Some understand forgiveness as a normative power. Here we raise an objection to such views. They cannot explain certain instances when forgiveness is beyond our grasp. A victim of a wrong, despite thinking forgiveness is the right thing to do, and wishing she could forgive, may find herself unable to do so. No good explanation of this impossibility, consistent with forgiveness being a normative power, is available.

Here I distinguish two things jurisprudence might take itself to explain. A theory of law can be either concept-first or practice-first. Concept-first theories investigate the concept we implicitly deploy to label some things as law and not others. Practice-first theories investigate directly, and uncover interesting features of, a particular social practice. That practice could be, for instance, the practice of lawyers and officials which prevails in the United States. I identify Hershovitz's Law Is a Moral Practice with a practice-first approach. (...) Then I elaborate on the distinction and show that a practice-first approach is more defensible than many assume. Finally, I argue a practice-first approach rules out predictive theories of law. (shrink)

Perspectivalism is a popular way to understand legal obligations. That there is a legal obligation, on this view, is equivalent to there being a moral obligation from the legal perspective. But Adam Perry argues that perspectivalism cannot account for arguments going from legal premisses to a factual conclusion. Take, for instance, the premisses (i) only those over 18 have a legal right to vote and (ii) Sarah has a legal right to vote. Seemingly we should be able to arrive at (...) the valid conclusion that Sarah is over 18. Perry says perspectivalism cannot explain the validity of this conclusion. We show that it can. So his objection – that perspectivalism cannot make sense of an important feature of legal argumentation – fails. Along the way, our discussion reveals an important lesson: those who endorse perspectivalism must take care to ensure that all parts of a legal argument, both premisses and conclusions, are true according to the legal perspective. (shrink)