1. Introduction. It is generally admitted that a large part of man's knowledge is based on inductive arguments. Hence any philosophical theory concerning the nature of inductive arguments constitutes an epistemological theory. Any such philosophical theory of induction must, if it is to be satisfactory, take adequate account of Hume's criticism of inductive arguments. One way of treating his criticism is to say that the validity of inductive arguments is in an important sense relative to some broad factual assumptions about (...) the general nature of the universe and that these general factual assumptions are presupposed in a certain way by the users of inductive arguments. Let us call any theory of this general type a postulate theory of induction. (shrink)

In At the Will of the Body , Arthur Frank told the story of his own illnesses, heart attack and cancer. That book ended by describing the existence of a "remission society," whose members all live with some form of illness or disability. The Wounded Storyteller is their collective portrait. Ill people are more than victims of disease or patients of medicine they are wounded storytellers. People tell stories to make sense of their suffering when they turn their diseases (...) into stories, they find healing. Drawing on the work of authors such as Oliver Sacks, Anatole Broyard, Norman Cousins, and Audre Lorde, as well as from people he met during the years he spent among different illness groups, Frank recounts a stirring collection of illness stories, ranging from the well-known--Gilda Radner's battle with ovarian cancer--to the private testimonials of people with cancer, chronic fatigue syndrome, and disabilties. Their stories are more than accounts of personal suffering: they abound with moral choices and point to a social ethic. Frank identifies three basic narratives of illness in restitution, chaos, and quest. Restitution narratives anticipate getting well again and give prominence to the technology of cure. In chaos narratives, illness seems to stretch on forever, with no respite or redeeming insights. Quest narratives are about finding that insight as illness is transformed into a means for the ill person to become someone new. (shrink)

We obtain 2 models in which AC is false and in which there are long sequences of consecutive large cardinals.

Contemporary health care often lacks generosity of spirit, even when treatment is most efficient. Too many patients are left unhappy with how they are treated, and too many medical professionals feel estranged from the calling that drew them to medicine. Arthur W. Frank tells the stories of ill people, doctors, and nurses who are restoring generosity to medicine--generosity toward others and to themselves. The Renewal of Generosity evokes medicine as the face-to-face encounter that comes before and after diagnostics, pharmaceuticals, (...) and surgeries. Frank calls upon the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius, philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, and literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin to reflect on stories of ill people, doctors, and nurses who transform demoralized medicine into caring relationships. He presents their stories as a source of consolation for both ill and professional alike and as an impetus to changing medical systems. Frank shows how generosity is being renewed through dialogue that is more than the exchange of information. Dialogue is an ethic and an ideal for people on both sides of the medical encounter who want to offer more to those they meet and who want their own lives enriched in the process. The Renewal of Generosity views illness and medical work with grace and compassion, making an invaluable contribution to expanding our vision of suffering and healing. (shrink)

We examine the number of normal measures a successor cardinal can carry, in universes in which the Axiom of Choice is false. When considering successors of singular cardinals, we establish relative consistency results assuming instances of supercompactness, together with the Ultrapower Axiom (introduced by Goldberg in [12]). When considering successors of regular cardinals, we establish relative consistency results only assuming the existence of one measurable cardinal. This allows for equiconsistencies.

A correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10912-021-09698-y.

Assuming Con, a model in which there are unboundedly many regular cardinals below Θ and in which the only regular cardinals below Θ are limit cardinals was previously constructed. Using a large cardinal hypothesis far beyond Con, we construct in this paper a model in which there is a proper class of regular cardinals and in which the only regular cardinals in the universe are limit cardinals.

We construct two models containing exactly one supercompact cardinal in which all non-supercompact measurable cardinals are strictly taller than they are either strongly compact or supercompact. In the first of these models, level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness holds. In the other, level by level inequivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness holds. Each universe has only one strongly compact cardinal and contains relatively few large cardinals.

A collection of stories by bioethicists writing about their own illnesses displays the importance of microethics. From this perspective, ethics happens not in the application of principles to specific decisions, but rather in the moment-to-moment flow of clinical interaction, as healthcare workers and patients make decisions, especially in their use of language. Microethical issues that are common to multiple stories are described as dense junctures of ethical concern. Three junctures are discussed in detail: conflicts between medical and patient rationalities, issues (...) of how clinicians represent patients, and practices of truth telling. These junctures are illustrated with examples from the bioethicists’ personal stories of treatment. (shrink)

We construct models containing exactly one supercompact cardinal in which level by level inequivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness holds. In each model, above the supercompact cardinal, there are finitely many strongly compact cardinals, and the strongly compact and measurable cardinals precisely coincide.

We construct two models in which the least strongly compact cardinal κ is also the least strong cardinal. In each of these models, κ satisfies indestructibility properties for both its strong compactness and strongness.

We show the consistency, relative to the appropriate supercompactness or strong compactness assumptions, of the existence of a non-supercompact strongly compact cardinal $\kappa _0$ (the least measurable cardinal) exhibiting properties which are impossible when $\kappa _0$ is supercompact. In particular, we construct models in which $\square _{\kappa ^+}$ holds for every inaccessible cardinal $\kappa $ except $\kappa _0$, GCH fails at every inaccessible cardinal except $\kappa _0$, and $\kappa _0$ is less than the least Woodin cardinal.

This review of Jay Baruch's Tornado of Life: A Doctor's Journey through Constraints and Creativity in the ER considers the book's contributions, including its explorations of the clinical dilemma of working with patients’ stories that are fragmented, how easily clinicians can miss crucial parts of patients’ stories and how that affects care, and the “agonizing compromises” between what patients need and what institutions can provide. Baruch acknowledges, without any self‐indulgence, the shame that his work causes him, given the limitations of (...) what he can do. (shrink)

This symposium contribution presents three vignettes of resistance to COVID-19 public health measures in Alberta, Canada, where I live. These show resolutely individualistic attitudes toward health and a desire to understand the pandemic as a one-off aberration. I then suggest four ways that the work of bioethics needs to change. These begin with situating the pandemic within the context of global climate emergency and end with how a new polarization diminishes possibilities for the rational dialogue that bioethics has here-to-fore assumed (...) people would engage in. (shrink)

Let φ1 stand for the statement V = HOD and φ2 stand for the Ground Axiom. Suppose Ti for i = 1, …, 4 are the theories “ZFC + φ1 + φ2,” “ZFC + ¬φ1 + φ2,” “ZFC + φ1 + ¬φ2,” and “ZFC + ¬φ1 + ¬φ2” respectively. We show that if κ is indestructibly supercompact and λ > κ is inaccessible, then for i = 1, …, 4, Ai = df{δ κ is inaccessible. We show it is also (...) the case that if κ is indestructibly supercompact, then Vκ⊨T1, so by reflection, B1 = df{δ κ is inaccessible, we demonstrate that it is possible to construct a model in which κ is indestructibly supercompact and for every inaccessible cardinal δ < κ, Vδ⊨T1. It is thus not possible to prove in ZFC that Bi = df{δ < κ∣δ is an inaccessible limit of inaccessible cardinals and Vδ⊨Ti} for i = 2, …, 4 is unbounded in κ if κ is indestructibly supercompact. © 2011 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim. (shrink)

.In this paper, we first prove several general theorems about strongness, supercompactness, and indestructibility, along the way giving some new applications of Hamkins’ lottery preparation forcing to indestructibility. We then show that it is consistent, relative to the existence of cardinals κ<λ so that κ is λ supercompact and λ is inaccessible, for the least strongly compact cardinal κ to be the least strong cardinal and to have its strongness, but not its strong compactness, indestructible under κ-strategically closed forcing.

When clinician‐patient relationships go wrong, the problem may not be merely that one person is knowingly mistreating the other. More likely, they are caught up in different stories, and animated by different moral visions. The task is for each to see the point of the other's story.

"More than any thing else technology creates our world. It creates our wealth, our economy, our very way of being," says W. Brian Arthur. Yet, until now the major questions of technology have gone unanswered. Where do new technologies come from -- how exactly does invention work? What constitutes innovation, and how is it achieved? Why are certain regions -- Cambridge, England, in the 1920s and Silicon Valley today -- hotbeds of innovation, while others languish? Does technology, like biological (...) life, evolve? How do new industries, and the economy itself, emerge from technologies? In this groundbreaking work, pioneering technology thinker and economist W. Brian Arthur sets forth a boldly original way of thinking about technology that gives answers to these questions. The Nature of Technology is an elegant and powerful theory of technology's origins and evolution. It achieves for the progress of technology what Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions did for scientific progress. Arthur explains how transformative new technologies arise and how innovation really works. Conventional thinking ascribes the invention of technologies to "thinking outside the box," or vaguely to genius or creativity, but Arthur shows that such explanations are inadequate. Rather, technologies are put together from pieces -- themselves technologies -- that already exist. Technologies therefore share common ancestries and combine, morph, and combine again to create further technologies. Technology evolves much as a coral reef builds itself from activities of small organisms -- it creates itself from itself; all technologies are descended from earlier technologies. Drawing on a wealth of examples, from historical inventions to the high-tech wonders of today, and writing in wonder fully engaging and clear prose, Arthur takes us on a mind-opening journey that will change the way we think about technology and how it structures our lives. (shrink)

We show how the use of a Laver function in the proof of the consistency, relative to the existence of a supercompact cardinal, of both the Proper Forcing Axiom and the Semiproper Forcing Axiom can be eliminated via the use of lottery sums of the appropriate partial orderings.

The narrative ethicist imagines life as multiple points of view, each reflecting a distinct imagination and each more or less capable of comprehending other points of view and how they imagine. Each point of view is constantly being acted out and then modified in response to how others respond. People generally have good intentions, but they get stuck realizing those intentions. Stories stall when dialogue breaks down. People stop hearing others' stories, maybe because those others have quit telling their stories. (...) The narrative ethicist's job is to help people generate new imaginations that can restart dialogues. (shrink)

A scholarly edition of Volume 2 of The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke: A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul by Arthur Wainwright. The edition presents an authoritative text, together with an introduction, commentary notes, and scholarly apparatus.

We construct a model in which the strongly compact cardinals can be non-trivially characterized via the statement “κ is strongly compact iff κ is a measurable limit of strong cardinals”. If our ground model contains large enough cardinals, there will be supercompact cardinals in the universe containing this characterization of the strongly compact cardinals.

We prove two theorems which in a certain sense show that the number of normal measures a measurable cardinal κ can carry is independent of a given fixed behavior of the continuum function on any set having measure 1 with respect to every normal measure over κ . First, starting with a model V ⊨ “ZFC + GCH + o = δ*” for δ* ≤ κ+ any finite or infinite cardinal, we force and construct an inner model N ⊆ V (...) [G] so thatN ⊨ “ZF + [DCδ] + ¬ACκ + κ carries exactly δ* normal measures + 2δ = δ++ on a set having measure 1 with respect to every normal measure over κ”.There is nothing special about 2δ = δ here, and other stated values for the continuum function will be possible as well. Then, starting with a modelV ⊨ “ZFC + GCH + κis supercompact”,we force and construct models of AC in which, roughly speaking, regardless of the specified behavior of the continuum function below κ on any set having measure 1 with respect to every normal measure over κ, κ can in essence carry any number of normal measures δ* ≥ κ++. (shrink)

We prove three theorems which show that it is relatively consistent for any strong cardinal κ to be fully Laver indestructible under κ-directed closed forcing.

Action explanations like ‘I am heading to the ferry because the bridge is closed,’ are supposed to require restatement: ‘I am... because I believe the bridge is closed,’ because (i) the objective claim may be false though the intended explanation is correct, and (ii) because objective circumstances have to be cognitively mediated if they are to bear on action. This supposition is rejected here. Restatements cannot withdraw the objective claim without withdrawing the explanation. In the context of reason‐giving, belief statements (...) do not function as assertions about the inner life. The fact that belief statements may be true though the belief itself is false creates the illusion of distinctive subject matters. The illusion is exploited by conceptions of belief positing stored representations. Even if there were such representations, retrieved for the sake of expressing previously acquired beliefs, the expression of belief must endorse p and cannot merely advert to the existence and content of a representation. The reverse of the standard philosophical view about restatement is actually correct. Wherever an agent correctly adduces a belief that an objective circumstance obtains in explaining his action, a de‐psychologizing restatement that merely makes the objective claim must be ascribable to the agent. (shrink)

This general type of view may be characterized more fully by using the notion of an inductive method. All scientists use approximately the same inductive method, which we will call the standard inductive method. This method is based on the rule of induction by simple enumeration, which may be roughly stated as follows: if it is known only that a certain property Ψ has accompanied another property Φ in a number of instances, then the larger this number of instances the (...) higher the probability that the next occurrence of Φ will be accompanied by Ψ. Though scientists actually reason inductively in accord with this rule, it is important that there are logically consistent inductive methods based on alternative rules. We will describe two of these briefly. The inverse inductive method assigns probabilities according to the rule that if it is known only that Ψ has accompanied Φ a number of times, then the larger the number of instances the lower the probability that the next occurrence of Φ will be accompanied by Ψ. The random predictive method assigns to the proposition that the next occurrence of Φ will be accompanied by Ψ a probability completely independent of the number of times that Ψ has accompanied Φ in the past.. (shrink)

If bioethics seeks to affect what people do and don't do as they respond to the practical issues that confront them, then it is useful to take seriously people's sense of rightness. Rightness emerges from the fabric of a life—including the economy of its geography, the events of its times, its popular culture—to be what the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu calls a predisposition. It is the product of a way of life and presupposes continuing to live that way. Rightness is local (...) and communal, holding in relationship those who share the same predisposing sense of how to experience. Rightness is an embodied way of evaluating what is known to matter and choosing among possible responses. Bioethics spends considerable time on what people should do and on the arguments that support recommended actions. It might spend more time on what shapes people's sense of the rightness of what they feel called to do. (shrink)