We contrast two theoretical positions on the relation between phenomenal and access consciousness. First, we discuss previous data supporting a mild Overflow position, according to which transient visual awareness can overflow report. These data are open to two interpretations: (i) observers transiently experience specific visual elements outside attentional focus without encoding them into working memory; (ii) no specific visual elements but only statistical summaries are experienced in such conditions. We present new data showing that under data-limited conditions observers cannot discriminate (...) a simple relation (same versus different) without discriminating the elements themselves and, based on additional computational considerations, we argue that this supports the first interpretation: summary statistics (same/different) are grounded on the transient experience of elements. Second, we examine recent data from a variant of ‘inattention blindness’ and argue that contrary to widespread assumptions, it provides further support for Overflow by highlighting another factor, ‘task relevance’, which affects the ability to conceptualize and report (but not experience) visual element. (shrink)

Agency has two meanings in psychology and neuroscience. It can refer to one's capacity to affect the world and act in line with one's goals and desires--this is the objective aspect of agency. But agency can also refer to the subjective experience of controlling one's actions, or how it feels to achieve one's goals or affect the world. This subjective aspect is known as the sense of agency, and it is an important part of what makes us human. Interest in (...) the sense of agency has exploded since the early 2000s, largely because scientists have learned that it can be studied objectively through analyses of human judgment, behavior, and the brain. This book brings together some of the world's leading researchers to give structure to this nascent but rapidly growing field. The contributors address questions such as: What role does agency play in the sense of self? Is agency based on predicting outcomes of actions? And what are the links between agency and motivation? Recent work on the sense of agency has been markedly interdisciplinary. The chapters collected here combine ideas and methods from fields as diverse as engineering, psychology, neurology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind, making the book a valuable resource for any student or researcher interested in action, volition, and exploring how mind and brain are organized. (shrink)

We argue that it is possible to go beyond the “selfish goal” metaphor and make an even stronger case for the role of unconscious motivation in cognition and action. Through the relevance of a representation (ROAR) framework, we describe how not only value motivation, which relates to “selfish goals,” but also truth motivation and control motivation impact cognition and action.

Murayama and Jach argue that it is not clearly specified how motivation constructs produce behavior and that this black box should be unpacked. We argue that the authors overlook important classic theory and highlight recent research programs that already started unboxing. We feel that without relying on the mechanisms that such programs uncover, the proposed computational approach will be fruitless.

In their paper: “Learning of Predictive Relations Between Events Depends on Attention, Not on Awareness” Custers & Aarts demonstrate that when one is first exposed to a clear predictive relationship – a consequent predictive relationship will be represented as a unidirectional association in the percievers’ minds regardless of their awareness of that relationship. Furthermore, a conscious intention to learn the relationship leads to the formation of a bidirectional association. While these findings may prove to be a significant step in understanding (...) other forms of implicit learning such as implicit artificial grammar learning and implicit sequence learning and why they are affected by intentional learning; Custers & Aarts’ postulation that “top-down” regulation is at work here is debatable as their experimental manipulation can be understood as “bottom-up” activation of implicit learning processes. (shrink)