In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reply to CriticsBethany Henningplato knew that philosophy is not something we write; it is something we live. As Deweyans, we know philosophy is an ideal that emerges within experience as the highest possibility for dialogue. Insofar as a book appears as an extended monologue, it obscures the qualitative and transactive dimensions of philosophy as it is practiced. But sessions like these reveal that books are moments in a conversation, (...) "perchings" in a dialogue that is forever in media res. I am deeply grateful to Bill Myers for organizing this panel, and for the generosity of Frank Ryan, Gregory Pappas, and Jim Garrison for having taken the time to read and think about this book. Each of them has served as a model for philosophical scholarship, and I am humbled and honored to have the opportunity to engage with them directly. They have challenged me in three distinct ways and have engaged with what I have written on separate plateaus of thought, at times revealing layers of which I was not fully aware. So I will do my best to respond to their concerns and develop our shared inquiry in their light. I will also own that my reading of Dewey is selective, and it is my attempt to work through a problem that materialized, as all problems do, in the course of ordinary lived experience.At Southern Illinois University Carbondale, where I attended graduate school, we offered a course called "The American Mind." The title was a provocation, so I applied to teach it one semester. It was a fantastic challenge to try to curate a selection of texts that would serve as an encounter with an intellectual tradition that eludes me as much as it informs me—after all, prior to college, I only knew that a "philosopher" is what becomes of the loser in the board game called Life. I did not know that there was something called "American philosophy" until I applied to study at SIUC.If philosophy is the way that a culture reflects upon itself, then in this book, I have tried to invite the American mind to lie down on the couch. [End Page 95] Or, it might be more accurate to say that I have asked John Dewey, as the representative of American philosophy, how he might psychoanalyze such a mind. My hypothesis is that Dewey's theory of aesthetic experience, and the art that communicates and preserves such moments of intensified vitality, touches the deepest, but unspoken meanings that human beings encounter. This is where quality, the character of an event as a singular whole, the immediate aspect of an event that we feel rather than know, can be stabilized and communicated. If an interpretation can be made of the deep conflicts that have left philosophy at the margins of American life, I believe we would be wise to begin with our "dreams," with the creations of our imagination, the artistic products that reveal the felt dimension of our shared world.Many readers of Dewey choose to focus on his theory of inquiry, his recasting of the scientific method, and his instrumentalism as forming the core of his thought. This is an understandable approach; his work here is novel and corrects bad intellectual habits. However, for the purposes of this book, I have emphasized aesthetic experience, the role of the qualitative, and pursuit of meaning over the correction of practice in my interpretation. This is a controversial choice since it courts the irrational and the vague, but I believe that our neglect of these portions of experience prevents philosophy from reconnecting with American life.Response to Frank RyanFrank Ryan is concerned about the extent to which I have cast the organism as porous, and that I have identified aesthetic experience as unconscious. I agree with Dr. Ryan's assessment that defining aesthetic experience as wholly unconscious would be a grievous error—and I hope not to have made it. There is a misleading ambiguity in the title of the book that might predispose the reader to suspect that I am claiming an equivalence, but what I intended to argue was not that aesthetic experience itself is unconscious, but rather... (shrink)

The publication of Art as Experience in 1934 marked a theoretical turning point away from the disinterested spectatorship of Kant towards an aesthetics of everyday life. Dewey’s major claim therein is that “aesthetic experience” is privileged and ought to be taken as paradigmatic for all experience because it is controlled by an affective unity that he calls “pervasive quality” which harmonizes thought and action with its social and environmental context. In 1935 Walter Benjamin argued that pre-industrial works of art have (...) an “aura” that exerts an affective lure on consciousness, and that the remnants of this aura in the post-industrial age may lead to the abandonment of critical thought and seduce the masses into the sway of fascism. This paper considers John Dewey’s aesthetic theory in light of the critical perspective developed by his contemporaries in the Frankfurt School. I will consider whether Dewey’s reliance on the qualitative dimension of experience undermines the critical reflection that, theoretically, prevents the “aestheticization of politics” that leads to the spread of fascism, and propose that pragmatist aesthetics would benefit from greater tolerance for the “negativity” exemplified by the critical theorists. (shrink)

The dubious relation of “subjective” experience to “objective” reality finds its correlate in the opposition we often suppose between culture and nature. Twentieth century theorists, most notably Freud, have claimed various methods for interpreting the illusions of one realm that hide the truths of the other. Ricœur has famously called the psychoanalytic method of dream interpretation a “hermeneutics of suspicion,” which he sees as a threat to the “mytho-poetic core of imagination.” John Dewey regarded the binary opposition between culture/nature as (...) particularly dubious, preferring to see them as reciprocal phases of a continuous process; if cultural life is an interpretation of the biophysical environment, that environment surely has its say. However, in the century since Freud, the tactics of suspicion have proven themselves to be indispensable for developing of critiques that reveal the subtle operations of anti-democratic ideologies, perhaps at the expense of democratic faith. This paper considers if there are less suspicious, more Deweyan possibilities for the interpreting and sharing of dreams, not for the benefit of the psychic health of the individual dreamer, but for the sake of a recovery of democratic life. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Flesh in Public:Eros and Political TransformationBethany HenningAmerican Sexual CrisisWe live in a time of erotic dysfunction: In 2020, and again in 2023, there was a brief media frenzy in the wake of studies published by UCLA that concluded that Gen Z is having statistically less sex than millennials did in their formative years. The generational angle made for good headlines, but the same surveys indicated that people of all (...) ages are having less sex than they used to (Herbenick et al.; Wellingham). We needn't work hard to identify likely factors that might have led us here. The pandemic undoubtedly shifted our tolerance for closeness and contact, which has only reinforced the proliferation of technological commodities (devices, apps, platforms) that have made isolation ever more convenient. These studies also found an increase in "rough sex" (inclusive of choking) when people do manage to have sex—which is enough to generate a separate paper pondering the relationship between aggressiveness in the American psyche, the apparent anti-feminist backlash to the #MeToo movement, or it has given some a need to fetishize/work through profound feelings of powerlessness that arise in other domains of life (Skinner and Gottfried). But I tend to think that the recent decrease in sexual activity is the symptom of a wider pathology that should be understood as an "erotic depression."In 1998, as Queer Theory was just beginning to achieve a narrow but resolute foothold in academic life, Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner wrote "there is nothing more public than privacy" (Berlant and Warner 548). This aporetic statement develops into their central claim that our negotiation of the commons is structured by a "core national culture" that "can be imagined as a sanitized space of sentimental feeling and immaculate behavior" through the mechanism of "national heterosexuality." National heterosexuality (distinct from though similar to Adrienne Rich's "compulsory heterosexuality") [End Page 51] is the tacit assumption that family life with its reproductive and consumptive activities is the arrangement that authorizes/redeems desire. If this is the tacit assumption that structures public space, we needn't go through the trouble to represent sexual desires and practices in public. We then assume that normal, healthy sexuality occurs in private. The content of intimate life is presupposed, and protection of this private life and its material pleasures is the central concern around which American politics is organized. For Berlant and Warner, differentiating between what is "public" and what is "private" isn't thoroughly explicated. In The Public and Its Problems, Dewey offered a functional distinction between the private as transactions between individuals that are "immediately and directly engaged," and the public as the as-yet-inchoate collection of individuals that are affected by the "indirect consequences" of a private transaction (LW 2:244). The public, in other words, coheres on the basis of a problem that emerges while their attention is engaged elsewhere—presumably by their own private transactions. But, if that public is to cohere and advocate for itself, fellow-sufferers must find a way to recognize one another as such and then organize around their shared interest. The impediments to queer liberation thus indicate a general hurdle in democratic life: The search for the public involves qualitative work in an affective field that is troubled by the repressive mechanisms that split the private and the public into a strict dichotomy—if the dominant customs repress the crucial affective capacities of the inchoate public, would-be political movements are repressed before suffering can be expressed.If sexual life can be thought of as one possible expression of erotic perception, and if the Deweyan can accept an analogue between erotic perception and what Dewey calls "qualitative thought," then our erotic deficits amount to a diminished sensitivity and a failure of sensual attentiveness to a crucial layer of experience as a whole. Democratic life withers when we fail to perceive the connection between what we do and what we suffer. Without these rhythms of reciprocal response, the live creature becomes hopelessly alienated. The work of Dewey and of Merleau-Ponty represent some of the most successful attempts to think ecologically, because they are willing to take... (shrink)

Abstract:American philosophy has an uneasy relationship with sex. At least, this is the central claim of Richard Shusterman’s recent article, “Pragmatism and Sex: An Unfulfilled Connection,” in which he provides for us an overview of the failures of Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead to theorize about erotic life in any particularly “useful” way. This paper will critically examine this claim by advocating for a more careful reading of the appearance of sexuality within classical American thought—particularly as it is cast within (...) Dewey’s aesthetics—while ultimately sympathizing with the felt need for American philosophers to engage intimate experience with more frankness, respect, and focus. Although American philosophy has erred on the side of reserve, Shusterman’s misreading of Dewey’s critique of Freud, and his mistaking the appearance of Darwin’s theories as reductive, are critical blunders that paint the tradition as overly prudish, and egregiously dismissive of this important sphere of experience. (shrink)

Bethany Henning argues that within the naturalistic strains of American philosophy, there is an implicit theory of the unconscious that finds its fullest expression within the work of John Dewey. Although the unconscious contributes to all experience, it plays a principal role in experiences that are emphatically aesthetic.

dewey is an optimistic thinker. He fits into a vein of pragmatism known as meliorism, which holds that the condition of the world can be improved through intelligent, imaginative, human action. For this reason, it is tempting to read Dewey as permanently cheerful—particularly when we compare him with philosophers from the continental tradition who work on similar themes. However, it is important to remember that meliorism holds that improvement is possible through intelligent engagement—not that it is guaranteed. Dewey's aesthetics particularly (...) have been mischaracterized as overly sanguine, lacking solid account of the tragic. This is a misreading since Dewey's aesthetic does make ample room for human suffering on... (shrink)