The paper offers a comparison of the understanding of the realtion between psychology and philosophy in classical and alternative psychologies. In the "externalistic" vision, connected with the classical psychology, the philosophy is seen mainly as a discipline "outside" of psychology: philosophy is not neither to exert a direct influence on psychology, nor to enter into the the psychological inquiry. This approach implies the priority of empirical experience as well as shoving up the theoretical reflection beyond the framework of psychology. Contrary (...) to that the "internalistic" conception underlines the unity of the theoretical and empirical le_vels of knowledge, which are inseparable and mutually connected. This approach accepts the fact, that the philosophy does exert an influenc on the epistemological processes of psychology and does enter into them. Thus philosophy does not exist only "outside" of psychology as an academic disciplne, but also "inside" it, directly influencing the process of knowledge. (shrink)

The paper examines the concept of "implicit philosophy" as used in the integrated psychotherapy, making clear its content as a "potential philosophy". The author sees its meaning as opposite to the meaning of "explicit philosophy". To use the relationship between implicit and explicit philosophy in an explanation involves a binary conception of philosophy in its narrow and broader senses. The author shows, how the philosophy critically explains certain primal sponatneous genera_lizations in order to offer "secondary reimplications" of new philosophical attitudes. (...) The philosophical work is thus the middle stage of the whole process of proceeding from primary to secondary implicit philosophy. The concept of "implicit philosophy" can be applied also beyond the psychotherapy - e. g. in social philosophy or in the philosophy of science. (shrink)

The Alexandrian theologian Origen wrote that God the Father exceeds the Son in a way that surpasses the Son’s own transcendence of creation, and he apparently did so in order to oppose those who disregarded Jesus’ statement that «the Father is greater than I» . Just a few years after Origen’s death, however, when correction of his Son of God theology was well underway, Arius radicalized the latent subordinationism present in Origen’s thought by placing the Son among created things. The (...) Arian tendency to associate the Son with the created realm can be traced back to the attempts of Methodius of Olympus and Eusebius of Caesarea to counter Origen’s doctrine of eternal creation. Arius claimed that Christ is called «Son» because he is the created instrument of God’s will, and he gained sympathy for this voluntaristic view by citing John 14:28. Here was irrefutable scriptural proof of the metaphysical priority of the Father over the Son who is a separate and yet perfect creature of God. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Beitrag nimmt die unter anderem von Walter Benjamin zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts im Rahmen einer Auseinandersetzung um die konzeptionelle Ausrichtung der Germanistik geäußerte Forderung in Augenschein, dass der spekulative Drang zum Philosophischen mit der verweilenden Aufmerksamkeit fürs Einzelne zu kombinieren sei, um die gleichzeitige Geltung geistesgeschichtlicher Zusammenhänge und historischer Details, von konkretem Gegenstand und allgemeinem Wesen, in den Blick zu bekommen. Am Beispiel von Athanasius Kirchers Traktat Scrutinium physico-medicum von 1658 wird gezeigt, dass es an Benjamins (...) Forderung eine frühneuzeitliche Annäherung gibt, in der die Wahrnehmungsform der spekulativen Aufmerksamkeit zu einer Möglichkeit wird, die Geistesgeschichte als Ergebnis eines Wechselverhältnisses zwischen Fokus und Entgrenzung zu verstehen. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE BARTH LEGACY: NEW ATHANASIUS OR ORIGEN REDIVIVUS? :A RESPONSE TO T. F. TORRANCE RICHARD A. MULLER Fuller Theological Semma1·y Pasadena, California I I N A SERIES of papers, essays, and introductions reaching back some twenty years, T. F. Torrance has provided an interpretation of the place arnd of the importance of Karl Barth not only in the theological debates of the twentieth cent- -bury but also and (...) more importantly in the who1e of the history of doctrine. According to Torrance, Barth is not only the greatest theologian since Schleiermacher and the most important thinker of our own times, he is also the greatest theologian since Athanasius, the heir of the Reformers, and the thinker on whose insights our theological future must rest.1 In these essays by Torrance, the characterization of Barthian thought as "neo1 Cf. Karl Barth, Theology and Church: Shorter Writings, 1920-1928, trans. Louise Pettibone Smith, with an introduction (1962) by T. F. Torrance (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 7, 9-10; T. F. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction (London: SCJ'vf, 1965), pp. 99, 103-105, 111-115; idem, ReaUty and Evangelical Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1982),,pp. 14-15; idem, Transformation and Convergence in the Frame of Knowledge (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984), pp. vii-x, 279-283; idem, "The Legacy of Karl Barth (1886· 1986)," in Scottish Journal of Theology, 39 (1986): 289-308 and "Karl Barth and the Latin Heresy," in 39 (1986): 461-482. The latter two essays draw together themes from the earlier words..Although the term "Latin heresy" does not seem to have been used by Torrance in any of his previous writings, it does represent a continuation of the attack on medieval and postReformation theology :first presented in his introduction to The School of Faith: The Oatechisms of the Reformed Ohi1rch (N.Y.: Harper, 1959), pp. lxx-lxxix, and elaborated in Space, Time and IncM'nation (London: Oxford, 1969). 673 674 RICHARD A, MULLER orthodox" takes on a new meaning. Barth himself rejected the term, just as (we might guess) Calvin or Chemnitz would have!'ejected any claim that their great dogmatic projects were the proper basis for a new orthodoxy in the sixteenth century. Both Calvin and Chemnitz stood for right teaching, for ortho-doxy, but neither would have presented their own views-no matter how correct they believed their exegesis and interpretation to be-as a final ground for the establishment of future theological formulations. Both in the Reformation aind in the twentieth century, it has been the next generation, the generation of the students of the great teaicher, that has moved definitely from the system of the teaicher to the establishment of a new orthodoxy. And in all fairness to the Protestant orthodox of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, we must l'ecognize that they neither exalted the theology of the Reformation to the status of a new orthodoxy (ovcer against the faith of the church throughout the centuries) nor identified any single theological system, whether that of Calvin or that of Chemnitz or of a later, more fully "orthodox" and "scholastic" thinker like Polanus or Gerhard, as an exhaustive statement of theological Ol1thodoxy for the chmch.2 In the writings of Torrance, we encounter this second-generation sense of orthodoxy but, I believe, without the caution characteristic of the Protestant orthodox of the seventeenth century. In the following essay, I propose to examine the origin and the subsequent trajectory of Torrance's views on Barth's relationship to the tradition, with attention to his view of Barth's patristic roots and of Barth's position over against the western theological mind. In the concluding sections of the essay, I will try to provide a corrective to Torrance's approach to the history of 1Christian doctrine and, on the basis of that correc-. tive, an alternative view of the lega1cy of Karl Barth. Torrance's pronouncements concerning the role of Barth in 2 Cf. Richard A. Muller, " Scholasticism Protestant and Catholic: Francis Turretin on the Object and Principles of Theology," in Ohuroh Historv, 55 ( 1986) ; 19::!-205, THE BARTH LEGACY 675 the history of Christian doctrine and, therefore, in its future development a11e based on an... (shrink)

This article examines Athanasius’ argument in his work Contra Arianos, focusing on the reasons for the order in which he addresses the biblical texts he considers. While the choice of which texts to discuss is dictated by the need to consider those texts that were evidently important in the Arians’ own exegetical arguments, the order in which Athanasius discusses them derives from his desire to begin with biblical texts that clearly describe the whole sweep of biblical redemption. Texts (...) such as Philippians 2:5-11 and Hebrews 1-2 describe in some detail the movements of humiliation and exaltation which the Son undergoes as he becomes man, and thus these texts demonstrate the need to apply any given assertion about the Son either to his eternal existence as God or to his temporal existence as man. In such texts, the literary context-the subject of the passage itself-explicitly describes the broader redemptive context. As a result, these texts constitute the starting point from which to develop interpretive principles applicable to other biblical texts in which the redemptive context is not as obvious. The article concludes with reflection on the significance of Athanasius’ starting point: the story of redemption begins not with the Gospels or even with Genesis 1, but with the eternal relationship of Father to Son, a relationship we were created to share and redeemed that we might share it anew. (shrink)

For Athanasius, non-being describes the original state of creatures, and the state that creatures return to when they are not sustained by God. ‘Being’ is a gift given to creatures. Sin, for Athanasius, is creaturely rejection of God and therefore rejection of being itself. This implies that when we sin, humans fall into nothingness and cease to exist, leading to the implication that fallen human nature and personal sin should result in our immediate non-existence. In this paper I (...) describe Athanasius’ position on non-being and sin, and then go on to look at how the theology of Maximus the Confessor may offer a means of understanding the difficulty implied in Athanasius’ work. I look at how Maximus understands being to be transformative, and something that humans grow into. Perfect being which is full communion with God, or absolute non-being are, through Christ, reserved for the time after this life on earth. (shrink)

Arius maintains that the Father must produce the Son without any pre-existing ingredients (ex nihilo) because no such ingredients are available to the Father. Athanasius denies this, insisting not only that the Father himself becomes an ingredient in the Son, but also that the Son inherits his divine properties from that ingredient. I argue, however, that it is difficult to explain exactly how the Son could inherit certain properties but not others from something he is not identical to, just (...) as it is difficult to explain the precise way that a statue inherits certain properties but not others from the lump of bronze it is made from. (shrink)

This essay explores the history of the concept of _monstrum_ from Francis Bacon’s _Novum Organum_ to Athanasius Kircher’s _Mundus Subterraneaus_ (1664), as well as its relationship with the origins of science; as in the early modern age, the term _monstra_ is considered as a synonym for _mirabilia naturae_. The introductory part focuses on the difficult definition of “monster”, starting from Aristotle’s famous sentence in _De generatione animalium_: whoever does not looks like his parents, or whatever happens in a different (...) way from the “generality of cases”, is included within the category of the “monstrous”. Monster is a being, whose anomaly represents a warning; therefore, monsters may be considered as signs, susceptible of an allegorical, moral and even political interpretation. In another acceptation of the term, monsters may be considered as the privileged witnesses of the richness and fecundity of nature. In the second part, Bacon’s theory of monsters is exposed: they are classified as _instantiae deviantes_, within that interpretation of nature, through which the Lord Chancellor lays the epistemological foundations of the modern science. In the third, fourth and fifth parts, a taxonomy of monsters is given: at first, by means of the _cabinets des curiosités_, which flourished in sixteenth and seventeenth century Italy, from Naples to Rome, from Bologna to Milan, with famous collectors such as Ferrante Imperato, Ulisse Aldrovandi, Manfredo Settala, Athanasius Kircher; then, through the “books of secrets”, which are at the same time a new, successful literary genre and a way of thinking nature, an aspect of natural history. Among the “professors of secrets”, there are Giovan Battista Della Porta, Ambroise Paré, Leonardo Fioravanti, Jean Fernel, Pierre Borel, Kenelm Digby, and Athanasius Kircher, again, with some disciples of his, such as Kaspar Schott. Secrets of nature and _mirabilia naturae_ are finally compared: the classical list of _mirabilia_, from Pliny the Elder to Kircher, completes the taxonomy of monsters. The sixth and last part of this essay offers an explicative theory of monsters and prodigies: the marvels of nature are magnetic phenomena, which seem to imply a mysterious action at a distance. Such magnetic action can be accounted for on the basis of the Renaissance, Ficinian and Neoplatonic concept of spirit – conceived as the universal vehicle of occult sympathies and antipathies - and then through the seventeenth concepts of corpuscular effluvia, introduced by Pierre Gassendi in his _Physica_ (1658), and _sphaera activitatis_, produced by the effluvia which each body emits, and surrounding it. This sphere is the place when most of marvelous phenomena happen. (shrink)

In The Kingdom and the Glory, Giorgio Agamben traces a genealogy of the concept of ‘economy’ through the development of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.1 While the more detailed metaphysics of the Trinity—the distinctions between ‘being,’ ‘nature,’ ‘essence,’ and ‘persons’ that drove the debates at Nicea and Chalcedon—were still in the process of development, Agamben argues that the concept of economy formed a kind of ‘placeholder’ for these concepts, holding together the mystery of the Trinity with the seeming ambivalence (...) of the world. Through a series of genealogical twists, this ‘economic’ paradigm in theology turns out to form the basis of modern economic governmentality—the ‘Petersonian’ counterpart to the ‘Schmittian’ shape of modern sovereignty. While Agamben links the language of ‘economy’ in early Trinitarian thought to the problem of the Trinitarian unity, he does so by delinking its use from the economy of salvation. As a result, the later history of the Trinitarian doctrine is characterized (on Agamben’s reading) by an increasing separation of the ‘economy’ and the ‘ontology’ of the Trinity; an inseparable division is opened up in Christian thought between ‘being’ and ‘acting,’ one which haunts Trinitarian doctrine and spills over into the history of Western political, philosophical, and economic thinking. In this paper, I intend to retrace this ‘economic’ lineage, but in order to re-link the questions of the Trinity and salvation; it is clear that the stakes for patristic writers, in working out a Trinitarian theology, were precisely salvation. The lines between heresy and orthodoxy are consistently argued in terms of their relationship to the possibility of salvation—the possibility of a triumph over sin and death. Only once re-situated in this way can the economic ‘theodicy’ of divine administration and the mature formulation of the ‘immanent’ metaphysics of the Trinity be read—as Karl Rahner famously claims—as the same thing. I will proceed first of all by retracing Agamben’s own steps—reconstructing his argument about the centrality of the category of ‘economy’ within Trinitarian theology. Secondly, I will intervene within Agamben’s genealogy at a key juncture, one that is passed over by Agamben’s own text: the Arian controversy. It is with the Arian controversy and the articulation of Nicene Trinitarianism that Agamben locates the break between ‘being’ and ‘activity’ or ‘economy,’ and so it is by re-narrating this controversy that an alternative account of the relationship between these terms in Trinitarian thought can be narrated. Finally, I will draw out a different, intrinsic relationship between Trinitarian ‘being’ and ‘activity’ than the one presumed by Agamben; one in which a relative break is conditioned by a more fundamental soteriological unity. This has, in turn, consequences for how the ‘economic paradigm’—in both its earlier Christian context and in its modern governmental instantiations—operates: the economic-theological paradigm produces the political-theological or ‘ontological’ paradigm of sovereignty to which it is linked. (shrink)

The doctrine of creation out of nothing was conceptually sharpened as the Church Fathers engaged the cosmological views of their opponents. This article discusses the emergence of this doctrine in the second century, focusing on the polemic of Irenaeus against the Gnostics. For Irenaeus, creatio ex nihilo was already a part of the “rule of truth,” which provided a hermeneutical key to the scriptures. Irenaeus also used rational arguments to show that Gnostic cosmologies obscured, rather than explained the origins of (...) the world. A different challenge arose in the fourth century, when Arius began to teach that the Son was created out of nothing, thereby treating the divine act of the generation of the Son analogously to the creating of the world. Athanasius of Alexandria introduced an important distinction by correlating the eternal generation of the Son with the divine essence and the creation of the world with the will of the Father. (shrink)

Summary The famous Jesuit father Athanasius Kircher (1602?1680) tried to interpret the Creation of the world and to explain the origin of life in the last book of his geocosmic encyclopedia, Mundus subterraneus (Amsterdam, 1664?1665). His interpretation largely depended on the ?concept of seeds? which was derived from the tradition of Renaissance ?chymical? (chemical and alchemical) philosophy. The impact of Paracelsianism on his vision of the world is also undeniable. Through this undertaking, Kircher namely developed a corpuscular theory for (...) the spontaneous generation of living beings. The present study examines this theory and its relationship with Kircher's chymical interpretation of the Creation in order to place it in its own intellectual and historical context and will uncover one of its most important sources. (shrink)

John Henry Newman made two translations of Athanasius's Orations Against the Arians: in the first half of the 1840s, when still an Anglican, for the Oxford Library of the Fathers series and a second attempt late in his life, a “free translation” published in 1881, by which time he was a Cardinal. The changes that he made to his original translation reflect thirty-five years of reading Catholic theology. In various ways, the new translation shares the theology of Leo XIII's (...) Thomistic revival. (shrink)

If anyone ever lived up to our image of a baroque Universalgelehrter, it may have been the Jesuit natural philosopher Athanasius Kircher, whose life and interests spanned most of the 17th century. In his prolific career, Kircher wrote at least 14 major works, on subjects as varied as light, magnetism, music, geology, combinatorics, and Sinology. Thomas Leinkauf’s thorough, penetrating study of Kircher’s life and work does a tremendous job of making the Jesuit’s work both comprehensible and fascinating, as well (...) as granting us a vision of the inner workings of Kircher’s mind, a mind formed both by his period and his position in the history of ideas, and driven by an unusual creativity and capacity for synthesis. (shrink)