Sometimes two expressions in a discourse can be about the same thing in a way that makes that very fact evident to the participants. Consider, for example, 'he' and 'John' in 'John went to the store and he bought some milk'. Let us call this 'de jure' coreference. Other times, coreference is 'de facto' as with 'Mark Twain' and 'Samuel Clemens' in a sincere use of 'Mark Twain is not Samuel Clemens'. Here, agents can understand the speech without knowing that (...) the names refer to the same person. After surveying many available linguistic and pragmatic tools (intentions to corefer, presuppositions, meanings, indexing, discourse referents, binding etc.) I conclude that we must posit a new semantic primitive to account for de jure coreference. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose and defend a pair of necessary conditions on evidence-based knowledge which bear resemblance to the troubled sensitivity principles defended in the philosophical literature. We can think of the traditional principles as simple but inaccurate approximations of the new proposals. Insofar as the old principles are intuitive and used in scientific and philosophical contexts, but are plausibly false, there’s a real need to develop precise and correct formulations. These new renditions turned out to be more cautious, (...) so they won’t be able to do everything the old principled promised they could. For example, they respect closure for knowledge. But these sober formulations, or something like them, might be the best that we can do with respect to sensitivity. And there’s value in understanding the limits to these types of principles. (shrink)

En este contexto interesa preguntarse por la significación y la utilidad que puede tener hoy una conversación con los escritos de Wittgenstein. No es una pregunta que deba interesar sólo a los especialistas, sean filósofos profesionales o de otros campos científicos, sino que es una pregunta que toca los intereses de las personas en cualquiera de los ámbitos de la acción. En el contexto del giro hermenéutico en el pensamiento de Wittgenstein me propongo destacar algunos puntos que pueden dar lugar (...) a un diálogo más amplio entre el pensamiento de Wittgenstein y la hermenéutica filosófica contemporánea, tales como la relación entre los conceptos de ethos o forma de vida, logos, juego, sentido común y cotidianidad. (shrink)

La intervención de la ciudad con fines artístico-creativos en manos de colectivos o anónimos transeúntes, es una práctica cada vez más habitual en el espacio urbano. Esta pluralidad de manifestaciones, tanto icónicas como verbales, suscita ciertas controversias a la hora de nominarlas, sobre todo por tratarse de “obras” proscritas en su mayoría, por lo que su estatus artístico o literario es, a veces, discutible. A partir de la delimitación de la estructura de necesidades de algunas expresiones artísticas, en este trabajo (...) proponemos una taxonomía, basada en la lógica analógica de Jean-Marie Schaeffer, de las manifestaciones murales de tipo lúdico-textual inscritas en la ciudad. Para ello, tomamos como referentes a tres representantes vigentes de lo que llamaremos aquí, pintadas poéticas. Con este trabajo trabajo buscamos contribuir a esclarecer la ambigüedad conceptual que existe en torno a la noción de pintadas poéticas, y a revitalizar la discusión sobre el espacio urbano, el espacio virtual, la subversión y la institución artística. (shrink)

Resumen: El objeto de estudio es mostrar la relevancia de la paciencia en el pensamiento kierkegaardiano. Abordaremos, en primer lugar, los textos fundamentales donde Kierkegaard la analiza. Mostraremos seguidamente la idea que tiene sobre la paciencia el paradigma clásico de San Agustín y Santo Tomás para valorar la peculiaridad del pensamiento de Kierkegaard. Explicaremos, en tercer lugar, las características de la paciencia en relación con el tiempo, el bien, el sufrimiento, la libertad y Dios en el pensador danés. Esto nos (...) permitirá valorar su aporte y la actualidad del tema.: The purpose of the study is to show the relevance of patience in kierkegaardian thought. First of all, we will deal with the fundamental texts where Kierkegaard analyses it. We will then show the idea that the classical paradigm of St. Augustine and St. Thomas has about patience in order to assess the peculiarity of Kierkegaard's thought. Thirdly, we will explain the characteristics of patience in relation to time, good, suffering, freedom and God in the Danish thinker. This will enable us to assess his contribution and the topicality of the subject. (shrink)

Resumo: Abordamos a interpretação nietzschiana sobre “liberdade” e “necessidade” e como o filósofo contesta noções da tradição, vinculadas a essa problemática: “causa e efeito”, “sujeito”, “vontade”, etc. Ele assinala como esses conceitos seriam construtos antropomórficos que não conseguem desvendar as ações geridas apenas pela dinâmica da vontade de potência. Mostramos que Nietzsche, mesmo com sua crítica aos conceitos da tradição, continua empregando noções como “fatalidade”, “necessidade”, que parecem reeditar uma conceituação antropomórfica. Indicamos como ele ultrapassa objeções passíveis de serem feitas (...) a um pensamento oscilante, que parece negar e afirmar a liberdade. Concordamos com intérpretes que destacam como seu estilo suscita deliberadamente paradoxos e aporias, já que seu objetivo, antes que estabelecer uma doutrina ou uma teoria consolidada, visa instigar novas reflexões e experiências de pensamento sobre o agir do homem.: We address nietzschiana interpretation on the issue of freedom and necessity. We show how the German philosopher disputes notions of philosophical tradition, linked to this problem, as “cause and effect”, “subject”, “i”, “will” etc. He points how these concepts would be just anthropomorphic constructs that cannot unravel the nature of the actions; managed only by the power control game of the will of power. We show that Nietzsche, even with this radical criticism of the concepts of tradition, continues to employ notions such as “fatality”, “necessity” that seem to resend to the anthropomorphic conceptualization questioned. We indicate how the author of Zaratustra manages to overcome the objections that may be made to an oscillating thought, which sometimes seems to deny and affirm freedom at different times of his work. We agree with interpreters who point out that Nietzsche’s style deliberately chooses to raise paradoxes and apparent apores, since his goal, before establishing a doctrine or a consolidated theory about freedom and necessity, is an attempt to instigate new reflections, new thought experiences, new paths of meditation on the action of man. (shrink)

The research project of common sense or folk behavior for the specific purposes of advancing epistemology has quickly become one of the largest in experimental philosophy. This chapter explains some of this work as it relates to two positions in epistemology: contextualism and interest relative invariantism (IRI). Naturally, questions arise about the relevance of folk behavior to debates in epistemology. First, there is the dialectical issue concerning the extent to which epistemologists have in fact relied on ordinary behavior in defending (...) their theories. Second, in the cases where epistemologists have made such appeals, people can ask if they have been correct in doing so. And third, assuming correctness in this regard, there is a question about which experimental methods, if any, are pertinent for understanding folk behavior. It is taken takes for granted that epistemologists appeal to ordinary usage and that their doing so in fact informs epistemology. (shrink)

Es indudable que el inconsciente colectivo estudiado por Jung y su escuela psicoanalítica, nos ha demostrado fehacientemente que las conductas observadas y aprendidas en la infancia tanto en la familia como en la sociedad, se reproducen de manera muy similar en las generaciones jóvenes.

The article outlines the essential foundations of a phenomenology of passion. It describes the noetic correlate of the phenomenon as a concentration of the interests of existence that reverts into a condensation of self-experience. Secondly, it examines the noematic correlate as a contraction of the horizons in the totalizing figure of a world. Further, it elucidates the temporality of passion and the peculiar convergence of freedom and necessity, which is its peculiar characteristic. Finally, the relationship between passion and mystery is (...) shown. (shrink)

There are two kinds of philosophical problems in the theory of partial truth: semantical and methodological problems. The semantics of partial truth must be clarified by some standard system of multivaluedlogic. Fuzzy set theory should be applied to solve some methodological problems.

El escepticismo de Pirrón une a su condición fundadora un problema de recepción recurrente en los clásicos de la antigüedad, y presente aquí en extremo: la ausencia de textos escritos del autor. La interpretación del escepticismo como modo de vida, y no como discurso, en Michel de Montaigne y Friedrich Nietzsche, es el resultado de asumir radicalmente, aunque de formas divergentes, la tensión originaria entre escepticismo y (ausencia intencionada o no de) discurso verbal: como restitución de la paridad de palabras (...) y cosas o como privilegio de la lectura sobre la designación del texto. (shrink)

All around the world, but especially in the Third World, we are confronted by beggars who appeal to our sympathy. Most of us have no principled way to deal with the situation. Should we give to them? How much? To what purpose? We are inclined to let our momentary feelings dictate our response. Although applied ethicists have been tackling the general question of poverty in the world and what we ought to do, if anything, to alleviate it, nobody seems to (...) have taken an interest in the specific part of the general question which involves mendicity. This paper argues, firstly, that the question of our duties, if any, towards beggars demands a reasoned answer, and secondly, that careful reasoning indicates that we should channel the resources we are ready to give to beggars not tothem directly but rather to charities, for they have more and better information on who can and should be helped. (shrink)

Se establece un diálogo hermenéutico entre las concurrencias y bifurcaciones del idealismo simbólico de Cassirer y el racionalismo alado de Bachelard en tres mo mentos. Primero, a partir de indicios bio-bibliográficos se construye el contexto de significación vital donde se anclan sus respectivas ideas; segundo, se establecen entre ellos paralelismos fundamentales, y, tercero, se ofrecen ejemplos de la terminología bachelardiana, cercana a la hermenéutica simbólica contemporánea. Con ello se ex pande la comprensión de los análisis de Cassirer acerca del pensamiento (...) indirecto e interpretativo hacia las relaciones del hombre y la cultura, así como al papel del símbolo en el tránsito de la naturaleza a la cultura. (shrink)

La reciente ampliación de los BRICS al formato BRICS+ ha incorporado al club cinco nuevos estados: Irán, Arabia Saudí, Egipto, Emiratos Árabes Unidos y Etiopía. Si los cinco estados originales ya planteaban un desafío relevante al orden mundial de carácter liberal —particularmente las tres potencias regionales de Europa y Asia (Rusia, China e India) —existen importantes incertidumbres en torno al carácter potencialmente contra-normativo que este bloque de diez estados puede representar para el actual ordenamiento jurídico internacional. Los riesgos de fragmentación (...) del sistema internacional en diversos subsistemas regionales y funcionales amenazan al multilateralismo —con una reivindicación de las demandas del llamado Sur Global—, y pueden derivar en un desorden geopolítico que propicie alianzas de intereses comunes entre sistemas políticos autoritarios, nulamente interesados en la aplicación interna del marco normativo de los derechos humanos. (shrink)

There is a substantive disagreement with regard to the characterization of pre-reflective self-awareness despite the key role that is supposed to play for the distinction between conscious and unconscious states. One of the most prominent ones—between egological and non-egological views—is about the role that the subject of experience plays.I show that this disagreement falls short to capture the details of the debate, as it does not distinguish phenomenological and metaphysical disputes. Regarding the former, the contenders disagree on whether pre-reflective self-awareness (...) concerns the subject of experience or the experience itself. I first argue that such an awareness has to be indexical—de se or de mentis respectively—, and then show that de se awareness can straightforwardly address classical objec­tions against egological views, whereas de mentis awareness fails to support epistemological arguments in favor of non-egological ones. The metaphysical commitments of a phenomenologically egological view depend on what the corresponding de se awareness demands from reality. I consider two alternatives, the structural and the representational approach and offer some consid­erations in favor of the later and its prima facie neutrality with regard to the metaphysical dispute. (shrink)

I respond to comments from Branden Fitelson, Chad Gonnerman and John Waterman, and Mark Walker. My response to Fitelson concerns how we should understand the notion of “sensitivity” which is central to my account of why we find skeptical premises intuitive. I argue against his recommendation except for a specific type of “loose” skeptical hypothesis. Gonnerman and Waterman push me to say more about the conditions under which we feel or not feel the skeptical pull. I clarify and expand on (...) the theory presented in the book. Finally, Walker presents a new type of skeptical challenge. To deal with this challenge, I distinguish between two types of skeptical hypotheses, a mild and more substantial one. Walker’s skeptical argument concerns mild skepticism. My account is aimed at more substantial accounts. However, I speculate about how we may respond to this challenge. (shrink)

I selectively summarize some of the main ideas in my book Why We Doubt, focusing on the elements that are discussed in the replies from commentators. In the book, I investigated our skeptical intuitions which form the basis of the skeptic’s arguments. I argue that these intuitive judgments or inclinations to judge are produced by the deployment of a subconscious heuristic, pbs, which serves us well most of the time but misfires in esoteric cases like those associated with global skepticism. (...) I do this by identifying the rational function of pbs and arguing that when we apply this rational function to global skepticism, it doesn’t yield a skeptical result. (shrink)