Alguns filósofos e economistas buscam fundamentar eticamente a economia, a fim de voltar a subordiná-la à política, apelando, inclusive, para uma aproximação entre Marx e Aristóteles a partir da teoria da práxis. Este artigo pretende analisar em que sentido os conceitos aristotélicos de ação, produção, ato e potência exercem influência sobre Marx. Afirma que, contrariamente ao que muitos filósofos da moral defendem, são as investigações de Aristóteles sobre economia que serviram como ponto de partida para a fundamentação da crítica à (...) economia política elaborada por Marx, enquanto que a ética e a política aristotélicas são apenas secundárias para a teoria marxiana. Some philosophers and economists have sought an ethical basis for the economy, to subordinate it to politics, and even to appeal for an approximation between Marx and Aristotle based on a theory of praxis. This article analyzes in what sense the Aristotelian concepts of action, production, act, and power influence Marx. It affirms, contrary to many moral philosophers, that it is Aristotle's investigations of the economy that are the basis of the criticism of political economy developed by Marx, while Aristotelian ethics and politics are only secondary to Marxian theory. (shrink)

The proponents of neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism (henceforth “Aristotelian naturalism” for short) include Foot (2001), Geach (1956, 1977), Hursthouse (1999), McDowell (1995), MacIntyre (1999), Nussbaum (1993, 1995), and Thompson (1995); and also Anscombe because her work has influenced so many others. (Gaut [1997, 2002] should also be known as a significant contributor.) Their views are so unlike those of other proponents of ethical naturalism (see Naturalism, Ethical), and they occupy such an unfamiliar position in philosophy, that they are simultaneously (...) criticized on at least two quite different bases. Some say they are not trying to offer naturalism at all, because they avowedly employ a moralized conception of human nature; some say they are trying to offer naturalism insofar as they offer a biological foundation for ethics, but that either this has counterintuitive upshots or the biology is Aristotle's and thereby pre-Darwinian and not a proper naturalistic foundation at all. (shrink)

Sir Anthony Kenny presents a second edition of his landmark work The Aristotelian Ethics, which transformed Aristotle studies in 1978 by showing, on stylistic, historical, and philosophical grounds, that the Eudemian Ethics was a mature work with as strong a claim to be Aristotle's ethical masterpiece as the more widely studied Nicomachean Ethics. In this new edition Kenny offers a critical survey of developments in the field since The Aristotelian Ethics was first published. Kenny (...) also addresses the criticisms of his first edition, both accepting those he sees as justified and addressing and refuting those which he feels are unfounded. The book remains essential reading for anyone interested in Aristotle's ethical works, arguably the most influential ever written. (shrink)

Aristotelian ethics is widely accepted by many scholars as a practical science. However, this study showed that it is not after all a practical science but a speculative or theoretical science. Having employed textual analysis on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, it was found out that eudaimonia the Highest Good/Chief Good which is the ultimate goal of Ethics is achieved not through action but through contemplation. Contemplation is the act not of the will but of intellect. Hence, the (...) highest virtue or excellence of man is the fulfilment of highest faculty which is reason in contemplation of the Chief Good. The Chief Good, which is characterized by Aristotle as final, complete, and Self-Sufficient End is not physical and concrete but rather incorporeal and abstract because such qualities cannot be found among corporeal entities. Thus, Aristotelian ethics is metaphysics; it is neither concrete nor practical. Moreover, happiness cannot be the Chief Good because happiness is merely an activity, a quality, and a disposition and an activity cannot be identified as end which is desired for its own sake. Therefore, the Chief Good must be a substance and this substance is the Final Cause/the Necessary Being which is the End of all ends and the Good of all goods. KEYWORDS: Philosophy, Aristotle, Ethics, Nicomachean Ethics, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics,Theoretical Science, Speculative Science, Descriptive Textual Analysis, Philippines. (shrink)

This article surveys the interpretations of the ethical foundations of Karl Marx’s thought. These interpretations focus on the early ideas of Marx and analyze them in the context of various traditions of moral philosophy. Aristotelian ethics is often proposed as the best model to understand the ethical foundations of Marx’s work. This article also points to the significance of Alasdair MacIntyre’s works in moral philosophy for the Aristotelian interpretation of Marx’s ethics.

Arthur Madigan's Contemporary Aristotelian Ethics examines the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, Martha Nussbaum, and Robert Spaemann in the context of twentieth-century Anglo-American moral philosophy. By surveying the ways in which these three philosophers appropriate Aristotle, Madigan illustrates two important points: first, that the most pressing problems in contemporary moral philosophy can be addressed using the Aristotelian tradition and, second, that the Aristotelian tradition does not speak with one voice. Madigan demonstrates that Aristotelian moral philosophy is (...) divided on important issues, such as the value of liberal modernity, the character and provenance of our current moral landscape, and the role of nature in Aristotle's ethics. Through his examination of MacIntyre, Nussbaum, and Spaemann, Madigan offers a vision for the future of Aristotelian moral philosophy, urging today's philosophers to set a clear educational agenda, to continue refining their concepts and intuitions, and to engage with new conversation partners from other philosophical traditions. (shrink)

By bringing together influential critics of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics and some of the strongest defenders of an Aristotelian approach, this collection provides a fresh assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of Aristotelian virtue ethics and its contemporary interpretations. Contributors critically discuss and re-assess the neo-Aristotelian paradigm which has been predominant in the philosophical discourse on virtue for the past 30 years.

A study of the relationship between the Eudemian and Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle.

First, we shall examine theoretical similarities and differences between two ethics: that of a Christian-Aristotelian Ethics as commented upon by Aquinas and Augustine and that of a Christian-Aristotelian Ethics as developed by Joseph Fletcher in his Situation Ethics. The deep similarity is that both ethics find that the highest virtue is that of love. The key difference is that for a Christian-Aristotelian Ethics developed by Aquinas and Augustine there are some actions (...) and feelings that are evil in themselves and which have no Golden Mean whereas for a Christian-Aristotelian Ethics as developed by Fletcher there are no actions which are evil in themselves. This question of whether there are actions evil in themselves is the primary reason for writing this paper. Second, we shall examine (a) the positive practice of the virtues, arguing that there is little to no practical difference between a Christian-Aristotelian ethics as developed by Aquinas and Augustine and a Christian-Aristotelian situation ethics as developed by Fletcher in the positive practice of the virtues; and we shall examine (b) the practical differences between these two ethics in deciding whether there are some actions that are evil in themselves by reflecting upon the four conditions of the principle of the double effect. The paper will conclude by favoring a Christian-Aristotelian Ethics as developed by Aquinas and Augustine. Keywords: Christian-Aristotelian Ethics, Aquinas, Augustine, Joseph Fletcher. (shrink)

Biophilia is a concept that has been much utilized as a foundation for an environmental or “land” ethic. E.O. Wilson characterizes it as a genetic disposition that links human survival to valuing living systems. J. Baird Callicott argues that human sentiments are naturally directed to all living systems and beings and this sentiment has evolutionary value. This author contends that if biophilia is to be a viable foundation for such an ethic, it must be conceived more abstractly and broadly as (...) an interconnecting feature of biotic systems. The foundation for such a conception can be found in Aristotle’s ethics, wherein his discussion of friendship, philia, can provide a theory of interspecies obligation. Although Aristotle’s focus in the Nicomachean Ethics is human relations, he makes it clear that this sentiment can be felt towards other living beings. This paper develops a broader conception of philia that includes interspecies relationships and then reconceives the modern concept of biophilia as a form of interspecies philia. It goes on to argue, using Aristotle’s theory of obligation as reciprocity within friendship, that such a re-conception of biophilia might provide another approach to founding an environmental ethic on a theory of sentiment. (shrink)

Kenny’s main subject is the interrelationship of what we know as Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and his Eudemian Ethics. His first and crucial aim is to show that the "common books," EN 5-7 = EE 4-6, belong with the EE rather than with the EN, where they are placed by all editions and translations. On the basis of this conclusion, he goes on to argue that there is no reason to accept the now-current view that the EN was written (...) after the EE rather than before it, and that once we accustom ourselves to thinking of the common books as part of the EE, we may well slough off the habit of centuries, and come to regard the EE as the authoritative and best Aristotelian treatise on ethics. (shrink)

In “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Elizabeth Anscombe makes a “disenchanting” move: she suggests that secular philosophers abandon a special “moral” sense of “ought” since she thinks this no longer makes sense without a divine law framework. Instead, she recommends recovering an ordinary sense of ought that pertains to what a human being needs in order to flourish qua human being, where the virtues are thought to be central to what a human being needs. However, she is also concerned to critique consequentialist (...) views for their rejection of absolute prohibitions. This raises the question of whether the disenchanted form of Aristotelian ethical naturalism that she recommends to secular philosophers can support such absolute prohibitions. Anscombe expresses skepticism on this point and seems ultimately to recommend a divine law ethic, at least as a supplement to a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic. This chapter takes issue with Anscombe’s view, in part: the author agrees that the disenchanted form of Aristotelian virtue ethics cannot support absolute prohibitions, but disagrees that appeal to divine law is the best way to understand these prohibitions since it misses the intrinsic reasons for them: namely, they concern that which is sacred or reverence-worthy and thus should be regarded as inviolable and as involving a “special moral ought.” This means that a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic that can properly recognize moral absolutes will need a reenchanting move: namely, it needs to recognize the special normative demands of the sacred. This chapter also explores the question of what “moral ontology” can best make sense of the moral phenomenology of the sacred, but the main aim is to show the significance of a common anti-consequentialist form of moral perception that involves a sense of the sacred. (shrink)

Nature as the source of moral ordinance in Aristotle received doubt with the publication of J. Donald Monan’s Moral Knowledge and Its Methodology in Aristotle. Arguing for an earlier versus later Aristotle, he opined for the φρόνιμος as Aristotle’s final word on the criterion for ethical right. “Normative Nature and the Moral Good in the Aristotelian Ethics” argues exegetically and on Aristotelian grounds the inaccuracy of such a view. As early as the Protrepticus, Nature as the guide (...) to proper conduct appears, a view unchanged in the later, mature Ethics. (shrink)

Neo‐Aristotelian ethical naturalists take the concept “human” to be central to practical philosophy. According to this view, practical philosophy aims at a distinctive human good that defines its subject matter. Hence, practical philosophy can survive neither the elimination of the concept nor its subsumption under a more general concept, such as that of the rational agent. The challenge central to properly formulating Aristotelian naturalism is: How can the concept of the human be specified in a way that captures (...) the distinctive role that it is supposed to play in practical philosophy? For the view to be sustained, the concept “human” as it figures in practical philosophy must not designate rationality plus a set of facts that we learn empirically about ourselves and then consider from a detached standpoint of reason. Heidegger's existential analytic offers an approach to addressing the challenge to neo‐Aristotelian naturalism and, therefore, a way of capturing the sui generis human good. I aim to show that concepts of the existential analytic in Being and Time have their origin or parallels in readings of Aristotle and that they capture the distinctive character of the being that we are, exclusively, completely, and as a unity. I argue that fundamental ontology offers a way to grasp the integral unity and irreplaceability of the human that lies at the heart of the neo‐Aristotelian project. (shrink)

This modern interpretation of Aristotelian ethics is ideally suited for undergraduate philosophy courses. It is also an engaging work for the expert and the beginner alike, offering a middle ground between existential and analytic ethics. Veatch argues for the existence of ethical knowledge, and he reasons that this knowledge is grounded in human nature. Yet he contends that the moral life is not merely one of following rules or recipes, nor is human well being something simple. Rather, (...) the moral life, which Veatch calls 'rational or intelligent living', is the life of practical wisdom where individual judgement of the particular and the contingent is paramount. Veatch's Rational Man offers a pluralistic understanding of human well being without lapsing into moral relativism. For those interested in morality and liberty, Rational Man offers fertile ground for developing an account of free and responsible persons. It has profoundly influenced the work of Den Uyl, Campbell, Machan, Miller, Mack, and many others. (shrink)

Richard Kraut argues that Neo-Aristotelian ethics should include a com­mitment to “diluted hedonism,” according to which the exercise of a developed life-capacity is good for S only if and partly because S enjoys it. I argue that the Neo-Aristotelian should reject diluted hedonism for two reasons: first, it compro­mises the generality and elegance of the initial developmentalist account; second, it leads to mistaken evaluations of some of the most important and ennobling capacities and activities in human life. (...) Finally, I argue that a more plausible ac­count of the place of pleasure in the good life derives from Aristotle’s discussion in book X of the Nicomachean Ethics: pleasure is a supervenient good that signifies the value of the underlying capacity and activity, but it is not a necessary condition for their goodness. (shrink)

For Aristotle, in making the deliberate choice to incorporate the extensive requirements of the young into the aims of one’s life, people realise their own good. In this paper I will argue that this is a promising way to think about the ethics of care and parenting. Modern theories, which focus on duty and obligation, direct our attention to conflicts of interests in our caring activities. Aristotle’s explanation, in contrast, explains how nurturing others not only develops a core part (...) of the self but also lead to an appreciation of the value of interpersonal relationships. (shrink)

Growth in human happiness seems to do in part with insights gained through attentive emotional engagement with fictional characters and their identities. For this reason it is important to pay attention to the critique that founding ethics on what we cannot but affirm of ourselves, our identity (rationality and sociability, in Nussbaum’s reading of Aristotle), amounts to a moral elitism, excluding those who fail to meet these marks of human identity. This objection throws light on the importance of the (...) shift towards thematizing ‘subjectivity’ in modern and contemporary philosophy. Ethics takes place at the level of the deliberating subject, intending the good. The foundational element is grasped through moral commitment and not at all ‘neutrally’, in a disengaged attitude alien to human aspirations – something disturbingly overlooked in much normative ethics today. The criteria picked out as essential to our humanity are clarifications of this commitment, and involve an attitude of inclusivity. In our own non-classical philosophical framework this needs spelling out, in a manner not made clear in Nussbaum’s ‘self-validating’ arguments, in terms of the exigencies of self-enactment and personal identity. This also answers critics who would disallow the conflation of identity and judgments of value. (shrink)

: How might bioethics take account of cultural diversity? Can practical wisdom of an Aristotelian sort be applied across cultures? After showing that practical wisdom involves both intellectual cleverness and moral virtue, it is argued that both these components have universality. Hence practical wisdom must be universal as well. Hellenic ethical thought neither depended on outdated theoretical notions nor limited itself to the Greek world, but was in fact developed with constant awareness of cultural differences, so it arguably works (...) as well in other times and places as when formulated. Even the eudaemonistic setting for practical wisdom is unproblematic. (shrink)

The late twentieth century has provided both reasons and occasions for reassessing just war theory as an organizing framework for the moral analysis of war. Books by G. Scott Davis, James T. Johnson, and John Kelsay, together with essays by Jeffrey Stout, Charles Butterworth, David Little, Bruce Lawrence, Courtney Campbell, and Tamara Sonn, signal a remarkable shift in war studies as they enlarge the cultural lens through which the interests and forces at play in political violence are identified and evaluated. (...) In his review of the contribution made by these texts, the author focuses on the cohesion of just war theory, the asymmetry between Christian and Islamic attitudes toward holy war, and the need to develop just war theory into a tool adequate to assist in the moral evaluation of violent conflicts within, not just between, nation-states. (shrink)