platonic view with standard interpretations of his previous work, stressing the historical force that I expect this thesis to have. Afterwards, in three respective sections, I proceed to pay heed to relevant passages in the Timaeus, Philebus and Laws in order to establish the main point of this paper. Finally, in section V, I consider the challenge apparently introduced against my thesis by Plato’s occasional talk of immortality and eschatology in those dialogues, and argue instead that many of those passages add further strength to the view defended in this essay. (shrink)

This work is the first monograph devoted to the interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of chance in Physics II 4-6 and its implications and projections in other treatises, including an original and comprehensive account of the Aristotelian conception of chance, of accidental causality in the realm of nature, and of accidental causality in the realm of human action. One of the main interpretative issues around Aristotle’s discussion of chance is its relation to the four causes and to teleology. In this sense, (...) it is particularly difficult to find the common features which fortune (tyche) and spontaneity (automaton) share. This work, offers such an interpretation of Aristotle’s general concept of chance (i.e. common to fortune and spontaneity), which shows clearly its relation with his theory of causality (Phys. II 3), with teleology, and with the application of this theory to the study of nature. It also shows how fortune and spontaneity can be interpreted consistently with this general characterization of chance, and how the specific differences between them can be accounted for paying attention to the different structures of causality in the realm of nature and in the realm of human action. Regarding the specific concept of spontaneity (automaton), a crux interpretum, the book offers one of the few independent discussions this issue in Aristotelian literature, and proposes a sub-classification in two kinds of spontaneity based on an analysis of Aristotle’s different examples and characterizations: ‘mixed spontaneity’ (which shares some features with fortune), and ‘pure spontaneity’ (which takes place strictly in the realm of nature). These different structures had not been recognized in specialized literature before. The problem of chance has projections into Aristotle’s natural philosophy, as well as into Aristotle’s theory of action and practical philosophy. This ample perspective of Aristotle’s work, and of the different explanatory models and ontological structures therein involved, constitutes an interesting groundwork for future developments in some or many of these realms of investigation. (shrink)

In this article the relations between philosophy and applied ethics are considered. The presented deliberation is concentrated on the question whether philosophy has contributed to applied ethics, especially to business ethics. Trying to find an answer to this question I will refer to the discussion which was started by R. Rorty in which he presented his own point of view on the issues related to moral development and the role of philosophy and philosophers in the modern world. Rorty points at (...) proper tools which, in his opinion, can be helpful to business ethicists and formulates the goal they should try to aim at. His opinions has started a vivid discussion. Patricia H. Werhane, Daryl Koehn and Richard T. De George try to discuss with Rorty’s statement. They oppose Rorty’s argument that philosophy is not more relevant to applied ethics than any other academic disciplines. They point to the facts which document philosophers’ contribution in forming business ethics. This article presents their arguments as well as an attempt of their critical assessment. (shrink)

Fortuna y Providencia son las fuerzas dinámicas para crear el cambio social. Estas fuerzas constituyen el leit motiv del quehacer humano, y una pretensión pedagógica de educar al hombre para alcanzar la felicidad.Fortune and Providence are the dynamic forces of social change. Those forces constitute humans chore leit motiv, and a pedagogical intention of educating the man, in order to attain happiness.

In the present study the impact of need for cognitive closure manipulations via time pressure and explicit closure goal activation on executive control was investigated. Although there is some evidence that NFC, measured as an individual variable, is related to better performing in attentional tasks involving executive control, these results have never been validated across different manipulations of NFC. Thus, in the present study we induced NFC via internal and external time pressure and tested the impact of these manipulations on (...) the performance in tasks that measure executive control, i.e., the Stroop and switching tasks. The results revealed that induced high NFC, indeed boosted performance in executive control tasks. Moreover, there was no difference in the effect of both NFC manipulations on task performance. The implications regarding the role of executive control and specific NFC manipulations in social cognition are discussed. (shrink)

S’il n’y a pas de théorie du goût chez Rousseau, la question du goût traverse néanmoins toute son œuvre. Elle apparaît d’abord comme une critique adressée à la société mondaine, puis fait place, dans les écrits de la maturité, à une analyse des conditions sociales du bon goût général. En dépit de la terminologie classique de ses textes, ceux-ci développent en fait une conception sui generis du goût. Rousseau ne se réfère pas à un ordre de perfection pour expliquer et (...) fonder le bon goût. Le goût est selon lui un phénomène collectif qui manifeste l’état des affections sociales. Le goût tant social qu’individuel est dit « bon » lorsque le jugement sur ce qui plaît ou ce qui déplaît n’est pas soumis à l’opinion. L’autonomie du goût et le bon goût se confondent, la volupté et l’égalité relative en sont alors les conditions. (shrink)

RESUMEN Recientes intentos por conectar la ética y la biología aristotélicas marcan una suerte de continuidad entre el carácter de los animales no racionales y de los seres humanos, de modo tal que en la descripción de los caracteres de los animales no racionales puede identificarse el punto de partida biológico del propio ser humano en el desarrollo de su carácter moral. En este artículo, propongo señalar los límites de este tipo de lectura, ya que, entendida de cierto modo, ella (...) implica una continuidad entre la normatividad natural y la normatividadpráctica propia de un naturalismo fundacionalista que no puede atribuirse a Aristóteles. En conexión con ello, sostengo que el concepto de virtud natural no es un concepto natural, sino ético, tal que sólo cobra sentido en el marco de la normatividad práctica; la virtud natural, en este sentido, no forma parte de una explicación genética de la virtud sino de un análisis que va del todo a las partes, de acuerdo al cual ella no es anterior sino posterior a la virtud ética. ABSTRACT A recent trend in Aristotelian scholarship tries to link ethics and biology. Within these attempts, some sort of continuity between the character of non-rational animals and that of human beings has been proposed, so that the starting point ofmoral development could be identified in Aristotle’s description of animal’s character. In this article I argue that this reading should strongly qualified, for understood in some ways it entails a sort of continuity between natural normativity and practical normativity that belongs to an Archimedean ethical naturalism, which cannot be reconstructed from Aristotle’s writings. Connected to this, I argue that the concept of natural virtue is not a natural concept, but an ethical one that only makes sense from within the realm of practical normativity; natural virtue, thus understood, is not part of a genetic explanation of virtue, but emerges from a conceptual whole-part analysis. In this manner, natural virtue is no prior, but posterior to ethical virtue. (shrink)

As is well known, Heinrich Scholz and his academic society maintained good scientific contacts with Polish logicians before, during, and after the Second World War. My interest here is to examine the details of their collaboration by presenting Scholz’s unpublished correspondence with Fr. Józef M. Bocheński. The following topics are discussed here: Polish logicians who survived the war and their current place of work; reorganization of the scholarly environment, didactic activities, duties, scholarly trips; current research topics, prospects for post-war publications, (...) and future publishing plans; information about Jan Łukasiewicz, Bolesław Sobociński, and Joachim Metallmann; personal matters. (shrink)

El artículo propone poner a prueba la idea comúnmente admitida de que en la concepción aristotélica las emociones tienen una función o fin en el ámbito biológico. Me propongo probar que esta concepción sería más propia de otras posturas, como la tomista y la cartesiana, y especialmente de la darwiniana y neo-darwiniana. Tras presentar en la sección 2 el tipo de explicaciones teleológicas que Aristóteles admite y emplea en biología, analizo en la parte 3 la concepción de las emociones de (...) Descartes y en especial de Darwin y muestro que ellas se adaptan bien al modelo explicativo teleológico aristotélico. En la sección 4, ofrezco varios argumentos con apoyo en los textos biológicos de Aristóteles para mostrar que, en cambio, este tipo de explicaciones teleológicas de las emociones no aparecen con claridad en los escritos biológicos del estagirita, toda vez que lo que encontramos allí es, más bien, explicaciones fisiológico materialistas del carácter de los animales. Por último, sugiero una asimetría con el tratamiento de las emociones desde el punto de vista de la racionalidad práctica que desarrollaré en trabajos ulteriores. (shrink)

This paper challenges a widespread reading of Aristotle’s use of dialectic in the treatment of aporiai. According to this reading, the search for a resolution of an aporia is supposed to proceed by arguing against conflicting theses to refute one of them. I argue that this reading is not satisfactory and propose an alternative, based on an often overlooked distinction between two dialectical procedures, the refutation (elenchos) of a thesis and the resolution (lysis) of an argument. These two terms are (...) employed fairly consistently by Aristotle in the treatises as well. Since an aporia requires not merely conflicting theses, but conflicting arguments for those theses, I contend that the ideal way out of aporiai involves a critical analysis of those arguments, akin to that involved in the dialectical resolution. A relevant implication of this reading is that it expands the critical use of dialectic for philosophy, and points to the specific philosophical utility of the Sophistical Refutations. (shrink)

The complex relationships between humans and AI-empowered machines have created and inspired new products and services as well as controversial debates, fiction and entertainment, and last but not least, a striving and vital field of research. The convergence between the two categories of entities has created stimulating concepts and theories in the past, such as the uncanny valley, machinization of humans through datafication, or humanization of machines, known as anthropomorphization. In this article, we identify a new gap in the relational (...) interaction between humans and AI triggered by commercial interests, making use of AI through advertisement, marketing, and corporate communications. Our scope is to broaden the field of AI and society by adding the business-society-nexus. Thus, we build on existing research streams of machinewashing and the analogous phenomenon of greenwashing to theorize about the humanwashing of AI-enabled machines as a specific anthropomorphization notion. In this way, the article offers a contribution to the anthropomorphization literature conceptualizing humanwashing as a deceptive use of AI-enabled machines aimed at intentionally or unintentionally misleading organizational stakeholders and the broader public about the true capabilities that AIEMs possess. (shrink)

If there is no theory of taste in Rousseau, the question of taste nevertheless is present throughout all his work. It appears at first as a criticism addressed to worldy society, and then gives way, in the writings of his maturity, to an analysis of the social conditions of general good taste. In spite of the classical terminology of its texts, they in fact develop a conception sui generis of taste. Rousseau does not refer to an order of perfection to (...) explain and base the good taste. Taste is, according to him, a collective phenomenon which manifests the state of social affections. The taste, as much the social and the individual, is called “good” when the judgment on what pleases or what displeases is not subject to opinion. Autonomy of taste and good taste are confounded, voluptuousness and relative equality are then the conditions. (shrink)

The paper concentrates on the teaching of qualitative data collection techniques. The theoretical assumptions upon which the interview strategy is based are analyzed in the first place. For this purpose, “minimum” contents of the body of knowledge formed by phenomenology, symbolic interactionism and..

Economic activities are always supposed to carry with them the risk of market. Our area of research is concerned with what is known as the model of risk decisions at the level of economic activity; a model that can be valuable at any point of economic development. In our research, we present important aspects of risk in taking decisions in the previous and current dynamics of the market. The conditions of taking decisions with potential risks provide decision-makers with the possibility (...) to analyze and calculate risk in order to know what can be gained and lost. In our paper, we present a short description of a different model of risk in economic activity and of decision-making risk, providing examples that have been offered by various authors. For example, Friedman and Savage present the utility function of an economic agent and its availability to accept the risk, while Markowitz defines utility in terms of winning or losing. Our paper starts with a presentation of the quantification of risk in economic activity. In the second part, we present a model of decision-making risk that is applied in economic activities and the difference between risk and uncertainty. (shrink)

The papers included in this book explore various aspects of the relation between nature and practical normativity in Antiquity, from the Presocratic period to Neoplatonism. Leaving aside the question how much of contemporary naturalism is present in Ancient Philosophy, and whether that much is sufficient for finding traces of it in ancient naturalism, one may still ask the historical question of whether or not this is a feature that all ancient ethics share. To this effect, the following pages offer a (...) palette of readings that provide diverse analyses and diagnoses about the manner, the extent, and the success with which the appeal to nature can be identified as a strategy for founding practical normativity in Ancient Philosophy. (shrink)

En este trabajo proponemos abordar, desde un enfoque interdisciplinar, los cambios históricos en la definición y representación de la naturaleza patagónica, a partir de indagar el caso del proyecto de Vivero y arboretum en la Isla Victoria, en el lago Nahuel Huapi. Pretendemos dar cuenta cómo las representaciones que se realizan desde las instituciones científicas y gubernamentales acompañan los proyectos político-ideológicos cada período histórico. Tomaremos como fuentes de análisis parte de las representaciones visuales pertenecientes al arte institucional, algunas entrevistas realizadas (...) a profesionales vinculados a nuestro objeto de estudio y otras fuentes bibliográficas históricas. Nuestra hipótesis es que el proyecto de forestación en Isla Victoria-que se inicia en 1925 con Gross y la creación del arboretum- reflejó la cosmovisión ilustrada moderna, mediante la cual se ha buscado “construir naturaleza” bajo una lógica positivista. Se enfatiza un vínculo con la naturaleza como Otredad y como objeto a dominar, ya sea de modo ornamental o productivo. Esta cosmovisión se plasma en las representaciones científicas de la naturaleza de la Isla. Esta perspectiva de una “Naturaleza a mejorar”, pareciera ser antagónica a las nuevas miradas ecológicas. Desde la década de 1970 cambia el paradigma sobre el uso de exóticas y se advierten sus peligros, promoviendo acciones de conservación de especies nativas. (shrink)

Abstract:In this article, we present a pragmatic approach to neuroethics, referring back to John Dewey and his articulation of the “common good” and its discovery through systematic methods. Pragmatic neuroethics bridges philosophy and social sciences and, at a very basic level, considers that ethics is not dissociable from lived experiences and everyday moral choices. We reflect on the integration between empirical methods and normative questions, using as our platform recent bioethical and neuropsychological research into moral cognition, action, and experience. Finally, (...) we present the protocol of a study concerning teenagers’ morality in everyday life, discussing our epistemological choices as an example of a pragmatic approach in empirical ethics. We hope that this article conveys that even though the scope of neuroethics is broad, it is important not to move too far from the real life encounters that give rise to moral questions in the first place. (shrink)

Este artículo examina la incorporación de la ética aplicada a la inteligencia artificial (IA) en los currículos universitarios chilenos, destacando la urgencia de implementar un marco de acción integrado. Mediante un análisis documental, se evidencia que la mayoría de los programas de educación superior no declaran cursos de ética en IA en sus currículos, lo que alerta la necesidad de sistematizar esta integración institucionalmente. En respuesta, proponemos un enfoque basado en el feminismo en la ciencia y el feminismo de datos, (...) promoviendo la inclusión de diversas perspectivas y experiencias en la enseñanza de la ética aplicada. Este marco busca mejorar la integración de la ética en el currículo y también preparar a los estudiantes para resolver dilemas éticos en contextos sociotécnicos complejos, reforzando la necesidad del razonamiento ético aplicado en la formación en disciplinas asociadas a la IA. (shrink)

In this paper, I set out to refute several charges that have recently been raised against Plato’s attitude toward the environment and to present him under a new light of relevance for the contemporary environmental debate. For this purpose, I assess the meaning of Plato’s metaphysical dualism, his notion of nature and teleology, and the kind of value that he attributes to animals, plants, and the land in general. I thus show how Plato’s organicist view of the universe endows it (...) with an intrinsic value that is over and above each of its parts, including humans, and provides an argument for the preservation of species of nonhuman animals, which in many relevant ways are not ranked below the human species. In addition, I show how Plato’s dialogues provide good evidence for human concern about the environment and how such a concern is promoted rather than hindered by his nonanthropocentric notion of teleology. (shrink)

This article begins by examining the importance that critical intercultural dialogues have within the Modernity/Coloniality Research Program toward reaching an alternative geopolitics and body-politics of knowledge, in order to raise the question whether the colonial difference creates conditions for dialogical situations that bring together critiques of coloniality emerging from different experiences of coloniality. The answer it offers is twofold. On the one hand, if one imagines such situations to be communicative exchanges à la Bakhtin that put logos at the center, (...) given what is termed the coloniality of language and speech, the possibility of such exchanges is feasible only as an abstract gesture. On the other hand, when one faces the complications of the erasure of dialogue produced by coloniality, the kind of decolonial communicative relations that seem possible among people thinking and acting from the colonial difference are less conscious or agential than emotive. By articulating the relations between coalitional methodologies and a global sense of connection the article proposes a nondialogical theory of decolonial communication: a way of orienting ourselves with a sense of permeability and recognition of being on the same side that doesn't need to be politically motivated but is always active. (shrink)

Interessamo-nos, neste trabalho, em refletir acerca de uma aproximação entre estética e ecologia por meio do conceito de unidade, tal como anteriormente indicada por Freitas (2005). Diante de um contexto contemporâneo de crise ambiental, propomos lançar um olhar para o campo da arquitetura e do urbanismo, em que observamos uma crescente busca por modelos estéticos e epistemológicos que se caracterizem como ecológicos. Tomamos como referencial teórico a filosofia pragmatista de Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), considerando, em especial, a afinidade apontada por (...) Nöth (1996; 1998; 2001) entre esse pensamento e a ecologia. Partindo daí, organizamos o trabalho em dois momentos distintos: um primeiro, conceitual; e um segundo, voltado para a relação entre conceito e prática. Iniciamos por identificar e selecionar, em escritos de Peirce e de seus estudiosos, alguns entre os usos do termo unidade, buscando compreender o modo como está relacionado a conceitos próprios de sua filosofia, percorrendo a fenomenologia, as ciências normativas e a metafísica, com passagem pelo pragmatismo, pressupondo evidenciar uma compreensão de unidade que fundamenta aquela aproximação inicial. Com base nisso, refletimos, em seguida, acerca dessa concepção com relação à arquitetura e ao urbanismo, a partir do trabalho de Toyo Ito, que se interessou pela transição de uma estética da máquina para uma estética de fluxos e cujo diálogo profissional entre a teoria e a prática nos conduz a considerações mais amplas acerca do conhecimento em arquitetura, com consequências para a formação de novas condutas nesse campo. (shrink)

Es necesario fundamentar teóricamente la inclusión de la cultura de seguridad del paciente en los currículos de las facultades de odontología, con el fin de impulsar comportamientos y acciones acordes con el derecho a los cuidados en salud seguros y de calidad. La presente es una investigación de revisión narrativa de la literatura científica, fundamentada en la bioética latinoamericana y los derechos humanos de los pacientes. Las interpretaciones se basan en el análisis del contenido de artículos y presentadas de acuerdo (...) con la legislación sobre derechos humanos de los pacientes y el currículo en odontología. La cultura de seguridad es una intervención para propiciar vivencias que consoliden valores y conocimientos, asimismo, requiere estrategias que centren su adopción entre todos los actores, partiendo de la relación estudiante-paciente-docente. (shrink)

En este trabajo examino el memoir Ilegal: Reflexiones de un inmigrante indocumentado (2019), de José Ángel Navejas. A raíz de una lectura de este texto, exploro las formas en que el narrador describe cómo los inmigrantes mexicanos indocumentados crean espacios de alianza y pertenencia en Estados Unidos. Para eso, parto del concepto de ‘ciudadanía casera’ de Mitchell (2020), quien apunta a que el ‘pertenecer’ no depende de la inclusión cívica o el reconocimiento estatal, sino que es una noción que se (...) construye por medio de las prácticas comunitarias informales. Por ende, sugiero que en Ilegal son espacios de ‘ciudadanía casera’ para el narrador: 1) el lenguaje y el acceso a la educación formal; 2) el barrio de Pilsen, en Chicago; y 3) la red familiar, ya que por medio de esas esferas el narrador encuentra un sentido de pertenencia. Palabras clave: literatura mexicana, ensayo personal, memoir, ciudadanía casera, ciudadanía cultural. (shrink)

Resumen: En Metafísica E 2 y 3 Aristóteles discute el problema de lo que es por accidente y sus causas, con el fin último de examinar si esto puede ser objeto de la filosofía primera. El resultado de esta discusión es, en este sentido, negativo. Sin embargo, la filosofía primera tiene algo que decir acerca del accidente, aunque solo sea mediante un discurso de segundo orden. La naturaleza de lo accidental es así explorada en estas páginas de la Metafísica para (...) confirmar la imposibilidad de un estudio científico acerca de esta forma de ser y sus causas. La parte central de este artículo discute el complejo pasaje E 2, 1026b27-1027a15, donde Aristóteles presenta las causas de lo que es por accidente. Procuraré mostrar que las tres causas allí presentadas son no solo compatibles, sino también relevantes para la completa caracterización de lo accidental, en la medida en que pueden entenderse como la causa formal, eficiente y material de lo que es por accidente.: Aristotle’s Metaphysics E 2 and 3 are devoted to the discussion about accidental being and its causes, with the aim of assessing its credentials as a possible object of first philosophy. The result of this discussion is, in this sense, negative. However, first philosophy has something to say about accidental being, if only through a second order speech. The nature of the accidental is thus explored in these pages of Metaphysics, with the ultimate aim of confirming the impossibility of a scientific study about this way of being and its causes. The central part of this paper deals with E 2, 1026b27-1027a15, where Aristotle introduces the causes of accidental being. I endeavor to show that each of the three causes presented in these lines are compatible and relevant, as they can be understood, respectively, as the formal, efficient and material cause of what happens by accident. (shrink)