This paper explains why Clark’s Extended Mind thesis is not capable of sufficiently grasping how and in what sense external objects and technical artifacts can become part of our human cognition. According to the author, this is because a pivotal distinction between inside and outside is preserved in the Extended Mind theorist’s account of the relation between the human organism and the world of external objects and artifacts, a distinction which they proclaim to have overcome. Inspired by Charles S. Peirce’s (...) philosophy of mind, in particular, the author tries to find a way out of this ‘inside–outside’ fallacy. External objects, artifacts or processes should, according to him, not be conceived as inanimate and unintelligent matter utilised by a separately living, inner mental sphere that has set certain pre-established goals for itself. Mind has rather an artifactual character. It is not extended by an inner biological cognitive core but rather unfolds itself through objects and artifacts. Mind as such is, especially in our modern technological culture, shaped by virtue of and through technical artifacts. Recognizing this artifactual dimension of mind will, the author concludes, enable a more critical analysis of contemporary claims that ascribe certain original and irreducible features to thinking. (shrink)

Typically, public discussions of questions of social import exhibit two important properties: they are influenced by conformity bias, and the influence of conformity is expressed via social networks. We examine how social learning on networks proceeds under the influence of conformity bias. In our model, heterogeneous agents express public opinions where those expressions are driven by the competing priorities of accuracy and of conformity to one’s peers. Agents learn, by Bayesian conditionalization, from private evidence from nature, and from the public (...) declarations of other agents. Our key findings are that networks that produce configurations of social relationships that sustain a diversity of opinions empower honest communication and reliable acquisition of true beliefs, and that the networks that do this best turn out to be those which are both less centralized and less connected. (shrink)

Patient rights are universal values which we have to adopt. It is not so easy, however, to put such values and principles into effect. As approaches and attitudes differ from individual to individual, from society to society, and from country to country, a uniform application of these values is difficult. If we want to reach a general conclusion about the status of patient rights in the world as whole, we should examine the situation in individual countries. As far as Turkey (...) is concerned, we can say that, although the idea of patient rights is accepted in principle, patient rights have yet to be adequately implemented. (shrink)

Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. In recent years, a consensus has emerged that the credibility of this and other well-known anti-physicalist arguments can be undermined by allowing that we possess a special category of concepts of experiences, phenomenal concepts, which are conceptually independent from physical/functional concepts. It is held by a large number of philosophers that since the conceptual independence of phenomenal (...) concepts does not imply the metaphysical independence of phenomenal properties, physicalism is safe. This paper distinguishes between two versions of this novel physicalist strategy –Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) – depending on how it cashes out “conceptual independence,” and argues that neither helps the physicalist cause. A dilemma for PCS arises: cashing out “conceptual independence” in a way compatible with physicalism requires abandoning some manifest phenomenological intuitions, and cashing it out in a way compatible with those intuitions requires dropping physicalism. The upshot is that contra Brian Loar and others, one cannot “have it both ways.”. (shrink)

Although modern technical and scientific developments in medicine are followed closely in Turkey, it cannot be claimed that the same is true in the field of bioethics. Yet, more and more attention is now being paid to bioethics and ethics training in health sciences. In addition, there are also legal regulations in bioethics, some of which are not so new. The objective of these regulations is to provide technical and administrative control. Ethical concerns are rather few. What attracts our attention (...) most in these regulations is the presence of the idea of "consent". (shrink)

Are critiques of the "West" peculiar to the Muslim world? Are they a reflection of a simple discontent with the international order or a conservative rejection of Western-originated, universal modernity? How should Western intellectuals and leaders respond to the Muslim critiques?

Bu araştırmada, Suriyeli ergen bireylerde dini tutum, psikolojik dayanıklılık ve depresyon arasındaki ilişkiyi tespit etmek amaçlanmaktadır. Araştırmanın örneklemi, Elazığ’da ikamet eden 13–18 yaş aralığındaki 216 Suriyeli bireyden oluşmaktadır. Yaş ortalaması 15,31 olan katılımcıların 124’ü kadın, 92’si erkektir. Verilerin toplanmasında Kişisel Bilgi Formu, Beck Depresyon Envanteri II, Dini Tutum Ölçeği, Çocuk ve Genç Psikolojik Sağlamlık Ölçeği (ÇGPSÖ - 12) kullanılmıştır. Veriler SPSS (22,0) paket programı kullanılarak analiz edilmiştir. Araştırma sonucunda, Suriyeli ergenlerde depresyon ve dini tutum düzeyleri arasında negatif ve anlamlı bir (...) ilişki; depresyon ve psikolojik dayanıklılık düzeyleri arasında negatif ve anlamlı bir ilişki; psikolojik dayanıklılık ve dini tutum düzeyleri arasında pozitif ve anlamlı bir ilişki olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Ayrıca araştırma bulguları Suriyeli ergenlerde psikolojik dayanıklılık ve dini tutumun depresyon düzeyindeki toplam varyansın yaklaşık %20’sini açıkladığını göstermiştir. (shrink)

McGinn claims, among other things, that we cannot understand the theory that explains how echolocationary experiences arise from the bat’s brain. One of McGinn’s arguments for this claim appeals to the fact that we cannot know in principle what it is like to have echolocationary experiences. According to Kirk, McGinn’s argument fails because it rests on an illegitimate assumption concerning what explanatory theories are supposed to accomplish. However, I will argue that Kirk’s objection misfires because he misapprehends McGinn’s argument. Further, (...) I will articulate and briefly assess some ways in which McGinn’s argument can be blocked. (shrink)

The study of social justice asks: what sorts of social arrangements are equitable ones? But also: how do we derive the inequitable arrangements we often observe in human societies? In particular, in spite of explicitly stated equity norms, categorical inequity tends to be the rule rather than the exception. The cultural Red King hypothesis predicts that differentials in group size may lead to inequitable outcomes for minority groups even in the absence of explicit or implicit bias. We test this prediction (...) in an experimental context where subjects divided into groups engage in repeated play of a bargaining game. We ran 14 trials involving a total of 112 participants. The results of the experiments are statistically significant and suggestive: individuals in minority groups in these experiments end up receiving fewer resources than those in majority groups. Combined with previous theoretical findings, these results give some reason to think that the cultural Red King may occur in real human groups. (shrink)

The author of this paper starts by sketching a general framework for Peirce's ethical theory: first, he discusses very briefly Peirce's phenomenological categories; then, he outlines some implications of these categories for Peirce's concept of personal identity. In the rest of the paper he discusses successively within this framework Peirce's views on the status of ethics, ideals, concrete reasonableness, evolutionary love, and the relation between the individual and the cosmos. He then argues that these notions, taken together, culminate in a (...) non-subjective ethical theory that indicates what is a good life. The central argument that he develops is that we, according to Peirce, can only become authentic persons through a process of giving a general form to our interactions with our social and natural environment, i.e., a form that is constituted by virtue of the belief in and embodiment of common ideals, which are no less real than concrete, physical events. (shrink)

The replicator dynamics and Moran process are the main deterministic and stochastic models of evolutionary game theory. The models are connected by a mean-field relationship—the former describes the expected behavior of the latter. However, there are conditions under which their predictions diverge. I demonstrate that the divergence between their predictions is a function of standard techniques used in their analysis and of differences in the idealizations involved in each. My analysis reveals problems for stochastic stability analysis in a broad class (...) of games, demonstrates a novel domain of agreement between the dynamics, and indicates a broader moral for evolutionary modeling. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to do three things. First, I introduce the distinction between the Uniqueness Thesis (U) and what I call the Conditional Uniqueness Thesis (U*). Second, I argue that despite their official advertisements, some prominent uniquers effectively defend U* rather than U. Third, some influential considerations that have been raised by the opponents of U misfire if they are interpreted as against U*. The moral is that an appreciation of the distinction between U and U* helps to (...) clarify the contours of the uniqueness debate and to avoid a good deal of talking past each other. (shrink)

The split between analytic philosophy and Continental philosophy has mainly preoccupied scholars of philosophy so far, but in fact, it has broader pedagogical implications. This article argues that conventions of argumentative writing, as taught in colleges today, have their roots in analytic philosophy and its assumptions regarding ways of disseminating knowledge. Behind writing instructors’ emphasis on the ‘thesis and evidence’ structure lie analytic tendencies such as verifiability and intersubjectivity. By contrast, Continental philosophy emphasises the subjective human experience, which leads to (...) a more experimental form of writing. This split and the embeddedness of argumentation in analytic philosophy is indispensable in comprehending the rationale behind the conventions of academic writing taught in colleges today. (shrink)

In this note, I would like to focus on the two central distinctions Inan draws between varieties of ignorance. One is the distinction between “objectual” and “propositional” ignorance, and the other is the distinction between “truth-ignorance” and “fact-ignorance,” which is a distinction between two types of propositional ignorance. According to Inan, appreciating these distinctions allow us to see what is wrong with the “received view,” according to which ignorance (or awareness of it) is “always about truth,” and enables us to (...) “overcome our [philosophers’] propositional-bias.” I will argue for two theses. First, fact-ignorance appears to be a form of objectual ignorance; and, if this is so, there are no two distinctions but only one distinction that Inan in effect offers, which is between objectual and propositional ignorance. Second, what Inan calls “the received view” can raise some reasonable worries about objectual ignorance that are not taken into account by him. (shrink)

: This paper deals with the subject of mushākala, ta'rīz, kināya and ijāz in terms of language andthe using of Qur’ān's verb and noun forms, human genre and adjective nouns in terms of style and someother related problems. The punishment or retribution from Allāh (Makr) as mushākala form, whichsometimes occurs at the level of a gradual diminution or collapse, is a punishment that gradually destroysthe sinner without his realizing it. However, it is possible to say that there is another dimension (...) inMüshākala, destiny, and the formula of the working mechanism of destiny. According to this formula, it isunderstood that whatever behavior a person exhibits, Allah responds with a similar behavior. Based onthis dimension of destiny, it is understood that in one aspect (with the exception of Allah's will), mandetermines his own destiny relatively, and that his destiny is shaped as a result of his own actions. Some(Ta’rīd) verses and expressions with indirect narrative content were misinterpreted by some peoplebecause they implied something too deep to understand by human beings and had a profundity ofmeanings as well as secret wisdom. The fact is that about the 6th verse of the chapter of al-Mâida: "O youwho have believed, when you rise to (perform) prayer, wash your faces and your fore arms to the elbowsand your heads too." Shiites misunderstand Ibn Abbas's statement pointed out as "I can find nothing butwiping the feet in Allah's book, but they did not accept anything but washing", and their anointing of theirfeet is due to such a misunderstanding. In the Qur’ān, indirect expression is used in places that mentionabout the adab of maram (private) affairs in marital relationships; and that which should not be saidopenly. With such a form of expression, the Qur’ān is descended upon human beings from Allah to beexpressed in indirect expressions in situations where it is not welcome to express clearly. In the same way,it can be said that when the Qur’ān mentions a negative situation, it refers to it with closed expressions,and It can also be said that it uses Kinâya as a politeness and courtesy style. However, in any case, thecustomary usage should not be ignored while giving meaning to the verse expressions with allusions. Inexpressions of the Qur’ān, ijāz is used extensively; It is possible to say that a large part of the ijāz is theeliminate of words in expressions. For this reason it should not be overlooked that in some verses thatare not understood, some part of it may be deleted for ijāz. In terms of the style of the Qur’ān in thearticle, there are important points in terms of rhetoric in the use of verb and noun form, which is one ofthe topics discussed. (shrink)

A new Turkish Penal Code came into effect on 1 June 2005. Article 280 concerns health care workers’ failure to report a crime. This article removes the responsibility from health care workers to maintain confidentiality, but also removes patients’ right to confidentiality. It provides for up to one year of imprisonment for a health care worker who, while on duty, finds an indication that a crime might have been committed by a patient and who does not inform the responsible authorities (...) about it. This forces the health care worker to divulge the patient’s confidential information. A patient who thinks he or she may be accused of a crime may therefore not seek medical help, which is the universal right of every person. The article is therefore contrary to medical ethics, oaths taken by physicians and nurses, and the understanding of patient confidentiality. (shrink)

Unintentional plagiarism abounds at universities. The literature offers several explanations for students’ difficulties with acquiring standards of good academic practice. In this paper, I propose an alternative account: unintentional plagiarism can only be understood in the context of implicit but irreconcilable forms of knowledge. While higher education institutions mainly operate within the framework of propositional epistemology, institutions of primary and secondary education tend to furnish students with encyclopedic epistemology. Accordingly, universities and institutions of pre-college education tend to propagate conflicting assumptions (...) regarding the nature of knowledge. Put simply, propositional epistemology is characterized by dialogue, agency and the exchange of ideas, which are ideally made explicit in academic writing. By contrast, encyclopedic epistemology tends to present knowledge monologically, leaving the scholarly conversation around it out. It is highly likely that the hardwired legacy of encyclopedic epistemology among students impedes the acquisition of the dialogism of academic inquiry at universities, resulting in cases of unintentional plagiarism. (shrink)

In this article, I make a distinction between two versions of non-epistemicism about seeing, and bring explicitly into view and argue against a particular version defended by Dretske. More specifically, I distinguish non-epistemic seeing as non-conceptual seeing, where concept possession is assumed to be cognitively demanding, from non-epistemic seeing as seeing without noticing, where noticing is assumed to be relatively cognitively undemanding. After showing that Dretske argues for the possibility of non-epistemic seeing in both senses of the term, I target (...) his thesis that a given subject sees all the objects that are visually differentiated in her visual field, where visual differentiation does not require that she notice those objects. I argue that the notion of a visual field deployed in the formulation of the thesis cannot be phenomenal and therefore that seeing without noticing amounts to mere visual confrontation. I further argue that since the epistemicist does not deny the existence of seeing without noticing in the sense of mere visual confrontation, there is a clear sense in which Dretske's non-epistemicism turns out to be trivial. (shrink)