The following considerations concern modelling Belief Dynamics (BD) not just in the sense of a formalization, but rather in the sense of building a computational model and implementing the corresponding data structures and algorithms of recomputing beliefs. The purpose of such a project is to illustrate some ideas about belief changes in a Web of Beliefs (WoB) to explore and deepen one's understanding of belief changes by trying to implement or improve corresponding algorithms.

There are positive and negative lessons from Sartre: - Taking up some of his ideas one may arrive at a better model of consciousness in the analytic philosophy of mind; representing some of his ideas within the language and the models of a functionalist theory of mind makes them more accessible and inte¬grates them into the wider picture. - Sartre, as any philosopher, errs at some points, I believe; but these errors may be instruc¬tive, especially in as much as they (...) mirror some errors in some current theories of consciousness. This paper, therefore, is not a piece of Sartre scholarship, but an attempt of a “friendly take¬over” of some ideas I ascribe to Sartre into current models in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

The feedback arrow extending from the response to the distal state in the lens model, together with Brunswik's dictum that the organism is a stabiliser of systems, implies a dynamic view of behaviour. This paper describes the main problems in the study of dynamic decision making: feedback delays and the feedback structure of the tasks. It also describes microworlds, a methodology for studying dynamic decision making in the laboratory. The results from experiments with microworlds show that subjects have problems compensating (...) for feedback delays and side effects. These results are discussed in terms of Brunswik's distinction between perception and thinking. (shrink)

In narrative style, Plato and the Founding of the Academy illustrates how the dialogue usually known as the Republic is constructed on the basis of simple but technical mathematical and harmonical principles, or numbers.

In his recent paper in History and Philosophy of Logic, John Kearns argues for a solution of the Liar paradox using an illocutionary logic (Kearns 2007 ). Paraconsistent approaches, especially dialetheism, which accepts the Liar as being both true and false, are rejected by Kearns as making no ?clear sense? (p. 51). In this critical note, I want to highlight some shortcomings of Kearns' approach that concern a general difficulty for supposed solutions to (semantic) antinomies like the Liar. It is (...) not controversial that there are languages which avoid the Liar. For example, the language which consists of the single sentence ?Benedict XVI was born in Germany? lacks the resources to talk about semantics at all and thus avoids the Liar. Similarly, more interesting languages such as the propositional calculus avoid the Liar by lacking the power to express semantic concepts or to quantify over propositions. Kearns also agrees with the dialetheist claim that natural languages are semantically closed (i.e. are able to talk about their sentences and the semantic concepts and distinctions they employ). Without semantic closure, the Liar would be no real problem for us (speakers of natural languages). But given the claim, the expressive power of natural languages may lead to the semantic antinomies. The dialetheist argues for his position by proposing a general hypothesis (cf. Bremer 2005 , pp. 27?28): ?(Dilemma) A linguistic framework that solves some antinomies and is able to express its linguistic resources is confronted with strengthened versions of the antinomies?. Thus, the dialetheist claims that either some semantic concepts used in a supposed solution to a semantic antinomy are inexpressible in the framework used (and so, in view of the claim, violate the aim of being a model of natural language), or else old antinomies are exchanged for new ones. One horn of the dilemma is having inexpressible semantic properties. The other is having strengthened versions of the antinomies, once all semantic properties used are expressible. This dilemma applies, I claim, to Kearns' approach as well. (shrink)

The paper argues against a commitment to metaphysical necessity, semantic modalities are enough. The best approaches to elucidate the semantic modalities are (still) versions of lingustic ersatzism and fictionalism, even if only developed in parts. Within these necessary properties and the difference between natural and semantic laws can be accounted for. The proper background theory for this is an updated version of Logical Empiricism, which is congenial to recent trends in Structural Realism. The anti-metaphysical attitude of Logical Empiricism deserves revitalization. (...) Another target besides metaphysical necessity are substantial forms of iterated modalities, as used, for instance, in the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

This book gives an overview of paraconsistent logics - that is logics which allow for inconsistency. Although allowing for inconsistency, paraconsistent logics are worth considering: Logical systems are worth considering in their own right since we can learn about very abstract structural properties of logics and the concepts employed within them such as negation, necessity and consistency. Some non-classical logics are especially of interest from a philosophical perspective since they alone offer the possibility of solving or even stating some philosophical (...) problems. These introductory lectures argue from a philosophical perspective that some paraconsistent logics are of interest or even the best candidates for dealing with specific philosophical problems. Although logic is seen from the point of view of its philosophical use, various formal systems are described, compared and employed. (shrink)

Anläßlich ihres 75-jährigen Jubiläums hat die Philosophisch-Theologische Hochschule Sankt Georgen in Frankfurt am Main am 19. und 20. Oktober 2001 eine Tagung zu "Vernünftig. Ansätze gegenwärtiger Religionsphilosophie" veranstaltet, deren wissenschaftlicher Ertrag mit diesem Band öffentlich zur Diskussion gestellt wird. In zwei thematischen Einheiten haben zuerst Philosophen und dann Theologen neue Überlegungen aus ihren Forschungsgebieten vorgetragen und aktuelle Fragestellungen referiert, auf die jeweils ein Vertreter der anderen Fakultät mit kritischen Anfragen erwidert hat. Alle Gesprächseinheiten dieser Art bilden den ersten Teil des (...) vorliegenden Bandes (C.S. Evans/A. Kreiner, P. Valadier/M. Sievernich, F. Ricken/M. Kehl; D. Böhler/H. de Ternay, H.-J. Höhn/M. Dreyer, J.A. Martínez Camino/H.-D. Mutschler, H. Verweyen/J. Splett). Darüber hinaus enthält der Band Beiträge aus dem Kreis der Teilnehmer, die auf die Diskussionen während der Tagung zurückgehen. Zwei geistesgeschichtlich orientierte Aufsätze eröffnen diesen zweiten Teil (R.M.W. Stammberger, R. Berndt). Zwei weitere Texte unterziehen zeitgenössische religionsphilosophische Entwürfe einer kritischen Analyse (G. Kruck, H.-L. Ollig), bevor systematische Skizzen das Buch abschließen (H. Watzka, R. Audi, R. Wimmer). (shrink)

I consider here several versions of finitism or conceptions that try to work around postulating sets of infinite size. Restricting oneself to the so-called potential infinite seems to rest either on temporal readings of infinity (or infinite series) or on anti-realistic background assumptions. Both these motivations may be considered problematic. Quine’s virtual set theory points out where strong assumptions of infinity enter into number theory, but is implicitly committed to infinity anyway. The approaches centring on the indefinitely large and the (...) use of schemata would provide a work-around to circumvent usage of actual infinities if we had a clear understanding of how schemata work and where to draw the conceptual line between the indefinitely large and the infinite. Neither of this seems to be clear enough. Versions of strict finitism in contrast provide a clear picture of a (realistic) finite number theory. One can recapture standard arithmetic without being committed to actual infinities. The major problem of them is their usage of a paraconsistent logic with an accompanying theory of inconsistent objects. If we are, however, already using a paraconsistent approach for other reasons (in semantics, epistemology or set theory), we get finitism for free. This strengthens the case for paraconsistency. (shrink)

Roger W. Sperry received the Nobel Prize for Physiology in 1981 for his outstanding scientific achievements in connection with the study of people with severed brain commissures. Sperry linked the results of his research to philosophical considerations pertaining to the conscious mind of human beings and its place in the natural sciences. He was interested in the philosophical question of whether or not the severing of the cerebral hemispheres constituted a violation of the unity of consciousness. Sperry’s explanatory account of (...) mind-body interaction forms part of a broadly construed theory of emergent interactionism – one that also purports to guarantee the unity of consciousness. In this article, I first present an intellectual profile of Sperry, outlining the evolution of his philosophical-scientific analyses. I then outline the emergence and flourishing of theories of emergence, along with the elements essentially associated with them. Using this as a basis, I go on to consider Sperry’s account of emergent interaction more closely, focusing on his understanding of downward causation. In conclusion, I show how his theory corresponds to a version of emergent interactionism, and seek to address some criticisms leveled against it. I also aim to establish how far this theory can be said to answer the question of the conscious character of mental states. (shrink)

In a petty German principality around 1700, an influential Court Jew wants a traditional Hebrew commentary published. The printer he commissions moves shop and starts printing, not aware of severe clerical censorship. With part of the job done he has to move to another location hoping for a more liberal policy there. Within the absolutist system the episode highlights the opportunities and the limits of Court Jew's influence, as well as the prince's wavering between the prospect of profiting from a (...) new trade and the fear of risking covert un-Christian propaganda. (shrink)

Traditionally transcendental logic has been set apart from formal logic. Transcendental logic had to deal with the conditions of possibility of judgements, which were presupposed by formal logic. Defined as a purely philosophical enterprise transcendental logic was considered as being a priori delivering either analytic or even synthetic a priori results. In this paper it is argued that this separation from the (empirical) cognitive sciences should be given up. Transcendental logic should be understood as focusing on specific questions. These do (...) not, as some recent analytic philosophy has it, include a refutation of scepticism. And they are not to be separated from meta-logical investigations. Transcendental logic properly understood, and redefined along these theses, should concern itself with the (formal) re-construction of the presupposed necessary conditions and rules of linguistic communication in general. It aims at universality and reflexive closure. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

English summary: Gilduin (1155) was, from 1113, the first abbot of the community of the Canons Regular of St Augustine, soon to become an abbey, under the auspices of St Victor of Marseille, on the left bank of the river Seine. After the death of his confrere Hugh, who was of German descent and the leading figure of the Victorines, on 11 February 1141, abbot Gilduin took care that the writings of Hugh were collected and compiled in a representative complete (...) edition. This 'Gilduin-edition' - as it is called in Medieval scholarship - comprises four volumes, the first of which is reconstructed herewith and presented in print. This volume follows the 2008 edition of Hugh's theological summa, De sacramentis christiane fidei. Then as now we are dealing with a critical albeit historical text. This new volume contains nine works, among which the first ever complete edition of Hugh's Cronica surely stands out. German description: Gilduin (+ 1155) war ab 1113 der erste Abt der einige Jahre zuvor gegrundeten und bald zur Abtei erhobenen Gemeinschaft von Augustinerchorherren unter dem Patronat des hl. Victor von Marseille, auf dem linken Ufer der Seine. Nach dem Tode seines Mitbruders Hugo, des aus Deutschland stammenden fuhrenden Kopfes der Viktoriner, am 11. Februar 1141 hat Abt Gilduin dafur gesorgt, daa die Schriften Hugos gesammelt und in einer reprasentativen Gesamtausgabe zusammengestellt werden. Diese in der internationalen mediavistischen Forschung so genannte,Gilduin-Ausgabe' der Werke Hugos von Saint-Victor umfaat vier Bande, deren erster hiermit rekonstruiert und im Druck vorgelegt wird. Dieser Band folgt somit auf unsere im Jahre 2008 besorgte Ausgabe der theologischen Summe Hugos, De sacramentis christiane fidei. Damals wie heute handelt es sich um einen kritischen, wenngleich historischen Text. Dieser neue Band umfaat neun Werke, unter denen insbesondere die uberhaupt erste vollstandige Ausgabe von Hugos Cronica hervorzuheben ist. (shrink)

The argument that Broca's area is preferentially involved in specific syntactic operations is based on a strong assertion regarding patterns of sentence comprehension found among patients with Broca's aphasia. This assertion is shown to be largely inconsistent with the available evidence from published studies, which indicates that only a subgroup of Broca patients demonstrate the target pattern.

J’ai souvent songé que le propre du clerc dans l’âge moderne est de prêcher dans le désert. Je crois que j’y suis passé maître.Julien Benda Faute de savoir dans quelle catégorie vous classer, on ne vous inscrit dans aucune.Louis Rougier.

Die im vorliegenden Band veröffentlichte Vorlesung "Einleitung in die Philosophie" aus dem Wintersemester 1922/23 ist aus vier 1922 von Husserl in London unter dem Titel "Phänomenologische Methode und phänomenologische Philosophie" gehaltenen Vorträgen hervorgegangen. Die Vorlesung befasst sich vor allem mit dem für die Grundlegung eines philosophischen Systems zentralen Problem der Letztbegründung. Radikale philosophische Letztbegründung ist gemäß Husserl nur möglich in einer sich in apodiktischer Selbstkritik bewährenden phänomenologischen Transzendentalphilosophie. Die tatsächliche Durchführung einer solchen letzten, in seinen späten Schriften und Vorlesungstexten immer (...) wieder geforderten Kritik, findet sich nur in der vorliegenden Vorlesung "Einleitung in die Philosophie". Mit diesem unverzichtbaren Bestandteil seiner Ersten Philosophie bringt der vorliegende Band eine wichtige Ergänzung zu der in den Bänden VII und VIII veröffentlichten Vorlesung "Erste Philosophie" von 1923/24. (shrink)

Dan Lloyd jest profesorem filozofii w Trinity College. Tytuł i motto omawianej książki nawiązuje do wiersza Allena Ginsberga „Skowyt" [„Widziałem najwspanialsze umysły mego pokolenia, zniszczone obłędem,... którzy ukończyli uniwersytety chłodnym promiennym okiem..." ]. Książka Radiant Cool jest napisana prostym językiem, chociaż pojawia się w niej wiele neurofenomenologicznego „żargonu", co może zniechęcać do dalszej lektury. Książka dostarcza dobrego wprowadzenia do fenomenologii Husserla i do debat obecnych we współczesnej, angloamerykańskiej filozofii świadomości, odwołujących się do wyników badan neurologicznych. Można ją polecić studentom filozofii, (...) psychologii oraz neurologii. Wprowadzający charakter książki podkreślają liczne schematy, wytłuszczenia, wcięcia tekstu, tabelki itp., mające unaocznić główne toki rozumowania. Cechy ujemny takich schematów i rysunków jest to, ze równocześnie zawyżają one pole rozumienia i sprawiają wrażenie, że tak naprawdę, to problem świadomości już został rozwiązany. Dlatego podczas czytania Radiant Cool należy ciągle pamiętać, że tezy Lloyda są z założenia „optymistyczne" i mają informacyjno-komercyjny charakter. (shrink)

This essay deals with the concept of truth in the context of a version of internal realism . In §1 I define some variants of realism using a set of realistic axioms. In §2 I will argue that for semantical reasons we should be realists of some kind. In §3 I plead for an internalistic setting of realism starting from the thesis that truth is, at least, not a non-epistemic concept. We have to bear the consequences of this in form (...) of a more complicated concept of truth. The "internal" of "internal realism" points to the justification aspect of truth. The "realism" of "internal realism" points to the correspondence aspect. A thesis concerning the irreducibility of the two aspects will be established in §4. (shrink)

Within the philosophy of logic there has been an old debate about strengths and weaknesses of so-called “deviant” logics, as compared to standard logic (i.e. First Order Logic with Identity). With the development of a multitude of many-valued and modal logical systems and the various ways they can be employed in various fields of philosophy, linguistics and computer science, former “deviant” logics have become well accepted. Nowadays we seem to have a new and almost contrary debate about whether there is (...) any universal logic at all or only a multitude of systems: logical pluralism. But what does logical pluralism claim? In this paper one prominent version of logical pluralism is the main target of further questions. (shrink)

The following essay reconsiders the ontological and logical issues around Frege’s Basic Law (V). If focuses less on Russell’s Paradox, as most treatments of Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (GGA)1 do, but rather on the relation between Frege’s Basic Law (V) and Cantor’s Theorem (CT). So for the most part the inconsistency of Naïve Comprehension (in the context of standard Second Order Logic) will not concern us, but rather the ontological issues central to the conflict between (BLV) and (CT). These ontological (...) issues are interesting in their own right. And if and only if in case ontological considerations make a strong case for something like (BLV) we have to trouble us with inconsistency and paraconsistency. These ontological issues also lead to a renewed methodological reflection what to assume or recognize as an axiom. (shrink)

This essay tries to elucidate structural elements of consciousness by drawing on phenomenological descriptions of consciousness and employing representationalist models of consciousness. The aim is not to explain the genesis of self-awareness, but to outline different aspects of its structure.

Naturalistic explanations (of linguistic behaviour) have to answer two questions: What is meant by giving a naturalistic explanation, and what does it explain after all? Two kinds of descriptivism present in Wittgenstein´s work are distinguished and applied to Hirsch´s “division problem”. They answer the two questions raised and keeping in mind their distinction is important to assess naturalistic explanations.