In the present article, we are faced with two phenomenological philosophers who, in two different intellectual traditions, namely philosophical hermeneutics and moral phenomenology, have referred to the concept of the Other as the fundamental possibility of the individual. The other, as an ontological and common concept in the thought of Gadamer and Levinas, is the turning point of the condition for the possibility of understanding and ethics. Focusing on the concept of the other, while addressing the points of difference and (...) commonality between Gadamer and Levinas, this article will show that Levinas’s preoccupation with the other as a philosopher refers to the foundations of ethics, and the condition for the possibility of foundations of ethics is encountering the other. In Gadamer, the turning point is the determination of the possibilities of understanding in dialectical and dialogue-oriented relationships. Without the other, in Levinas’s thought, ethics, and moral matter, and in Gadamer’s thought, the process of understanding will not occur in the form of a fusion of horizons. Therefore, this article shows that the other is a common concept between these two philosophers, which both of them cannot avoid in their philosophical analyses of ethics or the process of understanding. Introduction The analysis of ethics is one of the important and innovative achievements of Levinas’s philosophical intellectual structure. Levinas’s concern is to refer to the foundations of morality itself, regardless of institutionalizing the moral in the form of law, and the foundation of morality is in face-to-face relationships with others. Regardless of Levinas’s plan about the concept of the other, Gadamer imagines the determination of understanding in a new way in the face of the other. The other is the comprehensible strain in philosophical hermeneutics, in such a way that the process of understanding is formed by the presence of the other and the face-to-face encounter with it. According to Gadamer, the other is the factor of openness in the process of understanding. The fusion of horizons is the product of openness and mutual encounters in dialogue, which is not possible without the other. The other is the condition of determining the possibility of understanding in each of the parties who are allowed to reveal a part of their being and allow the other to open up and talk. In fact, understanding is a kind of event that is revealed in a two-way conversation in an event-like way. This type of understanding depends on the presence of another. The main focus of the research is the analysis of the concept of the other, which has been done with emphasis on two important works: Truth and method, Totality and infinity. Body & discussion In general, the process of understanding is a dialogical process, whether the other side of the conversation is a text or a person, the foundation of understanding is formed in a relationship with the other. Determining the other as an independent personality and a different perspective is an ontological determination. The other thinks and becomes meaningful beyond the subject or object and even beyond my intellectual position, it belongs to its own independent world and its own experience. In conversation, it plays a significant role in the production of truth. Openness provides the possibility of dialogue and mutual agreement. In dialogue, the final product is not reproduced. The other condition for the production of the final product is dialogue According to Gadamer, facing the other is facing his world. At the moment of facing me, the other makes his abstract aspects concrete and opens his lived experience to me. He believes that the question-and-answer process is a kind of encounter with the world of experience and openness toward it. According to Gadamer, the process of understanding is the result of dialectical-hermeneutic relations between me (the interpreter) and you (the other). The dialogical relationships that allow each other to enter the other’s history are relationships that are formed based on questions and answers. From Gadamer’s point of view, questions and answers are the opening of a new horizon based on tradition and contemporary history. Levinas phenomenologically refers to the philosophical tradition of the West to reread the process of the formation of the concept of the other. Many commentators and interpreters of Levinas’s works believe that it is possible to determine the foundations of ethics from Levinas’s point of view from face-to-face relationships. The condition for the possibility of morality is to pay attention to others. To describe another concept, Levinas analyzes the negative and positive aspects of this concept. In a negative way, Levinas first answers what the other is not, and for this reason, he criticizes the history of Western metaphysics and the criticism of Husserl and Heidegger’s phenomenology. Positively, the other is relative to me and different from me. The other is beyond subject and object. The other is not subjugated by any concept and recognizes its independent identity. The other and the encounter with him are the conditions for determining fundamental ethics from Levinas’s point of view. Another condition of concreteness refers to another person. According to Levinas, it is the condition for the formation of moral form. He believes that ethics is a kind of double encounter in the context of bilateral relations. Many moral concepts are formed in relation to a concrete other. In Levinas’s genealogy of ethics, we are faced with the presence of the other in a concrete way and with the subjectivity of the subject in an abstract and a priori way. Levinas specifies two approaches with the description of the other in the form of an infinite idea. First of all, there is an infinite gap between the other and the same. This issue shows its foreignness and otherness, its independence, and being true to its essence towards me. Second, it is the determination of another in a concrete or abstract form, which in both cases evokes an identity independent of me. Conclusion According to the explanations of the concept of the other in the thought of Gadamer and Levinas, we are faced with two phenomenological philosophers who have paid attention to the ontological aspects of the concept of the other in the fields of philosophical hermeneutics and ethics. In Gadamer’s thought, the other is an ontologically dialectical relationship between I-Thou and the starting point of the conversation process. The fusion of horizons is the turning point of the formation of the relation to the other, which is manifested in another area. The other has its own history, world, tradition, and authority, regardless of the formation of dialogical relationships, and has an independent identity. The other is allowed to share his lived experience in the conversation. The other creates new worlds. The other has opened himself and in return can be self-interpreting and self-revealing. Regardless, the other is the consistency of the complex relationship between language and the world. This form of bilateral relations, which is manifested in the presence of another, is a linguistic form that is the cause of a deep connection between language and the world. The other, whether concrete or abstract, is the turning point of our connection with the world in an ontological way. Regardless of Gadamer’s point of view, Levinas returns to another concept in his new thought project entitled “How to determine the possibilities of ethics.” According to Levinas, finding the foundations of ethics and determining the condition of moral possibilities is in facing the other and in face-to-face relationships. The other is concretely a kind of bilateral encounter which is the basis of many moral events and is manifested abstractly in the form of the subject’s subjectivity. This kind of infinite aspect of the other is revealed in subjectivity is implied in sense. Encountering another in an abstract form within itself is the encounter of the subject’s subjectivity with the sense, and the sense is in the encounter with the other. Sense is the basis of the subjectivity of the subject. Sense is a kind of concrete and visual face-to-face encounter that adds to the importance of determining another. Therefore, both Gadamer and Levinas raise many possibilities about the concept of the other, which shows the importance of this concept in the Western philosophical tradition. (shrink)

n this article, I try to defend the thesis that imagination against reason, moral progress through imagination not the reason, the emergence of literary culture after philosophical culture from Hegel onwards, contingency of language, the usefulness of literature (poetry, novels and stories, etc.) in enhancing empathy with one another and ultimately reducing philosophy to poetry in Richard Rorty's writings point to one thing: the priority of literature to philosophy. The literary or post-physical culture that Rorty defends is opposed to the (...) Enlightenment and the philosophical and religious culture. Rorty prefers literary culture among the religious culture and philosophical culture. The literary culture Rorty envisages is a radically historicist and nominalist one. Rorty’s romanticised version of pragmatism aims precisely at dealing with this literary or post-physical culture or, in generally, the literature. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyse opinions of Kierkegaard in his famous book, Fear and Trembling, and Heidegger’s points of view in the great work of thought, Being and Time, in order to present a new meaning of human. And these all going to introduce the new aspect of Ethic. Kierkegaard puts the act of the faith against of the virtue ethics according to the tale of Abraham in the Bible. He claims that the act of the faith (...) transcends from general ethic with achieve its individuality. The actor of the faith can not returns to generality, as the actor of tragedy can. He leaves the generality to make decision in a free manner. on the other hand, Heidegger’s existancial analyses leads into that the human determiner is not an ideal essence, but it’s his existance, in other word it’s his ability-to-be. Human is who he can be. So it is obvious that these two great thinkers believe that human is not a predestined being, but he is facilities. And for this reason we can renew our definition of the ethic. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to consider Hegel's unity, which is "the Unity of Identity and Difference" Or to examine and explain the "unity of seemingly contradictory features in a single coherent whole" in the light of the main problem of Hegel's philosophy, that is, the overcoming of divisions or dualities, as the solution of her philosophy. Unity (Einheit) is an important ideal, goal and end for Hegel's philosophical system. Hence, in his entire philosophical system and in different periods (...) of his intellectual life, the traces of the search for unity are always obvious, from the beautiful artistic unity in Greece to his desired unity, which is a rational, speculative, philosophical, absolute and Mediated unity. For him, the whole of philosophy is nothing but the study of the definition of unity and its realization in society. A unity that, instead of eliminating or absorbing another, tries to preserve and eliminate pluralities and differences by accepting and recognizing another in a single coherent whole. A unity in which differences and dualities do not disappear but are preserved as necessary and inevitable moments. Unity that is not the result of direct intuition but the product and result of passing through different stages and an intersubjective matter. For Hegel, it is not atomism and excessive individualism in the modern world that lead to rupture, not mere mystical and abstract unions that wipe out all differences, but the unity of the whole in which All distinctions are preserved. (shrink)

فلسفههای معاصر غرب به مثابه جنگلی پر از درختان کوتاه و بلند است که چنان درهم تنیده شدهاند که گاهی تشخیص ریشهها، تنهها و شاخ و برگهای آن‌ها از یکدیگر دشوار میشود. این وضعیت فلسفههای معاصر مغرب زمین است که تنها یک صفت برای آن‌ها مناسب است: تنوع و کثرت. بیشک عصر ما عصر استقبال از تفاوتها و کثرتها و دوری از این‌همانی‌ها و وحدتهایی است که از افلاطون تا هایدگر اول فیلسوفان آن را یگانه قلمرویی که حقیقت در آن (...) سکنی گزیده می‌دانستند. البته این تنوع و پیچیدگی از یک سو، محصول بافت تاریخی، اجتماعی، سیاسی، اقتصادی، فلسفی، علمی، هنری و رسانههای جمعی قرن بیستم است و از سوی دیگر، همین بافت نیز بیتأثیر از فلسفهها و اندیشههای فلسفی و علمی به ارث رسیده از قرن نوزدهم نیست. بنابراین، تعامل بین این دو عامل و تأثیر و تأثر از یکدیگر قابل اغماض نیست. تحولات در عصر حاضر را به دو شکل میتوان توصیف کرد. یکی تحولات در عرصة جهان روزمره که میتوانیم آن‌ها را تحولات سختافزاری بنامیم و عبارت‌اند از دو جنگ جهانی خانمان‌سوز اول و دوم، نژادپرستی، ظهور و افول دولتهای کمونیستی، تولید سلاحهای هستهای و استفاده از بمب اتمی، تولید سایر سلاحهای کشتار جمعی، درگیریهای قومی و نژادی و ضد استعماری، جهانیشدن، ظهور جنبشهای زنان، سقوط دولتهای استبدادی و ظهور دولتهای دموکراتیک، ظهور جامعة پساصنعتی، رشد روزافرون تکنولوژیهای کامپیوتری، افزایش قدرت رسانههای جمعی، پیشرفتهای روزافرون در حوزة پزشکی و... . تحولات نرم‌افزاری ‌عبارت‌اند‌ از ظهور نظریههای جدید در حوزة علم مانند نظریة نسبیت و نظریة کوانتوم، پیدایش پدیدارشناسی و فلسفههای اگزیستانس، فلسفههای پساساختارگرایانه، ظهور جنبشهای نوظهور در هنرها، تفسیرهای جدید از مفهوم عدالت در فلسفة سیاسی و... . هم تحولات سخت‌افزاری و هم تحولات نرم‌افزاری در تعامل فزاینده با یکدیگر سمت و سوی تازهای به فلسفههای معاصر نیز داده‌اند که آن را در قالب کثرت و تنوع و تفاوت فلسفهها میبینیم. این کثرت و تنوع به فلسفة معاصر غربی محدود نمیشود بلکه تقریباً شبیه همین وضعیت را در علوم اجتماعی، علوم سیاسی، حوزة هنرها و ‌به‌طور کلی در علوم انسانی و حتی در علوم تجربی مثل فیزیک شاهد هستیم. برای مثال اگر در قرن هجدهم فقط پارادایم نیوتنی غالب بود، امروز پارادایم انشتینی، پارادایم کوانتمیِ هایزنبرگی و سایر پارادایمها غالب هستند. گویی سرنوشت و تقدیر انسان معاصر این بوده که به این کثرتگرایی و تنوع تن دردهد. تنها وحدتی که میتوان با اطمینان خاطر بیشتری در فلسفة معاصر غرب پذیرفت این است که «کثرت» نقطهای است که فلسفههای معاصر به دور آن حلقه زدهاند. انسان معاصر گریز و گزیری از «کثرتگرایی» ندارد؛ لذا سرنوشت خود را باید در این فضا رقم زند. فلسفههای معاصر چه اروپایی مثل پدیدارشناسی، اگزیستانسیالیسم، هرمنوتیک و غیره، چه انگلیسیزبان مثل فلسفههای تحلیل زبانی و چه فلسفههای امریکایی مثل پراگماتیسم قدیم و جدیم در این جادة پر فراز و نشیب کثرتگرایی پا به عرصة هستی گذاشتهاند. یقیناً مبانی این فلسفهها نیز از سایة عظیم کثرتگرایی بیرون نیستند. البته مراد ما از کثرتگرایی صرفاً معنای متافیزیکی آن نیست بلکه به معنای عام کلمه است که دامنة آن تمامی حوزههای دانش بشری در عصر حاضر را شامل میشود. نکتة دیگر این است که این کثرتگرایی از ابتدای قرن بیستم به بعد ابعاد وسیعتری به خود میگیرد، چرا که در ابتدای قرن بیستم هنوز آن تفکر وحدتگرای هگلی در فلسفه و علمیکردن همة ابعاد زندگی و تلقی علمی از ‌جامعه در قالب مارکسیسم ــ به قول لیوتار غلبة روایت‌های کلان بر روایت‌های خرد ــ اجازة تنفس به تفاوتها را نمیداد؛ ولی نقدهای کوبندة نیچه به متافیزیک افلاطونگرا ـ ‌مسیحی سنت غربی، شکستن شیشة شفاف و یکدست نفس به دست فروید، وقوع دو جنگ جهانی، ظهور جنبشهای دادائیستی در عالم هنر و افول مرز هنر والا و هنر پست، ظهور بحران معنا، مرگ مؤلف و مرگ سوژه، جایگزینی زبان به جای ذهن، تقدم عمل بر نظر، استقبال از تفاوتها، سقوط دولتهای غیردموکراتیک و ظهور جوامع دموکراتیک در اشکال مختلف، ظهور جنبشهای زنان در قالب‌های گوناگون فمینیسم، طرح مباحث زیستمحیطی، همه و همه این نوید را داد که تفکر وحدتگرای تمامیتخواه در فرهنگ انسان قرن هجدهم و نوزدهم به بن‌بست رسیده است و اکنون وقت آن فرارسیده که نگاهها به سمت تنوعها، کثرتها و تفاوتها در تمامی حیطههای جامعة بشری قرن بیستم و بیست‌ویکم معطوف گردد. فیلسوفان همة این تحولات را در فلسفههای معاصر به چشم خویش دیدند و اغلب تسلیم این کثرتگرایی به معنای عام کلمه شدند. شاهد دیگری برای این کثرت و تفاوت در فلسفة معاصر، ظهور فلسفهها و مکاتب، جنبشها و جریانهای فلسفی متعدد در این دوره است. ما در هیچ دورهای از تاریخ طولانی فلسفه به اندازة دورة معاصر با کثرت فلسفه و مکاتب مواجه نیستیم. چنانچه در قرن هفدهم دکارت پدر معنوی فیلسوفان است و فیلسوفان این دوره فلسفههای خود را در مسیر دکارتی ایجاد کردهاند، در قرن هجدهم کانت و در قرن نوزدهم هگل و برخی فیلسوفان دیگر نقش پدر معنوی را بازی کرده‌اند. کما اینکه افلاطون پدر معنوی تمامی فلسفة غرب شناخته میشود. وایتهد در جملة معروفی گفته بود: «کل تاریخ فلسفة غرب پانوشتی بر افلاطون است.». (shrink)

This article tries to show the place of God in philosophy of Nishida Kitaro. Thus, religious aspect of philosophical thought of Nishida has been considered in four themes, namely, God as the ground of reality, absolute nothingness, divine love, and religion. Nishida interprets God in mystical vocabulary which it is similar to theory of pantheism. He explains relation between God and the creatures as manifestation of God. For him, God is the ground of reality and according this opinion, there is (...) not any separation between God and world. He also believes that God is not being, but He is absolute nothingness- of course it is not the same nothingness in Islamic philosophy that we know- and consciousness of this nothingness is equal with love of God and love of self. We intuit God from within and divine love lies in us. (shrink)

In this article, we try to show that Maurice Merleau-Ponty, as the patron saint of the body, offers a phenomenological analysis of the body that is neither psychological nor rational, but existential in nature. Influenced by Heidegger's philosophy, Merleau-Ponty presents an existential analysis of man and his corporeality as the corporeal subject relates to the world. In this article, focusing on concepts such as location, body schema, flesh, absent body, and body perspective, we show that Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological analysis of these (...) existential concepts has important role in understanding of the lived-body. Merleau-Ponty, by criticizing Descartes' body and abandoning his duality of soul and body, turns to the existential union of the two in the form of a bodily subject, showing that human existence can be understood through this bodily. He contrasts this analysis with philosophical analyzes, including Cartesian philosophy, in which he believes that sensory perception and the body as the foundation of human consciousness play an important role in his pre-reflective understanding of himself and the world. (shrink)

In this article, our aim is to examine the place of “reality” in Richard Rorty’s thought in view of the important and key discussion of language in the philosophy of this thinker. In other words, we know that with the occurrence of the “linguistic turn” in the middle of the twentieth century, the relationship between language and reality has become one of the central debates of philosophy, especially analytical philosophy, and has become of particular importance. Is it language that determines (...) the external reality for us? Is knowing the world outside the mind possible only through the possibilities that language gives us? And to what extent does the structure of language affect our cognitive pattern? These are only a part of the linguistic concerns that have occupied the minds of contemporary philosophers. The main concern and problem of the present article, which has been approached using a descriptive-analytical method, is to examine the relationship between language and reality in Richard Rorty’s thought and to show how he defends the linguistic structure of having reality. Rorty, following an analytical philosophy that, in addition to detailed analyses of traditional philosophical concepts, like the concepts of truth, meaning, necessity, etc. and by changing the discussion from experience to discussion from language in the direction of pragmatizing the basic principles of positivism, believes that it is trans-lingual and trans-temporal. The common denominator that Plato found in the outside world and transferred to man in the Cartesian-Kantian tradition is sought in analytic philosophy in language, and so analytic philosophers continue to pursue the traditional philosophy project of providing a trans-historical and eternal framework for the accurate representation of the world. Rorty tries to overcome this view of analytical philosophers with a Darwinist and pragmatic view of language and under the influence of philosophers such as Wittgenstein.For Darwinists, language is a tool among other tools that gives its users the ability to better and more efficiently adapt to their environment and meet their needs. For the likes of Wittgenstein and like-minded people, despite their many and sometimes profound differences, language had an important and pivotal place with its eventual and possibility feature. Influenced by thinkers such as Wittgenstein, and in the context of his Darwinist and pragmatic approach to language, Rorty attributes certain characteristics to language that can be said to influence his whole thought. Firstly, he considers language as a tool like other tools and, therefore, considers it to have no fixed nature and identity. Given that it is not possible to leave the language and on the other hand language has a poetic and metaphorical character, the function of language cannot be a representation of reality and reality can never be available to us naked and as independent of language and descriptions. Therefore, from Rorty’s point of view, reality is a linguistic and constructed matter of language that we humans have invented in cooperation with each other and in accordance with our historical-cultural situation and needs. Of course, Rorty’s point in saying that reality is made by language is by no means that we create reality arbitrarily and as we wish; rather, what is happening is that we are responding to an external stimulus, a response of various sentence types that manifests itself as linguistic reactions. (shrink)