The authors of a much discussed recent book A Lot of People are Saying: The New Conspiracism and the Assault on Democracy, Russell Muirhead and Nancy L. Rosenblum argue that ‘a new conspiracism’ has emerged recently. Their examples include Donald Trump’s allegations that elections have been rigged, ‘Birther’ accusations about Barack Obama, ‘QAnon’ and ‘Pizzagate’. They characterize these as ‘conspiracism without the theory’. They argue that the new conspiracism is validated by repetition, disregards experts, and is satisfied with the (...) conclusion that allegations are ‘true enough’. Here I argue that there is no new conspiracism. Muirhead and Rosenblum have misconstrued their chief examples of new conspiracism and mischaracterized classic conspiracism. The non-existence of a new conspiracism matters. If those studying contemporary conspiracism suppose that many of the objects of their study are theory-free then they are liable to fail to examine the theories that actually are driving contemporary conspiracism. Also, if they suppose that they are confronting an entirely new phenomenon then they are in danger of failing to learn lessons from the rich history of conspiracy theorizing. (shrink)

As a form of academic activism this paper proposes an epistemic redress of obstetric violence by arguing for a more birther-defined conceptualization of the construct, in order to further the agenda of reproductive and social justice. Since the term was first used in the early 2000s in Latin America, the construct has evolved, and contemporary understandings of obstetric violence note it as a complex and multifaceted phenomenon with various configurations of analysis depending on the stakeholder that is discussing it. (...) While the ontology of obstetric violence has been grappled with, the most ubiquitous challenge that is foregrounded in this paper is that of its conceptualization, specifically its epistemic leanings and origins. Drawing primarily on Fricker’s framework of epistemic injustice, particularly hermeneutical injustice, I argue that current interpretations of obstetric violence are epistemically tenuous, and I posit that any understanding of obstetric violence must include the subjective and lived experience of all birthing persons, leading to a more socially and epistemically fair understanding of the construct. (shrink)

When an individual is unable or unwilling to become a parent the natural way, he/she can avail of a surrogate mother. Furthermore, when the surrogate pregnancy takes place in a foreign country, the practice is popularly referred to as ‘surrogacy tourism’ or ‘birther tourism’, which is the main topic of this research. In contrast to existing research most of which is confined to the medical angle, here we look at how marketing makes surrogacy tourism more accessible but concomitantly promotes (...) unwanted ethical and marketing practices, even if inadvertently. On one hand, rigorous promotion of surrogacy tourism has successfully spread the word and has made such option available to individuals who would have otherwise been unaware of such opportunity. On the other hand, excessive marketing has resulted in unethical, illegal and in some cases, unhealthy medical practices in which, service providers, clinics and doctors often participate, but on which there appears to be scant research. This analysis, therefore, has two-fold implications: first, the findings can be extended to several other related professions, such as the medical community, administrators, law enforcement agencies and most importantly, potential ‘parents’; secondly, it can aid administrators and regulators tighten extant loopholes in the system, and thereby, provide a more robust and safer option for surrogate tourists. (shrink)