Agency is a power, but what is it a power to do? The tradition presents us with three main answers: (1) that agency is a power to affect one’s own will, consequent upon which act further events ensue, beginning with the movement of a part of one's body; (2) that agency is a power to affect one’s own body, consequent upon which act further events ensue, beginning with the movement of an object that one touches; and (3) that agency is (...) a power to affect that material upon which one brings one's action to bear---e.g. the apple one is peeling (with a knife in one's hand). These three answers correspond to three increasingly expansive conceptions of the province of human agency. I refer to them, respectively, as volitionalism, corporealism and materialism. Only the first two are seriously considered in contemporary action theory. Favoring the third, and hoping to sharpen the conflict between the third and the first, I criticize the second. Corporealism has been a popular position—arguably, the default position in the philosophy of action—since Donald Davidson’s classic paper “Agency” (1971). Although it seems to occupy a sensible middle ground between volitionalism and materialism, corporealism is, I argue, indefensible: it shares the vulnerabilities of both its two rivals, without possessing the strengths of either. Nevertheless, reflection on corporealism lights the road to materialism, which, in the end, is the only possible alternative to volitionalism. (shrink)

The debate concerning the ontological status of musical works is perhaps the most animated debate in contemporary analytic philosophy of music. In my view, progress requires a piecemeal approach. So in this article I hone in on one particular musical work concept – that of the classical Western art musical work; that is, the work concept that regulates classical art-musical practice. I defend a fictionalist analysis – a strategy recently suggested by Andrew Kania as potentially fruitful – and I develop (...) a version of such an analysis in line with a broad commitment to philosophical naturalism. (shrink)

For as long as there has been anything called “the philosophy of action,” its practitioners have accounted for action in terms of an associated kind of explanation. The alternative to this approach was noticed, but not adopted, by G. E. M. Anscombe. Anscombe observed that a series of answers to the reason-requesting question “Why?” may be read in reverse order as a series of answers to the question “How?” Unlike answers to the question “Why?”, answers to the question “How?” are (...) not explanatory of what they are about: they reveal, not reasons for doing something, but ways of doing something, and they have the form of what Aristotle called a practical syllogism. The alternative to theorizing action in terms of explanation, is, thus, to theorize it in terms calculation. In exploring this alternative, I argue for three main theses: first, that (pace Anscombe) it is not a matter of indifference whether we theorize action in terms of the question “Why?” or in terms of the question “How?”; second, that the question “Why?” is a question for an observer of action (the agent already knows the answer and can learn nothing from the inquiry), whereas the question “How?” is a question for the agent—and moreover, one that the agent must answer in order to achieve any end whatsoever—so that part of what is at stake is the standpoint from which action is to be theorized; and finally, that the standpoint of the agent, revealed by the question “How?”, is prior to that of an observer. (shrink)

This article maps existing research from 5,874 scholarly publications on social entrepreneurship (SE) utilizing scientometrics. The mapping indicates a taxonomy of five clusters: (a) the nature of SE, (b) policy implications and employment in relation to SE, (c) SE in communities and health, (d) SE personality traits, and (e) SE education. We complement the scientometric analysis with a systematic literature review of publications on SE in the Financial Times 50 list (FT50) and Business & Society and propose a multistage, multilevel (...) framework that highlights the clusters of existing research on SE based on their stage and level of analysis. This review study also helps outline a set of future research directions, including studies examining (a) the process stage at the micro-level and macro-level, (b) linkages across levels and stages, (c) linkages across stages over time or longitudinal studies, (d) SE in resource-constrained environments, (e) technological advancement and its impact on SE, (f) the types of social enterprises and their outcomes, and (g) various emerging topics in SE. (shrink)

To determine what the speaker in a cooperative dialog meant with his assertion, on top of what he explicitly said, it is crucial that we assume that the assertion he gave was optimal. In determining optimal assertions we assume that dialogs are embedded in decision problems (van Rooij 2003) and use backwards induction for calculating them (Benz 2006). In this paper, we show that in terms of our framework we can account for several types of implicatures in a uniform way, (...) suggesting that there is no need for an independent linguistic theory of generalized implicatures. In the final section, we show how we can embed our theory in the framework of signaling games, and how it relates with other game theoretic analyses of implicatures. (shrink)

Irad Kimhi considers the conundrum, first addressed by Parmenides, of how negative facts can be the case and be thought, to be the puzzle that philosophy has been working to solve since Plato and Aristotle and wants to do his part by criticizing Frege's dissociation of sense and force and developing a more Aristotelian account of judgment. Michael Della Rocca considers the conundrum a hopeless aporia that we must avoid by embracing Parmenides' radical monism of being and in a recent (...) article (“Parmenides' insight and the possibility of logic”) aims to show that Kimhi is confronted with exactly the kind of insoluble difficulties that he that finds in Frege. The present article agrees with Kimhi that we can think about what is not the case, although thinking reaches all the way to what IS the case. But Della Rocca is right that Kimhi cannot explain by virtue of what we are able to do this. The counter‐proposal says: (1) Thinking reaches to being in that we have learned to read things in the intersubjective spatial field of consciousness as model tokens of singular propositions about them. (2) Negation can be thought of because thinking has its very origin in absolute, non‐well‐founded negation. (shrink)

To determine what the speaker in a cooperative dialog meant with his assertion, on top of what he explicitly said, it is crucial that we assume that the assertion he gave was optimal. In determining optimal assertions we assume that dialogs are embedded in decision problems (van Rooij 2003) and use backwards induction for calculating them (Benz 2006). In this paper, we show that in terms of our framework we can account for several types of implicatures in a uniform way, (...) suggesting that there is no need for an independent linguistic theory of generalized implicatures. In the final section, we show how we can embed our theory in the framework of signaling games, and how it relates with other game theoretic analyses of implicatures. (shrink)

At the heart of Karl Jaspers on Truth and Dialogue is the question of the possibilities and limits of global communication. Anton Hügli shows how disastrous it is for the individual, for society, and for the destiny of humanity when the will to communicate is lacking.

It is my contention that understanding natural phenomena such as vocal mimicry can bolster theories of the evolution of language and music as well as inform evolutionary and naturalistic aesthetics more generally. In this commentary I present this phenomena as a case study in order to stimulate further aesthetic theorising.

In this paper, we attempt to provide starting points for a discussion on immediate and longer term consequences of COVID-19-induced uses of digital technologies for the distinction of the public an...

The article consists of a general introduction and two main parts, the first relating to sensory, qualitative consciousness and the second to discursive, intentional consciousness. The general thesis of the first part can be formulated like this: Humans literally overlap in their infinite spatiotemporal field of consciousness, which is one and the same for all and is only oriented differently by each individual, namely egocentrically in each case. On the basis of this common extended consciousness we can talk to each (...) other about things. In the second part, the thesis – inspired by the divergent picture theories of elementary sentences developed by the early Wittgenstein and then by Wilfrid Sellars – is argued that when we talk about things, we read them and translate them into verbal language. We read them as world-sided primordial tokens (1) of their names, (2) of phenomenal “this-such” representations of them, and (3) of various elementary sentences about them, thus treating them as objects, as Kantian intuitions and as token facts respectively. Incidentally, this result can serve to illuminate Heideg­ger’s thesis in his 1950 lecture on language that it is originally language that speaks – as the “ringing of silence” or “chiming of stillness” (“Geläut der Stille”) – and that humans have the call to speak back to language in talking to each other, i.e. to respond to the chiming of stillness. (shrink)

We present a new manifestation of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem and discuss its foundational significance, in particular with respect to Hilbert’s program. Specifically, we consider a proper extension of Peano arithmetic ( $\mathbf {PA}$ ) by a mathematically meaningful axiom scheme that consists of $\Sigma ^0_2$ -sentences. These sentences assert that each computably enumerable ( $\Sigma ^0_1$ -definable without parameters) property of finite binary trees has a finite basis. Since this fact entails the existence of polynomial time algorithms, it is (...) relevant for computer science. On a technical level, our axiom scheme is a variant of an independence result due to Harvey Friedman. At the same time, the meta-mathematical properties of our axiom scheme distinguish it from most known independence results: Due to its logical complexity, our axiom scheme does not add computational strength. The only known method to establish its independence relies on Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. In contrast, Gödel’s theorem is not needed for typical examples of $\Pi ^0_2$ -independence (such as the Paris–Harrington principle), since computational strength provides an extensional invariant on the level of $\Pi ^0_2$ -sentences. (shrink)

Partial combinatory algebras (pcas) are algebraic structures that serve as generalized models of computation. In this article, we study embeddings of pcas. In particular, we systematize the embeddings between relativizations of Kleene’s models, of van Oosten’s sequential computation model, and of Scott’s graph model, showing that an embedding between two relativized models exists if and only if there exists a particular reduction between the oracles. We obtain a similar result for the lambda calculus, showing in particular that it cannot be (...) embedded in Kleene’s first model. (shrink)

De l'apathie de l'âme humaine, ou, L'incapacité de l'âme de se sentir, et l'absence de faculté de sentir en elle, alors que notre oragnisme vivant possède ces qualités -- Sur les idées distinctes des choses qui appartiennent soit à notre âme, soit à notre corps organique vivant -- Traité de l'art de philosopher avec simplicité et précision.

In this pa per I will try to of fer a syn the sis be tween two con flict ing epistemological po si - tions on the re cent philo soph i cal scene: pos i tiv - ism, whose her i tage sur vives as the be lief that sci ence is the most gen u ine form of knowl edge, and the de fend ers of incommensur..

Papers originally presented at a symposium in Bad Homburg, Germany, in April 1993.

This article seeks to interpret how the scientific study of individualization, broadly construed, is conceived from within. It presents and discusses an analysis of qualitative data gained from performing semi-structured expert interviews. By way of a thematic-analytic approach to interpreting this data, this article seeks to investigate the attitudes and opinions of a sample of scientific experts who study individualization, across a wide range of scientific fields, with regard to key concepts, phenomena, motivating factors, and open questions. Centering its analysis (...) on discussion of four themes, this paper (1) emphasizes the importance for science of individuals and individuality, (2) reflects on matters pertaining to language and interdisciplinary communication, (3) distinguishes between nine meanings of the word “individualization,” stressing their significant features, and (4) considers ideas about the consequences of individualization and ongoing methodological concerns. (shrink)

Marxism -- Middle-class materialism -- Dietzgen -- Mach -- Avenarius -- Lenin -- The Russian revolution -- The proletarian revolution.

How Biology Shapes Philosophy: New Foundations for Naturalism. Edited By Smith David Livingstone.