In On What We Mean, Arnold Chien discusses the meaning of a speaker, a notion we use in everyday conversation. Speaker's meaning is a fundamental notion of pragmatics, i.e. the study of the relation between words and speakers. Yet everyday speaker's meaning has not been systematically studied in philosophy or linguistics. Chien's approach to these issues is to take a speaker's meaning as an answer to "what do you (s/he) mean" (WDYM) questions. He then analyzes WDYM-questions in (...) terms of Bas van Fraassen's analysis of why-questions, according to which, a question consists of a set of parameters whose values vary according to the context. The constraints on speaker's meanings are analyzed in terms of certain constraints on answers to WDYM-questions. The account is extended to metaphor, understood to be a kind of conceptual indeterminacy. (shrink)

I argue for a subsumption of any version of Grice’s first quantity maxim posited to underlie scalar implicature, by developing the idea of implicature recovery as a kind of explanatory inference, as e.g. in science. I take the applicable model to be contrastive explanation, while following van Fraassen’s analysis of explanation as an answer to a why-question. A scalar implicature is embedded in such an answer, one that meets two probabilistic constraints: the probability of the answer, and ‘favoring’. I argue (...) that besides having application at large, outside of linguistic interpretation, these constraints largely account not only for implicatures based on strength order, logical and otherwise, but also for unordered cases. I thus suggest that Grice’s maxim and its descendants are expressions of general explanatory constraints, as they happen to be manifested in this particular explanatory task. I conclude by briefly discussing how I accordingly view Grice’s system outside of scalar implicature. (shrink)

Fodor argued that in contrast to input systems which are informationally encapsulated, general intelligence is unencapsulated and hence non-modular; for this reason, he suggested, prospects for understanding it are not bright. It is argued that an additional property, primitive functionality, is required for non-modularity. A functionally primitive computational model for quantifier scoping, limited to some scoping influences, is then motivated, and an implementation described. It is argued that only such a model can be faithful to intuitive scope preferences. But it (...) is also argued that an extended model which includes all scoping influences is a hopeless prospect from a developmental perspective. Fodor's views are concluded to have some independent support: quantifier scoping is a mental ability parasitic on general intelligence that is non-modular though in a revised sense, warranting pessimism about our ability of model it. (shrink)

This paper argues against the moral Turing test as a framework for evaluating the moral performance of autonomous systems. Though the term has been carefully introduced, considered, and cautioned about in previous discussions :251–261, 2000; Allen and Wallach 2009), it has lingered on as a touchstone for developing computational approaches to moral reasoning :98–109, 2015). While these efforts have not led to the detailed development of an MTT, they nonetheless retain the idea to discuss what kinds of action and reasoning (...) should be demanded of autonomous systems. We explore the flawed basis of an MTT in imitation, even one based on scenarios of morally accountable actions. MTT-based evaluations are vulnerable to deception, inadequate reasoning, and inferior moral performance vis a vis a system’s capabilities. We propose verification—which demands the design of transparent, accountable processes of reasoning that reliably prefigure the performance of autonomous systems—serves as a superior framework for both designer and system alike. As autonomous social robots in particular take on an increasing range of critical roles within society, we conclude that verification offers an essential, albeit challenging, moral measure of their design and performance. (shrink)

Husserl beruft sich immer wieder programmatisch auf Platon als den Gründervater der europäischen Philosophie, arbeitet jedoch die Bezüge der Phänomenologie zum Platonismus nie auf - obwohl er die "historische Rückbesinnung" auf die Urstiftung seines Denkens als wesentlichen Bestandteil der "Selbstbesinnung auf ein Selbstverständnis dessen hin, worauf man eigentlich hinaus will, als der man ist, als historisches Wesen" charakterisiert. Die vorliegende Arbeit will diese Reflexion leisten. Ihr Gegenstand ist mithin die Transformation Platonischer Gedanken in Husserls Phänomenologie. Dabei werden sechs Problemgebiete thematisiert: (...) A) Philosophie als Wissenschaft, B) Philosophie als Ethik, C) Philosophie als Polemik, D) Philosophie und das Ende der Lebenswelt, E) Philosophie und das Eigenrecht des Eidetischen, F) Philosophie und das Absolute. Den Abschnitten folgen jeweils kritische Erwägungen zu den Spannungen, die vor dem Platonischen Hintergrund innerhalb der Phänomenologie sichtbar werden. Die Arbeit zeigt, dass die Phänomenologie tatsächlich als eine eigenwillige Endstiftung des Platonismus betrachtet werden kann, wodurch sich eine neue Perspektive auf ihre programmatische und systematische Grundkonfiguration ergibt. (shrink)

Many have tackled the question ‘What (if anything) is analytic philosophy?’ I will not attempt to answer this vexed question. Rather, I address a smaller, more manageable set of interrelated questions: first, when and how did people begin using the label ‘analytic philosophy’? Second, how did those who used this label understand it? Third, why did many philosophers we today classify as analytic initially resist being grouped together under the single category of ‘analytic philosophy’? Finally, for the first generation who (...) described themselves as analytic philosophers, what was their intended contrast class? Relatedly, when did ‘continental philosophy’ become the standard opposition? Some evidence I present justifies received answers to these questions; other evidence supports surprising and unorthodox answers to these questions. (shrink)

In attempting to learn more about the relationship between social structure and behavior, this chapter identifies the transforming conditions that promote an actor's acquisition of a noninstitutionalized role. The role concept is modified to be seen not only as an aspect of social structure, but connected to the life situation of a performer, constituting a person-role formula. Being defined according to the degree of involvement an actor will have with the proffered role, a person-role formula may be based on embracement, (...) integration, downgrading, or avoidance. Roles are transformed into one of these possible relationships through three stages (1) role discrepancy, (2) role typification, and (3) role validation. (shrink)

The article demonstrates unity in Plato’s thought to a degree not heretofore realized and suggests analytical links to developments in logic, metaphysics and epistemology millennia later, substantiating Whitehead's famous comment that ‘the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.’.

"Arguing that debates over legitimacy, political violence, freedom, and justice would benefit greatly from cross-tradition theorizing, this book shows how putting analytic and continental political theory in conversation would help us to overcome these intractable problems"--.

The current debate about the moral status of animals is strongly determined by a misunderstanding of the role of moral intuitions. It is often assumed that our moral intuitions contain an implicit understanding of something that could ideally always be made explicit in terms of a consistent set of general principles. I have argued that this assumption is certainly wrong with respect to our moral intuitions about how we should behave towards animals. The meaning of these intuitions will always be (...) intimately tied up with deeply ingrained attitudes which precede the endorsement of any explicit moral view. While it cannot be excluded that these attitudes might radically change, it is wrong to suppose that such a transformation could result from abstract reasoning. (shrink)

Peter Strawson makes a crucial distinction between reactive attitudes and the objective attitude. Reactive attitudes such as gratefulness, anger and indignation imply that we take each other seriously as responsible agents. The objective attitude implies that we stop taking each other seriously. Strawson argues that the objective attitude is not merely psychologically difficult: it is inconceivable that we would systematically refrain from taking each other seriously and stop discussing with each other or blaming ourselves or others. Strawson, however, only discusses (...) the reactive attitudes from a general point of view. In this paper, we argue that the reactive attitudes of remorse and moral indignation are forms of ”symbolic restoration’. Retributive punishment should also be interpreted from this perspective. Consequently, our concern with moral blame cannot be understood independently from a concern with the harm that has occurred. Our attitude to the outcome determines our attitude to the agent. The concern with the mental state is secondary: it is structured by its place within the practice of symbolic restoration. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has, of necessity, demanded the rapid incorporation of virtual technologies which, suddenly, have superseded the physical medical encounter. These imperatives have been implemented in advance of evaluation, with unclear risks to patient care and the nature of medical practice that might be justifiable in the context of a pandemic but cannot be extrapolated as a new standard of care. Models of care fit for purpose in a pandemic should not be generalized to reconfigure medical care as virtual (...) by default, and personal by exception at the conclusion of the emergency. (shrink)

This paper will first introduce first-order mereotopological axioms and axiomatized theories which can be found in some recent literature and it will also give a survey of decidability, undecidability as well as other relevant notions. Then the main result to be given in this paper will be the finite inseparability of any mereotopological theory up to atomic general mereotopology (AGEMT) or strong atomic general mereotopology (SAGEMT). Besides, a more comprehensive summary will also be given via making observations about other properties (...) stronger than undecidability. (shrink)

I will limit myself to a brief description of a phenomenon which could perhaps be perceived as a distortion or perversion of caring. What I have in mind is something which is distinguished from volitional necessity. Being guided by volitional necessity is a form of being active because I am governed in my actions by something I really care about. This, however, could be contrasted with a phenomenon which perhaps does not occur in your work, but I was wondering what (...) you would say about it. What I have in mind is the desire of people to be identified with something that may be very different from what they actually are. (shrink)

Autonomy, self-determination, self-affirmation, emancipation: all these words refer to an ideal that orients the way in which our contemporary culture speaks about many moral and political problems. The importance of this ideal for us can be seen in the way we accept as obvious a number of ideas that follow from it. Most of us would certainly tend to accept that no universally valid answer can be given to the question of what kind of human life is truly meaningful or (...) valuable and that, because of this, people should be granted as much freedom as possible to pursue a life that best corresponds with their own personal tastes and preferences. Many would go a step further and claim that people should also be encouraged to live as much as possible according to what they have themselves chosen, and that they should give up traditional forms of life and role patterns.One aspect of this cult of individual freedom or autonomy is the idea that we should develop a critical attitude towards anything established, accepted or traditional: every form of power or authority, prevailing moral norms and educational customs, traditional role patterns, etc. A further feature of this is the tendency to describe any improvement in the fortunes of the weak, the vulnerable and the less well off as an ‘emancipation’. The idea that the poor, the handicapped and the elderly should receive more support, assistance, respect and attention is translated by the assertion that they, too, should be ‘liberated’.The ideals that we associate with words like ‘emancipation’ or ‘self-affirmation’ were at one time innovative and revolutionary, but they gradually became established as accepted ways of thinking and thus became part of a new common sense. Nowadays, anyone wanting to be provocative will attain their goal more easily by scoffing at everything falling under the rubric of emancipation than by speaking out in its defence.This fact is characteristic of an ambiguity in our culture. While the ideals of self-affirmation and emancipation enjoy enormous popularity, in certain intellectual circles they are treated with suspicion. At stake here is the general image of humanity associated with these ideals. Thinkers such as Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Lacan, Derrida or Baudrillard have, each in their own way, attacked the idea of the autonomous subject and stressed that people’s most intimate thoughts and desires are determined by something that transcends them: by the language they speak or the culture to which they belong.Rejecting the idea of the autonomous subject is usually one aspect of a more general critique of ideas inherited from the Enlightenment. The question whether and to what extent this critique is justified occupies a central position in many contemporary philosophical discussions, and much of what goes on in contemporary philosophy can be described in terms of the opposition between those who would defend Enlightenment ideals and those who would reject or cast doubt on those ideals.What I would like to discuss here undoubtedly fits into a framework that could be called ‘antiliberal’ or ‘anti-humanist’. However, it is certainly not my intention to criticize humanism or liberalism directly and systematically. (shrink)

When I was asked to formulate some questions or remarks about Prof. Barry’s paper, it was probably assumed that I would not confine myself to the expression of pure agreement. And yet, that is what I am inclined at first to do. I do agree that the view he criticizes is wrong for the reasons he mentions. And I admire the clarity and vigour of his arguments. However the reasons one has for agreeing with a thesis may belong to a (...) context that is very different from the context the thesis itself belongs to. Prof. Barry’s paper can be read at one level as the defence of a certain policy — it contains political recommendations. It is at that level that I entirely agree with it. But his recommendations are probably part of a theoretical outlook I do not share.The question I would like to deal with is: “How should the position which is the target of Brian Barry’s criticism be characterized?” One could say that it is anti-liberal. It is certainly opposed to the liberalism Brian Barry advocates. But there are, I think, also good reasons for characterizing it as a kind of liberalism. It is a sort of excessive, perverse, loony liberalism, but liberalism nevertheless. For the sake of convenience I call it quasi-liberalism. (shrink)

This paper does not question the thesis that the phenomena associated with the phrase 'moral luck' point to an important philosophical problem. The aim is, rather, to sketch an interpretation of these phenomena. It is argued that the notion of symbolic restoration is the key we need to understand why the out-come of our actions has a moral significance that is not reducible to the moral significance of the mental states from wich these actions arise.

This paper studies the complexity of constant depth propositional proofs in the cedent and sequent calculus. We discuss the relationships between the size of tree-like proofs, the size of dag-like proofs, and the heights of proofs. The main result is to correct a proof construction in an earlier paper about transformations from proofs with polylogarithmic height and constantly many formulas per cedent.

Object-hood is central to Husserl’s work, yet he employs several different notions of object-hood without clarifying the differences; his work thus offers rich and nuanced reflections on object-hood, but in a theoretically underdeveloped, at times even paradoxical, form. This paper aims to develop Husserl’s theory of objects systematically. In order to achieve this I distinguish five object-concepts operative in Husserl’s phenomenology and prove that they are not co-extensional. I also argue that they form a layer in terms of transcendental constitution, (...) one implying the other. I conclude the paper by exploring Husserl’s paradoxical claim that the absolute is not an object. From these considerations, two meta-phenomenological lessons emerge: object-hood is not total ; yet we cannot escape objectification while engaged in phenomenological reflection. (shrink)

Throughout the history of philosophy the concept of unity has presented a problem. What does it mean to say that the cosmos is one, that a thing is one, that an organism is one, that a nation is one, that mind and body are one, that knower and known are one? Exactly what is it that is denoted when unity is postulated of anything? And when two or more entities are conceived as subsisting in unity, exactly what is the relation (...) between that unity on the one hand, and its correlative duality or plurality on the other? (shrink)

According to an old view the world as such does not exist. That's why we had to invent it, over and over again, in order to be able to live in it. Behind the problem of habituation lies the world we live in, a construction of self-evident things, however which in itself remains essentially opaque. Blumenberg's philosophical anthropology reconstructs this being-in-the-world as the ongoing process of a conceptual self-habitation: the path of human development leads from the primeval forests via the (...) savannahs and caves to the first houses, the end of which development once seemed to be marked by a firmly established architectonics of reason. However, as we are bound to experience in the wilderness of digitalization, this abode was not to be permanent, for homemade reasons. Did we drive ourselves out of the world or did we fall into the trap of our own world designs? (shrink)

During the last thirty years we have witnessed sweeping changes in health care worldwide, including new and expensive biomedical technologies, an increasingly powerful and influential pharmaceutical industry, steadily increasing health care costs in industrialised nations, and new threats to medical professionalism. The essays collected in this book concern costs and profits in relation to just health care, the often controversial practices of pharmaceutical companies, and corruption in the professional practice of medicine. Leading experts discuss justice in relation to business-friendly strategies (...) in the delivery of health care, access to life saving drugs, the ethics of pharmaceutical company marketing practices, exploitation in drug trials, and undue industry influence over medicine. They offer guidance regarding the ethical delivery of health care products and services by profit-seeking organisations operating in a global marketplace, and recommend pragmatic solutions to enhance organisational integrity and curb medical corruption in the interest of patient welfare. (shrink)

David Schweickart has challenged a number of claims that are central to my argument that market socialism would probably degenerate into something only nominally distinguishable from capitalism. Chief among these is the claim that competitive pressures would force the workers in a worker-controlled firm to create pay and authority differentials that would make such firms structurally homologous to capitalist firms. Schweickart challenges this on two fronts: He argues that there is no good reason to believe that market forces under market (...) socialism would create the pay and authority differentials characteristic of capitalism. He further argues that certain structural features of market socialism would insure that competition would not be as intense as it is under capitalism. Consequently, even if capitalistically structured firms were more efficient, it would not make much difference, since no sword of Damocles would hang over the heads of those firms whose workers prefer more collectivist methods of control. Let us consider each of these points in turn. (shrink)