Kerr-Lawson discusses the reconstruction of knowledge Santayana undertakes in the second half of SAF. Kerr-Lawson explains Santayana’s general approach to the reconstruction, as well as his treatment of a priori knowledge, factual knowledge, and the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief.

For both Spinoza and Santayana, freedom consists in a partial autonomy (enjoyed by a few) firmly situated within a naturalistic system; this makes no appeal to indetermination (although Santayana does not embrace determinism). Both have an earnest skepticism about the reliability of the conscious will and its place in free agency. Instead, they adopt a more classical account of freedom in terms of self-knowledge and reason. Despite many differences, their accounts of freedom draw close together for those obeying the dictates (...) of reason or leading a life of reason. For both, this leads to a measure of spirituality. (shrink)

A beginning philosopher in the mid-twentieth century might encounter difficulties with each of the two main options open to him. The English speaking philosophical world is focused on language and the application of mathematical logic to arguments. While the questions that arise may be of technical interest, attempts to apply these excessively precise techniques to deal with philosophical issues seem ill chosen, and fail to come to grips with the perennial questions of philosophy. Indeed, with these techniques came the amazing (...) thesis that philosophy is unable to deal at all with many such questions. Continental European philosophy is the main alternative. It does tackle important issues, but it seems at times to rely on rhetoric and force majeure, rather than on honest consideration of opposing arguments and positions. In... (shrink)

From a review by a young Santayana of James's IThe Principles of PsychologyD, written well before IThe Life of ReasonD, are found reasons for questioning the position that only in the later years does his philosophy find its materialist ontology. His special delight is James's "tendency everywhere to substitute a physiological for a mental explanation of the phenomena of mind." Although he sees other aspects of James's metaphysics which conflict with this naturalism, it is clearly the latter which Santayana admired (...) and in some measure adopted. (shrink)