It is widely thought that focusing on highly skilled movements while performing them hinders their execution. Once you have developed the ability to tee off in golf, play an arpeggio on the piano, or perform a pirouette in ballet, attention to what your body is doing is thought to lead to inaccuracies, blunders, and sometimes even utter paralysis. Here I re-examine this view and argue that it lacks support when taken as a general thesis. Although bodily awareness may often interfere (...) with well-developed rote skills, like climbing stairs, I suggest that it is typically not detrimental to the skills of expert athletes, performing artists, and other individuals who endeavor to achieve excellence. Along the way, I present a critical analysis of some philosophical theories and behavioral studies on the relationship between attention and bodily movement, an explanation of why attention may be beneficial at the highest level of performance and an error theory that explains why many have thought the contrary. Though tentative, I present my view as a challenge to the widespread starting assumption in research on highly skilled movement that at the pinnacle of skill attention to one's movement is detrimental. (shrink)

Physicalism is thought to entail that mental properties supervene on microphysical properties, or in other words that all God had to do was to create the fundamental physical properties and the rest came along for free. In this paper, we question the all-god-had-to-do reflex.

Aquí nos dedicamos al problema central de pensar cuál sería el motivo de recuperar los vínculos sociales en escenarios de reconciliación, perdón y justicia. Vamos a tratar de mostrar que hacerle frente a la posibilidad de vivir juntos, con todo lo ocurrido en el pasado, es un asunto que compromete criterios de composición social y fuentes de confluencia local que necesitan ser caracterizados teóricamente. Así, pues, nos preguntamos de qué son capaces los sujetos cuando se unen, se organizan, piensan y (...) deciden juntos. ¿Qué es aquello de lo que son capaces los colectivos para superar el pasado? La hipótesis de trabajo es la siguiente: la fraternidad de la existencia alegre, justo en el seno de los dilemas asociados al Terror y la Dolor, constituye la empresa de salvar la vida y las posibilidades que contiene. Al pensamiento de lo colectivo y al élan de la fraternidad nos apegamos para decir que es en el problema de la composición y de la celebración de las capacidades que vamos a encontrar el camino a los motivos de vivir juntos. (shrink)

I am going to argue that it is time to come to terms with the difficulty of understanding what it means to be physical and start thinking about the mind-body problem from a new perspective. Instead of construing it as the problem of finding a place for mentality in a fundamentally physical world, we should think of it as the problem of finding a place for mentality in a fundamentally nonmental world, a world that is at its most fundamental level (...) entirely nonmental. The mind-body problem, I want to argue, is the problem of determining whether mentality can be accounted for in terms of nonmental phenomena. In other words, it is the question, ‘is mentality a fundamental feature of the world’. (shrink)

How does thinking affect doing? There is a widely held view that thinking about what you are doing, as you are doing it, hinders performance. Once you have acquired the ability to putt a golf ball, play an arpeggio on the piano, or parallel-park, reflecting on your actions leads to inaccuracies, blunders, and sometimes even utter paralysis--that's what is widely believed. But is it true? After exploring some of the contemporary and historical manifestations of the idea, Barbara Gail Montero (...) develops a theory of expertise which emphasizes the role of the conscious mind in expert action. She aims to dispel various myths about experts who proceed without any understanding of what guides their action, and she analyzes research in both philosophy and psychology that is taken to show that conscious control and explicit monitoring of one's movements impedes well practiced skills. Montero explores a wide range of real-life examples of optimal performance, in sports, the performing arts, healthcare, the military, and other fields, and draws from psychology, neuroscience, and literature to offer a refreshing and persuasive view of expertise, according to which expert action generally is and ought to be thoughtful, effortful, and reflective. (shrink)

This work examines the scientific and social objectives of the Human Genome Project. Scientific ones are “to map the human genome” while social ones are “to improve the human health and welfare”. Ten years after this project has begun, their scientific aims are fullfilled, but their social ones are still pending. The reason for that is that both scientists and policy makers have forgotten something: the current configuration for the right to intellectual property—patents —grants to the discoverers of the human (...) genetic map the possibility of using their new knowledge to obtain private profit. There is a scientific-business dynamic in this area that make difficult to reach the proclaimed social aims of the human genome project. “Human dignity” —a common topic in international and European Declarations—is also afected. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The modern obsession with safety (which ranges from extreme fear of germs to xenophobia) ends in isolation. In this paper, we explore what is behind of this concern with safety, the metaphors that surround it (which come from immunology), and a way to escape from fear using the Deleuzian idea of nomadic ethics as a point of departure. From a contemporary perspective of how immune systems work, we rethink the metaphors used to describe it: as far as new characterizations (...) of immunity arise, there is a need to approach a notion of non-defensive, non-reactive answers to the ever-changing demands of a world in motion, of becoming. It implies rethinking alterity, the need to embrace it instead of avoiding it, and the need to understand its importance, the way in which it makes us humans. We will argue that nomadic ethics require a nomadic epistemology, an acknowledgement that a full understanding and control of reality may be beyond our reach, and therefore an acceptance of partial, tentative, and diverse forms of knowledge. RESUMEN La obsesión moderna por la seguridad (desde el miedo extremo a los gérmenes hasta la xenofobia) termina en el aislamiento. En este artículo exploramos qué hay detrás de esta preocupación por la seguridad, las metáforas que la rodean (y que provienen de la inmunología) y una forma de escapar del miedo tomando como punto de partida la idea deleuziana de la ética nómada. Desde una perspectiva contemporánea de cómo funcionan los sistemas inmunológicos, repensamos las metáforas: en la medida en que surgen nuevas caracterizaciones de la inmunidad, existe la necesidad de aproximarnos a las respuestas no defensivas, no reactivas a las demandas del devenir. Implica repensar la alteridad, la necesidad de abrazarla en lugar de evitarla, y su importancia para entender lo que nos hace humanos. Argumentaremos que la ética nómada requiere una epistemología nómada, un reconocimiento de que una comprensión y un control plenos de la realidad pueden estar fuera de nuestro alcance y, por lo tanto, una aceptación de formas de conocimiento parciales, tentativas y diversas. (shrink)

This article intends to show how the philosophy of Kant supposes a rupture with the doctrines based on a system of absolute rationality, where the most important element is the unity of reason. In this way, it will try to underline the main critiques of the Prussian philosopher to theories based on the unity of reason and direct access to reality, as well as exposing the Kantian proposal of a unitary formal rational structure, but with several irreconcilable uses.

Are species real categories or just conventions? Are species natural kinds? Are teleological statements a distinctive feature of biology? Can life sciences escape from teleology? These are common issues in philosophy of biology. This paper aims to show that in order to answer to each of these questions it is inevitable to take a position respecting the others. Therefore, there is a historical relation between the concept of species and teleological issues. In order to analyse such relation, I will take (...) a historical perspective.After making such historical reconstruction focused on the Aristotle, Linnaeus, Buffon and Lamarck thoughts, I will analyse the Darwinian peculiar view respect teleology and his ideas about species. Although Darwin set out the collapse of teleological essentialisms in biology, there are important vestiges of teleology in his theory. (shrink)

According to Hume, experience in observing art is one of the prerequisites for being an ideal art critic. But although Hume extols the value of observing art for the art critic, he says little about the value, for the art critic, of executing art. That is, he does not discuss whether ideal aesthetic judges should have practiced creating the form of art they are judging. In this paper, I address this issue. Contrary to some contemporary philosophers who claim that experience (...) in creating art is irrelevant to one’s ability to judge that art form, as well as to some dance critics who see dance training as possibly even detrimental to one’s aesthetic judgment, I suggest that having practiced dancing makes one a better observer of certain aesthetic qualities of dance. Dance training, I argue, can facilitate a kinesthetic experience upon watching dance without which some aesthetic aspects of a dance performance—such as grace, power, and precision, as perceived kinesthetically—may go unnoticed. (shrink)

Might the world be structured, as Leibniz thought, so that every part of matter is divided ad infinitum? The Physicist David Bohm accepted infinitely decomposable matter, and even Steven Weinberg, a staunch supporter of the idea that science is converging on a final theory, admits the possibility of an endless chain of ever more fundamental theories. However, if there is no fundamental level, physicalism, thought of as the view that everything is determined by fundamental phenomena and that all fundamental phenomena (...) are physical, turns out false, for in such a world, there are no fundamental phenomena, and so fundamental phenomena determine nothing. While some take physicalism necessarily to posit a fundamental level, here I present a thesis of physicalism that allows for its truth even in an infinitely decomposable world. (shrink)

According to David Chalmers , 'we have good reason to suppose that consciousness has a fundamental place in nature' . This, he thinks is because the world as revealed to us by fundamental physics is entirely structural -- it is a world not of things, but of relations -- yet relations can only account for more relations, and consciousness is not merely a relation . Call this the 'structural argument against physicalism.' I shall argue that there is a view about (...) the relationship between mind and body, what I call, 'Russellian physicalism' that is consistent with the premises of the structural argument yet does not imply that consciousness is fundamental. (shrink)

The conservation of energy law, a law of physics that states that the total energy of any closed system is always conserved, is a bedrock principle that has achieved both broad theoretical and experimental support. Yet if interactive dualism is correct, it is thought that the mind can affect physical objects in violation of the conservation of energy. Thus, some claim, the conservation of energy grounds an argument for physicalism. Although critics of the argument focus on the implausibility of causation (...) requiring the transference of energy, I argue that even if causation requires the transference of energy, once we accept the other required premises of the argument that lie behind any supposed argument from the conservation of energy the law of the conservation of energy is revealed as irrelevant to the question of whether the mental is physical. (shrink)

We examined whether variations in contextual diversity, spacing, and retrieval practice influenced how well adults learned new words from reading experience. Eye movements were recorded as adults read novel words embedded in sentences. In the learning phase, unfamiliar words were presented either in the same sentence repeated four times (same context) or in four different sentences (diverse context). Spacing was manipulated by presenting the sentences under distributed or non‐distributed practice. After learning, half of the participants were asked to retrieve the (...) new words, and half had an extra exposure to the new words. Although words experienced in diverse contexts were acquired more slowly during learning, they enjoyed a greater benefit of learning at immediate posttest. Distributed practice also slowed learning, but no benefit was observed at posttest. Although participants who had an extra exposure showed the greatest learning benefit overall, learning also benefited from retrieval opportunity, when words were experienced in diverse contexts. These findings demonstrate that variation in the content and structure of the learning environment impacts on word learning via reading. (shrink)

Imagine that our world were such that the entities, properties, laws, and relations of fundamental physics did not determine what goes on at the mental level; imagine that duplicating our fundamental physics would fail to duplicate the pleasures, feelings of joy, and experiences of wonder that we know and love; in other words, imagine that the mental realm did not supervene on the physical realm. Would our world, then, be a world in which physicalism is false? A good number of (...) philosophers who ponder such issues—perhaps all philosophers who have hitherto pondered such issues—answer “yes.” The purpose of this paper is to suggest that, despite what physicalists say, they don’t think so, either. What is it that they really think? What is the actual doctrine of physicalism? I conclude withan attempt to uncover that as well. (shrink)

La tesis central de este artículo es que la concepción de la razón pública propuesta por John Rawls, incluso en su versión “inclusiva”, es demasiado restrictiva y viola el principio liberal de legitimidad y la tesis de la neutralidad del estado, que constituyen elementos centrales de la teoría política de Rawls y del liberalismo político en general. Finalmente, se propone una concepción alternativa de la razón pública liberal, centrada únicamente en un deber básico de civilidad, el deber de reciprocidad, a (...) la que denominaré la concepción “abierta” de la razón pública. (shrink)

Marías’ Romane setzen die kontingente Verfasstheit großstädtischen Lebens in Szene, indem sie das Zeitbewusstsein der Figuren in ein Spannungsverhältnis zur Unausweichlichkeit des – oft plötzlichen – Todes setzen, und dabei die Ambivalenz von Ordnung und Chaos, von Freiheit und Emanzipation in Indifferenz und Beliebigkeit überführen. Sie spiegeln heutige Formen ausgeprägter Individualität in der Großstadt, für die Vanitas zur Erscheinungsweise der als kontingent erfahrenen Selbst- und Welterfahrung wird. Der Roman Morgen in der Schlacht denk an mich thematisiert solche Ambivalenzen der Kontingenz (...) in unterschiedlichen Figurenkonstellationen. Nicht einmal die Möglichkeiten der libidinösen Befriedigung greifen noch, wie Marías’ Roman Die sterblich Verliebten bestätigt. Vielmehr werden Konfigurationen der Vanitas in den skizzierten Rahmen rekontextualisiert, wodurch sich ein Schwinden von Identität, eine Aushöhlung des Subjekts, vollzieht. (shrink)

El presente artículo pretende hacer un recorrido por las prescripciones sobre el estudio de las lenguas bíblicas en el magisterio pontificio. No solo desvela los lugares concretos en los que se hallan, sino que, sobre todo, explica el contexto teológico que justifica su prescripción. El análisis aporta perspectivas que hacen del conocimiento de estas lenguas un instrumento irrenunciable para el recto ejercicio de la exégesis católica. También se añade una serie de consecuencias a partir de las perspectivas extraídas.

Do we remember what pain feels like? Investigations into this question have sometimes led to ambiguous or apparently contradictory results. Building on research on pain memory by Rohini Terry and colleagues, I argue that this lack of agreement may be due in part to the difficulty researchers face when trying to convey to their study’s participants the type of memory they are being tasked with recalling. To address this difficulty, I introduce the concept of ‘qualitative memory’, which, arguably, is the (...) sort of memory we have of what red looks like yet lack with respect to pain. I also briefly address a number of consequences the acknowledgment of qualitative memory would potentially have for philosophy, arguing that if we fail to have qualitative memories of certain sensations, such as pain, the standard philosophical accounts of experience, rational choice, and the sources of moral action may all need revision. (shrink)

Mary knows all there is to know about physics, chemistry and neurophysiology, yet has never experienced colour. Most philosophers think that if Mary learns something genuinely new upon seeing colour for the first time, then physicalism is false. I argue, however, that physicalism is consistent with Mary's acquisition of new information. Indeed, even if she has perfect powers of deduction, and higher-level physical facts are a priori deducible from lower-level ones, Mary may still lack concepts which are required in order (...) to deduce from the lower-level physical facts what it is like to see red. (shrink)

Critical studies of Dostoevsky’s work usually avoid relating it to ideology. This essay assumes that the confrontation between the author’s ideology and his literary work can provide some vital clues to understanding concepts shared by both fields. The categories of strength and weakness are analyzed as important nodes in the conceptual-imaginative net. This paper focuses on a critical period in Dostoevsky’s work, from 1860 to1864, because there is a general consensus that it was an essential time for the evolution towards (...) his mature work. (shrink)