This volume provides a thought-provoking critique the main, existing school of environmental ethics and seeks to build a more coherent and rigorous philosophical basis for future environmental policy.

It is argued that 'sustainable development' has been defined in such a way as to be either morally repugnant or logically redundant. 'Strong' sustainability, overriding all other considerations, is morally unacceptable as well as totally impractical; and 'weak' sustainability, in which compensation is made for resources consumed, offers nothing beyond traditional economic welfare maximisation. The 'sustainability' requirement that human well-being should never be allowed to decline is shown to be irrational. Welfare economics can accommodate distributional considerations, and, suitably defined, the (...) concept of welfare can include the subjective effects of changes in – as well as the levels of – well-being. Hence there is no reason why welfare maximisation should not remain an overriding policy objective. Nor can sustainability be regarded as a 'constraint' on welfare maximisation unless there is a clear conflict between the two – which has yet to be demonstrated. This is not to deny the importance of intergenerational justice, nor the need for economic incentives to correct market imperfections if the environment is to be managed in a socially optimal manner. Apart from a few small developing countries heavily dependent on minerals or other finite primary products, the measurement of some wider concept of 'sustainable' GNP is a waste of time and such estimates as have been made are virtually worthless. (shrink)

This article concentrates on the Jacobs and Daly criticisms (Environmental Values, Spring 1994) of my earlier article in the same journal (Autumn 1994) criticising the concept of 'sustainable development'. Daly and Jacobs agreed with my criticisms of 'weak' sustainability, but defended 'strong' sustainability on the grounds that natural and manmade capital were 'complements' in the productive process and that economists are wrong, therefore, in assuming that they are infinitely substitutable. This article maintains that they are confusing different concepts of 'complementarity' (...) and 'substitutability'. It is also argued that, in fact, they do both sell crucial passes in their defence of strong sustainability without providing any clear criteria for their abandonment of it in certain cases. It is also denied that the fact that environmental services may provide different satisfactions from those obtained from other goods and services elevates it to the status of some over-riding moral value, or that discounting future costs and benefits is 'unfair' to future generations. (shrink)

It is widely believed that environmental conservation has to be guided by respect for the ‘rights’ of future generations. But it is argued in this chapter that it may not be plausible to think in terms of the ‘rights’ of future generations in general or their rights to any specific environmental assets. Future generations may well have rights when they come into existence, but these will only be rights that can be satisfied at the time. But ‘rights’ do not exhaust (...) the whole of morality, and future generations will certainly have interests, which means that we are under moral obligation to take account of them and of the effect that our environmental policies may have on them. Thus, the problem is to predict what the main interests of future generations will be and how to weigh them up against the interests of people alive today. It is argued that this approach will lead to a very different ranking of priorities among our moral obligations to future generations. (shrink)

The paper discusses some of the criticisms of contingent valuation (CV) and allied techniques for estimating the intensity of peoples' preferences for the environment. The weakness of orthodox utilitarian assumptions in economics concerning the commensurability of all items entering into peoples' choices is discussed. The concept of commensurability is explored as is the problem of rational choice between incommensurate alternatives. While the frequent claim that the environment has some unique moral intrinsic value is unsustainable, its preservation often raises ethical and (...) other motivations that are not commensurate with the values that people place on ordinary marketable goods. Nevertheless, CV is also claimed to have some advantages and it is concluded that little progress will be made in this area until both sides in the debate recognise what is valid in their opponents' arguments. (shrink)

In response to recent work on the nature of human aggression, and to shed light on the proximate, as opposed to ultimate, causes of tribal warfare, we present a record of events leading to a fatal Waorani raid on a family from another tribe, followed by a detailed first-person observation of the behavior of the raiders as they prepared themselves for war, and upon their return. We contrast this attack with other Waorani aggressions and speculate on evidence regarding their hormonal (...) underpinnings. On-the-ground ethnographic observations are examined in light of the neuroendocrinological literature. The evidence suggests a chain of causality in launching lethal violence, beginning with a perceived injury, culminating in a massacre, and terminating in rejoicing. Although no blood or saliva samples were taken at the time of this raid, the behaviors were consistent with a deliberate initiation of the hormonal cascade characterizing the “fight-or-flight” response, along with other hormonal changes. We conclude with observations on the stratified interrelationships of the cognitive, social, emotional, and neuroendocrinological causes of aggression leading to coalitional male homicide. (shrink)

It is recalled that serious doubts can be raised concerning the status of theories such as those pertaining to the rights of future generations, or the constraints imposed on us by theories of intergenerational justice. At the same time, we do have moral obligations to future generations. But these must be based on an appraisal of what are likely to be the main interests that future generations will have and which of these are most likely to be under permanent threat. (...) These, it is argued, will be in the field of human relations rather than in the field of the environment. It is concluded, therefore, that the most important bequest we can make to future generations is to leave them a society in which there is a greater respect for basic human rights than is the case today throughout most of the world. And since the best way of bequeathing a more decent society to future generations is, of course, to improve the respect for human rights today, there is no conflict of interest between the present generation and future generations. Hence, theories of intergenerational distributive justice are not only untenable but are also unnecessary. (shrink)

This chapter leaves the ‘safe’ world of philosophical speculation and turns to the dangerous world of economic prediction. It outlines the economic reasons for believing that, in the very long term—i.e. abstracting from cyclical or other transitory fluctuations in economic activity—future generations will be incomparably richer than people today. Reasons are also given for believing that there will be no significant obstacles to future growth on account of popularly feared environmental developments, such as running out of ‘finite’ resources, or climate (...) change. (shrink)

Discusses one principle that has been suggested as a guide to the way we ought to take account of the interests of future generations, namely the principle of intergenerational ‘equity’ and its related claim of intergenerational equality, particularly in spheres such as the way we should share out ‘finite’ resources among generations. This chapter examines the possible arguments in favour of intergenerational egalitarianism and concludes that they are difficult to defend. It is proposed that egalitarianism should be replaced by the (...) principle of ‘threshold prioritarianism’, so that our moral obligation to future generations should be based on a humanitarian concern to avoid policies that may impoverish them. (shrink)

During the last two or three decades, various developments in the environmental sphere have led to increasing concern with our obligations to posterity and to the non‐human part of the natural world. These developments have exposed gaps in both traditional, moral, and political theory and in conventional economics. Environmental issues have exposed these gaps and have brought to the fore questions such as how far the society, with whose welfare we are concerned, includes future generations or is limited to individual (...) nations or human beings. This book examines these questions as well as related ethical aspects of environmental policy, such as environmental valuation or the equitable allocation among nations of the burden of environmental protection. (shrink)

Some current environmental problems are global and have public good elements that raise, in an acute form, the question of how the costs of a collective effort from which the world as a whole will benefit should be shared out among poor and rich countries. This chapter discusses how far theories of justice provide guidance to this question. It argues that the answer seems to be ‘very little’ and that, in order to arrive at some ground rules for allocating the (...) burden of global environmental protection between countries—as between generations—we are forced back on humanitarian principles of concern for the poor. (shrink)

It is argued that although there may be some case, on economic grounds, for international cooperative action to deal with the threat of climate change or an excessive depletion of biodiversity, the advantages of participation in such action are probably not very great for most rich countries. Furthermore, some of the ‘ethical’ arguments advanced in support of the view that the rich countries should shoulder most of the burden of international action are weak. Nevertheless, there is a case for the (...) richer countries to do so both on grounds of a moral responsibility to assist very poor people and on grounds of the need to look at international cooperation in a wider framework that takes account of the dependence of cooperation from different groups of countries in dealing with a host of other international problems. (shrink)

Although there are many theories of justice, one crucial feature of those that are most widely accepted is that they lay down principles that determine the allocation of rights and obligations in society. They do not eliminate conflicts of interest between different groups but, by specifying such principles, they are designed to enable conflicting interests to be resolved in a peaceful and harmonious manner. But insofar as future generations cannot be said to have any rights, their interests cannot be protected (...) within the framework of any theory of intergenerational justice. This chapter discusses the general relationship between ‘rights’ and ‘justice’, and the obstacles to any theory of intergenerational justice. (shrink)

Human mating strategies are contingent on individual prospects. Gangestad & Simpson provide a useful framework to explore these differing prospects, but do not take sufficient account of what is known ethnographically about mating decisions. Women often do not select their own long term mates. Men often have two or more long term mates, and can invest in the offspring of short term matings also.

Even if future generations have no rights and intergenerational justice, intergenerational egalitarianism, and sustainable development are all flawed, this does relieve us of a moral obligation to take account of the impact of our policies on the interests of future generations. In this chapter we argue that whereas, in the very long run, it seems that widespread acute poverty will be eliminated and a decent environment will be preserved, there seems to be no prospect of ever eradicating the inherent weaknesses (...) of the human psyche that are responsible for some groups in society imposing intolerable suffering on others. Hence, it seems that the most valuable bequest we could make to future generations would be a more decent, tolerant, and ‘just’ society than the one in which most people live today. Furthermore, there is clear evidence that the greatest environmental damage has been done in countries where there has been the least respect for basic human rights. (shrink)

Another widely suggested principle governing our obligations to future generations is ‘sustainable development’. The first part of this chapter argues that the mainstream interpretations of the concept of sustainable development are open to serious objections on ethical grounds. The chapter also shows that even if intergenerational egalitarianism were a viable objective there is nothing intergenerationally egalitarian about sustainable development.

Extending the findings of this work: Tribal peoples need study. Monogamy as marital institution and monogamy as sociosexual orientation must be separated. Sociosexuality must be considered as an aspect of somatic as well as reproductive effort; third-party interventions in sociosexuality need attention; and multiple sociosexual orientations, with frequency-dependent fitness payoffs equal at equilibrium, need to be modeled.

There are interesting parallelisms between McCullough et al.'s article and studies of revenge presented by French legal anthropologist Raymond Verdier, particularly as regards the discussion of the increasing likelihood of revenge with increasing social distance. Additionally, the observation that many peoples speak of revenge in the language of debt and repayment, links it with exchanges of benefits as well as costs.

Generations are not homogeneous entities and are composed of individuals and nations that have conflicting interests in the way in which resources are allocated among competing uses. This chapter discusses whether ‘the environment’, or ‘nature’, should enjoy special status in any allocation; whether the economist's approach is too anthropocentric; the concept of ‘intrinsic’ values; and the application of these concepts to environmental valuation. It is argued that while many environmental assets are ‘public goods’, so that the free market is unlikely (...) to supply the socially optimal amount, the same applies to many other things, such as public health or education services or the arts, not to mention the fact that most people in the world are, anyway, in dire need of a simple increase in their ability to buy simple basic private goods. This means that the allocation of resources to environmental objectives ought to take into account some form of cost‐benefit analysis. (shrink)

According to Lynne Baker, there are three main arguments for the.

Campbell's evolutionary explanation of women's typically lower rates of interpersonal aggression is plausible, but some supporting evidence requires scrutiny. Women may not commit less interpersonal violence than men against small children. Women are more vulnerable than men in same-sex encounters. The link between dominance and reproductive success for males is less secure than was once thought.