The discussion concerning the patenting of academic knowledge is already closed for many people. It has become a type of credo, solemnly intoned at all levels: universities must commercially valorize the knowledge that they generate as extensively as possible.The public means that are reserved for universities can never increase at the same rate as the mounting costs for highly specialized research. So universities, if they want to work at the top level, must increasingly appeal to private resources. Universities are increasingly (...) forced to aim at contract research, sponsorships, commercialised service, the patenting of technical findings, and spin-offs: Cash for knowledge!The pressure for the unfettered commercialisation of academic knowledge does not only come from within the universities. The message also comes from the politicians and those who are committed to economic prosperity. They argue that the commercialisation of intellectual property contributes to new employment because it makes new industrial developments possible and reinforces the competitiveness of ventures. They make it seem that universities form the motor of the knowledge economy.In a country without considerable natural resources and with extremely high personnel costs, innovation is of vital importance. Few convictions are equally as expressly avowed at so many differing forums. The direction of the march seems clear.It was once different. The knowledge that was acquired, deepened, preserved, and transmitted within the universities was not for sale. In fact, its sale could present difficulties because academic knowledge has never answered to the properties of a marketable thing. Use does not deplete knowledge and if you consider it your mission to bring to light knowledge, you do not want to exclude anyone from making use of it.Academic knowledge could thus not be an object of trade, at least so long as nobody was intent on keeping that knowledge secret, and so long as nobody appealed to regulations, whereby one could restrict the legal use of that knowledge. Today neither of these strategies are taboo within academic centres. The patenting of all forms of qualifying knowledge is even encouraged.A patent assumes, on the one hand, that one makes public the knowledge upon which a technique rests, while one, on the other hand, can grant use of that technique exclusively to who one gives a licence, whether or not for a fee. This system is put forth as attractive for all parties. The researchers can keep up with technical details, and the entrepreneur can commercialise the finding. Everyone is happy.Or perhaps not? Are there reasons to be concerned that universities must increasingly submit themselves to the laws of the market? Are there arguments for evaluating academic performance differently than the performance of entrepreneurs? Must one regret that knowledge is commercialised as much as possible?The proponents of the commercial orientation point out that all kinds of new incentives will give a new impetus to the old academic system and will increase the relevance of academic research. They seem to dismiss resistance to the renewal as a nostalgic outpouring of a privileged group that used to have it too good, a group that for too long knew to retreat too safely back into a series of unworldly problems.The opponents of the economically oriented approach fear that the proper character of the academic mission will be lost. They fear that the loss of academic autonomy will make the specific function that a university fulfils within society impossible. In what sense?In our society, there is not one type of sphere, and there is not one valid set of standards, the basis upon which performances are evaluated, functions are judged, or objectives commended. There are strongly divergent spheres and each have their own specific function. The laws that apply in one sphere do not necessarily have authority in another sphere, and the standards that apply in one sort of relationship often have little or no meaning in another relationship.Each sphere recognises its own standards and answers to its own system of exchange for compensation, approval, and recognition. What applies in the sphere of law does not necessarily apply in the sphere of someone’s personal friendships, or is not applicable among family members. What applies in trade does not necessarily apply in the sphere of art.Even more, things go wrong when the autonomy of these spheres is not respected. Within the domain of art, love and friendship, monetary laws are not valid, at least in a healthy situation. That is not to say that the rules that apply within the free market would be wrong or unethical – far from it. It seems self evident that these laws are valid under the condition that they apply in the environment to which they belong, and that one respects these limits.This applies for all spheres. It would be unjust if one would apply the standards of friendship to the spheres of jurisprudence or education. Manifestly, it seems self evident not to define justice as a univocal principle that must be extended with the same consistency in every type of sphere. Rather, it is just to respect the individual character of the normative relationship that applies in the diverse spheres of life, and to prevent one sphere from colonising another.Justice assumes that one prevents the political sphere from stipulating what must be said, or concealed, within the academic sphere. Academics must answer alone to that which is expected of them within the academic sphere. Political pressure may exert no influence on this. Why cannot one say the same about economic pressure?Do we run the risk that the economic sphere will colonise the academic sphere just as the economic sphere previously colonised the sphere of media? What must one imagine in this supposed risk? In what sense should economic laws threaten the academic sphere?In the academic sphere, it is traditional to follow one’s own interests and investigate anything whatsoever without having to ask if this knowledge is useful for something or how the fruits of this research fit within the economic context. The academic search for a better understanding of everything has an unconditional character.The manner in which researchers evaluate the performance of each other seldom has to do with the economic effects that their findings have, but with their reliability, the meticulousness with which they were checked, the scrupulousness with which the sources were collected, and the honesty with which they were communicated. The function of the academic is to collect and refine knowledge, and to bring to light the truth.By doing so, universities offer a type of foot-hold within society. They make it possible that a place exists where one can be obedient to what lets itself appear most truthfully today. Nobody has to fear, at least as long as the autonomy of the academic sphere is respected, that the communication of a particular subject was rhetorically coloured in function of a commercial interest, was applied according to the wishes of the sponsor, was brought into conformity with what was agreed upon by the financiers, or answered to the demands of a patent.It is possible that the influence of the commercial sphere shall be less dramatic than pessimistic academics imagine, but nothing indicates the opposite. Today we are giving a new strategy power, and nobody knows how the magician’s apprentice will bring it off.This forms the context of the questions that we shall try to answer together this number of Ethical Perspectives, and we will restrict our discussion to patents. We are aware that the discussion about patents illuminates just one part of the problems, which have to do with the relation of the worlds of academia and commerce. But there is a reason for confining oneself to an aspect of this problematic relationship. If one were to broaden the scope of inquiry further, one would risk missing the complexity of the subject matter already covered, and be consigned to a far too general and aimless debate.We have brought together a number of specialists, jurists, ethicists, and people with practical experience with the field. They shall introduce us into the problematic, confront us with their points of view, and help to answer our questions: Are there moral limits to the patenting of academic knowledge? Is patenting always the most efficient strategy? Does not perhaps the university sell its soul if it gradually leaves itself subject to the laws of the market?We will begin by asking how in particular a university should proceed with the patenting of knowledge. Modern universities were inspired by the ideals of the Enlightenment, which was characterised by the open distribution of unselfishly pursued knowledge.The privatisation and commercialisation of knowledge would seem to conflict with this traditional vision. Jürgen Mittelstrass and Bart Pattyn provide a theoretical and historical basis for protecting the autonomy of university research from the corrupting aspects of the market economy.But, are there reasons for giving up the traditional outlook? Few or no universities have not chosen to patent discoveries, but how is one to proceed within the framework of the university, once one has obtained patent protection? Can one pursue a policy of using these protected intellectual rights to secure the fruits of knowledge for financially weaker groups, or do circumstances compel the universities to be exclusively driven by market forces?Those are the kinds of questions that Gilles Capart and Geertrui Van Overwalle of the KU Leuven will deal with.Sigrid Sterckx of the university of Ghent will answer the question: can patents be morally justified?Paul Belleflamme of the Université Catholique de Louvan La Neuve writes concerning the economic evidence of patents, and the real effect of incentives. Are there any economic facts that can demonstrate the effectiveness of patenting?Then we give the floor to Christopher May of the University of Lancaster, who looks at the question of how universities have to deal with the global information society. (shrink)

The intention of this paper is to relate the various standpoints regarding anxiety and uncertainty. Within the humanities and social sciences, research is pursued in many different disciplines without much interaction between them. Everyone's thinking is based on concepts which are domain-specific, and the distinctions, methods and arguments used are the ones that are generally accepted within the discipline. The divergent conclusions constitute pieces of a puzzle that are seldom if ever put together. There are even doubts about whether such (...) a puzzle can be put together. It can hardly be denied, however, that inspiration is to be found in a consideration of the views and findings of colleagues from other disciplines who are working on the same problems. Now that we have as our guests two prominent academics, each with specific views about our subject, we should take this opportunity to discuss together some of the sociological, anthropological, economic, philosophical and theological approaches to anxiety and uncertainty.If a number of well-known authors are to be believed, lack of trust, uncertainty and insecurity affect the most affluent and modern societies. In French one speaks of précarité , in German of Unsicherheit and Risikogesellschaft , and in English of “fear”, “risk” and “insecurity” . All modern Western societies seem to be afflicted with the same dismal and frustrating human experience.Belgian society is no exception to this. In recent years we have regularly been subjected to the emotional reactions provoked by sensational events in the areas of politics , justice and public health . Less spectacular but no less real were the results of opinion polls which showed that confidence in public institutions in general, and politics in particular, is at an all-time low. (shrink)

Analyse van de crisis in de normen, waarden en gebruiken in het oude Griekenland, zoals beschreven door Plato.

What is the meaning of tradition and community for ethical reflection in specific situations? Can ethical decisions be deduced from a theory of norms and ideals isolated from traditionrelated meaning systems? Given a multiform world, with what valid arguments can a particular meaning system, e.g. the Christian tradition, participate in current debates on matters of applied ethics? These are the questions addressed in this issue.

On May the 3rd, 2002, the European Centre for Ethics held the Politeia Conference in the Palace of the Royal Academy in Brussels. The conference title was The Rise of Lifestyle Politics and its Consequences for Liberty. In this issue we present the lectures delivered during this conference.The Politeia Conference intends to familiarize a broad public with innovative ideas to stimulate dialogue about the future of our society. Held every two years, the Politeia Conference invites internationally renowned academics with inspiring (...) views about social and political events.The conference is an interdisciplinary initiative. The conference enjoyed the support of the Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for Arts and Science. It was a joint inter-university event, with the participation of K.U.Leuven, V.U.Brussels, the University of Ghent and the University of Antwerp.Until recently, political ideology provided a broad context of meaning and united a large group of people who strived for the same social ideals. The communication between the leadership of a political party and the grass-roots members went by way of local party representatives, and the voter's ballot was a sign of trust in the ability of the party leadership to translate their ideas into concrete political decisions.Now it seems that the traditional ideology-based political movements are a thing of the past. Their role and influence is in decline, while the importance of communication through the mass media has increased dramatically. Politicians are finding it necessary to show their faces on television.The efforts they make in diligently following certain issues turn out to be less 'rewarding' than submitting noteworthy legislative proposals, making audacious pronouncements, or participating in talk shows or demonstrations. What appeals nowadays to the reader or viewer — i.e., the voter — is not in the first place a specific message or a powerful argument.The focus now is on the politician as an individual, the lifestyle he personifies, and whether or not he is a smooth talker. In such an environment, political communication has a great deal in common with advertising. But when the majority of citizens entertain themselves with media spectacles and exhibit little interest in substantive arguments about decisions made at an increasingly abstract and global level, then political power withdraws from the eye of public opinion.A potentially troubling development that goes together with the waning influence of traditional political ideologies is the shift towards a more meritocratic society. The highest aspiration of a society driven by economic growth is not the general welfare or service to the community, but personal success.People are not judged on the basis of their loyalty and commitment to their organization, but on their individual achievements and belongings. However, a growing number of citizens feel they are unable to attain the kind of achievements and obtain the belongings that command respect today. This feeling of powerlessness has less to do with intellectual baggage or material considerations than with a lack of social recognition for their accomplishments.This malaise is particularly acute among those working in sectors where the emphasis is on the general public welfare and where career rewards are relatively meagre: education, health care and various other public services. Identification with the dominant political culture is also problematic among immigrants, who tend to work in low-prestige jobs and bear the stigma of a foreign origin.For these reasons, a growing number of people are distancing themselves from 'official' culture and taking refuge in the virtual enclaves of various mass media where a carefully cultivated house style ensures an attractive forum for a specific target group.A network or a newspaper that aims at a clearly definable segment of the population is an excellent medium for targeted advertising. Moreover, the creation of an atmosphere in which viewers, listeners and readers all feel at home benefits customer relations. Just as in real enclaves, the creation of a virtual enclave with an 'us versus them' presupposes a pressure to conform.Someone who does not meet the implicit expectations that are cultivated within a particular medium is denied access to the medium. Anything ugly, strange or out of the ordinary is held up to ridicule or indignation. The authority of a house style applies not only to the choice of fictional content, but also to the sort of news that is reported. News of crime and scandal is much better at strengthening the virtual solidarity of the group of insiders than abstract information concerned with the well-being of the actual society or world community.A virtual group gives the viewer, listener or reader a feeling of security, but it also undoubtedly contributes to a provincialism characterized by suspicion of everything complex, new or foreign. People who are susceptible to taking refuge in a virtual enclave are often the same people who feel attracted to political parties who favour a mono-ethnic enclave.In any case, there exists a demonstrable connection between the amount of television a person watches, a preference for commercial networks, soaps and game shows, on the one hand, and the choice of authoritarian leadership and xenophobia, on the other. This is a worrying state of affairs, in particular given the recent electoral success of anti-democratic parties in Europe.In order to resist anti-democratic feelings, we clearly need another sort of politics than 'lifestyle politics'. One aim of the Politeia Conference was to ask whether the decline of traditional ideology-based politics is an irreversible fact in light of the impact of the free market on the aspirations of citizens. Or is it possible to keep politics and the media out of the purely economic sphere, to create zones for real political debate and ethically inspired journalism? In this issue you will find some responses to these questions. (shrink)

Not all classically trained philosophers are enchanted by the success of ‘applied ethics’. Many among them are somewhat suspicious that the tendency toward further specialization will divert attention away from more fundamental ethical problems. This suspicion is reinforced by the fact that the world of medicine, technology, politics and economics demands ready made ethical answers, not to mention the fact that the sponsoring, subsidies and grants for research in areas which respond to this demand are significantly larger than for research (...) in classical moral philosophy. Such external influences on the ethical agenda are seen by many ethicists and philosophers as an encroachment on a more objective determination of academically relevant concerns. (shrink)

On Thursday, May 7th, The European Centre for Ethics organized the first ‘Politeia-conference’, whose aim is to reflect on responsible policy and civic sensibility. The title was ‘Courageous or Indifferent Individualism’ and the guest speaker was Robert Bellah, Eliot Professor of Sociology, University of California. In this issue, you will find Bellah’s lecture, the position papers and the discussion.Individualism can be seen as a gift or a curse, depending on the context in which it occurs. Alongside ideals such as maturity, (...) autonomy and emancipation, ‘individualism’ appears as one of modern culture’s most cherished acquisitions. An individualist is considered to be someone with personality and character, someone who is not easily intimidated by social pressure or customs, someone with a personal opinion and a singular view of the world. Because modern society finds it important that people think independently, decide autonomously and take personal initiatives, the concept of individualism has acquired a positive connotation.However, individualism is also linked with the tendency to withdraw from social life and turn in towards oneself. Alexis de Tocqueville described individualism as the cool and considered attitude which drives people to withdraw into a small, enclosed world consisting of their family and a few select friends, leaving the rest of society to its own devices.This dual connotation of individualism is reflected in the title of the conference by the qualifiers ‘courageous’ and ‘indifferent’. Courageous individualism refers to the dedication shown by people who have independently chosen for something or someone and work energetically for its sake in spite of opposition from family or society; indifferent individualism refers to people who have either lost all hope in their fellow human beings or are no longer interested in initiatives of a social nature, with the result that they are prepared to withdraw from society at all costs. (shrink)

None of us is able to keep track all the time of all the risks we are confronted with every day. Generally the opposite is the case: it is precisely because we usually succeed in not thinking about all kinds of potential danger that we are able to concentrate on more concrete matters. This is one of the reasons that September 11th represents a turning point. We all live in a different world now — not because the world itself has (...) changed, but because the pattern through which we view the world has lost its grip on us, and it will probably take some time before this mental pattern once again gives us peace. The psychological damage has been particularly acute in the United States. The question is how can we think of a world that is safe enough, a world in which we are once more able to engage with our everyday concerns. The tragedy has given rise to a great deal of soul-searching and reflection. People are once more aware that `foreign' countries exist, and international cooperation is once again a worthy goal to pursue.Terrorism is like a cancerous tumour: it must be cut away or destroyed. But even before it assumes a visible form, cancer is a risk that can be countered preventively. However, opinions are divided about how terrorist hatred arises. There are some who claim it is born of an unjust world trade system or the lack of local infrastructure and initiative; others point to the absence of external investment. (shrink)

Politicians attach great importance to the way in which they are portrayed in the media. Word choice and timing are carefully weighed. Corporations, social institutions and public services often appeal to communications experts. Under the motto `better communication', advertising agencies promote not only consumer goods but also ideas, lifestyles, beliefs and even blunders.At precisely the same moment, social scientists and philosophers are reaching an agreement that moral beliefs and social objectives are purified and legitimated when they are the object of (...) a wide-ranging dialogue. Views and ideals cannot simply be derived from individual reflections, abstract theories or tradition. Whoever wants to discover which social principles are legitimate and respectable must take part in the discussion about concrete social choices with all parties concerned.These tendencies are in conflict with each other. On the one hand, it is to be hoped that public opinion acquires a critical sense on the basis of fair social debates in which the various facets of prevailing social problems can be carefully examined. On the other hand, there is a fear that the slick, mediagenic style used by public relations experts leads more often to blindness than insight. The media play an important role in this game of power.In selecting news items and in their method of presenting these items, the media create metaphors, images and stereotypes that guide our perception of social reality. Their guiding motives in this are not selfless. In their competitive commercial atmosphere, a broad interest is essential.Around that subject the European Centre for Ethics organized the biannual Politeia Conference on “Modern Media and Social Dialogue”. The conference was well attended, and its strong international focus was reflected in the presence of speakers, workshop presenters and conference participants from throughout Europe as well as from across the Atlantic. Major speakers were: Zygmunt Bauman, Elihu Katz, Johan Galtung, Serge Moscovici, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Stephen K. White, Harry Kunneman, Gilles Lipovetsky, and Clifford Christians. The central question dealt with by this conference was how the media can make a contribution, in the present context, to a high-quality social dialogue. (shrink)

In spite of the fact that people spontaneously presuppose that moral consensus does not exist in today’s world, modern societies tend nevertheless to be characterised by an egalitarian liberal engagement that is sustained by a broadly upheld collective concern: the rejection or neutralisation of any kind of public justification. The failure of this neutralisation is apparent for all to see, however, leading modern societies with problems the existence of which they are forced to deny. The resulting situation thus obliges egalitarian (...) liberal societies to review many of their moral presuppositions. (shrink)

The traditional concern universities have had with public, universal knowledge seems to be waning, with an ever-greater stress upon privatised knowledge. Nevertheless, this is an old quarrel. Since Plato saw knowledge as in service of society, he scorned the Sophists for commercialising knowledge. For the mediaeval university, which continued and developed certain strands of Plato’s thinking, the privatisation of knowledge was also unthinkable, since all knowledge ultimately belonged to God.The success of the mediaeval university lay in its autonomy, and its (...) freedom from commercial pressure. As such, the university’s mission was the cultivation of a global, philosophical worldview in function of a broader social mission, and not in function of surplus economic value. The shift to modernity meant that scientific knowledge could lead to commercial products and techniques.With the cooling of the Enlightenment and its optimism in the scientific project, knowledge increasingly became a neutral resource used and applied in any way possible. Today, the close connection between entrepreneurs and scientists seems to reflect an official policy that the commercialisation of university knowledge is in the best interest of society.However, the university offers more than commercial knowledge – its orienting function also helps ensure that knowledge is won honestly and used responsibly, a double loyalty stretching back to Plato. It would not be wise to attempt to rail against the commercialisation of knowledge, but it would be just as foolish to think that knowledge is only something to be commercialised. The question is to forge an understanding between financial partners and academics that respects and works according to this double loyalty. The credibility of research – and the academy – depends on this. (shrink)

Neo-conservative talk about authority, tradition and ritual must have come as a surprise to all those enlightened ethicists who had to struggle in order to emancipate themselves from authority and traditional morality — all the more since the representatives of the neo-conservative tendencies are obviously not trying to obey any official authority, but are mostly independent academics.Invoking the image of a pendulum to describe this ethical turnaround, would neglect a significant feature by which the ‘new’ conservative philosophers and theologians might (...) be distinguished from ‘classical’ conservative thinkers. Though both encourage greater respect for tradition and authority, the reasons for choosing such conservative virtues rest on quite different epistemological presuppositions. If this is not taken into account, then the question how it is possible that philosophers and theologians such as Hauerwas could be tempted by such apparently conservative language, will be unanswerable.It goes without saying that epistemological presuppositions are seldom made explicit, and when they are, they often prove to be extremely complicated. Nor is it possible to fit them into clearly circumscribed categories without paying a certain price. Nevertheless, in order to shed at least some light on the current epistemological alternatives and their consequences, I would like to describe two positions which, for the sake of convenience, I will denote by the terms ‘classical’ and ‘new’. (shrink)

CONCLUSION :Whoever wants to pursue just social reforms, breathe new life into political democracy, and improve the welfare of the weak will have to do more than convince people to speak differently about themselves. The first ailment that must be cured is not an improper use of language, but the anxiety that gives rise to that language.Anxiety cannot be removed by socially uninspired philosophies. Anxiety is not a problem of individuals but of society’s consciousness. The individualistic attitude of the dominant (...) group of Anglo-Saxon thinkers has hitherto hindered any consideration of group mentality. There is too little known about the processes at work in this trans-individual domain.If people felt that they were being respected concerning their meaning, then they would probably be easier to reconcile with their finitude and the finitude of those around them. They would be more willing to think about the welfare of the community. Respect, however, is not manipulable like an object that one can give and take. Respect only exists in a context of participation. Improving the quality of that context implies not only that people pay more attention to an honest use of language, but also to craftsmanship, art and culture. If there is anything that allows people to go on in spite of anxiety, it is their participation in the community that gives them courage, whose patterns of expectation give everyone a feeling of self-respect and whose internal solidarity curbs the economic sufferings of backward social groups.I had the impression while writing this that Bellah would agree with many points. Although some of his texts argue that social change will only be achieved through a return to biblical and republican narratives, others seem to indicate that he has a better sense than most Americans of how strong the pre-reflexive influence of the social temperament can be. (shrink)

Much thought is being given nowadays to the ways in which society might continue to substantiate the principle of solidarity in the economic sphere. Predictable cost increases in the social security system stand at the root of a number of problems that have arisen. While those concerned look for solutions, a discussion is emerging concerning the communal scope of solidarity. People are not only asking themselves how they are to remain in solidarity, but also with whom they should share the (...) means at their disposal. The concomitant question ‘with whom?’ is not always as evident as it might seem, since the ethical scope of solidarity appears, in principle at least, to be unlimited.De facto, however, the limits of solidarity tend to coincide with those of the political community. The ongoing unification of Europe should broaden matters in this regard, but whether this process will also broaden our perspective on world-wide solidarity remains to be seen. At the same time, certain groups are calling for a stricter delimitation of our solidarity. The elections in Europe during the past ten years have made it clear that a number of emotional factors play a role in this context, factors which are not infrequently expressed in the slogan ‘our own first’.The intention of this article is to confront, with the Christian principle of solidarity, certain spontaneous and emotional motivating forces which call for a limitation of our solidarity. Solidarity implies both a feeling and a rational decision. In line with any other emotion, the feeling of solidarity is rooted in motivating factors of which we are not always consciously aware. Such factors are rarely thematised in an explicit fashion, partly because they are as such difficult to discuss and partly because they are difficult to make operational at the ‘scientific’ level. As a rule, our attention tends to be focused on the ethical desirability and practical-economical achievabilty of solidarity.As a starting point, I would like to broaden our vision of the emotional and subconscious motivating factors of solidarity. As a means to this end I will call upon a number of theories concerning the processes of social influence which go beyond the individual’s capacity to decide in the context of realising concrete initiatives. Having done this our second step will be to relate the problem of the emotional limitation of solidarity to the Christian concept of solidarity. (shrink)

It would seem obvious to assume that nothing enters our consciousness that does not have a `meaning'. Feelings, customs, prescriptions, gestures — all these are involuntarily interpreted and valued in function of various historical, social and cultural conceptions and circumstances. This is why philosophical considerations about justice, ethics and rights nowadays are linked with the concrete `meaning' of goods, customs, institutions and persons. Walzer is no exception when he situates his moral and political reflections in the `meaning' that goods, customs (...) and institutions have in a particular culture at a particular time.Though the importance of meaning is seldom overlooked, this does not prevent there from being opposed theories about it. Two of the current theories about how meaning is created give rise to quite divergent views about what founds ethics. Because I am curious about which of the currents Walzer would subscribe to, I will briefly sketch both of them.In contemporary philosophy we see, on the one hand, those who assume that the meaning of a person or a thing is the result of an interpretation based on reference narratives, ideologies, novels, articles of faith, cultural patterns of expectation, scientific models, and other sorts of interpretative frameworks. Alongside their attention to linguistic expressions and narratives, and contextual, historical circumstances, these thinkers also take into account something which, in their opinion, escapes reference, something that appears more in a negative than a positive experience. On this view, it is assumed, when speaking for example about human rights, that although there exist various cultural modes of interpretation, phenomena such as `human dignity' refer in one way or another to something that various cultures aim at. In every culture, the infringement of this underlying principle gives rise to some form of outrage which is expressed in an original way within the particular cultural context.Others claim that customs, narratives, practices, etc., cannot be considered as media that make meanings `interpretable' and communicable, but rather they should be seen as signs that establish meaning by virtue of their relationship with each other. Sometimes the structuralists who defend this notion are accused of giving the impression that we are all wanderers in a Kafkaesque dictionary labyrinth, moving from one entry to another without ever seeing the light of day. The critics say that language and signs play an important role, but ultimately reality consists of concrete people, concrete landscapes with houses, trees and roads, populated by plants, animals and various sorts of objects. (shrink)

People behave morally and show solidarity, not so much because of well-considered individual decisions, but because of feelings of belonging. But we cannot leave it at this. There is no spontaneous, innocent loyalty that would expand of its own accord to a larger group. Our loyalty must be developed, and the standard which guides us in this effort cannot stem from our own feelings alone. For there to be justice, more is needed than the tendency to identify with people who (...) are similar to us. Seeing justice as a wider feeling of loyalty prompts the question, ‘what is a just loyalty?’ However instructive this digression may have been, we are back to the same problem and the inquiry must begin again. (shrink)

Research in political science currently utilizes a no-nonsense principle. Little time is invested in complicated theoretical constructions. Only the facts matter. What is examined is the way in which certain ideas and behaviours cohere with other ideas and behaviours, and the explanations offered for this coherenece are usually quite brief. In some cases, the tone used in an explanation can make us suspect that there are complex underlying presuppositions.Some critics seem to base their opinions on a more optimistic liberal view (...) of human nature, while others have a pessimistic view of the quality of journalism, the disappearance of social capital, the short-sightedness of the political parties and the various popular forms of information and communication. Theoretical presuppositions are seldom the immediate focus of discussion. Facts are opposed to facts, since ultimately facts are the only basis for legitimate argument.Indeed, discussions that are not about facts are of little benefit to anyone. Predictions of doom with no basis in reality can hardly lead to a constructive dialogue. Facts, however, are always interpreted facts, and in order to interpret accurately, one needs theory. When actors are considered as individual black boxes who produce a certain output when confronted with a given input, then it is impossible to explain why people who watch a lot of television also tend to believe that they are powerless politically. And it is even more difficult to provide reasons for why viewers of soaps, game shows and sitcoms are more likely to harbour feelings of insecurity than viewers of news programmes or films, particularly since the latter exhibit images of aggression and conflict.Likewise, it remains unclear why commercial broadcasters give more airtime to reports of crime, or why the presentation of political issues in black and white terms is so rewarding at the polls. In this paper, I will first of all present a broad theoretical perspective, and subsequently come back to the facts. (shrink)