Utilitarianism is one of the “grand Enlightenment” moral philosophies. It provides a means of evaluating the ethical implications of common and unusual situations faced by psychiatrists, and offers a logical and ostensibly scientific method of moral justification and action. In this first of our two papers, we trace the evolution of utilitarianism into a contemporary moral theory and review the main theoretical critiques. In the second paper we contextualize utilitarianism in psychiatry and consider its function within the realm of the (...) professional ethics of psychiatrist as physician, before applying it to two dilemmas faced by psychiatrists as individuals and as members of a profession. We conclude that psychiatry must search beyond utilitarianism in grappling with everyday clinical scenarios. (shrink)

The paper discusses the basic assumptions proposed by John Dewey in his pragmatist ethics, posing at the same time a question whether pragmatist ethics satisfies the basic conditions of the ethical theory. The central category and criterion assumed in pragmatist ethics is a habit. Only good habits ensure good action. Habits are shaped by the milieu, and any attempts to change them entail a change in the conditions of the milieu. Permanent modification of habits is written in the basic goal (...) of moral action, i.e. development. Dewey rejects the theory of ethics comprehended as an order of moral norms and evaluations settled in advance. The theory proposed by him does not satisfy the conditions that a standard ethical theory is supposed to meet. This does not mean that it cannot be called a theory. It is Dewey\'s programme to give up traditional tasks assigned to an ethical theory. (shrink)

When working with parents of deaf children, clinicians and educators should explicitly add political-justice considerations to benefit-harm considerations in their ethical analyses of available interventions to prevent or reverse children’s hearing impairments.

The topic of the paper is to be the problem of normativity within naturalised epistemology. I pose a question whether naturalism can be conducted as a normative enterprise or whether it is merely descriptive as traditional epistemologists and some naturalists maintain. The article consists of two parts. The first one is an introduction to the main theses of naturalised epistemology, and the second one presents and disputes arguments against naturalised epistemology introduced in Jonathan Knowles’ book Norms, Naturalism and Normativity. In (...) the first part of the paper I indicate main differences between traditional and naturalised epistemology, especially I analyse their answers to the most important epistemological questions: What is the source of epistemic norms? When are beliefs valuable and how to gain such beliefs? What are criteria of justified belief and knowledge? The reason of differences in solutions of these problems is rotted in a different attitude to the naturalistic fallacy taken by the two sides of the discussion. Naturalists treat this fallacy as something that cannot be avoided and this approach deeply influences their account of normativity. To justify this thesis I firstly recall the traditional meaning of “normativity” on the bases of Descartes’ epistemology, post-Cartesian internalists’ and neopositivits’ works. Secondly, I present how and why the meanings of “epistemic norm” and “justified belief” have changed within naturalism. In this part I refer to Quine’s and Goldman’s naturalism. The second part of the paper discuses Knowles’ argument that the task of delivering genuine epistemic norms by naturalism is misguided and unreachable, for norms which naturalists refer to are reducible to descriptive statements. Naturalism, therefore, cannot be normative and consequently it cannot be an epistemology. I do not agree with this statement and in the last part of the paper I present how naturalised epistemic norms could be understood as different from descriptive statements, what functions they could perform and why naturalised epistemology is not redundant. (shrink)

Work is purposeful human activity oriented toward a useful outcome, particularly, but not exclusively, activity directed toward the satisfaction of human needs. It is distinguished from leisure, which encompasses human activity undertaken primarily for enjoyment or relaxation. Work includes both wage labor and uncompensated activities that, nevertheless, provide human beings with useful goods and services. Nurturing labor – sustaining the lives of children and preparing them for mature participation in society – is work, too.

This chapter reviews aspects of the way we use linguistic expressions to talk about things. After reviewing various types of NPs with respect to their possible use in referring, we turn to what it is that speakers are referring to, distinguishing real world from hypothetical and discourse referents. Figures of speech such as metonymy are briefly considered. Another important issue concerns choice of NP; for any given referent there are typically many possible expressions that could be used, and much research (...) has concerned how the choices among them are made. Finally we consider the perspective of the addressee, and what factors play a role in interpreting intended referents. (shrink)

Critical reasoning is a core element of the P4C program. Yet, the appearance of postmodernism, multiculturalism and ethnocentrism casts doubt on the Western concept of rationality and demands that its claim of universal purview be justified. In this context, the desideratum of this article is to provide a concept of rationality that has the potential to serve as the theoretical basis of reasoning in P4C. This is an important task, because if we cannot defend P4C against the postmodern criticism of (...) rationality, we cannot claim that it is a multicultural program in a true sense, nor can we defend it against the charge that this is just another attempt of western colonization. (shrink)

It appears there is general support amongst the commentaries for the potential usefulness of biorobots as models, with some caveats. These include the issue that not all areas of biology have been addressed by this methodology (and perhaps some cannot be?); and that other methodologies may sometimes be more useful. Which dimensions of biorobotic (or other models) are considered important varies with the goals of the investigator. These goals are also an essential part of the “modelling relationship.”.

Through exploring multiple contemporary conceptions of justice, this article illustrates that justice matters when considering outcomes in nongovernmental organization assistance. In environmental justice scholarship, the term justice has been underproblematized, assuming a tacit understanding of the concept as fairness or equitable distribution of environmental harms. Using the rebuilding of two heavily damaged poor and minority neighborhoods in post–Katrina New Orleans as case studies, this article makes evident the different conceptualizations of justice embedded within the strategies and techniques of NGOs and (...) community organizations. Examining both practices and outcomes, I argue that the definition of justice that NGOs implicitly or explicitly adopt in their strategies and technologies of assistance can lead to very different results in postdisaster neighborhood revitalization. For science and technology studies, conceptions of justice can help articulate a more critical social science that opens up the descriptive/normative divide. This is important in thinking about equitable social change and allied policy—as it applies not only to NGO assistance but also to other science and technology issues that intersect with marginalized communities as well. (shrink)

This article was inspired by Georges Didi-Huberman’s keynote lecture “Que ce qui apparaît seulement s’aperçoit” delivered in 2015 at Charles University in Prague during the “Dis/appearing” conference organized by the Internationales Kolleg für Kulturtechnikforschung und Medienphilosophie. Didi-Huberman’s lecture consisted of various reflections concerning the meaning of the image as instances of flaring up and fading away. During his talk, Didi-Huberman used evocative images – recollections – which he had collected over the years; impressions while walking in the streets, melancholic musings (...) about love, and thoughts gathered from literature en route. From this, the article identifies seven cases through which Didi-Huberman has conceptualized images; the nymph, the butterfly, the passer-by, the surface, the dance, the silence, and sophrosyne. These cases attest to the influence of Aby Warburg on the writing of Didi-Huberman and, taken together, identify what these cases of the image have in common; namely, that images occupy an interspace: the fleeting instant of appearance/disappearance. Didi-Huberman explains images – “Dante’s Beatrice and Baudelaire’s fleeting beauty” as “the paradigmatic ‘passer-by.’” Through these cases, this article poetically draws the reader’s attention to what Didi-Huberman calls “non-knowledge”; those fleeting, mobile, paradoxical aspects of images that resist clear categorization and can be thought of as fireflies against the night sky. The article asks: is it possible to characterize this genre? To denominate the collection of thoughts that welcome the image as a witness to the history of thought? The study of images can be understood, following Giorgio Agamben’s interpretation of Aby Warburg’s oeuvre, as “the nameless science.”. (shrink)

The image of wine has a “spiritual sense”, which helps the faithful to understand the principles of their belief. Its mystery is connected with the theme of “sober inebriation”, developed by Philo of Alexandria and Origen, and culminating in Ambrose. The good wines that the bride enjoys before the groom’s arrival are a symbol of the good doctrines of the OT, whose teachings are however inferior to the revelation of the incarnate Christ. Good, sweet wine, meanwhile, refers to the doctrines (...) of the NT interpreted spiritually, the logos that helps us begin to know Christ, to bind ourselves to him in ecclesial unity and to love our neighbour. It also leads us to the “winepress”, i.e. renouncing superfluous land, becoming “full of must” and inebriated, so that we can dedicate ourselves to contemplation. The vine has a Christological value and catechetical function, dating back to John 15.1, which is often quoted with Saint Paul. The place where the vine is born and develops is the soul; the Logos supports its flowering in those who, by their free will, choose to flourish. The cluster of grapes refers to Christ, or to the victory of the righteous; the many grapes that he contains are believers. The vineyard is a symbol of the church formed by the pagans, of the commandments of God, or of the good things that God gave to man, who did not preserve them, having been stripped of them by the devil. The guardians of the vineyard are angels or priests. (shrink)

Vilar, Gerard Jean-François Lyotard: Estética y políticaBarcelona: Gedisa, 160 p.ISBN 9788418525896.