Nietzsche presents a challenging conception of aesthetics. One of the most well-known discussions on this issue is presented by Heidegger in Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst. In discussing Nietzsche’s aesthetic theory, Heidegger argues that Nietzsche’s reception of Kantian aesthetics is only ever indirect and necessarily mediated by Schopenhauer. His conclusion hinges on what he considers to be a widespread misinterpretation of Kant’s theory of the beautiful, a misinterpretation that begins with Schopenhauer but characterizes all of Kant’s followers, especially Nietzsche. (...) In this paper, I will consider Nietzsche’s position toward aesthetics from a different perspective, namely in the space between Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s position. The argumentation departs from Nietzsche’s early critique of teleology; his first approaches to aesthetics in Die Geburt der Tragödie ; and his position on the concept of causality and morality. As a careful interpretation of GM III 6 will make clear, Heidegger’s claim that Nietzsche misinterprets Kant is made questionable by the fact that Nietzsche here distinguishes Kant from Schopenhauer’s approach and proposes an artist-based aesthetics in which it is rather Stendhal’s idea of beauty as “une promesse de bonheur” which expresses the human need for illusions in Nietzsche’s conception of aesthetics. (shrink)

The author sets out to present the Nothing of nihilism as the driving force behind the history of Western thought referred to as “metaphysics”. The starting points for clarifying the thesis are found in two interpretations of nihilism in the more recent scholarly literature: the understanding of nihilism as “differentiation” and as “overcoming”. The understanding of nihilism as overcoming calls for a broader examination of Nietzsche‘s interpretation of nihilism. On the one hand, the author relies on Heidegger‘s understanding of nihilism (...) and metaphysics, according to which nihilism cannot be separated from metaphysics. At the same time, she seeks to re-formulate the question about Nothing: to what extent can Nothing be phenomenologically understood as the destructive process that reflects metaphysics in its continuously changing guises as metaphysics, i.e. as the interpretative structure that continues to emerge throughout history. The Nothing thereby shows itself as a metaphysical “prerequisite” for man‘s creative power and reality as such.Die Absicht der Autorin ist es, das Nichts des Nihilismus als Antrieb der „Metaphysik“ genannten Geschichte des abendländischen Denkens aufzuzeigen. Um diese These zu erläutern, werden zwei Nihilismusdeutungen der neueren Fachliteratur, seine Auffassung als „Differenz“ und als „Überwindung“, zum Ausgangspunkt genommen. Die Auffassung des Nihilismus als Überwindung gibt Anlass zu einer umfassenderen Erläuterung von Nietzsches Nihilismusinterpretation. Sie stützt sich einerseits auf Heideggers Nihilismusund Metaphysikauffassung, wonach der Nihilismus nicht von der Metaphysik abgetrennt werden kann. Andererseits versucht sie die Frage nach dem Nichts neu zu formulieren: Inwiefern kann das Nichts phänomenologisch als derjenige Destruktionsprozess verstanden werden, der die Metaphysik in ihren immer wechselnden Masken als Metaphysik, d. h. als in der Geschichte stets zum Zuge kommende Interpretationsstruktur erweist? Das Nichts zeigt sich dabei als metaphysische „Voraussetzung“ der Schöpferkraft des Menschen und der Wirklichkeit überhaupt.Namjera autorice je pokazati ono ništa nihilizma kao pokretačku silu “metafizikom” nazvane povijesti zapadnjačkog mišljenja. U svrhu razjašnjenja te teze za polazišne točke uzimaju se dva tumačenja nihilizma u novijoj stručnoj literaturi: shvaćanje nihilizma kao “diferencije” i kao “prevladavanja”. Shvaćanje nihilizma kao prevladavanja daje povoda za obuhvatnije razjašnjenje Nietzscheove interpretacije nihilizma. Autorica se oslanja s jedne strane na Heideggerovo shvaćanje nihilizma i metafizike, prema kojemu se nihilizam ne može odijeliti od metafizike. Ujedno pokušava iznova formulirati pitanje o ničemu: u kojoj mjeri se ništa može fenomenološki razumjeti kao onaj destruktivni proces, koji metafiziku u njezinim stalno se izmjenjujućim maskama očituje kao metafiziku, tj. kao interpretativnu strukturu koja stalno izlazi na vidjelo u povijesti. Ništa se pritom pokazuje kao metafizička “pretpostavka” stvaralačke snage čovjeka i stvarnosti uopće. (shrink)