This paper explores the idea that human consciousness perceives itself as the "main character" due to the structure of the multiverse. If every decision branches into a new reality, then an individual’s memory and experience are biased toward the timeline where they continue to exist. This could lead to a form of subjective immortality, where consciousness shifts to realities where survival and satisfaction persist. The implications of this perspective are examined through the lenses of quantum mechanics, philosophy, and cognitive psychology.

In this article we offer a two-part commentary on Bolton and Gillett’s reconceptualization of Engel’s biopsychosocial model. In the first section we present a conceptual and historical assessment of the biopsychosocial model that differs from the analysis by Bolton and Gillett. Specifically, we point out that Engel in his vision of the biopsychosocial model was less concerned with the ontological possibility and nature of psychosocial causes, and more concerned with psychosocial influences in the form of illness interpretation and presentation, sick (...) role, seeking or rejection of care, the doctor-patient therapeutic relationship, and role of personality factors and family relationships in recovery from illness, etc. On the basis of this assessment, we then question Bolton and Gillett’s restricted focus on accounting for biopsychosocial causal interactions. The second section compares Bolton and Gillett’s account with a recent enactivist account of mental disorder that tackles similar conceptual problems of causal interactions. Bolton and Gillett’s utilize elements of the 4E cognition, but they combine these proto-ideas with an information-processing paradigm. Given their explicit endorsement of 4E approaches to mind and cognition, we illustrate some key ways in which a more fleshed out enactive account, particularly one that doesn’t rely on notions of information-processing, differs from the account proposed by Bolton and Gillett. (shrink)

Big data technologies are entering the world of ageing computer systems running critical infrastructures. These innovations promise to afford rapid Internet connectivity, remote operations or predictive maintenance. As legacy critical infrastructures were traditionally disconnected from the Internet, the prospect of their modernisation necessitates an inquiry into cyber security and how it intersects with traditional engineering requirements like safety, reliability or resilience. Looking at how the adoption of big data technologies in critical infrastructures shapes understandings of risk management, we focus on (...) a specific case study from the cyber security governance: the EU Network and Information Systems Security Directive. We argue that the implementation of Network and Information Systems Security Directive is the first step in the integration of safety and security through novel risk management practices. Therefore, it is the move towards legitimising the modernisation of critical infrastructures. But we also show that security risk management practices cannot be directly transplanted from the safety realm, as cyber security is grounded in anticipation of the future adversarial behaviours rather than the history of equipment failure rates. Our analysis offers several postulates for the emerging research agenda on big data in complex engineering systems. Building on the conceptualisations of safety and security grounded in the materialist literature across Science and Technology Studies and Organisational Sociology, we call for a better understanding of the ‘making of’ technologies, standardisation processes and engineering knowledge in a quest to build safe and secure critical infrastructures. (shrink)

This article comments on the following previously published article: Moncrieff, J., “ It Was the Brain Tumor That Done It!” Szasz and Wittgenstein on the Importance of Distinguishing Disease from Behavior and Implications for the Nature of Mental Disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 27, 169–181.Joanna Moncrieff’s philosophical views on the nature of mental illness represent in many ways the enduring legacy of Thomas Szasz in philosophy of psychiatry. She articulates a defense of Szaszian thinking about disease, with connections to Wittgenstein’s (...) philosophy, that is probably as compelling a defense as a contemporary student of philosophy is likely to find. However, Moncrieff’s... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Future Is Political and TransdisciplinaryAwais Aftab (bio)Philosophy, psychiatry, & psychology (PPP) is a transdisciplinary oasis, one of the few journals in mental health care that facilitate a meaningful dialogue between philosophers, psychiatrists, psychologists, and scholars from related disciplines. The fact that PPP successfully provides such a space is of no small importance, especially from my perspective as a psychiatrist. The multidisciplinary nature of the undertaking has been a (...) central aspect of the identity of the journal from the very beginning. PPP has maintained this transdisciplinary inclusive spirit over the years, and its editorial and advisory boards remain richly representative, but the challenge of ensuring continued participation of clinicians is not insubstantial. After all, the point is not token participation, but a robust and transformative interdisciplinary engagement. Clinicians have much to contribute to philosophical debates, however, such capacity for dialogue requires sustained cultivation (Aftab & Waterman, 2021), and forces in medical education have led to a situation where comparatively fewer psychiatrists have the interest or the ability to engage in such rigorous dialogue with philosophers. Philosophy of mental health has grown and specialized exponentially since the mid-90s. Keeping up with this literature is difficult even for philosophers, it is no small feat for full-time clinicians.This means that PPP and its affiliate organizations have a responsibility to take a more active role in supporting educational initiatives to ensure that future generations of psychiatric clinicians are able to contribute to philosophical debates, and that philosophy of psychiatry does not become divorced from clinical and practical concerns. My advice to clinicians based on my experience would be two-fold: first, it is essential to acquire a basic familiarity with the philosophy of psychiatry literature. Aftab and Waterman (2021) offer a sample list of reading recommendations. At the time of this writing, the International Network for Philosophy and Psychiatry is also undertaking efforts to develop curricula aimed at clinicians. Second, it is important to find ways to interact with others in the philosophy of psychiatry community. Formal avenues to do so include the annual meetings of the Association for the Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry and the Philosophy Special Interest Group of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, among others. There are also various online communities active on social media that many find helpful.In recent years, we have seen an unprecedented enthusiasm and support for inclusion of lived experience in mental health care. This is a welcome and much needed development, but we are only just beginning to scratch the surface of [End Page 5] how to philosophically navigate this inclusion. Frameworks such as standpoint epistemology and epistemic justice offer us starting points (Knox, 2022), but much remains to be worked out (Aftab, 2022). There are notable philosophical challenges, such as ascertaining the limits of lived experience, and the biases and errors to which it is vulnerable; the application of scientific method and philosophical criticism to lived experience; methods to resolve disagreements when different forms of lived experience contradict each other; handling discrepancies between knowledge from lived experience and knowledge from other sources be handled; and analyzing the intersection of politics of lived experience with other differentials of power. I anticipate that these topics will be of central importance to the field and to the journal in the coming years.It is also vital that philosophy of psychiatry engage with the sociopolitical dimensions of madness (Kalathil & Jones, 2016). The failure of philosophy to do so in a meaningful way has already been articulated powerfully by commentators such as Nev Jones (2022). An important aspect of acknowledging philosophy's failures in this regard comes from the notion of "elite capture," recently popularized by Olúfẹ́mi O. Táíwò (2022). It refers to how progressive philosophical ideas such as standpoint epistemology are co-opted by the "elite" to serve their own ends. Discussions on social media have already begun to point out that concepts in philosophy of psychiatry such as "epistemic injustice" show signs of elite capture by the psychiatric establishment, resulting in token participation but no systemic changes. Philosophy of psychiatry needs to tackle its own vulnerability to co-option. This will require creative forms of philosophizing and engagement with... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Can The Psychopathologized Speak?Notes on Social Objectivity and Psychiatric ScienceAwais Aftab*, MD (bio)In "Exclusion of Psychopathologized Standpoints Due to Hermeneutical Ignorance Undermines Psychiatric Objectivity" (2022), Bennett Knox offers a compelling argument that failure of psychiatric community to engage with the "psychopathologized" in processes such as the revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) constitutes a form of epistemic injustice and threatens the social objectivity of (...) psychiatric science. I find myself in agreement with the central thesis and I am glad to see it articulated so well by Knox. While it is clear that the exclusion of psychopathologized standpoints in psychiatric science cannot be justified, there are issues that arise that require further clarification, and may generate disagreements, when we consider the complexities of how this inclusion is to take place, what requirements can be imposed on this process of inclusion, and the relationship between the DSM and psychiatric science broadly when it comes to social objectivity.The Methodological Objectivity of the DSM Does Not Exhaust the Methodological Objectivity of Psychiatric ScienceThe DSM is a nosological project within a particular historical context, operating with a certain set of assumptions (Aftab & Ryznar, 2021). The DSM has limitations in terms of what sorts of perspectives it can meaningfully incorporate, but the limitations of the DSM are not the limitations of psychiatric science. This is because psychiatric science is a pluralistic domain and includes many different methodologies and perspectives (Jerotic & Aftab, 2021). As one example, the DSM is poorly equipped to capture the phenomenology of psychiatric conditions. It is not something that it sets out to do. This, however, only becomes a serious problem if we adopt the attitude "if it's not in the DSM then it doesn't really count." Unfortunately, many in the psychiatric community have [End Page 267] adopted this sort of attitude, at least implicitly, resulting in a serious neglect of phenomenology (and various other perspectives, including those of the psychopathologized), leading Nancy Andreasen to bemoan the "death of phenomenology." (Andreasen, 2007) The DSM is methodologically limited by design; there are things that it will fail to do. The appropriate response is to acknowledge these inherent limitations. Other perspectives such as neurodiversity or Hearing Voices Movement also bring their own sets of assumptions and limitations. The DSM is simply one element, one perspective, one methodology in a scientific field that is capable of and ought to adopt a plurality of perspectives and methodologies. This is worth pointing out because Knox appears to assume that if it proves difficult or impossible for the DSM to include radically diverse perspectives, then "all the worse for psychiatry's objectivity." If it is impossible for the DSM, that does not mean that it is also impossible for psychiatric science.1In Determining What Counts as Inappropriate Exclusion, What Is the Role of Scientific Expertise?Longino herself brings up this question: "in determining what counts as inappropriate exclusion of dissenting perspectives, does it matter what kind of issue is involved? Are the duties of inclusion different when the question is, Should we be trying to learn about such and such, for example, atomic fission? than when it is, Is atomic fission a controllable or uncontrollable process?" (Longino, 2002, p. 133) The danger that needs to be averted here is that of trivializing expertise and placing experts on an equal footing with non-experts, a danger that is strikingly illustrated by our social response to the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic.Take an example from medicine. Individuals with lung cancer have a lot to offer when it comes to the treatment of lung cancer, including their experiences of care, and choice of, say, aggressive chemotherapy vs palliative comfort care, etc. but how much do they have to contribute on the matter of the histopathological classification of lung cancer? Consider the Hierarchical Taxonomy of Psychopathology (HiTOP) (Kotov et al., 2021). This quantitative nosological project has a very specific aim: to determine the patterns of covariation among psychiatric symptoms using statistical techniques such as factor analysis. This... (shrink)

In this commentary on Anneli Jefferson’s book “Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders?,” I offer an overview of her central thesis, and then propose my own modified account of when we are justified in calling mental disorders as “brain disorders.” In doing so, I draw on recent work in neuroscience that understands the relationship between brain and behavior in complex, dynamic, and computational terms. In particular, I disagree with Jefferson’s criterion of sufficiency, that a particular brain process should always realize a (...) psychological dysfunction. I propose that a psychiatric disorder can be said to be a brain disorder if there are empirically identifiable systematic brain differences associated with it and if these associations are contextualized within a scientifically robust theoretical understanding of the relationship between brain and behavior. I conclude by preliminary reflections on whether the issue of “mental disorder” versus “brain disorder” comes down to “the language of psychology” versus “the language of neuroscience,” and the degree to which the former can be expressed in the latter. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Two Different “Religious Experience vs Psychopathology” DistinctionsAwais Aftab, MD (bio)Mohammed Rashed’s analysis of the distinction between “religious experience” and “psychopathology” challenges the assumptions that underlie traditional efforts to make such a distinction and he arrives at a provocative and memorable conclusion: “The distinction between religious experience and mental disorder can only be invoked from a secular standpoint but can only be clarified from a religious standpoint. In other words: (...) if you have the grounds to invoke it, you cannot have the tools to clarify it; and if you have the tools to clarify it, you do not have the grounds to invoke it” (Rashed, 2024). (For another recent discussion that challenges underlying assumptions of this dichotomy, see Gipps and Clark (2024) on the distinction between religious delusion and religious belief.)There is great merit in Rashed’s analysis, and I am in agreement with many aspects of the discussion. In particular, I admire Rashed’s ability here, as well as elsewhere (Rashed, 2021), to break the impasse of definitional debates by deconstructing and destabilizing the distinctions involved. In this commentary I’d like to note some points of disagreement and qualification that I hope can move Rashed’s analysis forward in a constructive way.The first thing I want to bring up is that Rashed defines religious experience very broadly: “Psychological distress or anomalous experience that has a religious origin, content, or end (purpose).” This effectively turns the distinction between religious experience and psychopathology into an instance of the general distinction between the religious worldview and the secular worldview. “Mental disorder” is understood by Rashed to be an exclusively secular concept. I am not sure this way of framing the dichotomy is entirely correct. If our notion of “religious experience” include any anomalous experiences believed to serve a religious purpose, then Rashed is correct that for the religious no anomalous experience would be excluded. And if “mental disorder” requires giving up on the idea of a divine purpose for our [End Page 211] suffering, then indeed the religious do not have the grounds to invoke it.I’d suggest that a better approach may be to think of two different “religious experience vs psychopathology” distinctions, one within the context of the religious worldview and one within the context of the secular worldview. Both are fuzzy and present demarcation problems of their own; both can be and ought to be destabilized.Rashed recognizes that the religious worldview does make space for illness and disease; it’s just that he says even these concepts are understood within a broader religious view of suffering:the proposal is not that religious traditions have no category of distress that is somatic in nature—of course they do—but that even with those categories, religion is never far off the horizon and will make an appearance at some point, if not in the origin or content of distress, then in terms of its broader purpose and so the recommended interventions.(Rashed, 2024, pp. 201)A vital implication of this is that the distinction between religious experience and a secular view of somatic illness would pose the same problem as the distinction between religious experience and mental illness; the religious would not have grounds to invoke it, for no illness is devoid of religious significance. And yet, the religious do meaningfully talk of “illnesses” and “diseases,” and they do meaningfully talk of “madness” (if not mental illness), and many often do meaningfully differentiate between madness and mysticism. This shows that the religious worldview has its own notions of disease and psychopathology, which differ from their secular counterparts in the sense that suffering involved is imbued with a divine purpose. The religious scholars interested in differentiating between the anomalous nature of the mystical experience and the anomalous nature of madness are interested, in part, in marking out abnormalities of thought and behavior so severe that they come to resemble the effects of somatic illness. Madness is where the internal coherence of the mystical experience breaks down, and becomes an instance of suffering at par with somatic illness.The secular worldview recognizes the phenomenology of religious experience—there is religious or mystical content—but... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dialectical Tension Between Gloomy and Rosy Prospects of Behavioral GeneticsAwais Aftab, MD (bio)Turkheimer and Greer’s article “Spit for Science and the Limits of Applied Psychiatric Genetics” (2024) offers a devastating critique of the state of psychiatric genetics, using Spit for Science (S4S) as a case study. I have read the paper many times in the process of writing this commentary, and each time I am left inarticulate. Nonetheless, I (...) hope that my comments, from the point of view of a practitioner who operates at the intersection of clinical psychiatry, psychiatric science, and philosophy of psychiatry, will be of some value to the discussion. I have no substantial disagreements with Turkheimer and Greer. The main point I wish to convey is that there is reason to hope that findings from genetic research will contribute to clinical progress in psychiatry in an incremental and iterative manner, but because psychiatric genetics has overpromised and underdelivered, we find ourselves vacillating between bullish and bearish moods.Some critics may say that the choice to selectively focus on S4S is unfair, or that it gives a misleading impression of the current state of psychiatric genetics. The launch and implementation of S4S captures a particular moment in the history of psychiatric genetics when it was known that individual associations will be small and that large samples will be needed for significant associations, but it was not appreciated exactly how small and how large respectively. Initial estimates of sample sizes needed for successful genetic associations turned out to be wildly inadequate. Progress occurred only with unprecedented international collaboration and extremely large sample sizes. For example, a 2022 genome-wide association study (GWAS) of schizophrenia included more than 76,000 people with schizophrenia and 240,000 controls (Trubetskoy et al., 2022)! S4S is one project from one institution. It is understandable in retrospect that a sample of 10,000 freshmen could only have delivered so much. It may be argued that whatever the promise of psychiatric genetics as a field, it is not constrained by the success or failure of S4S.On the one hand, it is true that S4S did not have the requisite sample size. On the other hand, the contemporary understanding of the genetics of alcohol use has not improved on insights from S4S by that much (Deak et al., 2019). SNP-based heritability estimate of problematic alcohol use [End Page 451] is close to 10% based on a GWAS of 435,000 individuals (Zhou et al., 2020), consistent with statistically non-significant estimates from S4S. The same GWAS has identified 29 risk variants, and genetic correlations with more than a hundred other phenotypes. Transcriptomic analysis has revealed that implicated genes are expressed in the brain but also in gastrointestinal, adipose, and liver tissue, pointing toward pathways of protection and vulnerability. A polygenic risk score (PRS) derived from associated variants is consistently and significantly associated with alcohol dependence, with variance explained ranging from 0.77% to 2.12% in different samples (Zhou et al., 2020).At present, PRS for problematic alcohol use has little predictive value at the individual level and is practically worthless from the standpoint of clinical practice. There are hints that genetic associations can point toward brain mechanisms involved in alcohol use disorder, but we have little to show for it yet. That PRS will achieve clinical utility is not guaranteed but neither is it impossible. A PRS for externalizing behavior explains approximately 10% of the variance, which is on par with factors such as socioeconomic status and neighborhood disadvantage (Karlsson Linnér et al., 2021). And even if PRS does not become a common part of clinical practice, it can still be a useful tool in clinical research. With regard to understanding mechanisms, the trivial effect size of the genetic association is by itself irrelevant. This point is made eloquently by Steven HymanWhen used as a tool to associate a trait with biology, the effect size of the allele on the ultimate phenotype does not matter… what makes a gene product a good drug target is not the effect size of the associated allele, but its overall role in biology… Once a pathway is shown to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On the Importance of Conceptual ContrastsMadness, Reason, and Mad PrideAwais Aftab, MD (bio)Garson (2023) offers an engaging historical and philosophical discussion around the importance Late Modern thinkers assigned to the task of differentiating madness from idiocy (or more specifically, to the tripartite distinction of sanity, madness, and idiocy). Based on this analysis, Garson’s identifies the need to offer a positive account of mental illness—one that does not define the (...) essence of mental illness exclusively as the absence, lack, or failure of the power of reasoning. Following the Late Modern thinkers (Locke, Kant, Wigan, and Heinroth), Garson concludes that madness is infused with reason, and what characterizes madness is the presence of reason in an altered and mutated form. This is all worth taking seriously. My own assessment of this historical and philosophical material nonetheless differs from that of Garson. To recognize madness as possessing reason within it in an altered form may be of less profound significance than he thinks it is. Garson’s discussion commendably highlights the importance of making conceptual contrasts explicit in definitional debates, and this should indeed lead us to search for contrasts that are more philosophically illuminating (what is better will depend on the context of inquiry). However, in my view, the recognition of madness as altered reason neither reframes the project of defining “mental disorder” nor does it provide an intellectual scaffolding for mad activism.The significance of “madness contains reason within in but in an altered or perverse form” is difficult to translate into contemporary scientific terms, and the fuzziness and historical baggage around the terms “madness,” “reason,” and “perversion” does not make it easy. “Mental disorder” or “psychopathology” means to us something quite different than what madness meant to Late Modern thinkers, and while “madness” remains a popular term in philosophical literature, there is no clarity on the nature of overlap between the domain of madness and the domain of conditions currently classified by the diagnostic manuals. Mental disorders, as currently conceptualized, include a motley of conditions that were previously characterized using terms such as idiocy, madness, neuroses, and psychopathic personalities. [End Page 297]From our contemporary vantage point, to compare idiocy and madness is to make a distinction within the domain of psychopathology. We are comparing two groups of psychiatric conditions. The lessons we derive from this comparison do not necessarily extrapolate well to a comparison of mental disorders with something outside the domain of psychopathology. To the extent that psychopathology is inclusive of both idiocy and madness, psychiatric disorders both contain and do not contain “reason” within them. The domain is heterogenous in this regard, and broad generalizations about the nature of reason in the mental disorders would be simplistic at best and inaccurate at worst. Other distinctions that we have made within the domain of psychopathology have included organic versus functional, neurosis versus psychosis, categories versus continua, and distinctions used within nosology have included operationalized criteria versus phenomenology, idiographic versus nomothetic, medical versus non-medical, description versus explanation, and so on (Aftab & Ryznar, 2021; Zachar, Banicki, & Aftab, 2023), all of which have the potential to offer a positive account of some aspect of psychopathology.It is worth nothing that the distinction between “absence of reason” versus “perversion of reason” is analogous to the common distinction between absence of function and altered function in patho-physiology. Such a distinction exists for almost every function that exists. Consider vision: absence of vision (blindness) and altered vision (illusions, distortions, hallucinations). Consider hypoesthesia (reduced sense of touch) and paraesthesia (altered sense of touch—tingling, pricking, burning, etc.). Garson alludes to diminished sexual capacity versus paraphilia as an analogy, but he does not seem to appreciate that the analogy applies much more broadly. Is the distinction between absence of reason versus perversion of reason of any greater significance than the distinction between blindness and hallucination? If we were to say, “What distinguishes hallucination from blindness is not the failure, absence, or lack of sight, but its presence—albeit in a perverse and mutated form,” how profound would it really be for our notions of disorder? Or imagine some Late Modern physician saying that a disturbance of speech and... (shrink)

We investigate whether the distinct nature of multinational firms (MNC) differently influence the governance-performance relationship compared to the local firms in Pakistan. We used a dynamic system GMM estimator that produces consistent and efficient estimation after controlling for dynamic endogeneity and simultaneity. Our results demonstrate that corporate governance (CG) has a significant positive impact on firm financial performance whilst CG practice of MNC firms is more effective than local firms in Pakistan. We observed two distinct financing behaviours, i.e., ‘pro-active investment (...) behaviour’ of MNC firms and ‘conservative investment behaviour’ of local firms. We conclude that a well-established corporate culture, significant financial worth and firms’ higher growth rate are key determinants of better CG practice. (shrink)

This book explores the challenges Islamic societies face due to globalization and the internationalization of Western values. Using Pakistani society as an example, it examines the differences between the Islamic value system and moral relativism, and the resulting ideological conflicts that lead to extreme polarization in societies.

Purpose: This study examines the interrelations between religious commitment, spirituality, and employee well-being in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with an emphasis on the serial mediating roles of the strength of religious faith and career calling. The integration of these variables is aimed at providing a more profound understanding of how intrinsic personal values influence psychological and emotional well-being in the workplace. Method: A cross-sectional design was used with data from 248 employees working in different departments across Saudi Arabia. The (...) measurement of the constructs was based on validated scales used in earlier research. Data were analyzed using Stata for SEM to check the hypothesized relationships as well as to check the mediation effects. Results: Thereby, the results revealed that religious commitment and spirituality are positively contributing to psychological and emotional employee’s well-being. All these relations are significantly mediated by religious faith and career calling. Findings highlight the salience of intrinsic values and purpose work, with the serial mediation model that shows robust explanatory power. Originality/Implication: This study advances theoretical frameworks by linking spirituality, faith, and professional purpose to well-being. It offers practical implications for organizations by bringing up the need for supportive environments accommodating religious and spiritual dimensions at the workplace, which increases the general satisfaction and performance in a workplace. (shrink)

This research aims to explore the influence of Islamic tourism destination attributes on support for heritage tourism, focusing on the mediating roles of Islamic heritage proximity and cultural identity, as well as the moderating role of cultural tendency within the context of heritage sites in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. A quantitative approach was employed, utilizing a structured questionnaire to gather data from 267 tourists visiting various heritage sites. Measurement scales were adapted from established literature to ensure validity and reliability. (...) Data analysis was conducted using ADANCO software for Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM). The findings indicate that Islamic tourism destination attributes significantly influence support for heritage tourism. Additionally, Islamic heritage proximity and cultural identity were found to mediate this relationship effectively, while cultural tendency served as a significant moderator, enhancing the connection between tourism attributes and support for heritage tourism. This study contributes to the understanding of how cultural and religious elements shape tourism dynamics in Islamic contexts. The implications for practitioners and policymakers highlight the importance of enhancing destination attributes to foster greater support for heritage tourism, ultimately promoting sustainable cultural preservation. (shrink)

This study examines the connections among cultural tourism, spirituality, and associated factors among religious tourists in Saudi Arabia. It focuses on how cultural tourism impacts spiritual fulfilment, considering visitors' intentions to visit religious sites, while also factoring in cultural competence and trust in tourism brands as moderators. This study involved 244 participants, who were administered self-report surveys during their visits to religious sites and cultural attractions in Saudi Arabia. Data analysis employed Stata-SEM software, utilizing structural equation modelling (SEM) to assess (...) the hypothesized relationships among the variables. The results indicate noteworthy positive associations between cultural tourism and the spiritual experiences of tourists, with mediating effects observed through their intentions to visit religious sites. Additionally, the study identified that cultural competence and trust in tourism brands exerted a moderating influence on the relationship between cultural tourism and spiritual experiences. This research contributes to the advancement of knowledge and practical applications in the realms of spirituality and cultural tourism. It substantiates the proposition that cultural tourism has the potential to influence the spiritual dimensions of visitors. The results underscore the significance of incorporating cultural and spiritual components in tourism marketing and destination management strategies. Moreover, they provide insights for destination stakeholders seeking to enhance cultural tourism initiatives, not only in Saudi Arabia but also in other contexts. (shrink)

The Resource-Based View (RBV) has been instrumental in shaping strategic management theory by underscoring the significance of a firm's unique, valuable, and hard-to-copy internal resources in securing competitive advantage. However, the conventional RBV framework, with its emphasis on static, possession-oriented resource conceptualization, falls short in addressing the dynamic and relational nature of resources in contemporary business environments. This paper aims to bridge this gap by introducing a processual perspective to the RBV, grounded in process philosophy. In this study, we delve (...) into the philosophical underpinnings of RBV, critiquing its static ontological assumptions and proposing a shift towards a more dynamic and relational ontology. Drawing from the insights of process philosophers such as Whitehead and Bergson, and differentiating between 'strong' and 'weak' process views, we reconceptualize resources not as static entities, but as dynamic elements continually constituted and reconstituted within networks of relationships and ongoing organizational processes. This approach allows for a more nuanced understanding of resources, recognizing their evolutionary and interconnected nature. Our methodology involves a rigorous theoretical analysis and synthesis of existing RBV literature, coupled with philosophical inquiry to construct a novel framework for resource conceptualization. We demonstrate how this reconceptualization offers fresh insights into strategic management, particularly in formulating strategies that leverage the dynamic interplay of resources and in understanding the boundary between internal and external resources. This paper contributes to the RBV literature by offering a process-oriented perspective that aligns more closely with the complexities of modern strategic landscapes. By challenging and extending traditional RBV assumptions, we pave the way for future empirical research and theoretical development in strategic management, highlighting the significance of process philosophy in enriching management theories. (shrink)

The role of digitization and globalization have changed consumers’ online buying behaviors, specifically in the times of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. This seriously influences the online retail industry in developing countries that are already struggling to move toward digital trading through e-business. Pakistan being a developing country is no exception, and it is, therefore, pertinent to examine factors that contribute to digital trading. Employing theories of reasoned action and the technology acceptance model, this study aims to investigate how personal innovativeness (...) and perceived usefulness impact consumers’ online purchase intentions through a serial mediational model. The data were collected through an online survey from 410 respondents. Structural Equation Modeling was used to test the proposed model. This study showed significant results for the direct effect of personal innovativeness and perceived usefulness on online purchase intentions as well as the indirect serial effect via internet browsing and attitude toward online purchasing. The study results have some important practical implications for selling firms, especially in the times of COVID-19. The study suggests that online retailers should be more responsive to the aforementioned factors to facilitate consumers to spend more time browsing, which influences consumers’ interest and intention to make online purchases. As the social distancing and lockdown approaches were implemented in Pakistan and other parts of the world, the trend toward online purchases has increased. Due to this shift in the overall purchasing behavior of consumers and the potential for strong growth in e-commerce, organizations need to consider the post-COVID situation to expand their business in an online platform for addressing the future pandemic crisis. (shrink)

In step with rapid advancements in computer vision, vehicle classification demonstrates a considerable potential to reshape intelligent transportation systems. In the last couple of decades, image processing and pattern recognition-based vehicle classification systems have been used to improve the effectiveness of automated highway toll collection and traffic monitoring systems. However, these methods are trained on limited handcrafted features extracted from small datasets, which do not cater the real-time road traffic conditions. Deep learning-based classification systems have been proposed to incorporate the (...) above-mentioned issues in traditional methods. However, convolutional neural networks require piles of data including noise, weather, and illumination factors to ensure robustness in real-time applications. Moreover, there is no generalized dataset available to validate the efficacy of vehicle classification systems. To overcome these issues, we propose a convolutional neural network-based vehicle classification system to improve robustness of vehicle classification in real-time applications. We present a vehicle dataset comprising of 10,000 images categorized into six-common vehicle classes considering adverse illuminous conditions to achieve robustness in real-time vehicle classification systems. Initially, pretrained AlexNet, GoogleNet, Inception-v3, VGG, and ResNet are fine-tuned on self-constructed vehicle dataset to evaluate their performance in terms of accuracy and convergence. Based on better performance, ResNet architecture is further improved by adding a new classification block in the network. To ensure generalization, we fine-tuned the network on the public VeRi dataset containing 50,000 images, which have been categorized into six vehicle classes. Finally, a comparison study has been carried out between the proposed and existing vehicle classification methods to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed vehicle classification system. Consequently, our proposed system achieved 99.68%, 99.65%, and 99.56% accuracy, precision, and F1-score on our self-constructed dataset. (shrink)

As organizations are benefiting from investments in big data analytics capabilities building and education, our study has analyzed the impact of big data analytics capabilities building and education on business model innovation. It has also assessed technological orientation and employee creativity as mediating and moderating variables. Questionnaire data from 499 managers at enterprises in Jiangsu, China have been analyzed using Structural Equation Modeling in SmartPLS. Big data analytics capabilities building and education strengthen technological orientation and increase business model innovation. Technology (...) orientation increases business model innovation and plays a mediating role. Employee creativity also boosts innovation. These findings show that business managers should adopt and promote a technological orientation. They should hire and train employees with big data education and training. Organizations can try to select and support employees who show creativity. (shrink)

The purpose of this research is to investigate the associations of internal and external support mechanisms with entrepreneurial success, in the context of China's entrepreneurial sector from network theory perspective. The role of digital technology, as a moderator, has also been analyzed. Data has been obtained from 500 entrepreneurs in Jiangsu, a province in China. All hypotheses were tested using structural equation modeling. It has been found that family support, business partner support, community support and external stakeholder relationships have positive (...) effects on entrepreneurial success. It has also been discovered that digital technology adoption strengthens the positive relationship between business partner support and entrepreneurial success. Theoretical and practical implications have been highlighted and future research suggestions have been provided. (shrink)

Saudi Arabia has had remarkable progress in reducing maternal and neonatal mortality over the past decades. While various challenges persist, such as unequal access to healthcare, a history of pre-existing maternal conditions, and neonatal complications, this review will focus on critical determinants of maternal and neonatal outcomes in Saudi Arabia, including government-driven efforts through Vision 2030 towards enhancing health care infrastructure and policies. The focus has been on antenatal care, neonatal intensive care units, and maternal mortality audit issues, enhancing outcomes. (...) Recommendations are the adoption of standardized risk assessment tools and health disparities abatement between the Saudi population and non-Saudi populations. Future strategies encompass holistic approaches: education, infrastructure improvements, and policy frameworks, aiming to achieve international standards. (shrink)

詩と哲学には、ともに語りえざるものを語ろうとする営みがある。本書はそれを宗教哲学と比較思想の視点に立って論及してみた。.

斬新な視点から、やまと言葉の考察を通し、日本語の哲学の可能性を探り、「日本人の心のありか」を指し示す、刮目の書。.

Awais Aftab’s response to my article is informative because it expresses what I suspect is a widespread but confused inclination among psychiatrists to “have their cake and eat it.” On the one hand they do not want to be branded as reductionists, so they deny they are equating mental disorder with brain disease or brain mechanisms. Yet, they want to maintain a role for physical causation in mental disorder, because without it the link between psychiatry and medicine starts to (...) look tenuous.Reductionism is the implication of what Aftab is saying, however. By denying any important distinction between behavior produced by a brain disease and other, non-disease driven behavior (which I refer to here as “ordinary... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Let me begin by expressing my gratitude to AAPP, PPP, and the Jaspers Award Committee—I am deeply honored to receive this award. So too let me thank Anke Bueter (2022) and Awais Aftab (2022) for their thought-provoking commentaries. Many of the concerns they bring up are ones that I share, so I am delighted to have a chance to discuss them in my response. I will bring (...) up three central issues in turn: 1) the role of shared standards versus background assumptions, 2) the limits of inclusion, and 3) pluralism in psychiatry. -/- Shared Standards or Background Assumptions? Both Bueter and Aftab reference Longino's "shared public standards" criterion for social objectivity (1990, p. 77; 2002, p. 130), which I did not explicitly discuss in the original paper (Knox, 2022). This was a choice I made partly because in the case of psychiatry determining what constitutes an appropriate "shared public standard" is often not at all straightforward, which points to a potential problem for Longino's view. Namely, in some cases it is a matter of dispute whether some assumption shared within a scientific field should be counted as a "shared public standard" (which Longino requires that there be) or a "background assumption" (which she requires be subjected to critical scrutiny). And it is sometimes unclear how we could effectively adjudicate this type of disagreement. Take the example Bueter uses of "psychiatrists aiming for biomedical explanations of a particular mental disorder, whereas the critics value research that does not assume the existence of mental disorders" (2022, p. 273). A conflict along these lines often does arise between advocates of the pathology paradigm and the neurodiversity paradigm with regard to Autism, for example. A psychiatrist working within the pathology paradigm may argue that something like "psychiatry must deal only with mental disorders, understood as pathologies" constitutes a shared standard, and so psychiatric research on Autism must understand it as a pathology. An advocate of the neurodiversity paradigm, however, might argue that this same proposition is merely a normative background assumption shared among many psychiatrists, which ought to be questioned and ultimately rejected. How might we adjudicate this meta-disagreement about the status of this standard/assumption? Bueter gives some helpful guidance on this issue by pointing to Carrier's requirement that participants exhibit the "epistemic attitude" (2013). I agree that if all participants commit themselves to this attitude, then "…differences in conceptual resources and standards of assessment need not make shared deliberation impossible, and the standards can be a subject of discussion themselves" (Bueter 2022, p. 273). For instance, since this attitude requires some commitment to empirical adequacy, we might search for some empirical evidence that favors one paradigm over the other. But advocates of both paradigms might actually agree on all the empirical facts, and yet still have a deep disagreement about which paradigm's understanding should be accepted as a shared standard. If participants are committed to some common standards and goals, we may often be able to resolve this sort of problem. But there is still a danger that we may arrive at an impasse, with no clear idea how to proceed. Though in many cases scientific experts must be allowed some power to set the standards in their domain (lest we dilute that expertise in ways that Aftab rightly points out would be problematic), I would also caution against accepting that something is a legitimate shared public standard just because the members of a scientific community say so. In keeping with the spirit of Longino's reliance on Quine, none of our shared standards are in principle immune from revision—save perhaps a minimal commitment to empirical evidence and rational argument. -/- The Limits of Inclusion My impression is that Longino's response to the "Nazi problem" presented by Hicks (2011) might be to bite the bullet: her account does require allowing Nazi scientists to participate, and perhaps even cultivating their participation. But if (as seems likely) the Nazi shows themself to be unable to adhere to the shared standards... (shrink)

I respond to the 4 commentaries by Awais Aftab & Kristopher Nielsen, Hane Htut Maung, Diane O’Leary and Kathryn Tabb under 3 main headings: “What is the BPSM really?” & Why update it?; “Is our approach foundationally compromised?”, and finally, “Antagonists or fellow travellers?”.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:What Can (and Cannot) Be Said About the Distinction Between Religious Experience and PsychopathologyMohammed Abouelleil Rashed, MD, PhDThe distinction between religious experience and psychopathology as a puzzle to be pondered, debated, clarified, and analyzed is an example of a thoroughly modern problem. It is modern in that the distinction can only make sense if our starting assumption is the existence of unique and separate types of experience that might (...) overlap phenomenologically but are ultimately different entities that should be distinguished from each other. And it can only have this sort of sense in a secular worldview where the possibility of a fully areligious type of psychological suffering is on the table and widely accepted. By framing the matter in this way, the debate presupposes, rather than argues for, the existence of unique and separate types of experience. This is a major presupposition, and its coherence cannot be assumed, nor can we ignore the impact of our standpoint in the debate on whether or not we can actually make that distinction let alone resolve it. In the original paper (Rashed, 2024), I deconstruct the distinction by examining what can, and cannot, be said about it given the standpoint that we adopt. In what follows, I respond to Awais Aftab’s and Warren Kinghorn’s thoughtful commentaries on my paper and in the process clarify my thesis further.What We Believe and the limits of What We Can ArgueAwais Aftab (2024) perceptively points out that the way I define the terms renders the distinction between religious experience and psychopathology an instance of the broader distinction between the religious worldview and the scientific worldview. Accordingly, my approach deviates from the usual [End Page 219] approach in these debates, which tend to focus on specific areas of phenomenology (delusion, hallucinations, low mood, etc.). This focus then directs the debate toward distinguishing these states from each other, and not toward asking if there is a distinction that needs to made at all, and, if there is, what the distinction is really about. In order to overcome this potential blind spot, we need to step back and examine our assumptions about the possibility and the nature of the allegedly competing conceptions of religious experience and psychopathology. And to do so, we need to apprehend the distinction in the broadest possible sense, as it is there that we can identify our assumptions about those ‘things’ we are trying to distinguish from each other.The first step in deconstructing this debate is to identify our stance towards the categories of religious experience and mental disorder, and what this stance enables us to say and prohibits us from saying. On an ontological stance, we would be dealing with two distinct categories of experience out there in the world for us to identify, study, and differentiate; there is a truth of the matter as to the origin of the experience, a truth that we can get hold of if we can get to the essence of the respective phenomena. On a constructivist stance, there is no sense to this claim, and what we have are two possible interpretations of experience that cannot be differentiated from each other from a natural or a supernatural standpoint; they do not reflect distinct types of experience, merely the attribution of meaning, which can always go the other way depending on the social situation and the cultural context. And so, our initial stance as to an ontological or constructivist understanding will constrain from the outset what can and cannot be said about the distinction between religious experience and psychopathology. The issue is further complicated by the fact that we can hold a range of positions: we can, at the same time, adopt an ontological view of religious experience and a constructivist view of mental disorder, or vice versa, and in each case we might end up in a different place.For philosophers, theologians, and others writing from a religious standpoint, we can assume that they are adopting an ontological reading of religious experience. In other words, they take it to be true that some experiences have a divine origin, connect the person to non... (shrink)

Readers, please welcome the new Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology editorial team of Senior Editors and our Managing Editor. We are grateful to keep our veteran Senior Editors Tim Thornton, Nancy Potter, Mona Gupta, and Werdie van Staden. However, we are equally grateful to have our new cohort of Senior editors, Awais Aftab, Anna Bergqvist, Derek Strijbos, and Michael Wong, revitalize our efforts. Many of you already know our efficient and capable Managing Editor, Sébastien Arviset, who has been with us (...) for several years now. This new influx of talent and energy we hope will invigorate the Journal and keep our editorial operations smooth and efficient. In alphabetical order, our editors can tell you a little... (shrink)